THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

VKW  YORK    •   BOSTON  •   CHICAGO  •   DALLAS 
ATLANTA  •   SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limited 

LONDON  •   BOMBAY  •   CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Lm. 

TOSOKZO 


\.^\\]  ' 


THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

HISTORICAL,  CRITICAL 
CONSTRUCTIVE 


BY 

CLARENCE  AUGUSTINE  BECKWITH 

ILLINOIS   PROFESSOR  OF    CHRISTIAN    THEOLOGY,    CHICAGO 
THEOLOGICAL  SEMINARY 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

1922 
All  rights  reserved 


/  JO/ 


J3^ 


PRINTED  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA. 


Copyright,   1922, 
By  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.     Published  October,  1922. 


BROWN    BROTHERS,    LINOTYPERS 
NEW  YORK 


y 


PREFACE 

"If  you  do  not  ask  me,  I  know."  Of  no  question  of 
intimate  human  concern  is  this  more  true  than  of  the  idea 
of  God.  Since  our  earliest  childhood  we  have  been  familiar 
with  the  word  "God" :  we  were  taught  it  at  our  mother's 
knee;  we  have  uttered  it  in  the  Lord's  prayer;  it  is  the 
background  of  all  we  learned  in  the  Sunday-school;  it 
is  the  atmosphere  of  our  religious  reading  and  our  church 
life;  it  is  the  inspiration  and  support  of  our  Christian 
experience.  We  have  never  stopped  to  define  what  the 
idea  means  to  us,  but  have  taken  it  for  granted  as  we 
take  the  air,  friendship,  education,  and  democracy.  We 
have  shrunk  from  exact  definition,  since  we  preferred  to 
leave  it  in  the  region  of  feeling;  in  its  very  vagueness  lies 
much  of  its  power  to  quicken  reverence  and  awe  and  to 
appeal  to  simple  trust ;  even  if  in  this  way  God  is  removed 
far  from  us,  he  is  yet  brought  near.  In  avoiding  defini- 
tion we  have  hoped  to  escape  the  aridness  of  an  abstract 
notion  of  God  and  the  bitterness  of  controversy  over  a 
logical  concept  which  has  only  a  remote  and  equivocal 
bearing  on  religious  experience.  Moreover,  there  is  the 
feeling  that  to  drag  this  sentiment  out  from  its  reticent 
retreat  and  turn  on  it  the  cold  light  of  reason,  force  it  to 
give  an  account  of  itself  and  to  justify  its  existence  on 
pain  of  rejecting  it,  is  nothing  less  than  the  unpardon- 
able sin. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  response  to  a  legitimate  demand 
of  the  human  mind,  the  idea  of  God  has  been  made  a  sub- 


49837^ 


vi  PREFACE 

ject  of  thought  and  treated  with  profound  reverence  and 
with  all  the  resources  available  to  rational  inquiry. 
Experience,  reason,  tradition,  psychology,  metaphysics, 
the  Scriptures  and  the  mind  of  Jesus,  the  scientific  world- 
view,  history, — indeed,  every  avenue  of  approach,  every 
principle  of  interpretation  has  been  laid  under  contribu- 
tion, and  each  has  brought  its  gift  to  the  enrichment  of 
this,  the  greatest  of  all  ideas.  In  this  procedure,  then, 
we  are  not  only  following  a  natural  impulse,  but  also 
acting  under  the  sanction  and  encouragement  of  other 
"seekers  after  God." 

We  do  not  arbitrarily  go  in  search  of  our  theme  as  if 
it  were  a  matter  of  caprice  to  select  this  instead  of  some 
other  equally  indifferent  subject.  Vast  fundamental 
changes  in  every  branch  of  science — in  physics,  biology, 
history  and  psychology,  the  powerful  impact  of  present- 
day  systems  of  thought,  as  Radical  Empiricism  and  the 
New  Realism,  and  not  least  the  clothing  of  this  idea  in 
appealing  literary  form,  free  from  every  dogmatic  fetter, 
— all  of  these  present  fresh  problems  and  make  impera- 
tive a  re-interpretation  of  "the  meaning  of  God  in  human 
experience." 

This  work  aims  at  such  a  presentation  of  the  idea  of 
God  as  will  enable  it  to  function  anew  in  the  life  of  to-day. 
In  the  attempt  three  leading  interests  are  combined — ^his- 
torical, critical,  and  constructive.  Wherever  a  historical 
survey  would  elucidate  our  problem,  this  has  been  undeiv- 
taken.  Because  both  past  and  present  conceptions  of 
God  contain  many  unequal  and  discordant  elements,  these 
have  been  subjected  to  critical  inquiry  with  the  view  of 
sifting  out  such  as  are  of  permanent  validity.  And  in 
order  that  the  results  thus  reached  may  not  be  left  float- 
ing around  as  disjecta  meinbra  on  a  sea  of  thought,  they 
have  been  helped  to  form  themselves  according  to  their 


PREFACE  vii 

natural  affinities  into  the  authentic  features  of  the  Living 
God. 

The  reader  who  notes  the  absence  of  an  explicit  meta- 
physics may  console  himself  with  the  reflection,  first,  that 
the  material  required  to  make  good  such  a  deficiency 
would  necessitate  the  writing  of  another  volume,  and  sec- 
ondly, that  the  positions  of  the  present  work  are  such  as 
may  be  trusted  to  verify  themselves  in  his  religious  experi- 
ence and  to  harmonize  with  the  spiritual  element  of  the 
Scriptures  and  the  scientific  view  of  the  world. 

Finally,  the  author  would  not  extinguish  the  torch  by 
which  his  path  has  been  lighted,  but  would  hand  it  on  to 
others  that  they,  guided  by  its  flame,  may  discover  fur- 
ther and  more  precious  meanings  in  him  who  is  for  us  the 
Living  God. 

This  foreword  must  not  close  without  an  expression  of 
unmeasured  indebtedness  to  President  Ozora  Steams 
Davis  for  his  generous  encouragement  in  the  carrying  out 
of  this  task,  and  then  for  the  fact  that  he,  together  with 
Mrs.  Grace  Tinker  Davis,  in  their  cottage  at  Sunapee 
Lake  and  afterward  read  the  manuscript  of  this  book  and 
offered  suggestions  which  led  to  the  simplifying  of  some 
obscure  and  many  difficult  paragraphs.  The  author  is, 
however,  solely  responsible  for  the  judgments  herein 
expressed. 

Clarence  Augustine  Beckwith. 


Chicago  Theological  Seminary, 
6757  University  Avenue,  Chicago. 


CONTENTS 

L 

CAUSES  NECESSITATING  CHANGE   IN  THE 
IDEA  OF  GOD 

PAGE 

I.  Introduction 1 

II.  Changes  in  Other  Departments  of  Thought  .      .  5 
III.     The  Scientific  Spirit 6 

IV.     The  Changed  World-view 6 

V.     The  Newer  Theories  Concerning  the  Scriptures  8 

VI.     The  Notion  of  Authority 10 

VII.     The  Supernatural 13 

VIII.     The  Historical  Origin  of  the  Idea  of  God    .       .  16 
IX.     Fusion  of  Semitic  and  Aryan  Thought  .       .      .18 

X.     The  New  Study  of  Jesus  Christ 19 

XI.     The  Psychology  of  Religion 21 

XII.     The  Static  and  the  Dynamic  Theory  of  Reality  22 

XIII.     The  Contribution  of  Experience 23 

XIV.     The  Ethicizing  of  Theology 25 

XV.     Literary  Interest  in  the  Idea  of  God     ...  28 

XVI.     The  New  Social  Emphasis 81 

XVII.      Influence  of  the  War 34 

XVIII.     The  Revision  of  the  Theistic  Arguments       .      .  36 

XIX.     The  Notion  of  the  Trinity     ......  36 

II. 

HISTORICAL  SKETCH  OF  THE   IDEA  OF  GOD 

I.     Introduction 38 

II.  The  Hebrew  and  Greek  Conception  of  God  .       .  38 

III.  The  Early  Christian  Centuries 42 

IV.     Augustine 48 

ix 


:  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

V.  The  Scholastic  Period 62 

VI.  Beginnings  of  the  Modern  Era 64 

VII.  The  Nineteenth  Century 67 

VIII.  The  Idea  of  God  and  Experience     ....  61 

ni. 

PRESENT-DAY  CONCEPTIONS  OF  GOD 

I.  Introduction 64 

II.  God  as  Finite 69 

III.  The  Social  Approach 73 

IV.  The  New  Realism 76 

V.  God  as  Immanent 78 

VI.  Christ  and  the  Spirit  Substituted  for  God    .      .      80 

VII.  Values  Enshrined  in  the  Idea  of  God     .      .      .81 

VIII.  God  in  Christian  Science 87 

IX.  A  Questionnaire  on  the  Idea  of  God  ....      90 

IV. 

THE  THEISTIC  ARGUMENTS— IN  GENERAL 

I.  Introduction 93 

II.  Hebrew  and  Greek  Thought 93 

III.  Anselm 97 

IV.  Hume 98 

V.  Kant     . 100 

VI.  The  Common  English  and  American  Doctrine  102 

VII.  Hegelian   Idealism 106 

VIII.  The  Pragmatic  Conception 109 

IX.  Summary  and  Criticism Ill 

V. 

THE  IDEA  OF  GOD  AND  THE  DOCTRINE 
OF  CAUSE 

I.     Introduction 116 

II.     The  Common  and  the  Scientific  World- View    .    116 


CONTENTS  xi 

PAOE 

III.  The  Doctrine  of  Cause 118 

IV.  Relation  of  the  Human  Consciousness  to  Crea- 

tion         120 

V.     Relation  of  the  Idea  of  God  to  Creation  .      .        121 
VI.     An  Eternal  Creative  Process  and  Salvation     .    123 

VI. 

THE  IDEA  OF  GOD  AND  THE  DOCTRINE 
OF  ENDS 

I.  Introduction 127 

II.  Sketch  of  Teleology 129 

III.  Place  of  Teleology  in  Animal  and  Human  Life  134 

IV.  Bearing  of  Teleology  on  the  Idea  of  God  .      .  138 
V.  Purposive  Activity  and  Consciousness   .       .      .  141 

VI.     "Hit  or  Miss/'  "Trial  and  Error"  Method  in 

Nature 146 

VII.      Plan  in  the  Universe 161 

VIII.     The  Immanent  Tendency  to  Development       .  155 

VII. 

THE  IDEA  OF  GOD  IN  RELATION  TO  EVIL 

I.  Co-existence  of  God  and  Evil 166 

II.  Experience  and  Evil 168 

III.  Evil  as  Occasion  of  Sympathy  and  Social  Serv- 
ice   173 

IV.  Evil  in  a  Good  World 177 

V.  Evil  and  the  Idea  of  God 181 

VI.  Moral  Evil  and  the  Overcoming  of  It  .      .      .184 

VIII. 
MORAL  VALUES  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

I.     Introduction       ...  191 

II.     The  Question  of  Values 192 

III.     God  in  Terms  of  Value 196 


xii  CONTENTS 


IV.     Values  and  the  Psychology  of  Religion      .      .197 
V.     The    Idea   of   God    and   the    Consciousness    of 

Values 199 

VI.     Relation  of  Value-Judgments  to  Reality     .      .    200 

IX.  . 

THE  FINITE  AND  THE  INFINITE 

I.  Introduction 206 

II.  Dilemma  of  God  as  Infinite 207 

III.  God    as    Finite 209 

IV.  Value  and  Happiness  in  Relation  to  God    .      .211 

V.     More  Recent  Presentations 214 

VI.     "Infinite"  as  Applied  to  God 221 

,X. 

THE  ABSOLUTE  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

I.     The  Metaphysical  Approach 226 

II.  The  Ethical  Argument  for  the  Absolute       .      .  239 

III.  Pragmatic  pluralism  and  the  Absolute  .      .      .  242 

IV.  God  and  the  Absolute 244 

XL 

TRANSCENDENCE  AND  IMMANENCE 

I.     Introduction       ...  262 

II.  The  Theological  Conception  of  Transcendence  253 

III.  The  Mystical  Idea  of  Transcendence   .      .      .    267 

IV.  The  Philosophical  View  of  Transcendence      .    269 
V.  Forms  of  the  Doctrine  of  Immanence    .      .      .    260 

VI.     Revaluation  of  Transcendence  and  Immanence  266 

XIL 

THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD 

I.     Introduction 273 

II.     Inherent  Difficulties  in  the  Term  "Person"       .    273 


CONTENTS  xiii 

PAGE 

III.  Person  and  Personality 278 

IV.  The  Naive  Approach  to  Personality     .      .      .  280 
V.     Personality  and  the  Absolute 282 

VI.     Primacy  of  the  Will  and  the  Absolute  .      .      .  284 

VII.     God  as  Super-personal 289 

VIII.     God  as  the  Perfect.  Personality       ....  293 

IX.     The  Personality  of  God  and  Purposive  Ends  .  296 

XIII. 
THE  LIVING  GOD 

I.     Introduction 802 

II.     The  Idea  of  God  a  Postulate  of  Faith  ...  303 

III.     The  Living  God  as  a  Simplifying  Conception  .  310 

IV.     The  Tension  Between  Justice  and  Mercy  .      .316 

V.     The  Idea  of  God  as  Related  to  Prayer     .      .  322 

VI.     Co-operation  with  the  Divine  Good  Will     .      .  328 

VII.     The  Great  Comforter 332 


THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 


CAUSES  NECESSITATING  CHANGE 
IN  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 


Until  recently  the  idea  of  God  has  been  regarded  as 
among  the  most  permanent  and  unchanging  of  all  human 
conceptions.  This  idea  as  defined  by  the  Council  of 
Nicaea  in  SS5  A.  D.,  seemed  destined  to  perpetual  valid- 
ity. Later  the  so-called  Athanasian  Creed  elaborated 
with  infinite  refinement  the  definitions  of  the  Nicaeno- 
Constitanopolitan  Creed  and  demanded  assent  to  the 
dogma  on  pain  of  eternal  damnation.  It  thus  became  the 
comer-stone  of  the  great  systems  of  theology;  it  pro- 
vided the  keynote  of  sermons  by  celebrated  divines;  it 
was  accepted  as  final  by  the  vast  majority  of  Christian 
believers,  whether  Greek  Orthodox,  Roman  Catholic,  or 
Protestant;  and  even  now  Jewish  theologians  regard  this 
dogma  as  the  authentic  and  irreformable  word  of  Chris- 
tian teaching  about  God.  This  conception  has  not  main- 
tained itself  without  challenge  from  various  quarters, 
especially  from  metaphysics  and  ethics.  Its  metaphysical 
basis  was  most  seriously  called  in  question  by  Spinoza, 
Kant  and  Hegel.  The  ethical  objection  came  from  the 
Socinians,  and  later  the  Unitarians  and  Universalists. 
Yet  in  spite  of  these  criticisms,  any  one  of  which  if  it 
had  prevailed  would  have  profoundly  modified  the  tradi- 
tional doctrine  of  God,  the  official  dogma  remained  for 
the  most  part  unaffected  by  these  and  other  influences. 
It  was  felt  to  be  so  entrenched  in  tradition,  so  fortified 

1 


^  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

by  impregnable  arguments,  so  much  at  home  in  the  senti- 
ments of  the  common  people,  so  essential  to  the  welfare  of 
the  church,  that  it  appeared  to  be  destined  to  last  as  long 
as  human  life  on  the  globe.  It  has  been  assumed  that 
whatever  changes  took  place  in  any  other  department 
of  man's  life,  the  form  of  this  dogma  would  persist 
inviolate  to  the  latest  time. 

Two  considerations,  however,  invalidate  such  an  ex- 
pectancy. The  first  arises  from  the  fact  that  the  tradi- 
tional idea  of  God  was  the  product  of  conditions  of  the 
time  in  which  it  appeared.  Those  who  formulated  the 
ancient  doctrine  did  so  under  the  assured  conviction  that 
they  were  putting  into  authoritative  and  permanent  form 
only  that  which  had  been  given  by  divine  revelation;  all 
later  additions  to  the  definition,  so  far  as  these  have  been 
sanctioned  by  the  church,  have  been  supposed  to  be  coined 
from  the  same  divine  deposit  of  truth.  There  are,  how- 
ever, constituent  elements  of  this  dogma  which  have  no 
other  source  than  the  consciousness  of  the  time.  These 
elements  are  derived  in  part  from  political  ideals,  in  part 
from  ethical  beliefs,  in  part  from  the  prevailing  philoso- 
phy, and  in  part  from  the  peculiar  rehgious  experience  of 
those  who  formulated  the  dogma.  Accordingly,  the 
dogma  can  be  dated  by  an  analysis  of  its  contents  and 
comparison  of  these  with  the  ruling  ideas  of  the  time. 
Historically  every  doctrine  represents  two  functions: 
first,  to  unify  and  express  the  social  ideals  and  customs  of 
an  age,  so  far  as  these  bear  on  the  subject  at  hand, — ^it 
becomes  thus  an  incarnation ;  secondly,  in  its  precision  of 
statement,  to  condemn  and  set  aside  competing  tendencies 
which  are  struggling  for  the  mastery.  This  is  the  more 
evident  according  as  the  idea  is  greater  and  the  interests 
involved  in  it  more  absorbing  and  influential.  At  no 
moment  in  the  history  of  the  Christian  church  has  a  single 


CAUSES  NECESSITATING  CHANGE  8 

idea  meant  so  much  or  drawn  to  itself  so  many  elements 
of  the  prevailing  thought  and  life  of  the  time  as  when 
the  Nicene  doctrine  of  God  was  formulated.  And  if  the 
historical  conditions  of  which  it  was  the  exponent  could 
have  continued  unchanged,  it  would  have  remained  a  fixed 
and  changeless  dogma,  adapted  to  the  permanent  intel- 
lectual and  religious  needs  of  the  church.  That  the  dogma 
has  persisted  for  so  long  a  time  bears  witness  to  its  great- 
ness and  to  the  fact  that  social  and  other  conditions  have 
until  a  comparatively  recent  period  suffered  no  radical 
change. 

The  second  consideration  is  that  since  the  idea  of  God 
is  functional  and  conditions  have  arisen  far  different  from 
those  in  the  early  centuries,  we  must  expect  a  correspond- 
ing change  in  this   idea.     In  the  following  paragraphs 
some  of  these  changes  will  be  indicated.     Meantime  we 
need  to  remind  ourselves  that  an  attempt  so  to  define  the 
idea  of  God  as  to  keep  it  wholly  aloof  from  the  modem 
view  of  the  world  is  to  place  it  in  extreme  jeopardy.     All 
the  sciences  have  been  born  since  the  fourth  century,  and 
have  changed  the  meaning  of  the  universe  for  all  thought- 
ful men.     The  social  order  has  undergone  profound  modi- 
fication.    The  simple  fact  is  that  the  Nicene  idea  of  God 
does  not  interpret  the  world  to  the  modem  man ;  between 
that  idea  and  the  world  of  to-day  is  an  impassable  gulf. 
If  the  alternative    is  either  that  idea  of  God  unmodified 
or  none,  then  the  conclusion  must  be — no  God.     Such  an 
idea  cast  in  irreformable  dogma  is  the  greatest  possible 
encouragement  to  atheism.     For  several  years  now  the 
difficulties  of  this  position  have  steadily  increased.     Men 
have  been  stigmatized  as  unbelievers,  sceptics,  or  atheists, 
not  on  the  ground  that  they  repudiated  all  reference  to  a 
Power  in  the  universe  higher  than  themselves, — no  one 
has  ever  held  such  a  view, — but  solely  because  they  could 


4  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

not  reconcile  their  thought  of  the  universe  with  the  com- 
mon dogmatic  definition  of  God.  Moreover,  additions 
to  the  idea  of  God  have  been  made  by  theologians,  so  that 
in  successive  generations  these  newer  ideas  have  become 
an  integral  part  of  accredited  orthodoxy.  It  has  even 
happened  that  although  the  basic  portion  of  the  earlier 
conception  was  retained,  yet  the  additions,  as  in  Calvin- 
ism, when  judged  by  ethical  standards,  were  even  more 
objectionable  than  the  original  elements. 

If  the  idea  of  God  could  have  received  final  statement 
in  the  fourth  century,  it  is  the  only  idea  of  the  human 
mind  of  which  this  may  be  said.  An  idea,  no  matter  in 
.what  field,  which  has  ceased  to  grow  is  either  moribund 
or  dead.  Those  who  betray  greater  anxiety  to  preserve 
the  exact  form  of  the  ancient  definition  of  God  than  to 
find  the  meaning  of  it  in  the  changing  conditions  of  each 
new  day,  treat  it  as  if  it  were  safe  only  when  mummified, 
shut  away  from  light  and  air,  bound  fast  in  the  grave- 
clothes  of  tradition.  Whereas  this  idea  is  the  most  vital 
and  energetic,  the  most  changeable  and  yet  the  most 
enduring,  the  most  susceptible  to  external  influence  and 
the  most  capable  of  varied  statement — always  partial  but 
always  suggestive — of  all  the  ideas  of  men.  There  is  no 
cause  for  alarm  that  this  ide&,  has  been  taken  down  from 
its  pillared  security  and  subjected  to  the  same  analytic 
scrutiny,  the  same  impartial  judgment,  the  same  liability 
to  revision  which  has  marked  the  consideration  of  economic 
and  other  social  problems.  In  these  latter  fields  immeas- 
urable progress  has  been  made;  theories  having  the  sanc- 
tion of  immemorial  and  undivided  tradition,  shown  to  be  no 
longer  tenable,  have  given  place  to  others  which  more 
fully  interpret  our  modem  world.  And  we  have  a  right 
to  expect  a  similar  result  with  reference  to  the  idea  of 
God.    In  any  case  no  change  which  could  come  to  it  would 


CAUSES  NECESSITATING  CHANGE  5 

be  as  dangerous  as  keeping  it  apart  from  the  thought  and 
experience  of  the  modem  spirit. 


II 

If  now  we  inquire  what  are  the  causes  which  impel  to  a 
restatement  of  the  idea  of  God,  we  may  discover  some  of 
them  in  the  following  conditions,  to  a  consideration  of 
which  the  remainder  of  this  section  will  be  devoted. 
There  is  first  the  impulse  from  the  changed  views  which 
have  taken  place  in  all  other  departments  of  human  inter- 
est. There  is  not  a  single  subject  on  which  the  content 
of  men's  thought  remains  the  same  as  it  was  no  longer 
than  fifty  years  ago.  To  feel  the  force  of  this  sugges- 
tion one  would  have  only  to  pass  in  rapid  survey  a  few 
of  the  great  outstanding  judgments  and  beliefs  of  that 
time.  The  point  of  view,  the  instruments  of  investiga- 
tion, the  method  of  inquiry,  the  things  sought  for  and 
discovered,  the  particular  interests  involved,  all  are  dif- 
ferent. And  when  we  come  to  religious  questions,  the 
same  is  true.  Of  the  historic  doctrines  of  the  church, 
aside  from  the  idea  of  God,  not  one  but  has  undergone 
redefinition — inspiration,  revelation,  the  Scriptures,  au- 
thority, creation,  providence,  the  supernatural,  sin,  the 
person  and  work  of  Christ,  conversion,  prayer,  the  world 
to  come.  This  fact  creates  a  strong  presumption  and 
expectancy  that  a  corresponding  change  wiU  mark  the 
present-day  idea  of  God. 

Ill 

We  have  to  recognize  the  dominance  of  the  scientific 
spirit  as  compared  with  the  spirit  which  prevailed  during 


6  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

the  period  when  the  idea  of  God  was  formulated.  The 
scientific  spirit  is  marked  by  certain  characteristic  ten- 
dencies and  habits.  Its  approach  to  reality  is  through 
observation  and  experiment.  It  relies  upon  inductive  veri- 
fication. All  questions  which  involve  human  beliefs,  cus- 
toms, and  ideals  are  subjected  to  historical  inquiry.  In 
no  field  of  interest  is  this  method  more  fruitful  than  in 
the  study  of  religion  and  the  contents  of  dogma.  These 
I  are  traced  through  the  various  stages  of  their  development 
to  their  sources,  in  order  to  discover  the  permanent  and 
unchanging  elements  in  their  multiplicity  of  forms.  Here 
the  whole  question  of  authority  has  to  be  reviewed  and 
revised.  No  scientific  man  thinks  of  wholly  rejecting 
authority  in  his  search  for  truth;  he  simply  modifies  its 
meaning.  Instead  of  yielding  assent  to  a  position  on  the 
ground  that  this  has  been  demanded  by  a  body  of  men, 
he  first  assures  himself  that  they  are  reliable  witnesses 
of  that  to  which  they  testify ;  and  his  assent  is  qualified 
by  the  reservation  that  the  conclusions  are  subject  to 
verification  and  revision.  He  is  thus  committed  to  the 
attitude  of  historical  criticism,  in  the  light  of  which  it  is 
seen  that  no  belief  retains  its  validity  unchanged  through 
i  perpetual  generations.  The  presumption  is  thus  created 
I  that  a  doctrine  such  as  the  idea  of  God,  which  originated 
I  in  modes  of  thought  alien  to  the  modem  scientific  spirit 
I  and  world-view,  requires  restatement,  in  order  to  become 

%  acceptable  to  the  scientific   temper  and  intelligence  of 

to-day. 

IV 

A  changed  view  of  the  world  cannot  fail  to  influence 

1  our  idea  of  God.     The  traditional  idea  was   connected 

with  certain  conceptions  of  the  world  which  are  no  longer 


CAUSES  NECESSITATING  CHANGE  7 

possible  to  us.  The  world,  for  example,  originated  in 
an  absolute  creative  act,  due  to  an  instantaneous  divine 
fiat.  All  the  various  orders  of  existence,  especially  living 
beings,  were  created  in  their  present  forms,  fixed  and 
incapable  of  transmutation.  The  Ptolemaic  astronomy 
provided  the  setting  for  the  relation  of  the  earth  as  cen- 
tral not  only  to  the  solar  system  but  to  the  rest  of  the 
finite  universe.  As  the  world  had  an  absolute  beginning, 
so  it  was  to  have  an  absolute  end.  God  was  free  to  create 
or  not  to  create,  and  free  at  any  moment  to  withdraw 
his  sustaining  power,  in  which  contingency  the  world 
would  sink  into  nothingness ;  his  power  was  also  unlimited 
in  respect  to  every  single  thing,  to  allow  it  to  exist  as  it 
is  or  arbitrarily  to  change  it.  While  therefore  the  world 
was  utterly  dependent  on  God,  he  was  in  no  sense 
dependent  on  the  world.  His  inner  (Trinitarian)  life 
remained  wholly  unaffected  by  the  creation. 

If  anything  in  the  world  appeared  to  oppose  God,  this 
was  referred  not  to  a  property  inherent  in  it,  but  solely 
to  the  limitation  which  God  before  the  origination  of  it 
saw  fit  to  impose  upon  his  own  action.  In  view  of  the 
fact,  on  the  one  hand,  that  in  the  nature  of  the  world 
as  we  know  it,  there  is  not  a  single  thing  which  argues 
for  an  absolute  beginning  of  Its  existence, — ^and  "revela- 
tion" is  silent  concerning  this, — and,  on  the  other  hand, 
that  there  is  the  same  reason  for  assuming  that  the  ulti- 
mate constituents  of  being  are  eternal  as  there  is  for 
holding  that  anything  exists  now,  the  idea  of  God  begins 
to  take  on  a  very  dIflFerent  character.  There  are  also 
certain  realities  which  lie  wholly  beyond  the  region  of 
possible  creation,  which  are  by  their  very  nature  change- 
less and  eternal,  as,  for  example,  time  and  space,  num- 
ber, the  principles  of  logic,  and  also  the  principles  of 
change.      Nor  must  we  here  overlook   the  evolutionary 


8  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

doctrine  of  the  world,  which  holds  that  the  entire  process 
of  development  is  to  be  referred  to  resident  forces,  operat- 
ing according  to  ascertainable  fixed  laws,  implying,  if  at 
all,  a  vastly  different  divine  activity  from  that  which  tra- 
dition alleges.  Moreover,  there  is  evil  in  the  world  which 
is  no  less  inherent  and  indestructible  in  it  than  is  good- 
ness ;  this  which  does  not  originate  by  divine  permission  is 
not  to  be  overcome  by  divine  power.  Furthermore,  when 
we  consider  personality  and  the  social  aspect  of  the  world 
we  become  aware  of  the  serious  limitations  set  by  these  to 
the  power  of  God.  The  naive  notion  of  him  revealed  in 
the  beautiful  story  of  the  Garden  of  Eden  is  unworkable 
and  out  of  place  in  relation  to  conditions  of  modem  civic 
and  industrial  communities. 


The  present-day  use  of  the  Scriptures  opens  a  way  to 
a  changed  view  of  God.  The  Bible  is  no  longer  equivalent 
to  a  treatise  on  systematic  theology  from  which  one  may 
cull  proof-texts  to  substantiate  and  expound  doctrinal 
positions.  Instead  of  this,  the  writings  which  are  here 
brought  together  under  one  cover  represent  the  progres- 
sive ideals  and  achievements  of  the  Hebrew  people  under 
the  most  varied  conditions.  If  we  confess  that  it  contains 
for  us  the  final  standard  of  faith  and  practice,  this  must 
mean  not  that  it  offers  a  logical  and  ultimate  form  of 
belief  on  all  matters  affecting  our  life,  but  rather  that 
the  principles  and  aims  which  are  fundamental  in  it  are 
permanently  valid  for  the  highest  and  farthest  reaches  of 
individual,  social,  and  religious  life.  We  cannot,  how- 
ever, without  further  ado  find  in  the  Scriptures  our  final 
idea  of  God.     For  we  should  have  first  to  inquire  which 


CAUSES  NECESSITATING  CHANGE  9 

of  the  many  ideas  there  presented  is  to  be  received.  It 
could  not  be  precisely  that  of  Moses  or  of  the  Judges,  or 
of  David,  or  the  prophets,  or  of  Paul,  or  even  of  Jesus, 
and  that  too  for  several  reasons.  (1)  While  each  of  these 
ideas  of  God  was  in  turn  adequate  for  the  particular 
period  in  which  it  appeared,  it  became  progressively 
insufficient  for  later  conditions.  (2)  It  is  impossible  for 
any  generation  to  push  back  its  thought-forms  into  the 
exact  molds  of  any  preceding  time,  and  this  is  especially 
true  of  two  ages  so  dissimilar  as  the  first  and  the  twen- 
tieth centuries  of  the  Christian  era.  (3)  Since  every 
idea  assumes  a  definite  content  as  it  functions  for  a  given 
condition,  under  different  conditions  the  idea  will  neces- 
sarily undergo  serious  modification.  No  idea  of  God 
which  arises  under  historical  conditions  is  permanently 
valid  for  the  rational  and  religious  consciousness. 

Even  if  we  supposed  that  the  idea  of  God  was  given  by 
revelation,  this  would  not  solve  our  problem.  For  on  this 
supposition  the  different  ideas  of  God  in  the  Scriptures 
would  have  to  be  referred  to  revelation,  and  since  all 
of  these  would  have  to  be  ascribed  equally  to  revelation, 
we  would  be  left  without  a  criterion  by  which  to  judge 
which  was  binding  on  us.  Again,  even  assuming  revela- 
tion as  the  source,  we  know  of  no  revelation  which  is  not 
historically  conditioned.  We  would  accordingly  be  unable 
to  distinguish  ideas  which  owe  their  origin  to  revelation 
and  those  which  emerge  in  the  personal  and  social  devel- 
opment of  consciousness.  Moreover,  the  Scriptures  them- 
selves make  no  claim  to  finality  but  point  beyond  them- 
selves to  other  times,  to  richer  experiences,  and  to  further 
disclosures  of  God  for  the  meaning  of  life.  The  ideas, 
instead  of  being  full-grown  and  rigid — an  arrested  devel- 
opment— ^having  therefore  exhausted  their  initial  impulse, 
are  on  the  contrary  germinant,  with  all  the  marks  of  a 


10  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

living  organism;  they  are  continually  changing,  with 
exhaustless  adaptability  to  circumstances,  capacity  of 
self-renewal,  with  a  certain  directive  control  over  the  raw 
material  of  experience  for  self-maintenance,  and  suscepti- 
bility to  certain  varieties  of  stimulus  by  which  they  take 
on  different  forms.  The  ideals  of  the  Hebrew  religion 
are  consciously  incomplete,  the  New  Testament  looks  for- 
ward to  a  further  unfolding  of  the  meaning  of  its  faith 
in  which  God  will  appear  in  yet  more  glorious  revelation 
of  his  creative  will.  Already  to  their  simple  idea  of  him, 
derived  from  the  prophets,  Jesus,  and  their  own  limited 
experience,  the  apostles  began  to  add  material  from  Greek 
and  other  sources,  and  so  opened  the  door  for  still  further 
assimilation  and  enrichment.  They  seem  not  to  have 
reflected  upon  what  was  involved  in  this  process,  which 
was  indeed  inevitable.  But  they  were  radically  right  in 
their  central  conviction  that  the  deepest  and  most  perma- 
nent need  of  humanity  is  justice,  love,  forgiveness,  purity 
of  heart,  sympathy,  peace,  loyalty,  and  that  wherever 
these  are,  there  God  is  and  is  essentially  defined  by  them. 
To  these  moral  qualities,  properties  of  a  metaphysical 
nature  were  added,  and  a  sanction  was  therefore  provided 
for  further  accretions  which  were  certain  to  follow  from 
contact  with  other  types  of  rational  religious  thought* 


VI 


A  transformation  of  the  notion  of  authority  involves  a 
change  in  the  idea  of  God.  As  long  as  authority  was 
conceived  of  as  external,  the  only  hope  for  a  change  in 
the  idea  of  God  lay  in  the  possibility  that  the  leaders  of 
the  churches  might  revise  their  doctrine  and  send  it  forth 
under  the  same  sanction  which  attended  the  earlier  dog- 


CAUSES  NECESSITATING  CHANGE  11 

mas.  Such  a  hope  was,  however,  destined  to  be  unrealized. 
Now  by  far  the  vast  majority  of  Christian  believers  in  the 
world — the  Greek,  Roman  Catholic,  most  of  the  Lutheran, 
many  Episcopalian,  and  indeed  great  numbers  of  other 
churches — ^hold  a  doctrine  of  God  which  in  itsi  essential 
features  is  practically  identical  with  that  in  existence 
fifteen  hundred  years  ago.  Essential  to  this  position  are 
peculiar  conceptions  of  revelation,  reason,  faith,  and  the 
autocratic  right  to  impose  beliefs.  (1)  Revelation  is 
regarded  as  a  miraculous  communication  of  truth  to 
which  the  recipient  brings  only  a  passive  acquiescence. 
Since  the  content  of  revelation  transcends  the  capacity  of 
the  human  mind  to  discover,  it  comprises  mysteries  which, 
if  they  do  not  contradict  what  is  held  to  be  true  in  other 
regions  of  thought,  and  in  certain  instances  even  if  they 
do  contradict,  are  to  be  accepted.  While  it  is  conceded 
that  some  knowledge  of  God  may  be  had  from  the  order 
and  ends  in  nature,  from  history,  and  from  the  moral 
consciousness,  yet  the  chief,  the  ultimate  reliance  is  placed 
on  revelation.  On  the  other  hand,  the  official  doctrine  of 
God  contains  elements  which  can  by  no  possibility  be 
justified  by  any  theory  of  knowledge,  as,  for  example,  the 
metaphysical  affirmations  concerning  the  inner  Trini- 
tarian life;  these,  therefore,  if  their  validity  were  ques- 
tioned, would  have  to  be  referred  to  revelation.  (2)  In 
harmony  with  this  notion  of  revelation,  the  reason  is  con- 
ceived of  as  an  instrument  not  for  arriving  at  the  highest 
knowledge  of  God,  but  for  dealing  with  secondary  mat- 
ters, for  judging  of  the  credentials  of  a  supposed  revela- 
tion, and  for  arranging  in  logical  order  the  truths  thus 
communicated.  (3)  Accordingly,  faith  is  an  attitude  of 
mind  to  which  the  revelation  is  addressed — waiting,  pas- 
sive, receptive.  Since  the  revelation  is  enshrined  in  dogma, 
faith  becomes  assent  to  propositional  notions.    (4)  Going 


12  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

along  with  tliis  is  the  unquestioned  trustworthiness  which 
belongs  to  the  Scriptures,  to  the  decisions  of  councils,  and 
to  the  prestige  of  great  names.  This  entire  point  of  view 
is  well  summed  up  as  follows :  "There  must  be  some  cen- 
tral authority  whose  duty  it  is  to  lay  down  the  broad 
lines  along  which  and  within  which  those  who  wish  to  be 
in  a  state  of  salvation  may  travel."  ^ 

The  notion  of  authority  has,  however,  undergone  a 
radical  change.  It  has  been  shifted  to  an  inner  court. 
It  has  emancipated  the  individual  conscience  from  ecclesi- 
astical control.  It  holds  to  the  self-evidencing  power  of 
truth.  It  appeals  to  the  subjective  as  well  as  to  the  col- 
lective judgment  of  men.  While  it  adheres  to  the  social 
aspect  of  authority,  it  finds  the  meaning  of  this  in  the 
fact  that  if  truth  has  been  already  arrived  at  by  a  few, 
yet  this  is  equally  open  to  the  experience  and  justification 
of  all  others.  It  consecrates  the  findings  of  scientific  men, 
providing  material  for  the  idea  of  God  which  is  no  less 
valid  than  the  decisions  of  councils  solemnly  affirmed  by, 
accredited  theologians. 

According  to  this  view,  there  are  many  aspects  of 
authority:  the  authority  of  history,  the  authority  of 
experience,  the  authority  of  the  purposive  ideal,  the 
authority  of  the  rational  judgment,  the  authority  of 
moral  values,  and  the*  authority  of  religious  yearnings. 
In  this  light  several  new  meanings  become  clear.  Reve- 
lation is  a  disclosure  of  the  purpose  of  God  through  the 
interpretation  of  history  and  experience  and  social  well- 
being.  Reason  is  the  power  and  the  only  power  by  which 
the  meaning  of  the  divine  will  is  ascertained  and  formu- 
lated. Faith  is  not  static,  as  assent  to  propositional 
statements,  but  is  dynamic  and  teleological,  surrender  to 


*  F.  W.  Wormley,  The  Theology  of  the  Church  of  England,  p.  84. 


CAUSES  NECESSITATING  CHANGE  13 

the  ideal  as  this  authenticates  itself  in  consciousness.  So 
radical  a  change  in  the  elements  which  are  involved  in 
authority  cannot  but  impel  to  a  corresponding  change 
in  the  idea  of  God, — a  change  which  shall  represent  the 
free  and  boundless  movement  of  the  human  spirit  in  its 
search  for  the  Ultimate  Reality. 


VII 


The  idea  of  God  is  subject  to  further  change  through 
a  redefinition  of  the  supernatural.  The  conception  of 
the  supernatural  has  a  long  and  significant  history.  From 
its  earliest  appearance  in  consciousness  on  into  present- 
day  theism  it  has  undergone  so  many  modifications  that 
we  can  with  difficulty  detect  traces  of  the  earlier  in  tlie 
latest  view.  Yet  with  diminishing  emphasis  the  charac- 
teristic feature  has  persisted:  the  absolute  freedom  of  the 
divine  power  and  its  superiority  to  the  forces  of  the  world  ^ 
in  which  it  operates.  In  earlier  times  this  divine  power 
was  conceived  of  as  acting  with  pure  unhindered  arbitrari- 
ness,— a  point  of  view  which  still  survives  in  the  doctrine 
of  the  absolute  sovereignty  and  predestination  of  God; 
yet  gradually  the  scope  of  its  manifestation  has  been  nar- 
rowed until  now  it  has  nearly  reached  the  vanishing  point. 
Its  functioning  has  been  variously  defined.  It  has,  for 
example,  been  brought  into  play  to  account  for  great 
moments  in  the  history  of  our  world,  as  the  creation,  the 
beginning  of  life,  the  origination  of  consciousness,  and  the 
appearance  of  the  moral  consciousness  in  man.  It  has 
also  been  requisitioned  in  connection  with  miracles  and 
answers  to  prayer.  According  to  some  thinkers,  miracles 
have  been  restricted  to  Old  Testament  and  apostolic  times ; 
accordingly,  all  ,sO'Called  ecclesiastical  miracles  occurring 


14  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

since  the  last  of  the  apostles  are  stigmatized  as  counter- 
feit. Others  maintain  that,  although  the  supernatural 
continues  to  manifest  itself  in  miracles  and  answers  to 
prayer,  yet  these  must  be  comparatively  few,  lest  their 
too  great  frequency  destroy  our  belief  in  the  order  of 
nature  and  the  uniformity  of  the  divine  action;  in  any 
case,  even  if  God  does  not  interfere,  his  power  to  do  so  is 
strenuously  upheld.  Owing  to  the  pressure  of  modem 
thought,  defenders  of  the  supernatural  have  been  divided 
into  two  camps.  One,  recognizing  at  length  the  untenabil- 
ity  of  its  former  contention,  has  reluctantly  yielded  its 
positions  one  by  one  and  accepted  the  scientific  view  of 
the  world,  together  with  its  implications.  The  other  camp, 
repudiating  modernism  and  the  scientific  interpretation  of 
reality  and  retreating  into  positions  abandoned  by  the 
advancing  intelligence  of  educated  men,  is  still  advocating 
antiquated  and  indefensible  theories  of  creation  and  mira- 
cles. The  motive  urging  to  this  procedure  is  indeed  com- 
mendable, since  it  springs  from  the  feeling  that  only  in 
this  way  can  the  idea  of  God  be  guarded  from  mistaken 
and  destructive  interpretations.  But  the  apprehension  is 
groundless.  The  reality  of  the  supernatural  depends  not 
on  any  theory  of  creation  as  an  absolute  origination 
of  the  world,  or  of  miracles  as  suspensions  or  violations  of 
the  laws  of  nature.  No  such  doctrine  is  found  in  either 
the  Old  or  the  New  Testament.  And  now  for  a  long 
time,  ever  since  Spinoza  and  Leibnitz,  and  especially 
Hume,  a  definition  of  miracles  has  been  sought  which 
would  be  relieved  of  difficulties  originating  in  metaphysics, 
science,  and  experience.  At  the  present  time  two  sugges- 
tions are  frequently  met  with.  One  is  to  the  eff^ect  that 
miracles,  regarded  as  phenomena,  are  unusual  or 
extraordinary  events;  the  other  is  that  miracles  consist 
essentially  in  the  coincidence  between   an  event  and  a 


CAUSES  NECESSITATING  CHANGE  16 

prophet's  word, — in  which  the  ghost  of  Leibnitz  is  seen 
to  walk  once  more. 

In  the  interest  of  a  theistic  interpretation  of  the  world, 
the  tension  between  the  natural  and  the  supernatural 
is  relieved  by  regarding  these  from  different  angles,  as 
the  causal  and  the  teleological.  From  the  point  of  view 
of  their  cause,  events  are  natural,  so  far  as  referred  to 
uniform  and  concomitant  variation  among  phenomena; 
they  are  supernatural  so  far  as  referred  ultimately  to  the 
will  of  God.  From  the  point  of  view  of  end,  the  distinc- 
tion between  the  natural  and  the  supernatural  is  seen  not 
in  an  essential  difference  between  the  events  in  which  these 
are  embodied,  but  solely  in  the  degree  of  their  value  for 
religious  experience.  The  profound  change  in  the  mean- 
ing of  the  supernatural  which  has  been  thus  described  will 
contribute  its  part  in  the  reconstruction  of  the  idea  of 
God. 


VIII 


We  now  turn  to  the  newer  conception  of  the  historical 
origin  of  the  idea  of  God.  The  common  theory  refers 
it  to  two  sources,  reason  and  revelation.  (1)  Froin_±he 
point  of  view  of  reason,  God  is  defined  as  an  ^'infinite  and 
perfect  Spirit  in  whom  all  things  have  their  source,  sup- 
pgrtj^and  end."  This  is  claimed  to  be  a  rational  intuition 
or  a  first  truth,  the  marks  of  which  are  universality,  neces- 
sity, and  independence  and  priority  in  relation  to  all 
other  truths.  Other  views  concerning  the  Supreme  Being 
are  referred  to  per\'ersions  or  misinterpretations  of  the 
intuitive  conviction.  All  of  our  knowledge  and  mental 
processes,  our  certainty  that  the  universe  is  a  unity  and 
has  rational  ends  involves  belief  in  God.  This  intuition 
implies  that  men  know  what  God  is  as  the  ultimate  reality 


16  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

of  the  world, — ^Perfection  of  Reason,  Power,  and  Person- 
ality. The  idea  of  perfection  results  from  three  pro- 
cesses: negative,  denying  to  God  all  limitations  of  the 
creature;  positive,  affirming  of  God  all  perfections  of  the 
creature;  and  by  way  of  causality,  maintaining  that  he 
is  the  ground  of  all  effects  in  the  world.  (2)  Revelation 
does  not  so  much  originate  the  idea  of  God  in  the  sense 
of  creating  its  first  beginnings,  but  rather  aids  in  illumin- 
ing, guiding,  correcting,  and  completing  it  as  it  emerges 
in  the  rational  intuition  which  it  presupposes.  This  reve- 
lation appears  in  nature,  history,  the  moral  consciousness, 
and  the  Scriptures.  From  the  Scriptures  are  derived  all 
those  qualities  of  God  which  are  involved  in  redemption — 
the  Trinity,  the  decrees,  the  divine  mercy  as  subordinate 
to  justice,  the  will  to  forgive  sinners  through  an  expiatory 
sacrifice,  and  the  final  judgment. 

These  two  explanations  of  the  origin  of  the  idea  of 
God  refer  it  not  only  to  two  different  sources,  but  to 
sources  so  disparate  that  the  elements  thus  derived  can 
be  harmonized  with  each  other  only  by  a  mechanical  pro- 
cess. To  derive  the  idea  from  an  intuition  of  reason  and 
then  supplement  it  by  revelation  is  a  purely  arbitrary 
procedure ;  to  hold  that  supernatural  revelation  communi- 
cates truth  which  is  otherwise  inaccessible  to  the  reason  is 
to  allege  an  impossible  definition  of  reason  and  revelation. 
In  any  case,  both  of  these  explanations,  each  for  a  differ- 
ent reason,  if  wholly  inadequate  for  its  task.  The  origin, 
including  the  development,  of  the  idea  of  God  is  to  be 
sought  in  the  historical  conditions  through  which  the  dif- 
ferent races  of  men  have  passed.  The  aim  of  every 
t religion  lias  been  to  enable  men  not  only  to  overcome  in 
the  struggle  for  existence,  but  even  more  to  attain  fullness 
of  life.  How  to  escape  sin,  suffering,  sorrow,  and  death, 
how   to  win  compensations   for  the  frustrations   of  en- 


CAUSES  NECESSITATING  CHANGE  17 

deavor,  how  to  discover  the  values  which  are  possible  to 
experience,  how  to  find  courage  and  strength  for  the 
common  social  tasks, — this  is  the  aim  of  every  religion, 
and  these  are  the  conditions  which  determine  the  content 
of  the  idea  of  God.  Accordingly,  different  peoples  in 
different  ages  and  countries,  and  the  same  peojple  in  dif- 
ferent times  and  conditions,  develop  different  ideas  of 
God.  In  fact,  however,  people  are  not  the  same  when 
conditions  change.  Two  conclusions  follow:  (1)  An 
idea  of  God  which  suffices  for  one  people  cannot  answer 
for  another  people  at  the  same  or  at  another  age  of  the 
world,  nor  indeed  for  the  same  people  at  a  further  stage 
in  its  own  history.  Whatever  may  be  alleged  of  the 
finality  of  the  great  dogmatic  definitions  of  God,  as  that 
of  the  Council  of  Nicaea,  the  fact  is  that  this  idea  as  it 
appears  in  Augustine,  Thomas  Aquinas,  and  the  leaders 
of  religious  thought  in  modem  times  reveals  progressive 
modifications  which  reflect  the  changing  conditions  of 
thought  and  experience.  (2)  Since  all  ideas  are  func- 
tional and  no  idea  of  God  meets  all  the  varied  needs  of 
all  Christian  people  at  a  given  time,  there  must  be  many 
variations  of  it  to  embody  the  requirements  of  different 
groups.  A  cross-section  of  present-day  religious  thinking 
discloses  a  rather  bewildering  diversity  of  ideas  of  God, 
as  these  appear  in  Calvinism,  Arminianism,  Socinianism, 
monism,  panlogism,  voluntarism,  vitalism,  pluralistic 
pragmatism,  and  the  New  Realism, — each  one  an  attempt 
to  solve  the  problem  of  existence  from  a  different  point 
of  view  and  in  answer  to  a  particular  set  of  needs.  Nor 
are  we  at  the  end  of  these  endeavors,  which  should  be 
welcomed  by  all  who  are  in  search  of  truth  whose  only 
function  is  to  serve  the  well-being  of  men.  The  gains  of 
the  recent  past  should  assure  us  that  the  future  will  open 
new  paths  into  the  meaning  of  God. 


18  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

IX 

The  discovery  that  the  traditional  idea  of  God  is  a 
blending  of  two  types  of  thought — Semitic  and  Aryan — 
which  will  later  be  subjected  to  more  specific  exposition, 
is  significant.  The  derivation  of  the  entire  metaphysical 
content  of  the  official  doctrine  of  God  from  Greek  specu- 
lative thought,  to  which  attention  was  called  by  Hamp- 
den,^ by  Ritschl  ^  in  1850,  by  Hamack,^  and  by  Hatch,^ 
raises  several  interesting  questions.  One  is,  whether  the 
Greek  elements  originating  in  a  different  world  in  answer 
to  a  philosophical  rather  than  an  empirical  religious  need 
should  not  be  eliminated  from  our  interpretation  of  God 
from  the  Christian  point  of  view.  If  this  course  should 
not  recommend  itself,  on  the  ground  that  the  Nicene 
Creed  added  to  the  Semitic  conception  of  God  only  those 
materials  from  Greek  thought  without  which  it  could  not 
function  in  the  religious  life  of  those  whose  ideals  were 
determined  by  the  Greek  culture,  then  two  further  ques- 
tions arise.  (1)  Whether  the  Greek  metaphysics,  both 
in  its  form  and  in  its  content  as  it  appears  in  this  Creed, 
is  now  an  indispensable  element  in  our  idea  of  God.  (£) 
Whatever  answer  we  given  to  this  question,  a  further 
inquiry  emerges :  if  the  Hebrew  and  the  earliest  Christian 
conceptions  of  God  were  necessarily  transformed  by  rea- 
son of  having  to  function  for  the  Greek  consciousness, 
does  not  the  same  law  hold  good  as  this  idea  makes  its 
way  in  the  ever  changing  conditions  which  confront  it  as 
it  passes  from  one  stage  of  civilization  to  another,  from 


*  Bampton  Lectures,  1832,  on  the  Scholastic  Philosophy  Considered 
in  Its  Relation  to  Christian  Theology. 

^  The  Origin  of  the  Old  Catholic  Church. 

*  History  of  Dogma,  1886-1890. 

*  Hibbert  Lectures,  1888,  The  Influence  of  Greek  Ideas  and  Usages 
on  the  Christian  Church. 


CAUSES  NECESSITATING  CHANGE  19 

simpler  to  ever  more  complex  and  exacting  moral  and 
spiritual  demands?  Of  two  alternatives  open  to  the  idea 
of  God,  that  of  remaining  on  the  Nicene  foundation  or 
advancing  to  meet  the  needs  of  to-day,  the  first  would  be 
suicidal;  in  the  second  alone  lies  the  hope  of  its  con- 
tinuous ministry  to  the  life  of  the  world. 


The  bearing  of  the  new  study  of  Jesus  Christ  on  the 
idea  of  God  is  profound  and  far-reaching.  In  orthodox 
circles,  until  less  than  one  hundred  years  ago  the  doctrine 
of  God  remained  wholly  unaffected  by  reference  to  the 
historical  Jesus.  The  Socinians  had  indeed  interpreted 
God  in  the  light  of  Jesus,  but  since  this  interpretation 
ignored  or  discredited  much  of  the  theology  of  the  schools, 
it  was  rejected  as  dishonoring  God.  Kant  had  placed 
the  knowledge  of  the  metaphysical  content  of  the  divine 
nature  under  grave  suspicion.  Schleiermacher  found  in 
the  God-consciousness  of  Jesus  the  supreme  disclosure  of 
God.  Strauss  by  his  negative  criticism  stimulated  the 
study  of  the  historical  Jesus  to  an  astonishing  degree. 
In  addition  we  may  be  reminded  of  the  more  recent 
attempt  to  make  theology  Christocentric.  All  these  move- 
ments have  contributed  to  withdraw  attention  from  the 
purely  dogmatic,  speculative  idea  of  God  to  the  ethical 
content  of  his  personality.  There  are  still  published  elab- 
orate works  on  theism  where  the  traditional  arguments 
for  the  being  of  God  are  advocated.  God  as  the  Abso- 
lute is  still  presented  in  writings  of  great  cogency;  but 
the  attention  of  Christian  thinkers  is  surely  moving  to 
another  field  of  interest.  Men  a^e  seeking  for  that  idea 
of  God  which  will  make  a  difference  in  their  lives.     This 


20  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

they  find  in  the  conception  of  Fatherhood,  as  reflected  in 
the  spirit  of  Jesus.  There  are  those  who  say  that  Jesus 
Christ  is  the  only  God  they  know;  others  maintain  that 
God  must  be  like  Jesus.  Such  positions  greatly  restrict 
the  scope  of  the  activity  traditionally  attributed  to  God 
and  preclude  reference  to  qualities  in  God  which  are 
proper  subjects  of  inquiry;  they  ignore  many  questions 
which  have  only  a  speculative  interest,  which  is  indeed 
legitimate  enough  in  its  place ;  and  they  tend  to  make  that 
controlling  for  thought  which  is  believed  to  be  central  in 
the  life  of  God  and  most  influential  in  the  life  of  men. 

Nothing  more  truly  defines  the  bearing  of  Christian 
thought  to-day  than  its  reference  of  all  ideals  of  conduct 
to  Jesus  Christ.  The  Christian  character  finds  its  spirit 
and  aim  embodied  in  him;  and  the  social  welfare  is  safe 
only  in  adherence  to  the  principles  of  his  teaching  and 
life.  Plain  men  who  have  become  confused  and  weary 
with  the  scholastic  definitions  of  God,  partly  because  they 
do  not  understand  them,  and  partly  because  if  they  do 
understand  them  they  are  not  able  to  see  what  relation 
they  have  to  actual  human  experience,  find  Jesus  intelligi- 
ble,— not  the  Jesus  of  the  theologians,  with  their  bewil- 
dering doctrine  of  nature  and  substance  and  person,  but 
the  Jesus  of  the  Synoptic  gospels.  If  they  look  beyond 
him  for  some  one  who  shall  mean  more  to  them  than  he 
does,  such  a  one  must  mean  at  least  as  much  as  he  means ; 
and  if  such  a  one  perchance  means  more,  the  more  must 
be  interpreted  in  the  light  of  what  is  most  real  and  pre- 
cious in  Jesus.  Thus  the  new  values  which  have  been 
discovered  in  Jesus  Christ  are  carried  over  and  incor- 
porated into  the  idea  of  God.  Welcome  is  every  fresh  ex- 
position of  the  gospels,  every  new  interpretation  of  the 
secret  of  his  life  for  the  sake  of  the  light  thus  thrown 
upon  the  highest  spiritua  lends. 


CAUSES  NECESSITATING  CHANGE  21 

XI 

The  transition  from  the  philosophy  to  the  psychology 
of  religion  is  radically  significant  for  the  idea  of  God. 
The  psychology  of  religion  occupies  a  different  point  of 
view  and  presents  other  materials  than  those  which  have 
hitherto  been  available.     It  is  in  no  way  concerned  with 
metaphysics.      It  deals   with   reality    as   dynamic   rather    \ 
than  static.    It  knows  and  can  know  nothing  of  an  aspect  y 
of  reality  conceived  of  as  at  rest  behind  the  changing   I 
forms  of  phenomena.     It  is  therefore  silent  on  many  of 
the  subjects   to  which  systematic  theology  has   devoted 
prolonged  attention  in  the  doctrine  of  God.     The  theistic 
arguments  find  no  place  in  such  a  study.     Its  presenta- 
tion of  the  divine  attributes  is  at  a  far  remove  from  the 
traditional  treatment  of  them :  self-existence,  immutabil- 
ity, eternity,  immensity,  omniscience,  omnipotence,  omni- 
presence, the  transcendent  Trinity,  and  divine  decrees,  so 
far  as  these  are  based  on  metaphysics,  are  ignored,  with 
the  result  that  to  those  who  are  accustomed  to  the  dog- 
matic method  in  theology,  the  contents  of  the  psycholog- 
ical treatment  seem  meagre  and  disappointing.     This  is,\ 
however,  due  to  the  fact  that  we  have  been  so  long  accus-^ 
tomed  to  seek  our  material  for  the  idea  of  God  fron^ 
quarters  which  sustain  no  organic  relation  to  experienceA 
which  could  neither  arise  nor  be  verified  in  the  utmost! 
ranges  of  possible  experience.     The  doctrines  in  question^ 
may  correspond  with  reality,  but  since  their  truth  can 
never  be  established,  their  bearing  is  purely  speculative 
and  without  influence  upon  practical  life. 

The  psychology  of  religion  shows  that  religion  is  oniy 
another  way  of  describing  an  aspect  of  the  highest  per- 
sonal and  social  interests  of  men.  When  these  life-inter- 
ests of  a  given  group  are  summed  up  and  unified,  they 


22  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

represent  an  idea  of  God  which,  in  however  fragmentary 
form,  expresses  a  true,  even  if  imperfect,  notion  of  the 
divine.  The  characteristic  note  here  is  the  consciousness 
of  value.  The  idea  of  God  thus  becomes  another  name 
for  the  highest  ideal  values  of  men.  Since  these  values 
are  undergoing  continual  transmutation,  at  one  time  ceas- 
ing to  function,  at  another  passing  into  higher  meanings, 
the  idea  of  God  changes  to  correspond.  This  idea  is 
further  shaped  according  to  the  type  in  which  these 
values  have  taken  form  in  the  social  experience,  as  in 
the  nomadic,  agricultural,  and  national,  whether  auto- 
cratic or  democratic.  The  values  thus  enshrined  in  the 
idea  of  God  have  no  other  basis  or  guarantee  than  what 
they  derive  from  the  consciousness  itself.  This  is  indeed 
subjective,  open  to  all  the  dangers  of  subjectivism,  but 
with  all  its  liabilities  to  mistake,  it  must  be  accorded  its 
full  worth.  There  are  those  who  find  in  the  consciousness 
of  value  the  essential  content  and  the  convincing  test  of 
reality.  Yet  to  any  who  wish  to  supplement  the  idea  of 
God  as  it  app€ars  in  the  psychology  of  religion  by  ref- 
erence to  other  points  of  view,  the  way  is  not  closed. 


XII 


The  change  from  the  static  to  the  dynamic  conception 
of  reality  is  fraught  with  promise  in  its  influence  upon 
the  idea  of  God.  From  the  conception  of  atoms  as  inert 
substances  moved  by  an  external  force,  taking  form  and 
serving  ends  for  which  they  have  no  inherent  fitness,  the 
entire  universe  is  resolved  into  energy  which  is  disclosed 
in  the  equipoise  of  action  and  reaction,  or  in  change  where 
the  action  for  the  moment  exceeds  the  reaction;  but 
always  with  a  tendency  to  return  to  dynamic  equilibrium. 


CAUSES  NECESSITATING  CHANGE  23 

This  does  not  indeed  do  away  with  atoms  and  electrons, 
since  these  are  resulting  equipoises  between  uniformly 
acting  dynamic  forces.  In  the  psychical  region  the 
dynamic  view  is  still  more  impressive.  Here,  instead  of 
postulating  a  mind-substance,  one,  indivisible,  unchange- 
able, attention  is  directed  to  the  fact  of  consciousness  !p^ 
where  what  appears  to  be  static  as  habit  is  the  equilibrium 
established  between  perpetually  active  dynamic  elements. 
However  deep  we  push  our  inquiry  into  the  nature  of  our 
world,  we  are  never  able  to  pass  beyond  energy  into  a 
substratum  of  inactive  and  changeless  Being.  Every- 
where is  action,  movement,  freedom — a  dynamic  universe. 
This  changed  point  of  view  compels  momentous  changes 
in  the  conception  of  God.  It  necessitates  a  different 
-' meaning  to  creation  and  providence,  but  also  to  the  very 
nature  of  God.  If  God  has  anything  to  do  with  the 
creation  of  the  world  and  with  control  in  it,  then  he  must 
be  the  kind  of  Reality  which  answers  to  the  world  as  we 
know  it.  And  if  energy  is  the  characteristic  principle  of 
the  intelligible  universe  and  there  is  nowhere  revealed  a 
resting  substratum  which  is  fixed  and  changeless  while  the 
universe  is  subject  to  continual  flux,  an  irresistible  pre- 
sumption is  created  that  the  Most  Real  Being  will  like- 
wise be  energy,  activity,  and  will;  accordingly  the  terms 
essence,  substance,  and  nature  must  be  interpreted  not  as 
a  resting  basis,  but  in  terms  of  energy,  that  is,  of  will 
and  purposive  activity.         ^ 

XIII 

Closely  allied  with  this  is  the  part  assigned  to  experi- 
ence in  determining  the  idea  of  God.  There  are  two 
points  of  view  from  which  this  may  be  considered.  (1) 
Experience  is  conceived  to  be  the  sole  source  of  the  knowl- 


24,  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

edge  of  God.  This  theory  has  never  been  consistently 
worked  out,  but  it  represents  a  strong  tendency  of  relig- 
ious thinking.  According  to  Scheiermacher,  the  basis  for 
the  idea  of  God  lies  neither  in  the  consensus  gentium  nor 
in  the  fitness  of  the  human  soul  for  religion,  but  in  re- 
ligious experience,  and  more  particularly  in  Christian 
experience.  Experience  is  then  resolved  into  the  feeling 
of  absolute  dependence.  This  in  turn  involves  absolute 
causality  as  the  corresponding  fundamental  property  of 
God.  In  the  reciprocal  relation  of  dependence  and  caus- 
ality as  this  is  focused  in  the  Christian  consciousness  is 
revealed  the  character  of  the  divine  attributes.  These 
attributes  are,  however,  not  to  be  affirmed  of  God  as  he 
is  in  himself,  since  we  have  no  valid  objective  knowledge 
of  him;  the  divine  attributes  are  not  separate  forms  of 
the  essential  being  of  God,  but  only  ways  in  which  we 
interpret  our  feeling  of  dependence.  In  this  feeling  of 
dependence  there  are  given  three  aspects  of  our  knowledge 
of  God:  (1)  in  relation  to  the  world  and  strictly  lim- 
ited by  the  world,  God  is  eternal,  active,  omnipresent, 
almighty,  all-knowing;  also  one,  unlimited,  simple;  (2)  as 
disclosed  in  the  contrast  of  sin  and  grace,  God  is  holy, 
since  he  legislates  duty  to  the  conscience,  and  righteous, 
since  he  connects  evil  with  sin;  the  essence  of  God  is  love 
as  revealed  in  the  will  to  redemption;  (3)  the  idea  of  God 
in  the  Trinity — the  union  of  the  divine  with  the  human 
in  the  person  of  Christ,  and  continued  in  the  common 
spirit  of  the  Christian  community. 

(2)  The  other  point  of  view  from  which  experience  is 
made  the  determining  condition  of  the  idea  of  God  is  not 
so  much  theoretical  as  practical.  The  powerful  move- 
ment of  religious  life  introduced  by  Wesley,  while  it  car- 
ried along  with  it  the  dogmatic  definition  of  God,  yet,  by 
its  emphasis  upon  experience,  tended  to  retire  into  the 


CAUSES  NECESSITATING  CHANGE  26 

background  all  those  ideas  of  him  which  did  not  lend 
themselves  to  the  immediate  uses  of  faith  and  practice. 
The  preaching  necessary  for  the  great  revivals  of  religion 
and  in  general  the  character  of  the  people  to  whom  for 
the  most  part  this  kind  of  preaching  has  ministered,  have 
made  it  imperative  that  the  message  of  the  gospel  draw 
its  power  from  the  moral  and  redemptive  side  of  God. 
So  far  as  those  who  occupy  this  point  of  view  have  encour- 
aged religious  revivals,  engaged  in  social  reforms,  in  the 
inculcation  of  civic  virtue,  in  the  constant  and  everywhere 
necessary  ministry  to  the  sinful,  the  sick,  the  suffering, 
and  the  dying,  they  have  drawn  their  inspiration  from  the 
personal  justice  and  compassion  of  a  loving  and  faithful 
God — the  God  and  Father  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ.  Such 
a  message  is  created  by  experience,  addressed  to  experi- 
ence, and  has  no  meaning  outside  of  experience.  And 
because  this  idea  works  and  other  ideas  of  God  derived 
from  metaphysics  seem  remote  and  ineffectual,  many  of  the 
most  influential  leaders  of  religious  thought  are  indifferent 
to  any  conception  which  does  not  bear  directly  upon  the 
Christian  experience  of  to-day.  We  are  therefore  invited 
to  inquire  as  to  the  demands  originating  in  Christian 
experience  which  so  far  determines  the  content  of  our  idea 
of  God. 


XIV 


The  subjecting  of  the  entire  content  of  theology  to 
ethical  standards  is  nowhere  more  significant  than  in  its 
influence  upon  the  idea  of  God.  Such  a  condition  was 
possible  only  in  the  later  stages  of  Christian  thought. 
The  traditional  idea  of  God  has  been  under  a  profound 
double  obsession ;  first,  of  Neo-Platonism  with  its  doctrine 
of  an  ultimate  Reality  utterly  inaccessible  to  the  human 


26  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

reason;  secondly,  of  Augustinianism,  that  to  the  will  of 
God  as  absolute  Sovereign  is  to  be  referred  the  arbitrary 
and  irresponsible  source  both  of  God's  action  and  man's 
^  obligation.  This  conception  was  further  vitiated  by  two 
additional  positions:  that  since  the  will  of  God  was  the 
sole  source  of  right  and  wrong,  the  values  of  both  might 
be  reversed  by  a  simple  change  in  the  divine  will,  and  that 
while  a  portion  of  the  divine  will  has  been  revealed  to  us, 
another,  and  possibly  the  most  important,  portion  con- 
cerned with  the  divine  decrees,  remains  hidden,  known  to 
God  alone.  As  long  as  theologians  by  the  aid  of  ecclesi- 
astical authority  could  enforce  such  an  idea  of  God,  while 
it  might  measurably  meet  the  need  of  the  time, — it  was 
the  best  they  had,  and  any  idea  is  better  than  none, — yet 
it  would  have  to  answer  the  challenge  of  the  advancing 
moral  consciousness.  While  it  endured  it  occasioned  many 
misgivings  on  the  part  of  those  who  accepted  it.  Calvin 
confessed  of  one  aspect  of  it,  "I  admit  it  is  horrible!" 
In  others  it  aroused  only  abhorrence;  Wesley  is  reported 
as  replying  to  a  Calvinist,  "Your  God  is  my  devil!"  In 
the  nature  of  things,  it  was  permanently  impossible  that 
principles  of  conduct  which  were  repugnant  to  men  should 
I  be  either  attributed  to  God  or  tolerated  in  him.  Pur- 
'  poses  referred  to  him  must  be  approved  by  the  moral 
i  sense  of  men  before  they  can  be  recognized  as  real  in 
God  and  binding  on  the  human  will.  For  the  ethical 
quest  there  is  in  the  nature  of  God  no  unexplored  remain- 
der which,  if  reached,  might  yield  up  something  irrecon- 
cilable with  what  we  know  of  him.  "God  is  light,  and  in 
him  is  no  darkness  at  all." 

The  tendency  under  consideration  is  at  present  twofold. 
(1)  To  shift  attention  from  the  periphery  to  the  center 
in  the  conception  of  God.  Discussion  of  the  natural 
attributes,  so-called,  such  as  wisdom  and  power,  has  given 


CAUSES  NECESSITATING  CHANGE  27 

place  to  exposition  of  the  moral  qualities  of  goodness  and 
love.  If  any  conflict  arises  between  omnipotence  and 
goodness,  the  tension  is  resolved  (as  by  John  Stuart  Mill) 
by  the  denial  of  unqualified  omnipotence  and  subordina- 
tion of  it  to  goodness.  (2)  To  ethicize  the  character  of 
God  to  correspond  with  the  advancing  moral  ideals  of 
/"'men.     It  is  no  longer  possible  to  find  a  sanction  for  any 

Lform  of  social  injustice  which  is  obnoxious-  to  the  highest 
moral  ideal  by  referring  it  to  the  divine  will.  A  further 
tendency  is  powerfully  operative,  namely,  to  disentangle 
the  purpose  of  God  from  all  complicity  with  evil  as  such. 
He  does  not  cause  it;  he  does  not  will  it  as  means  to  an 
end;  he  is  forever  against  it  and  is  forever  committed  to 
its  overthrow.  If  evil  is  everlasting,  even  as  is  the  good, 
yet  in  no  sense  and  at  no  time  may  the  idea  of  God  be 
opened  out  so  as  to  include  evil  in  the  slightest  degree. 

To  make  still  more  evident  the  ethical  test  to  which  the 
idea  of  God  is  subjected,  we  have  only  to  remind  ourselves 
of  the  eflicacy  of  the  criticism  to  which  the  historical 
doctrines  of  Christianity  have  been  subjected;  the  doc- 
trine of  original  sin  according  to  which  God  accounted 
all  men  who  were  descended  from  Adam  by  natural  gen- 
eration guilty  and  liable  to  eternal  death  by  reason  of 
Adam's  sin;  the  doctrine  of  an  expiatory  atonement,  in 
which  Christ  assumed  the  guilt  and  punishment  due  to  all 
or  a  portion  of  men  for  their  sins ;  the  doctrine  of  election 
according  to  which,  out  of  his  mere  good  pleasure,  God 
from  eternity  chose  some  to  everlasting  life  and  repro- 
bated or  passed  over  others,  thus  dooming  them  to  endless 
punishment;  the  doctrine  of  regeneration  according  to 
which,  by  almighty  power,  God  miraculously  recreates  the 
governing  disposition  holy.  These  and  other  doctrines 
have  as  their  chief  significance  the  light  which  they  throw 
on  the  conception  of  God.     Christian  thought  has,  how- 


2S  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

/  ever,  taken  all  of  these  doctrines  out  of  the  region  of  pure 
/   sovereignty,    of    mechanical    substitution,    of    arbitrary 
j     power,  and  required  that  they  conform  to  the  facts  of 
I    human  experience  and  to  ideals  which  alone  make  ethical 
\  action  possible.     To  the  criticism,  that  to  ethicize  the 
meaning  of  Christianity  is  to  rob  it  of  redemptive  ele- 
ments, and  that  to  ethicize  the  character  and  action  of 
God  is  to  strip  him  of  his  unique  and  irresponsible  arbi- 
trariness, it  is  to  be  replied,  first,  that  the  essential  notion 
of   redemption   is   neither  mysterious   no^r   magical,   but 
ethical,  and  secondly,  that  justice  and  truth,  goodness 
and  mercy  have  no  other  meaning  with  reference  to  God 
than    they  have    when    applied  to    other  moral    beings. 
^Knally,    since   the   characteristic    idea    of   God   in   each 
period  registers  the  social  ideal  of  that  pjeriod,  it  is  to 
be  expected  that  the  profound  changes  through  which  the 
world  is  passing,  compelling  new  and  hitherto  undreamed- 
of ideals,  will  necessitate  corresponding  changes  in  the 
Ijconception  of  God.     As  no  one  can  forecast  the  form  of 
the  new  social  order,  so  no  one  can  measure  the  degree  to 
which  the  idea  of  God  will  experience  modification  and 
enrichment.     One  may,  however,  safely  assume  that  in  the 
immediate  future  the  idea  of  God  will  be  subject  to  more 
radical  change  than  it  has  undergone  in  any  equal  length 
of  time  in  the  entire  history  of  religious  thought,  and  that 
this  change  will  in  part  take  place  in  the  ethical  content 
of  its  meaning. 

XV 

Various  literary  treatments  of  the  idea  of  God  bring  to 
expression  the  popular  mood.  Hitherto  when  the  idea  of 
God  has  appeared  in  fiction,  it  has  been  in  a  purely  formal 
way.     God  has  been  brought  in  as  a  sort  of  figure-head 


CAUSES  NECESSITATING  CHANGE  29 

to  give  dignity  to  the  story,  to  reinforce  a  moral  situa- 
tion, to  lend  atmosphere  to  the  development  of  a  plot,  a 
sign-manual  to  indicate  that  the  entire  movement  takes 
place  in  a  Christian  rather  than  a  pagan  environment ;  as 
the  portrait  of  Washington,  which  we  recognize  as  we  pass 
it  in  the  reception  hall,  shows-  that  we  are  gpod  Ameri- 
cans. Now,  however,  he  who  with  silent  voice  and  immo- 
bile features,  but  with  benign  and  far-seeing  eyes,  has  so 
long  looked  down  upon  us,  has  joined  us*  in  all  the  experi- 
ences of  our  life,  not  as  a  remote  and  detached  beholder 
of  our  affairs,  but  one  with*  us  in  the  storm  and*  stress 
of  existence.  Two  instances  may  be  adduced.  In  Jean 
Christ ophe,^  Holland  says,  "God  was  not  to  him  the 
impassive  Creator.  .  .  .  God  was  fighting.  God  was  suf- 
fering. Fighting  and  suffering  with  all  who  fight  and  for 
all  who  suffer.  For  God  was  Life,  the  drop  of  light  fallen 
into  the  darkness,  spreading  out,  reaching  out,  drinking 
up  the  night.  But  the  night  was  limitless  and  the  divine 
struggle  will  never  cease,  .  .  .  and  none  can  know  how  it 
will  end."  H.  G.  Wells  ^  declares  that  theologians  have 
made  extravagant  claims  for  God,  as,  for  example,  that 
he  is  all-powerful,  "but  the  common  sense  of  men  knows 
better.  .  .  .  It  is  not  fair  to  say  that  he  causes  all  things 
now.  .  .  .  God  is  not  absolute;  God  is-  finite.  A  finite 
God  who  struggles  in  his  great  and  comprehensive  way 
as  we  struggle  in  our  weak  and  silly  way — who  is  with 
us — that  is  the  essence  of  all  religion." 

While  these  are  the  most  outstanding  instances  in  recent 
fiction  of  a  new  conception  of  God,  their  significance  lies 
less  in  their  present  form  than  in  the  fact  that  they  herald 
the  advent  of  a  new  day.     Such  writers  are  not  to  be 


*  Vol.  Ill,  p. 

*Mr.  BHtling  8e§§  It  Through,  p.  406. 


so  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

charged  with  levity  or  irreverence,  or  with  simply  exploit- 
ing a  notion  which  by  reason  of  its  startling  novelty  will 
create  a  market  for  their  books  and  furnish  a  fresh  theme 
for  the  threadbare  conversation  of  an  afternoon  tea.  If 
the  metaphysicians  and  theologians  have  no  other  God 
than  one  who  is  incapable  of  participating  in  human 
affairs — an  abstract  Deity,  a  logical  formula,  isolated 
and  dwelling  in  Epicurean  felicity — then  those  to  whom 
the  seething  emotions  and  desperate  struggles  of  our  world 
are  real  will  reinterpret  God  in  terms  of  human  need. 
If  God  is  so  defined  that  his  existence  and  action  make 
no  practical  difference  to  men,  it  is  high  time  to  ignore 
him  altogether,  as  is  even  now  the  case  with  those  to  whom 
the  traditional  God  means  nothing,  or  else  to  seek  some 
new  conception  which  shall  show  him  as  really  one  with 
us  in  the  experiences  of  our  human  lot.  Moreover,  when 
an  idea,  which  has  in  one  form  become  to  a  great  extent 
inoperative,  is  presented  in  another  form  capable  of 
functioning  in  new  and  more  vital  ways,  those  who  are 
responsible  for  the  time-worn  idea  are  called  upon  to 
incorporate  the  newer  meaning  into  their  doctrine.  Par- 
ticularly is  this  true  of  an  idea  which,  like  Plato's  idea 
of  God,  for  fifteen  hundred  years  dwelt  undisturbed  in 
the  ethereal  realms  of  speculative  theology,  but  which  has 
now  descended  to  earth  to  take  up  its  abode  with  men, 
to  aid  them  in  the  creation  and  development  of  personal 
and  social  well-being.  It  is  one  thing  when  the  idea  of 
God  is  regarded  as  the  possession  of  scholars,  to  be  elab- 
orated in  learned  treatises,  to  be  read  and  understood  by 
those  only  who  have  been  trained  in  great  universities; 
it  is  another  and  very  different  thing  when  an  idea  of  God 
is  presented  in  popular  fiction  which,  reaching  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  readers,  makes  God  for  the  first  time  of  like 
nature  with  us,  intelligible,  sympathetic,  companionable. 


CAUSES  NECESSITATING  CHANGE  31 

XVI 

The  new  social  emphasis  in  religion  necessitates  a 
redefinition  of  God.  This  arises  from  several  points 
of  view : 

(1)  To  make  the  gospel  real  in  settlement-work,  house- 
to-house  visitation,  ministering  to  the  sick,  rescuing  the 
fallen,  caring  for  children,  and  other  forms  of  approach 
to  the  hearts  of  men.  Where  God  is  indeed  redeemer, 
comforter,  and  guide,  he  must  be  presented  not  only  as 
one  who  knows  the  most  intimate  sins  and  sorrows  and 
baffled  hopes,  but  also  as  forgiving,  soothing,  and  tenderly 
leading  those  who  trust  in  him.  This  condition  cannot, 
however,  be  permanently  met  by  either  of  two  methods. 
On  the  one  hand,  by  presenting  the  God  of  the  Nicene  or 
Athanasian  creed,  or  by  defining  him  as  an  "immaterial 
substance,  infinite,  eternal,  unchangeable  in  his  being, 
wisdom,  power,  holiness,  justice,  goodness  and  truth." 
Such  a  being  may  answer  the  needs  of  theologians  to  whom 
his"  supreme  quality  is  his  aloofness  and  unlikeness  to  men, 
who  are  satisfied  if  he  is  so  far  away  that  even  his  very 
existence  may  be  dispensed  with  and  neither  the  virtue  nor 
the  happiness  of  men  be  seriously  affected  thereby.  On 
the  other  hand,  they  are  doomed  to  disappointment  who 
expect  that  Christ  can  permanently  take  the  place  for- 
merly occupied  by  God  in  religion, — the  theologians  hav- 
ing removed  God  to  an  inaccessible  distance  from  men. 
This  makes  of  Christ  a  kind  of  interim  God,  the  outcome 
of  which  will  be  that  either  God  will  become  practically 
disregarded,  since  he  has  no  immediate  contact  with  men, 
— in  any  case,  he  will  have  nothing  of  which  men  are  in 
need, — or,  since  Christ  can  by  no  utmost  stretch  of  rea- 
son or  of  faith  take  the  ultimate  place  of  God,  a  new 
definition  of  God  will  have  to  be  suggested  which  will 


82  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

reveal  him  as  capable  of  the  same  real  relation  to  men 
which  Jesus  realized  in  his  own  person. 

(2)  Religious  education  is  in  exigent  need  of  a  restate- 
ment of  the  idea  of  God.  For  the  most  part  its  subjects 
are  young  people,  or,  if  the  persons  are  mature,  the  char- 
acter of  the  need  is  not  changed.  Many  of  these  are  in 
high  school  and  college,  with  some  training  in  science  and 
some  understanding  of  the  modern  view  of  the  world. 
Few  of  them  are  versed  in  the  subtleties  of  metaphysics, 
they  know  little  and  care  less  for  the  history  of  the  tradi- 
tional doctrine  of  God.  What  is  required  is  some  concep- 
tion of  God  which  shall  make  him  real,  attractive,  and 
helpful  to  boys  and  girls,  to  youth  as  they  cross  the 
threshold  of  responsibility  and  self-realization,  to  men 
and  women  in  the  varied  tasks  of  mature  years,  and  which 
shall  continue  with  them  as  they  draw  near  to  the  end 
and  the  Silence.  The  historic  creeds  do  not  answer  here ; 
too  many  human  events  have  happened  since  these  great 
statements  were  drawn  up.  We  do  not  think  as  their 
authors  did  concerning  the  Scriptures,  the  world,  and 
man.  Their  philosophy  is  not  ours.  We  care  more  for 
the  concrete  than  for  the  abstract.  We  have  far  less 
faith  in  definitions  than  they  had.  We  want  no  Deity  who 
can  be  snugly  imprisoned  in  cast-iron  formulas  and  im- 
posed by  any  body  of  men.  Nor  for  religious  education 
can  we  tolerate  an  idea  of  God  which  is  belied  by  the 
highest  intelligence  of  the  age,  inconsistent  with  every  or 
even  any  science,  from  which  in  later  years,  if  one  will 
think  in  terms  of  modem  thought,  one  frees  himself  only 
by  a  violent  wrench. 

(3)  A  further  demand  in  this  direction  comes  from  the 
democratic  consciousness  which  is  fast  spreading  through- 
out the  world.  Two  opposite  and  extreme  types  of  social 
life — the  autocratic  and  the  democratic — have  ever  pro- 


CAUSES  NECESSITATING  CHANGE  83 

vided  a  favorable  soil  for  the  development  of  correspond- 
ing conceptions  of  God — kingship  and  paternity,  sov- 
ereignty and  love,  transcendence  and  immanence.  It  will 
be  impossible  to  preserve  the  absolute  and  irresponsible 
sovereignty  of  God  when  earthly  kings  have  been  deposed. 
The  Scriptures  speak  of  the  casting  down  of  kings  and 
potentates  that  God  alone  may  be  exalted,  but  if  earthly 
thrones  disappear  the  throne  in  heaven  will  also  pass 
away.  Even  Fatherhood,  if  it  represents  simply  a  pater- 
nal, however  benevolent,  instead  of  an  all-pervading  min- 
istry of  love,  will  cease  to  represent  God  to  the  democratic 
society.  The  analogy  of  Fatherhood  is  more  significant 
as  we  discover  another  application.  The  father  is  father 
of  the  children,  not  that  there  may  forever  remain  a  gulf 
between  him  and  them,  nor  are  children  bom  in  order 
that  they  may  forever  be  implicit  subjects  of  the  father's 
will,  but  rather  that  the  relation  of  superiority  and  sub- 
ordination may  give  place  to  intelligent,  sympathetic,  and 
complete  mutuality.  Jesus  offers'  a  suggestion  which 
needs  only  to  be  carried  into  the  relation  of  God  and  men : 
"No  longer  do  I  call  you  servants ;  for  the  servant  know- 
eth  not  what  his  lord  doeth ;  but  I  have  called  you  friends ; 
for  all  things  which  I  have  heard  from  my  Father  I  have 
made  known  unto  you." 

We  need  constantly  to  remind  ourselves  that  the  princi- 
ple of  authority  and  the  source  of  obligation  are  not 
wholly  external,  but  partly  and  inalienably  within — in  the 
very  nature  of  the  moral  consciousness  and  the  moral 
ideal.  The  fear  lest  the  basis  of  virtue  would  be  removed 
or  at  least  imperiled  if  the  democratic  were  to  supplant 
the  autocratic  relation  of  God  to  man  is  therefore  ground- 
less. Indeed,  in  no  other  than  this  conception  can  we  find 
so  rich  a  field  for  the  culture  of  all  individual  and  social 
good.     Ifj^  however,  one  prefers  an  ethical  to  a  political 


34  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

term  with  which  to  characterize  this  relation,  he  may  sub- 
stitute "friendship"  for  "democracy"  and  all  the  values 
will  be  equally  conserved.  The  aim  is  not  to  degrade  God 
to  an  unworthy  plane  so  that  he  may  share  the  Augus- 
tinian  limitations  and  defects  of  human  nature,  but  to 
maintain  that  man  belongs  to  the  divine  type  and  is  a 
member  of  a  commonwealth  of  which  God  is  the  first  and 
greatest,  but  whose  priority  and  greatness  only  pledge 
him  the  more  to  ministry  and  service. 


XVII 

The  War  has  necessitated  reconsideration  and  revision 
of  the  idea  of  God.  Precisely  what  form  the  idea  will 
assume  as  a  result  of  the  War  it  is  too  early  to  predict. 
Doubtless  the  change  will  take  several  directions.  Already, 
however,  many  suggestions  have  been  offered.  Some  are 
seriously  advocating  the  notion  that  for  two  thousand 
years  God  has  been  waiting  for  just  this  cataclysm  of  the 
nations  in  order  to  bring  to  an  end  a  world  which  has 
grown  old  in  sin  and  ripe  for  destruction.  Others  have 
advanced  the  view  that  God  had  no  part  in  bringing  on 
the  War;  it  is  inconceivable  that  a  Being  of  perfect  love 
could  plunge  a  world  into  agony  so  monstrous  and  immeas- 
urable. Still  others,  feeling  themselves  obliged  to  choose 
between  goodness  and  omnipotence,  have  preferred  to 
regard  the  love  of  God  as  boundless,  but  to  limit  his 
power:  he  would  have  prevented  the  cruelty,  the  blood- 
shed, and  the  nameless  horrors  of  the  War,  but  he  could 
not.  There  are  others  who  are  neither  timid  nor  squeam- 
ish, and  are  not  afraid  that  God  will  be  dishonored  or 
discredited  if  he  is  conceived  of  as  a  "Man  of  War,"  tak- 
ing the  necessary  steps  to  bring  about  his  ends,  not  with- 


CAUSES  NECESSITATING  CHANGE  35 

holding  himself  from  even  the  "tumult  and  the  shouting." 
Once  more  there  are  those  who  have  no  theory  as'  to  the 
agency  of  God  relative  to  the  War,  but  who  find  ample 
scope  for  his  action  in  guiding  after-War  conditions,  in 
directing  the  thoughts  of  men  to  just  understanding  of 
the  basis  of  national  well-being,  and  in  instilling  into  their 
hearts  a  spirit  of  brotherhood  and  co-operation;  and  in 
addition  to  this  broader  field,  in  countless  ways  inspiring 
to  individual  and  social  ministry  for  those  who  have  suf- 
fered and  lost  in  the  awful  fortunes  of  war. 

We  cannot  forecast  the  exact  changes  which  will  come 
over  the  idea  of  God  from  this  cause,  yet  several  points 
are  clear.  Some  persons  will  steadfastly  oppose  any 
modification  of  the  traditional  conception,  insisting  that 
the  War  has  served  only  to  confirm  all  their  previous 
notions.  Others  will  seriously  attempt  a  readjustment 
of  their  most  cherished  theories,  with  the  aim  of  bringing 
God  into  yet  more  intimate  contact  and  agency  with  the 
greatest  social  movement  in  history,  of  enlarging  their 
thought  of  him,  and  of  reaching  a  basis  of  deeper  confi- 
dence in  the  Living  God.  Already  the  many  endeavors  to 
find  a  place  for  God  in  these  tremendous  events,  even  if 
they  are  but  partially  successful,  promise  much  for  a 
restatement  of  the  meaning  of  God  under  present-day 
conditions. 

XVIII 

The  arguments  for  the  being  of  God  have  now  for 
more  than  a  century  been  subjected  to  searching  criti- 
cism, with  the  result  that  in  their  commonly  approved 
form  they  bear  little  resemblance  to  the  traditional  state- 
ment of  them.  These  will  later  receive  suitable  attention ; 
here  the  aim  is  only  to  suggest  the  influence  which  their 
changed  value  has  on  the  idea  of  God,     If  we  limit  our 


Se  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

reference  to  two  of  these  arguments — the  cosmological 
and  the  teleological — it  is  evident  that  so  far  as  the  idea 
of  God  is  conditioned  or  defined  by  these,  it  cannot  fail 
of  being  affected  to  the  degree  that  they  are  discredited 
or  transformed.  If,  for  example,  God  is  regarded  as  abso- 
lute Creator,  on  the  ground  that  the  cosmological  argu- 
ment leads  to  the  First  Cause  in  that  sense,  and  it  is 
shown  that  the  argument  is  invalid  when  so  conducted, 
and  when  God  is  conceived  of  as  almighty  Designer,  on 
the  ground  that  the  argument  for  design  proves  universal 
contrivance  in  finite  things,  and  it  becomes  evident  that 
this  argument  is  unsound,  since  the  facts  available  do  not 
warrant  this  inference,  then,  so  far  as  the  idea  of  God 
is  dependent  upon  either  or  both  of  these  conclusions,  it 
must  undergo  modification.  That  these  arguments  may 
receive  restatement  is  no  doubt  true,  but  in  that  case  they 
will  represent  a  different  conception  of  the  Supreme  Real- 
ity^.  Other  arguments,  as  the  moral  and  the  concensus 
gentium,  have  not  justified  the  inferences  drawn  from 
them.  If  they  are  to  be  of  service  in  our  day,  they  must 
be  redefined,  with  the  result  that  a  different  God  from  the 
traditional  one  will  emerge  from  the  process.  Moreover, 
if  the  theistic  arguments  no  longer  command  assent  from 
modem  scholars,  the  idea  of  God  to  which  they  were  sup- 
posed to  lead  no  longer  functions  in  the  present-day  relig- 
ious needs  of  men.  If,  therefore,  the  newer  rational  ap- 
proach to  God  is  not  more  successful  than  that  of  former 
times,  it  would  be  better  for  us  to  ignore  it  altogether. 

XIX 

Another  conception  of  God,  which  is  not  indeed  the 
most  fundamental,  but  which  has  occasioned  much  con- 
troversy, is  expressed  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity.    This 


CAUSES  NECESSITATING  CHANGE  37 

found  dogmatic  statement  in  the  Nicene  and  later  in  the 
Athanasian  formula.  Although  this  is  held  to  be  binding 
in  the  larger  portion  of  the  Christian  church,  yet  it  has 
never  received  the  undivided  sanction  of  Christendom. 
The  subject  has  provoked  periodic  criticism,  many  modi- 
fications have  been  proposed,  and  one  may  sum  up  the 
present  situation  as  follows:  (1)  The  being  of  God,  if 
it  is  to  have  any  meaning  for  either  experience  or  thought, 
must  be  conceived  as  unity ;  never  was  this  point  of  view 
more  securely  fixed  for  the  definition  of  God.  (^)  Futile 
is  the  attempt  to  distinguish  between  Trinity  and  Tri- 
unity,  on  the  ground  that  Trinity  describes  the  self-man- 
ifestation, while  Triunity  refers  to  the  inner  and  essential 
being,  of  God.  (3)  Schleiermacher'si  contention  that  the 
Trinity  is  the  threefold  way  in  which  we  become  aware  of 
the  divine  in  our  experience  of  redemption  blazed  the  path 
for  modem  interpreters  of  this  doctrine.  (4)  It  is 
extremely  significant  that  recent  statements  of  the  doc- 
trine, differing  as  they  do  radically  from  the  ancient  for- 
mulas, are  not  controverted  from  the  traditional  side.  This 
fact  may  be  variously  accounted  for.  The  church  may 
have  shifted  from  the  metaphysics  of  the  Trinity  to  other 
subjects  regarded  as  more  vital  to  Christian  experience. 
Many  persons  may  have  Sabellianized  their  view  without 
being  aware  of  the  fact,  and  hence  they  do  not  feel  the 
same  repugnance  to  the  modem  presentations  which  they 
might  otherwise  feel.  Moreover,  since  those  who  interpret 
this  doctrine  are  yet  careful  to  maintain  the  religious  and 
spiritual  values  of  the  ancient  formula,  they  are  still 
within  the  spiritual  fellowship  of  those  from  whom  they 
differ  in  the  phrasing  of  their  faith.  Unquestionably  this 
doctrine  has  not  received  its  final  form ;  much  is  yet  to  be 
expected  from  a  different  logic,  a  different  view  of  the 
world,  and  a  different  conception  of  experience. 


II.    HISTORICAL  SKETCH  OF  THE 
IDEA  OF  GOD 


In  our  survey  of  the  history  of  the  idea  of  God  we  are 
to  consider  only  the  high  lights  of  its  development,  with 
the  aim  of  ascertaining  the  principles  which  have  guided 
the  process!  and  the  contributions  made  by  successive 
thinkers  to  the  permanent  meaning  of  the  Reality.  If 
we  begin  with  the  conception  of  the  Hebrew  prophets,  this 
is  not  because  they  alone  had  a  thought  of  God  which 
arose  out  of  their  experience  and  was  compelling,  but 
because  they  were  the  most  direct  source  from  which  the 
first  Christian  notion  of  God  was  derived. 


II 

At  the  outset  attention  is  directed  to  two  broad  streams 
of  tendency  which  flowed  on  for  a  time  separately  and 
then  gradually  merged  in  a  common  stream.  Each 
appears  to  have  originated  in  a  different  racial  character- 
istic and  to  have  satisfied  a  need  destined  to  be  comple- 
mentary to  the  other.  I  refer  to  the  Semitic  quality  of 
which  the  Hebrew  prophets  are  the  highest  exponents, 
and  the  Aryan,  which  is  for  our  purpose  most  fully  real- 
ized in  the  Greek  philosophers. 


HISTORICAL  SKETCH  59 

The  Semitic  idea  of  God  is  that  of  a  Being  in  action. 
It  took  its  rise  in  the  variety  and  stress  of  experience: 
God  disclosed  himself  in  what  he  did.  Knowledge  of  him 
was  derived  solely  from  his  action.  The  Jewish  religion 
developed  under  circumstances  which  necessitated  belief 
in  a  God  whose  nature  and  relation  to  his  people  and  the 
world  were  supremely  ethical.  The  Jewish  people  had  to 
believe  this  of  their  God.  Their  experience  was  attributed 
to  a  concept  of  God  which  was  fundamentally  ethical; 
Jahweh  had  chosen  them;  his  relation  to  them  was  there- 
fore not  natural  but  ethical.  In  their  passage  from  a 
nomadic  existence  through  an  agricultural  stage  to  the 
complex  conditions'  of  a  city  and  a  state,  with  the  neces- 
sity of  subduing  enemies  and  the  organization  of  a  unified 
social  consciousness,  they  made  increasing  demands  on  the 
ethical  character  of  their  God.  Their  geographical  loca- 
tion, their  political  exigencies,  their  experience  in  exile 
and  afterward,  intensified  and  defined  to  their  conscious- 
ness practical  needs  which  centered  in  their  God.  At  first 
they  did  not  know  whether  he  would  prove  stronger  than 
the  gods  of  neighboring  peoples,  whether  he  would  turn 
out  to  be  greater  than  all  gods,  whether  he  would  become 
the  God  of  the  whole  earth  who  made  and  ruled  all.  Nor 
did  they  know  until  long  afterward  that  their  storm-god 
who  became  their  tribal-  and  war-god  was  to  disclose  a 
spirit  of  impartial  justice  and  a  heart  more  tender  than 
^/^e  heart  of  any  mother.  All  the  qualities  of  their  God 
^S^hich  underwent  change  were  every  single  one  ethical. 
./the  two  matters  on  which  more  than  on  all  else  the  wel- 
fare and  progress  of  the  world  depend — sexual  purity  and 
social  justice — ^were  associated  with  a  God  who  would 
ultimately  tolerate  neither  the  abominations  of  the  Gen- 
tiles nor  the  inhumanity  which  violated  the  indefeasible  / 
rights  of  human  life.     Accordingly,  as  we  receive  the  idea 


40  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

/of  God  from  the  hands  of  the  prophets  he  is  a  self-con- 

'  scious,  perfectly  free  person;  independent  of  the  world, 

yet  absolute  ruler  of  it ;  the  eternal  sovereign  of  men ;  the 

alone  Supreme  in  power,  holiness,  righteousness,  wisdom, 

\love.    The  earlier  polytheistic  background  has  disappeared 

and  there  has  emerged  an  ethical  monotheism. 

At  a  period  nearly  parallel  with  this  developn>ent  of  the 
idea  of  God  among  the  Hebrews,  a  similar  process 
appeared  in  Greek  thought.  Here,  however,  while  the 
ethical  interest  was  by  no  means  absent,  attention  was 
concentrated  upon  the  metaphysical  properties  of  God. 
The  Aryan  type  of  thought  was  essentially  speculative. 
Already  both  in  Persia  and  in  Greece,  where  Aryan 
thought  attained  characteristic  expression,  the  divine  had 
been  conceived  oi  in  terms  of  essence  rather  than  of  action. 
In  Greece  the  conception  of  God  reached  its  spiritual 
summit  in  Plato  and  Aristotle.  For  Plato  the  world  was 
divided  into,  two  parts,  the  ideal  and  the  actual.  The 
ideal  or  intelligible  world  is  the  world  of  ideas  which  are 
immaterial,  eternal,  changeless,  independent,  self-existent, 
and  perfect.  The  highest  idea  is  the  absolute  Good,  that 
is,  God,  supreme  in  the  ideal  as  the  sun  is  in  the  visible 
world,  immeasurably  transcending  all  other  reality  in 
value.  The  Good  belongs  to  a  higher  category  than  per- 
sonality; instead  of  being  unreal,  since  God  is  an  Idea, 
he  is  the  highest  and  only  perfect  Reality.  In  God  is 
accordingly  found  the  meaning  and  purposive  end  of  the 
world. 

To  Aristotle  God  is  pure  intelligence,  pure  activity, 
himself  unmoved  yet  the  prime  mover  of  the  visible  world. 
He  is  not  creator  "in  the  beginning,"  for  the  world  equally 
with  God  is  self-existent  and  eternal.  Although  he  has  no 
inwardly  active  relation  to  the  world,  yet  he  is  the  final 
cause  of  all  the  motion  in  the  world,  precisely  as  the  beau- 


HISTORICAL  SKETCH  41 

tiful  and  desirable  attract,  while  he  himself  remains  com- 
pletely wrapped  up  in  the  contemplation  of  his  own 
esjsential  rational  being.  Now  for  the  first  time  in  hmnan 
thought  a  metaphysical  monism  is  established.  Not 
merely  as  in  Plato  is  God  immateriality;  he  is  pure  spir- 
ituality or  consciousness.  Moreover,  he  is  not  only  abso- 
lutely transcendent,  but  perfectly  blessed. 

In  these  two  greatest  of  the  Greek  thinkers  God  is 
conceived  of  as  purely  rational.  He  does  not  rise  out  of 
the  storm  and  stress  of  experience.  He  is  not  primarily 
ethical,  even  though  in  Plato  he  is  called  the  perfect 
Good ;  indeed,  the  conditions  of  ethical  being  are  in  part 
denied  to  him. 

A  comparison  of  the  Greek  with  the  Hebrew  idea  of 
God  reveals  radically  contrasting  features — one  static, 
the  other  dynamic;  one  ideal,  the  other  historical;  one 
metaphysical,  the  other  ethical ;  one  impersonal  or  super- 
personal,  the  other  intensely  personal;  one  that  of  an 
abstract,  the  other  that  of  a  Living  God. 

The  doctrine  that  the  immaterial  and  the  spiritual  was 
the  only  reality  failed  to  find  its  verification  in  further 
experience,  unless  indeed  one  portion  of  experience  was 
to  be  resolved  into  an  illusion.  Accordingly,  a  type  of 
thought  arose  which  aimed  to  meet  the  new  demand.  The 
Stoics  found  in  the  material  world  the  only  reality,  a 
position  which  involved  a  new  definition  of  the  material 
world.  Instead  of  following  Democritus  in  his  simple 
atomic  theory  of  all  existence,  the  Stoics  conceived  of 
substance  as  neither  pure  matter  nor  pure  mind,  but  as 
essentially  dynamic.  If  Stoicism  is  to  be  referred  to  a 
Semitic  origin,  then  its  profound  affinity  with  the  voli- 
tional quality  of  the  God  of  the  Hebrews  is  explicable. 
The  earlier  dualism  of  Greek  thought  has  disappeared; 
the  universe  has  become  a  living  being.     God  is  conceived 


^\ 


42  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

of  as  seminal  reason,  cosmic  reason,  universal  law,  destiny, 
providence.  Thus  we  are  introduced  to  a  thorough-going 
pantheism.  With  Stoicism  begins  that  long  development 
of  the  idea  of  God  in  which  "substance"  plays  a  charac- 
teristic and  consistent  part. 

The  Epicurean  theology  marks  an  advance  on  the  doc- 
trine of  Aristotle.  The  gods  exist  indeed  in  complete 
isolation  from  the  world  and  men ;  they 

"haunt 
The  lucid  interspace  of  world  and  world 
Where  never  creeps  a  cloud,  or  moves  a  wind, 
Or  ever  falls  the  least  white  star  of  snow. 
Nor  ever  lowest  roll  of  thunder  moans. 
Nor  sound  of  human  sorrow  mounts  to  mar 
Their  sacred  everlasting  calm."  ^ 

They  are,  however,  endowed  not  only  with  self-conscious- 
ness, but  with  felicity.  An  emotional  quality  now  takes 
precedence  as  compared  with  Plato's  rational  principle; 
the  rational  principle  is  indeed  present,  but  it  is  touched 
with  emotion.  For  the  first  time  in  religious  thought 
happiness  claims  its  right  in  an  ideal  experience.  The 
claim  may  be  one-sided,  and  the  gods  thus  described 
wholly  self-<;en»tered,  but  hun>anity  has  learned  its  lesson. 
Henceforth  no  idea  of  God  will  be  complete  which  lacks 
the  property  of  joy. 

Ill 

Already  in  the  New  Testament  period  the  Christian 
idea  of  God  had  been  profoundly  indebted  not  only  to  the 
Hebrew,  but  almost  more  to  the  Greek  conception.     This 


*  Tennyson,  Lucretius. 


HISTORICAL  SKETCH  43 

union   of  Hebrew    and   Greek   thought  which  began   to 
appear  in  several  writings  of  the  Old  Testament  and  in  ^jO 

the  Apocrypha  is  still  more  significant  in  the  New  Testa-^  ^^^^''^;^^^^-^ 
ment.    This  is  evident  from  several  facts,  such  as  empha- 
sis on  the  transcendence  of  God,  the  Logos  doctrine,  and 
the  beginning  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Spirit  of  God  as  a 
distinct  subsistence.   fLater  in  the  early  church  FatHerT"" 
and   the  Apologists   this   coalescence   became   still   more  . 

impressive.  It  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  idea  of  God  '/v*-'^  /  ^ 
developed  for  the  most  part  on  Greek  soil,  that  its  chief 
exponents  had  been  trained  in  Greek  philosophy,  that  the 
idea  had  to  justify  itself  to  the  Greek  consciousness,  since 
it  was  here  that  Christianity  was  making  its  first  great 
conquest;  and  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  Greek  mind 
had  something  to  offer  to  what  had  already  been  found 
true  in  Christian  belief.  In  the  situation  created  by  the 
most  intimate  contact  of  Christianity  with  the  Greek 
spirit,  theologians  were  confronted  by  serious  tasks:  to 
maintain  and  develop  the  ethical  monotheism  of  the  Old 
and  New  Testaments  against  polytheism;  to  identify  the 
God  of  revelation  with  the  absolutely  transcendent  Being 
of  Platonist  and  Neo-Platonist  speculative  thought;  to 
investigate  the  inner  nature  of  God  with  reference  to  its 
essential  unity,  to  the  Logos  as  the  eternal  revealing  prin- 
ciple, and  to  its  self-communicating  activity.  To  effect 
this  aim  there  were  brought  into  play  the  highest  cate- 
gories of  Greek  thought. 

At  no  time  in  the  history  of  the  Christian  church  has 
the  doctrine  of  God  been  in  so  precarious  a  position  as 
in  the  centuries  preceding  Augustine.  Four  great  con- 
temporary movements,  all  originating  in  the  same  general 
motive,  threatened  each  in  its  own  way  to  rob  Christianity 
of  the  God  whom  its  faith  had  enshrined  as  the  God  and 
Father  of  Jesus  Christ — Mithraism,  Gnosticism,  Neo-Pla- 


44  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

tonism,  and  Manichaeism.  Each  of  these  was  primarily  a 
,  ;  product  of  the  Aryan  genius,  and  each  thrust  the  ultimate 
\  "^v  idea  of  God  into  a  region  inaccessible  to  experience,  where 
/  even  the  possibility  of  ethical  definition  was'  excluded.  In 
I  the  background  of  all  of  these  was  a  common  feeling,  the 
need  of  redemption.  Never  has  the  opposition  between  the 
sensuous  and  the  spiritual,  between  matter  and  mind,  be- 
tween the  actual  and  the  ideal,  been  sharpened  to  a  more 
radical  contrast  and  contradiction  than  in  the  circles  in 
.,  which  these  religions  originated.  The  soul,  weighted  down 
by  the  material,  enslaved  by  the  senses,  fettered  by  the 
flesh,  and  longing  for  deliverance,  could  be  satisfied  by 
nothing  less  than  release  from  earth  and  elevation  to 
its  celestial  home.  Mysticism,  mythology,  speculation, 
fantastic  gropings  after  incongruous  elements,  coupled 
with  a  deep  sincerity  of  purpose,  characterized  all  these 
movements  of  the  human  spirit.  In  these  faiths,  however, 
the  divine,  the  world,  man,  and  redemption,  while  marked 
by  many  common  features  belonging  to  them  and  Chris- 
tianity, were  after  all  different  from  what  was  essential 
to  Christianity.  On  the  absorption  or  disappearance  of 
these  forms  of  religion  depended  the  continued  existence 
of  the  Christian  faith.  It  would  have  been  a  calamity  if 
any  one  of  these  or  a  fusion  of  two  or  more  of  them  had 
displaced  Christianity  as  a  religion  of  redemption.  It 
was  a  perilous  moment  for  the  idea  of  God  when  the 
Hebrew  people  passed  from  the  nomadic  to  the  agricul- 
tural stage,  and  again  from  the  life  of  the  fields  to  that 
of  the  city,  but  none  of  these  transitions  was  fraught  with 
the  danger  which  lay  in  wait  for  it  as  it  found  itself 
plunged  into  the  welter  of  Greek  speculative  thought  and 
oriental  mysticism.  Among  the  "ifs  of  history"  one  is 
appalled  as  he  contemplates  the  possible  consequences  of 
the  defeat  of  Christianity  by  one  of  these  faiths,  as,  for 


HISTORICAL  SKETCH  45 

example,  Mithraism.  "The  crisis  was  one  the  gravity  of 
which  it  would  be  difficult  to  over-estimate.  There  have 
been  crises  since  in  the  history  of  Christianity,  but  there 
is  none  which  equals  in  its  importance  this,  upon  the  issue 
of  which  it  depended  for  all  time,  whether  Christianity 
should  be  regarded  as  a  body  of  revealed  doctrine,  or  as 
the  caput  mortuum  of  a  hundred  philosophies — whether 
the  basis  of  Christianity  should  be  a  definite  and  definitely 
interpreted  creed,  or  a  chaos'  of  speculations."  ^ 

The  advocates  of  the  Christian  idea  of  God  have  been 
reproached — and  not  without  justification — for  the  myth- 
ological ingredients  of  their  theology :  mysticism  in  which 
feeling  and  vague    aspir«,tion    sometimes     crowded    out 
rational  judgment ;  sacramentalism  which  endowed  selected 
objects  and  many  rites  with  efficacious  virtue;  specula- 
tion by  which  they  incorporated  incongruous  Greek  ideas* 
into  the  very  substance  of  their  thought;  but  when  one 
has  acknowledged  the  full  force  of  these  and  other  alle- 
gations, it  yet  remains  true  that,  in  comparison  with  the 
representatives  of  the  other  faiths,  their  very  extrava- 
gances are  convincing  proof  of  their  fundamental  sanity. 
/instead  of  shivering  the  idea  of  God  into  irridescent  frag- 
V  ments  of  speculative   fancy,   their  last  word  concerning 
\him  was  that  of  ethical  personality.     The  world  under 
>  control  of  demonic  powers,  malign  and  hostile  to  man, 
was  the  work  of  God  and  therefore  subject  to  his  sovereign 
will.     Man  in  spite  of  his  subjection  to  these  destructive 
powers  was  yet  free  and  capable  of  immortality  through 
reception  of  the  nature  of  God.   And  Christianity,  instead 
of  being  a  purely  speculative,  or  mythological,  or  even 
simply  an  ethical,  religion,  was  a  religion  of  redemption, 
(  traced  to  a  definite  historical  person,  in  whom  God  had 


*  Hatch,  Organization  of  the  Early  Christian  Church,  p.  96. 


46  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

taken  up  human  nature  into  union  with  himself,  in  whom 
therefore  he  had  come  to  men  with  forgiveness  of  sins 
and  the  promise  and  power  of  eternal  life.  However  far 
it  might  wander  from  the  simplicity  of  its  founder's  spirit 
and  aim,  it  possessed,  as  did  none  of  the  other  faiths,  in 
the  life  and  purpose  of  its  founder,  a  principle  of  renewal. 
Christianity  was  fortunate  also  in  the  type  of  men 
who  became  its  advocates  in  this  early  day.  They  felt 
and  rightly  felt  that  the  question  of  supreme  moment  was 
the  idea  of  God,  and  upon  this  they  concentrated  the  vast 
energy  of  their  thought.  As  a  result  of  the  long  debate, 
certain  aspects  of  the  Christian  idea  of  God  received 
statement  which  with  comparatively  little  change  have 
remained  in  force  for  more  than  a  thousand  years.  The 
general  results  may  be  summarized.  (1)  The  mythologi- 
cal elements  which  still  clung  to  the  Aryan  ideas-  of  God 
were  for  the  most  part  done  away ;  if  there  still  lingered 
traces  of  this,  even  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  and  the 
person  of  Christ,  the  writers  were  not  themselves  conscious 
of  it.  (2)  The  tension  between  the  God  of  the  Old  Testa- 
ment and  the  God  of  the  New  Testament  which  had  been 
alleged  by  the  Gnostics  was  relieved;  instead  of  conceiv- 
ing of  the  God  of  the  Old  Testament  as  a  being  below 
the  supreme  God,  vengeful  or  even  just,  and  the  God  of 
the  New  Testament  as  the  highest  and  true  God,  merciful 
and  just,  they  set  upon  a  secure  foundation  the  unity  of 
God  in  his  historical  action  over  the  chosen  people,  the 
Christian  church,  and  the  world.  (3)  The  absoluteness 
of  God  which  had  from  several  directions  been  threatened 
was  guarded  from  any  suggestion  of  limitation;  in  his 
essential  being  he  existed  utterly  apart  from  space  and 
time,  both  of  which  were  due  to  his  creative  action ;  even 
as  these  began  by  the  divine  will,  so  by  the  same  will 
they  might  cease  to  be. 


HISTORICAL  SKETCH  47 

The  Gnostics  had  referred  the  origination  of  the  world 
to  a  process  in  the  ultimate  background  of  the  divine 
nature;  the  Neo-Platonists  had  described  it  as  an  over- 
flowing or  as  a  streaming  forth  from  the  primordial  inex- 
pressible One.  According  to  both,  this  process  took  its 
rise  in  the  inner  eternal  nature  of  the  Source  of  all,  and 
hence  in  sheer  necessity.  On  the  other  hand,  early  Chris- 
tian writers,  even  when  they  held  that  the  act  of  creation 
was  eternal,  maintained  that  it  originated  in  the  divine 
will  and  that  this  will  was  free.  Thus  the  dualism  which 
had  shadowed  Neo-Platonism  and  Manichaeism,  setting 
up  an  eternal  antithesis  between  God  and  the  world, 
between  God  and  evil,  disappeared  by  the  reduction  of 
one  of  these  terms — the  utter  dependence  of  the  world  and 
evil  on  God.  God  alone  was  real.  The  world  was  created. 
Sin  originated  with  man.  Evil  had  no  metaphysical  exist- 
ence ;  and  even  if  it  is  acknowledged  as  henceforth  unend- 
ing, it  is  wholly  within  the  power  of  God ;  he  can  abolish 
it  and  the  world  in  which  it  appears  at  any  instant,  if  he 
so  wills. 

The  pure  spirituality  of  God  was  not,  however,  the 
only  form  of  conceiving  of  him  at  this  time.  Tertullian 
presented  God  as  substantial.  Without  body,  members, 
form,  and  beauty  there  would  be  no  God ;  hence  no  prayer 
and  no  worship,  since  these  are  not  possible  except  toward 
concrete  personality.  The  corporeality  is  not  that  of 
human  beings ;  and  if  human  qualities  are  attributed  to 
God,  they  are  such  only  in  surpassing  de^ee.  Herein 
Tertullian  discloses  his  affinity  with  Jewish  anthropo- 
morphism and  with  Stoicism.  The  theory  of  God  as  sub- 
stantial appears  to  be  very  congenial  to  the  human  mind. 
Theologians  have  never  for  any  length  of  time  been  able 
to  free  themselves  from  this  point  of  view.  The  pure 
spirituality  of  God  is  too  abstract  a  notion  to  appeal  to 


48  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

any  but  the  most  abstruse  metaphysical  thinkers.  It  can 
point  to  no  analogies,  for  in  the  entire  circuit  of  our  ex- 
perience there  is  no  mind  without  embodiment.  Moreover, 
there  would  be  nothing  to  quicken  the  imagination.  Faith 
and  love  cling  only  to  the  concrete.  For  such  reasons-  as 
these  the  Hebrews  never  rose  to  the  conception  of  God 
as  purely  spiritual.  Later  we  shall  see  how  the  feeling 
of  Tertullian  has  haunted  and  influenced  theologians  in 
succeeding  periods. 

C'^At  this  time  little  attempt  was  made  to  find  God  in 
experience.  The  interest  was  apologetic,  to  clear  the  idea 
of  God  from  misapprehensions  which  Christians  were 
accused  of  holding,  and  to  show  that  this  idea  embraced 
all  that  was  of  worth  in  the  Greek  thought  of  the  divine. 
They  aimed  also  to  convince  their  countrymen  of  the 
truth  of  Christianity;  and  since  this  centered  in  the  idea 
of  God,  it  was  perfectly  natural  for  the  church  Fathers 
to  seek  to  make  this  idea  at  home  in  the  highest  reaches 
of  Greek  speculation. 


IV 

/  In  Augustine  the  tendencies  culminated  which  had  been 
I  active  in  the  church  since  its  beginning.  In  general,  these 
/  \may  be  reduced  to  two — the  rational  and  the  empirical. 
He  had  first  of  all  been  profoundly  indebted  to  a  series 
of  religious  philosophies.  In  his  Confessions  he  relates 
the  stages  through  which  he  passed  in  maturing  his  Chris- 
tian ideas.  First,  Manichaeism  in  which  God,  conceived 
of  as  substantial  light,  was  the  God  in  absolute  distinction 
and  separation  from  darkness  or  evil  and  from  the  mate- 
rial world.  Later,  in  Neo-Platonism  he  found  a  point 
of  view  for  conserving  two  interests — the  Logos  doctrine 
of  the  New  Testament — the  divine  principle  of  revelation, 


il 


HISTORICAL  SKETCH  49 

and,  with  the  Logos  as  a  mediating  principle  between  God 
and  the  world,  a  pure  and  perfect  Being  inaccessible  alike 
o  experience  and  to  thought.  Apart  from  his  relation 
to  the  world,  God  is  to  an  incomparable  degree  the  Abso- 
lute One,  Simple  Being,  as  distinguished  from  the  mani- 
fold and  changing  existences  of  the  phenomenal  world. ^ 
This  position  involved  certain  elements  which  are  perhaps 

.not  susceptible  of  complete  reconciliation.  On  the  one 
pand,  he  affirms  not  what  God  is,  but  what  he  is  not  ^ — 
a  fact  which  should  be  emphasized  but  not  over-empha- 
sized. Augustine  is  not  the  only  sinner  in  this  regard, 
for  he  shares  with  nearly  all  the  great  theologians  this 
contradictory  attitude.  On  the  other  hand,  God  is  essentia, 

\  that  is,  he  is  the  immanent  reality  in  all  existence.^  His 
knowledge  is  an  eternal  fullness,  self-identical,  an  intuition 
of  the  eternally  present,  in  no  way  conditioned  by  the 
finite  which  exists  only  because  God  knows  it.  He  is  the 
highest  good  and  self-contained.  Augustine  turned  from 
Manlchaeism  because  It  found  the  origin  of  evil  in  an  ulti- 
mate and  eternal  dualism,  but  he  retained  its  conception 
of  the  immeasurable  transcendence  of  God.  Neo-Platon- 
ism  appealed  to  him  by  reason  of  its  doctrine  of  the 
infinite  elevation  of  God  above  the  world  and  its  doctrine 
of  the  over-soul  by  which  the  inaccessible  God  communi- 
cates his  Being  to  the  world.  Although  both  Manlchaeism 
and  Neo-Platonism  were  unsatisfactory  as  a  philosophy 
of  life,  yet  their  fundamental  ideas  were  preserved  in  his 
Christian  doctrine  of  God. 

Augustine  was  also  deeply  indebted  to  Dionysius  the 
Areopagite  for  contrasting  elements  in  his  conception  of 
God.     In  Dionysius  for  the  first  time  the  attempt  was 


^De  Civitate  Dei,  11,  12.    De  trin.  6:4-6. 
^De  trin.  6:2. 
*Ibid.  6:2. 


1 


50  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

made  to  blend  a  fully  developed  Neo-Platonism  with 
Christianity.  Augustine  was  no  less  a  mystic  than  was 
Dionysius,  but  in  contrast  to  the  Areopagite  he  sought  in 
experience  the  secret  of  the  Eternal.  The  nature  of 
Augustine  was  one  of  extreme  richness ;  while  others  might 
be  content  with  a  mystic  philosophy  whose  roots  pushed 
deep  into  the  soil  of  rationalism,  he  could  rest  only  when 
the  claims  of  his  heart  were  satisfied.  Accordingly,  his 
experience  provided  the  other  source  of  his  idea  of  God. 
One  might  indeed  say  that  among  Christian  theologians 
before  Augustine  there  had  never  been  any  immediate 
experience  of  God.  St.  Paul's  experience  had  been  with 
the  "risen  Christ."  With  Augustine,  however,  "grace" 
took  the  place  of  Christ.  God  was  his  alter-ego,  his  other 
and  completing  self,  who  searched  and  to  whom  at  the 
same  time  he  laid  bare  the  inmost  secrets  of  his  soul. 
God  was  his  better  self  before  whom  he  poured  out  his 
most  intimate  confessions  and  his  penitential  tears.  He 
carried  on  an  inner  dialogue  between  himself  and  his  ideal 
of  truth  and  purity,  which  ever  and  again  blinded  him  by 
the  ineffable  splendor  of  its  beauty  and  grace.  The  sig- 
nificance of  this  aspect  of  Augustine's  idea  of  God  cannot 
be  overestimated.  Instead  of  continuing  as  an  object  of 
speculative  regard,  however  this  might  minister  to  a 
theory  of  redemption,  God  comes  to  live  with  him,  thinks- 
in  his  thoughts,  and  shares  his  changing  emotions. 
For  him  the  question  of  the  prophet  receives  its  satis- 
fying answer:  "Will  God  verily  dwell  with  men  on  the 
earth.?" 

Such  was  the  energy  of  Augustine's  experience  of  God 
that  it  has  been  continuously  influential  in  all  later  gen- 
erations. It  has  made  itself  felt  in  the  highest  degree  in 
those  who  have  sought  perfect  union  with  God  as  the  goal 
of  long  discipline,  in  those  who  have  found  here  and  now 


HISTORICAL  SKETCH  51 

in  communion  with  God  the  fruition  of  their  longings; 
and  even  the  common  majo  has  a  new  courage  as  he  feels : 

"No  distant  Lord  have  I 
Loving  afar  to  be ; 
Made  flesh  for  me,  he  cannot  rest 
Until  he  rests  in  me." 

Such  an  idea  of  God  as  that  of  Augustine  is  not  without 
its  dangers  which  have  not  seldom  been  realized.  (1)  It 
tends  in  an  excessive  degree  to  individualize  God  and  the 
^relation  of  the  soul  to  him.  (2)  It  tends  also  to  encour- 
age a  type  of  experience  in  which  one  detaches  himself 
from  the  social  group  that  he  may  the  more  uninter- 
ruptedly "enjoy  his  religion."  That  this  is  not,  however, 
an  inevitable  consequence  of  the  idea  in  question  may  be 
seen  in  Augustine  himself,  a  man  of  the  most  prodigious 
social  activity  both  as  writer  and  as  administrator  of 
great  affairs,  in  St.  Bernard,  St.  Francis  of  Assisi,  St. 
Theresa,  Luther,  John  Wesley,  and  Schleiermacher. 

Augustine  attempted  no  reconciliation  of  the  opposite 
poles  of  his  co«iception  of  God — the  God  afar  off  and 
the  God  who  was  near.  In  some  moods  he  took  refuge 
in  one,  in  very  different  moods  he  found  strength  in  the 
other,  aspect.  It  may  be  questioned  whether  he  was  aware 
of  the  inner  incompatibility  of  the  two  points  of  view. 
Nor  are  we  In  position  to  imagine  in  what  way  he  would 
have  sought  an  adjustment,  if  the  problem  had  presented 
itself.  In  any  case,  no  one  has  ever  set  forth  these  two 
aspects  of  the  idea  of  God — whether  contrasting  or  com- 
plementary— with  such  energy  of  conviction  as  this  great 
Father  of  speculation  and  experience.  Partly  for  this 
reason  and  partly  on  account  of  the  conditions  of  thought 
for  more   than   fourteen   hundred   years    afterward,   the 


52  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

greater  theologians  followed  in  his  steps,  yet  mostly  in  the 
mystic  and  speculative  rather  than  the  experimental  path. 


For  more  than  a  thousand  years,  however,  no  one  added 
to  Augustine's  thought  of  God.  In  the  ninth  century 
John  Scotus  Erigena,  in  the  twelfth  century  Bernard  of 
Clairvaux  and  Hugo  and  Richard  of  St.  Victor,  in  the 
thirteenth  century  Thomas  Aquinas,  in  the  fourteenth 
century  Meister  Eckhart,  and  in  the  seventeenth  century 
the  Cambridge  Platonists  did  no  more  than  by  the  aid  of 
the  reigning  philosophy — Neo-Platonist,  Aristotelian,  or 
Platonist — to  unfold  the  mystic  or  speculative  side  of 
Augustine's  conception.  God  is  presented  as  incompre- 
hensible and  ineffable,  the  Absolute  Mystery,  in  which  all 
affirmations  and  counter  affirmations  are  annulled  and 
reconciled  ;^  or,  since  man's  intelligence  is  his  highest  pre- 
rogative, he  may  with  Aristotle  regard  God  aS'  pure 
thought,  or  with  the  Neo-Platonists  as  pure  Being,  the 
ineffable  Absolute,  utterly  transcending  human  knowl- 
edge :  one  may  not  know  what  God  is  but  only  what  he  is 
not,  or  one  may  deny  to  the  Godhead  even  the  highest 
categories  and  yet  maintain  that  the  essence  both  of  the 
world  and  of  the  soul  is  God. 

In  general  two  paths  led  to  the  idea  of  God.  The  first 
was  the  speculative,  depending  on  a  theory  of  knowledge, 
the  Aristotelian  logic,  and  a  peculiar  dialectic  developed 
by  the  Western  mind.  The  second  was  the  contemplative, 
which  alone  promised  the  highest  satisfaction  to  the 
heart's  desire  to  know  God;  at  the  end  of  a  severe  dis- 


Erigena. 


HISTORICAL  SKETCH  53 

ciplinary  process  thought  is  transcended,  effort  laid  to 
rest,  and  in  love  the  soul  is  united  to  God ;  or  again  not 
a  logical  conception  but  an  intuitive  vision  of  God  crowns 
the  endeavor  to  know  him;  or  once  more  the  soul  having 
withdrawn  from  all  outward  things  and  from  sense-per- 
ception into  its  inmost  self,  lets  the  absolute  T)eity  which 
is  its  true  essence  become  all.  Plainly  this  is  mysticism. 
Whatever  mysticism  is, — and  no  two  definitions  agree, — 
it  witnesses  to  an  indestructible  conviction  that  there  is 
such  an  affinity  between  the  soul  of  man  and  the  ultimate 
reality  of  the  world  that  not  by  discursive  thought  but  by 
an  immediateness  of  consciousness  the  soul  becomes  aware 
of  God  or  feels  its  oneness  with  him. 

Two  other  aspects  of  the  idea  of  God  appeared  during 
these  cjenturies,  both  of  which  were  a  revival  of  Augus- 
tine's conception.  One  of  these  (Duns  Scotus)  found  in 
the  divine  will  the  final  truth  of  his  being.  Thus  atten- 
tion was  turned  wholly  aside  from  a  doctrine  of  God  which 
had  prevailed  since  Tertullian,  from  God  as  infinite  sub- 
stance to  God  as  purely  dynamic,  conceived  as  force  or 
will.  This  conception  has  its  root  in  Augustine's  theory 
of  predestination,  echoing  a  bold  suggestion  of  St.  Paul, 
that  will  in  God  may  be  both  ultimate  and  arbitrary. 
Such  a  view  involved  serious  consequences  for  both  the 
present  and  the  future  idea  of  God,  and  for  the  meaning 
of  his  relation  to  a  world  of  moral  beings.  If  the  primacy 
of  will  in  God  is  absolute,  then  the  rational  either  wholly 
disappears  or  is  subordinate  to  the  volitional  element,  and 
his  will  becomes  the  only  source  of  truth  and  justice  and 
all  ideals.  Another  more  favorable  consequence  would  be 
that  the  defining  characteristic  of  the  being  of  God  is 
not  a  static  changelessness,  but  activity.  No  self-contem- 
plative felicity,  no  fullness  of  being,  however  this  is 
described,  but  energetic  purposiveness,  an  eternal  will  of 


64  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

good  IS  the  essential  nature  of  God.  Later  generations 
will  more  fully  define  this  will  and  its  relation  to  the  world, 
both  of  things  and  of  men,  but  a  note  has  been  struck 
which  is  destined  id  dominate  the  idea  of  God. 

The  other  aspect  referred  to  has  its  bearing  on  the 
relation  of  God  to  experience.  From  this  point  of  view 
the  speculative  quest  was  ignored.  What  God  might  be 
for  the  soul's  daily  needs  was  alone  considered.  St. 
Francis  of  Assisi,  St.  Bernard  of  Clairvaux,  St.  Catherine 
of  Siena,  and  St.  Theresa  are  only  instances  of  those  at 
this  time  to  whom  God  was  more  real  than  their  own 
intensely  living  selves.  They  offered  no  criticism  of  the 
idea  of  the  inner  being  of  God  as  transcendent  and  unap- 
proachable,— this  in  common  with  others  of  their  day 
they  acknowledged, — ^but  this  aspect  of  God  was  not  their 
chief  interest.  And  we  must  not  place  it  to  their  discredit 
that,  instead  of  resting  content  with  speculating  on  God 
as  others  had  done,  they  found  their  supreme  satisfaction 
in  the  most  intimate  converse  with  him,  more  intimate, 
more  constant,  tender,  and  affectionate  indeed  than  with 
any  earthly  friend.  If  God  is  one  who  enters  into  com- 
munion with  men,  who  with  unwearied  and  inspiring  sym- 
pathy follows  them  in  the  vicissitudes  of  their  experience, 
to  whom  they  may  pour  out  the  most  trivial  no  less  than 
the  most  serious  concerns  of  their  hearts,  then  the  future 
of  piety  is  safe,  and  religion  as  an  experience  may  renew 
itself  with  each  new  generation  of  those  who  seek  God. 


VI 


For  several  hundred  years  until  Spinoza,  no  distinctive 
feature  was  added  to  the  idea  of  God.  Luther,  Calvin, 
and  Zwingli,  each  from  a  different  angle  and  with  varying 


HISTORICAL  SKETCH  65 

shades  of  emphasis,  reproduced  only  Augustine's  point  of 
view.  With  Spinoza,  however,  a  new  cycle  began.  Not 
that  his  conception  was  wholly  new.  He  derived  from 
Neo-Platonism  a  transcendent  element,  from  Neo-Platon- 
ism,  the  Stoics,  and  Bruno  a  pantheistic  trend,  and  from 
Descartes  his  mathematical  impulse.  God  is  absolute  Sub- 
stance, self-existent,  all-inclusive,  hence  defined  by  nothing 
outside  of  himself.  Since  all  existence  known  to  us  is 
either  extension  or  thought,  and*  since  neither  of  these  is 
complete  in  itself,  each  has  to*  be  referred  to  an'  infinite 
existence  of  which  it  is  an  essential  attribute.  Beyond 
these  we  may  assume  the  existence  of  an  infinite  number 
of  attributes  in  the  All-Real  Being,  unknown  indeed  to 
us.  The  attributes  of  extension  and  thought  appear  in 
an  infinite  variety  of  finite  forms>  and  they  have  no-  exist- 
ence outside  of  these  forms.  God  is  thus  the  immanent 
causal  essence  in  all  things.  There  is  no  God  apart  from 
the  phenomenal  world,  and  no  world  apart  from  God. 
God  and  Nature  are  interchangeable  terms.  He  is  the 
active  principle  of  all  change  (natvra  rurturans),  and  he 
is  the  changing  forms  in  which  this  active  principle  em- 
bodies itself  (natura  naturata).  If  one  asks.  What  God 
is?  all  the  well  known  definitions  except  self-existence  fall 
away,  and  we  are  face  to  face  with  unrelieved  pantheism. 
God  is  free,  since  there  is  no  reality  outside  of  him  to 
limit  or  constrain,  but  at  the  same  time  he  is  necessitated 
by  his  essential  nature.  In  the  Deity  is  no  unified  self- 
consciousness,  no  discursive  intelligence,  no  purposive  will. 
Since  man  is  a  phase  of  God,  he  has  both  a  transient 
and  an  eternal  aspect, — transient,  so  far  as  he  appears 
in  ever  changing  modes;  eternal,  as  embodying  the  dual 
elements  of  extension  and  thought.  The  reality  of  man 
is  God. 

Leibnitz's  doctrine  of  God  occupies  a  point  of  view 


56  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

diametrically  opposed  to  that  of  Spinoza.  First  of  all, 
he  substitutes  Force  for  Substance,  or  rather  interprets 
substance  in  terms  of  force.  This  is  true  not  only  of 
God,  but  of  the  universe, — all  becomes  spiritual  and 
dynamic.  Whereas  Descartes  had  divided  reality  into 
three  elements,  God  as  the  most  perfect  Substance,  and 
the  world  as  finite  substance  consisting  of  extension  and 
thought  arbitrarily  connected  by  omnipotence,  and 
Spinoza  had  conceived  of  existence  and  thought  as  attri- 
butes of  the  one  Substance,  Leibnitz  held  that,  since  all 
reality  is  force,  even  bodies  no  less  than  minds  are  imma- 
terial and  illocal.  Thus  the  universe  is  composed  of  an 
infinite  number  of  monads  which  owe  their  existence  to 
the  central  creative  Monad  or  God.  This  highest  Monad, 
an  infinite  and  eternal  Being,  existing  apart  from  the 
world,  is  pure  and  perfect  intelligence  and  activity.  Such 
is  the  nature  of  his  consciousness  that  before  the  creation 
of  this  imiverse  he  presented  to  himself  an  infinite  number 
of  possible  worlds;  among  all  of  these  as  possible,  some 
degree  of  evil,  both  metaphysical  and  moral,  was  unavoid- 
able. Although  he  was  free  to  create  or  not  to  create, 
yet  such  was  his  wisdom  and  goodness  that  if  he  saw  fit 
to  create,  he  could  not  but  choose  to  give  actuality  to 
that  universe  which  contained  the  least  evil,  that  is,  the 
best  of  all  possible  worlds.  In  his  creative  activity,  God 
made  the  finite  monads  each  absolutely  independent  of 
all  others,  and  yet  at  the  same  time  so  interrelated  from 
the  point  of  view  of  mechanism  and  teleology  that 
together  they  form  a  perfect  correspondence  of  activity, 
so  revealing  a  pre-established  harmony.  Now  for  the 
first  time  in  the  idea  of  God  and  the  world  we  pass  from 
monism  and  dualism  to  a  vital  pluralism. 


HISTORICAL  SKETCH  67 

VII 

Until  the  last  third  of  the  eighteenth  century  philos- 
ophers and  theologians  had  not  seriously  questioned 
whether  the  human  reason  was  competent  to  arrive  at 
the  truth  concerning  God.  The  many  diverse  views  and 
the  endless  controversies  respecting  the  idea  of  God  sug- 
gested neither  discouragement  nor  hesitancy  in  the 
unwearied  quest  for  reality.  With  Hume  and  Kant,  how- 
ever,— with  each  for  a  different  reason, — ^began  an  atti- 
tude of  mind  which  has  influenced  much  thinking  until 
the  present  hour.  Hume,  who  applied  the  psychological 
and  historical  test  to  the  meaning  of  religion,  is  unable 
to  reach  a  conclusion  concerning  the  being  of  God  with 
which  he  is  satisfied;  and  Kant,  in  his  divorce  of  the 
theoretical  from  the  practical  reason,  allows  the  practical 
reason  the  only  valid  word  concerning  God.  In  response 
to  the  rational  demand  one  may  indeed  posit  a  reality  to 
which  may  be  assigned  "necessity,  infinity,  extra-mundane 
existence,  freedom  from  limitations  of  time  and  space," 
but  since  this  postulate  transcends  all  experience,  it  is 
insusceptible  of  proof  or  disproof.  In  answer  to  the 
moral  demand  one  may  postulate  a  God  who  guarantees 
the  validity  of  the  highest  good,  and  is  therefore  the 
kind  of  being  who  will  crown  our  endeavors  with  happi- 
ness. In  this  way  he  opened  the  door  to  the  conception 
of  God  as  a  being  inconceivable  to  thought,  but  an  object 
to  which  we  yield  ourselves  in  faith  and  self-surrender. 

This  general  point  of  view  has  determined  the  idea  of 
God  as  presented  by  many  influential  writers ;  in  Great 
Britain  by  Hamilton,  Mansel,  Spencer,  Matthew  Arnold, 
John  Henry  Newman,  and  Balfour;  in  America  by  Horace 
Bushnell.  Each  of  these  thinkers  has  his  own  reasoning 
by  which  he  explained  and  justified  his  peculiar  way  of 


68  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

approach  to  the  idea  of  God.  Hamilton  held  that  while 
the  Infinite  cannot  be  known,  on  account  of  the  relativity 
of  knowledge  and  the  philosophy  of  the  unconditioned, 
yet  it  "is,  must,  and  ought  to  be  believed.*'  Mansel  con- 
tended that  the  human,  mind,  in  virtue  of  its  constitution, 
involves  itself  in  contradiction  whenever  it  ventures  to 
speculate  concerning  the  Infinite,  the  Absolute,  and  Per- 
sonality as  applied  to  God.  We  are  therefore  thrown 
back  upon  supernatural  revelation  for  the  source  of  our 
knowledge  concerning  all  that  relates  to  God, — a  revela- 
tion addressed  to  faith.  Accordingly,  there  is  no  rational 
standard  for  a  criticism  of  the  traditional,  or,  for  that 
matter,  any  notion  of  God.  An  attitude  not  unlike  that 
of  Mansel  was  advocated  by  John  Henry  Newman. 

Herbert  Spencer  sought  a  middle  path  in  which  to 
reconcile  the  conflicting  interests  of  several  tendencies, 
as,  for  example,  the  Positive  Philosophy  of  August  Comte, 
according  to  which,  since  phenomena  alone  can  be  known, 
the  question  of  an  Absolute  may  be  altogether  ignored; 
the  philosophy  of  Hamilton  in  which  the  relativity  of 
knowledge  was  coupled  with  certainty  concerning  the 
reality  of  the  Absolute  and  Unconditioned ;  the  evolution- 
ary view  of  science  in  which  the  organic  world  is  conceived 
of  as  developing  according  to  law — the  method  of  crea- 
tion; and  current  theories  according  to  which  both  God 
and  the  world  are  equally  real  to  thought.  For  Spencer 
the  idea  of  the  "Ultimate  Reality"  was  an  "absolute  datum 
of  consciousness."  We  cannot,  however,  know  this  Ulti- 
mate Reality,  since  to  know  is  to  limit  and  thus  to 
separate  what  is  known  from  the  Unlimited  and  Unknow- 
able. This  agnosticism  is  qualified  by  affirming  the  reality 
of  a  First  Cause,  a  Power  present  in  all  things,  an  Infinite 
and  Eternal  Energy  from  which  all  things  proceed,  of 
the  same  nature  as  that  which  wells  up  in  consciousness. 


HISTORICAL  SKETCH  69 

When  all  is  said,  we  are  in  the  presence  of  an  Eternal 
Mystery  before  which  our  true  attitude  is  that  of  rever- 
ence and  awe.  The  implications  of  Spencer's  doctrine 
were  developed  by  John  Fiske  in  a  clear  and  consistent 
theism. 

Matthew  Arnold  adopted  the  general  view  of  Hamilton 
and  Mansel  concerning  the  unknowableness  of  God  as 
the  Ultimate  Reality.  He  sought  to  conserve  the  religious 
value  of  God  by  two  considerations:  (1)  Our  apprehen- 
sions of  reality  are  embodied  not  in  terms  of  exact  knowl- 
edge, but  of  poetry  and  eloquence.  The  term  God  does 
not  submit  itself  to  a  logical  formula,  but  is  poetic  and 
literary  and  is  thus  sufficient  for  our  practical  needs. ^ 
(2)  For  the  personality  of  God  he  substituted  the  mem- 
orable phrase,  "An  enduring  Power,  not  ourselves,  that 
makes  for  righteousness."  ^ 

Rising  out  of  the  same  general  background  are  the 
views  of  two  widely  influential  writers,  Ritschl  and  Saba- 
tier.  Ritschl  excluded  metaphyiscs  from  theology,  and 
with  this  went  his  rejection  of  speculative  theism.  More- 
over, ecclesiastical  dogma,  a  mixture  of  theology  and 
Greek  metaphysics,  must  undergo  a  sifting  in  which  all 
cosmological  speculation  is  swept  away.  The  only  values 
which  are  enshrined  in  religious  knowledge  relate  to  pleas- 
ure and  pain  and  find  their  meaning  not  in  looking  back- 
ward to  causation,  but  forward  to  purpose.  Accordingly, 
as  Kant  observed,  the  idea  of  God  belongs  to  the  region 
of  practical  faith  rather  than  of  theoretical  knowledge; 
and  the  content  of  the  idea  will  be  perfectly  expressed  in 
that  of  a  loving  Will  revealed  in  the  reciprocal  relations 
between  Christ  and  God,  by  which  those  who  trust  in  him 


*  Literature  and  Dogma,  p.  11. 
*Ibid.,  p.  62. 


60  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

are  assured  of  spiritual  dominion  over  the  world  and  a 
perfect  moral  fellowship  in  his  kingdom  as  the  highest 
good.  For  Sabatier  our  knowledge  of  God  is  concerned 
neither  with  metaphysics  nor  with  cosmology,  but  only 
with  his  will  so  far  as  related  to  us.  We  are  in  no  uncer- 
tainty as  to  the  meaning  of  God  which  answers  to  the 
need  of  our  hearts.  The  inner  contradictions  of  our  being, 
the  devastating  threat  of  the  external  world,  and  the 
conflict  of  the  self  with  the  world,  waken  in  the  conscious- 
ness that  which  solves  the  discord  in  a  final  harmony.  If 
human  life  is  to  eventuate  in  personality,  then  God  must 
be  the  inevitable  postulate  of  man's  moral  and  spiritual 
ideal. 

As  long  ago  as  1848  Horace  Bushnell  had  been  engaged 
on  essentially  the  same  problem  and  he  arrived  at  the 
same  general  result.  By  a  theory  of  language  instead  of 
by  a  theory  of  knowledge  he  emancipates  his  thought  of 
God  from  metaphysics.  The  gospel  is  a  gift  to  the  imag- 
ination. The  idea  of  God  which  rises  from  one's  religious 
experience  is  so  defined  as  to  meet  the  demands  of  that 
experience.  If  Bushnell  had  been  familiar  with  the  phil- 
osophy of  Kant,  it  is  more  than  doubtful  if  he  would 
have  adopted  it  in  preference  to  his  own  method,  as 
pointing  the  way  to  his  conclusion.  The  Absolute  as 
such  had  no  meaning  for  him;  only  as  it  came  into  some 
instrumental  relation  to  us  could  we  become  interested. 
He  therefore  conceived  of  representative  forms  standing 
out,  as  it  were,  from  the  Absolute — the  dramatis  personae 
of  revelation,  conveying  to  us  as  far  as  possible  the  infinite 
in  finite  terms.  The  Son  bodies  God  forth  in  the  creation 
and  government  of  the  world  and  at  last  as  incarnate 
in  human  form.  As  thus  incarnate  he  calls  out  and  sets 
over  himself  in  celestial  exaltation  the  Father,  imper- 
sonated  in   lively   convertible   form.      To   complete   thisi 


HISTORICAL  SKETCH  61 

representation  of  God,  the  Spirit  is  conceived  of  as  acting 
within  us  under  conditions  of  space  and  time.  The  key 
therefore  to  the  idea  of  God  as  revealed  is  found  in  the 
"instrumental  Trinity,"  the  incarnation,  and  the  Spirit 
as  permanently  operative  in  the  life  of  man. 


VIII 


The  idea  of  God  as  deriving  its  meaning  from  social 
experience  has  been  greatly  reinforced  by  the  psychology 
of  religion.  The  history  of  religion  shows  that  this  idea 
has  developed  in  correspondence  with  such  experiences. 
HoefFding  made  it  clear  that  the  psychological  notion  of 
God  took  its  rise  in  the  feeling  of  the  conservation  of 
value,  to  which  Professors  Irving  King  and  Edward  Scrib- 
ner  Ames  have  added  that  it  answers  to  the  consciousness 
of  the  highest  social  values.  The  idea  of  God  detached 
from  social  experiences  in  which  it  gets  its  only  meaning 
and  reduced  to  metaphysical  terms  is  a  pale  and  worthless 
abstraction.  Professor  Ames  likens  an  attempt  of  this 
sort  to  that  of  a  child  who  seeks  behind  the  mirror  for 
the  reality  whose  image  he  beholds.  Where  the  conscious- 
ness of  values  increases,  there  the  consciousness  of  God 
also  increases.  Not  backward  to  a  First  Cause,  nor  out- 
ward to  an  abstract  notion,  but  forward  to  the  age-long 
process  where  social  values  come  to  richest  expression, 
are  we  to  look  for  development  and  culmination  of  the 
idea  of  God. 

A  position  having  certain  points  of  affinity  with  that 
just  mentioned  is  winning  recognition.  God  is  defined 
not  as  infinite  Substance,  nor  as  imperturbable  Absolute, 
but  in  terms  of  progressive  purpose.  The  antithesis 
proposed  is — "The  immutable  Absolute  or  a  God  who 


(52  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

Strives."  ^  If  with  President  Faunce  God  is  conceived 
of  in  terms  of  purpose,  and  one  looks  for  this  purpose 
in  the  only  place  where  it  is  revealed,  several  very  sug- 
gestive inquiries  are  set  on  foot.  If  the  world  is  plastic 
and  growing,  unfinished  yet  progressively  realizing  an 
ideal,  is  the  divine  life  itself  more  finished  or  complete 
than  its  expression  in  finite  forms?  Are  not  the  limita- 
tions of  time  and  space,  the  inertia  and  opaqueness  of 
matter,  as  real  to  God  as  to  us?  Does  not  the  conflict 
of  good  and  evil  on  the  field  of  life,  and  especially  in 
the  consciousness  of  man,  disclose  the  fact  that  the  world- 
ground  is  itself  not  beyond  good  and  evil,  but  is  somehow 
identified  with  these,  in  sympathy  both  with  the  struggle 
for  existence  and  the  attainment  of  moral  values?  If 
God  is  the  same  yesterday,  to-day,  and  forever,  is  this 
because  he  is  a  changeless  Absolute  or  a  consistent  and 
changeless  purpose,  slowly  but  gradually  and  effectually 
realizing  itself  in  nature  and  human  life?  And  when 
finally  we  confess,  "I  believe  in  God  the  Father  Almighty," 
do  we  think  of  Cause  and  Substance  and  the  Absolute, 
or  of  a  conscious  Presence  which  pervades  all  with  a  good 
will,  a  will  which  indeed  outruns  immediate  realization, 
but  is  nevertheless  inextricably  involved  in  the  processes 
of  its  fulfillment?  The  meaning  of  God  is  thus  identified 
with  the  purpose  and  love  disclosed  in  the  world  of 
experience.^ 

On  this  subject,  as  on  so  many  others  pertaining  to 
religious  experience.  Professor  James  offers  suggestions 
which  have  the  force  of  confessions  of  personal  faith. 
(1)  He  writes,  "I  myself  believe  that  the  evidence  for 
God  lies  primarily  in  inner  personal  experience."  ^     (2) 


*Cf.  H.  W.  Wright,  Am.  Journal  of  Theology,  Vol.  XI,  pp.  128-130. 
=*Cf.  W.  H.  P.  Faunce,  What  Does  Christianity  Mean?  pp.  61  fF. 
'Pragmatism,  p.   109. 


HISTORICAL  SKETCH  6^ 

He  advocates  the  view  of  God  as  finite  against  the  doc- 
trine of  the  Absolute ;  the  latter  is  "an  improbable  hypoth- 
esis." He  thus  criticises  and  repudiates  the  monism  of 
Spinoza  in  which  the  many  are  dissolved  in  the  One,  and 
the  later  monism  of  the  idealists  in  which  the  many  exist 
indeed,  but  as  objects  of  the  eternal  thought  of  the  One. 
This  idea  of  God  is  more  consonant  with  the  pluralistic 
panpsychic  view  of  the  universe  into  which  we  have  been 
drawn;  furthermore,  it  provides  the  only  basis  for  main- 
taining the  fact  of  the  will  as  creative,  of  evil  as  not 
simply  appearance,  and  of  history  as  real.  In  addition, 
this  doctrine  means  for  God  environment,  time,  and  a 
history  like  our  own.  Finally,  such  a  conception  allies 
itself  with  the  actual  experience  of  men  in  relation  to 
God ;  for  however  men  have  thought  of  God  as  great,  and 
even  as  surpassing  human  comprehension,  they  have  never 
regarded  him  as  all-embracing,  and  have  always  affirmed 
an  "other,"  an  actual  environment  of  some  kind  beside 
him. 


III.  PRESENT-DAY  CONCEPTIONS 
OF  GOD 


A  COMPARISON  of  the  traditional  presentations  of  the 
idea  of  God  discloses  a  singular  sameness  in  the  a  priori 
method  of  approach  and  the  conclusions  reached.  The 
same  arguments  for  the  divine  existence  appear  and  reap- 
pear, only  varied  with  a  somewhat  different  shading  and 
perhaps  order  of  treatment,  with  here  and  there  an  argu- 
ment omitted  which  has  been  found  valid  by  other  thinkers. 
The  same  attributes  are  predicated  of  the  divine  nature, 
with  practically  the  same  names  but  with  different  classi- 
fication and  arrangement,  and  in  general  with  unimportant 
differences  of  definition.  Other  and  contrasting  concep- 
tions have  indeed  appeared,  as,  for  example,  by  Spinoza 
and  Hegel,  but  since  these  were  "unorthodox"  they  have 
had  little  appreciable  influence  upon  the  official  doctrine. 
Now,  however,  a  new  phenomenon  has  arisen.  From  a 
condition  of  almost  complete  rigidity  the  idea  of  God 
is  becoming  to  a  high  degree  plastic.  Many  innovating 
conceptions  of  God  are  not  only  put  forth,  but  are  receiv- 
ing wide  and  serious  consideration.  In  this  it  simply 
shares  the  movement  which  has  overtaken  all  ideas.  Vari- 
ous causes  have  conspired  to  this  result:  the  loosening  of 
the  hold  of  dogma  before  the  challenge  of  the  historical 
spirit;  the  transference  of  a  portion  of  authority  from 
the  outer  to  the  inner  court;  the  new  view  of  the  world 
with  reference  to  matter  and  energy,  space  and  time,  and 

64 


PRESENT-DAY  CONCEPTIONS  OF  GOD         65 

the  testimony  of  all  the  sciences;  the  new  psychology  in 
its  account  of  the  nature  and  development  of  the  religious 
consciousness ;  the  new  social  emphasis  in  which  the  center 
of  gravity  is  shifted  from  the  autocratic  to  the  democratic 
ideal;  finally,  and  perhaps  more  influential  than  all  of 
these  interests,  the  desire  to  find  some  interpretation  of 
reality  which  shall  approximately  express  the  reaction  of 
experience  to  the  infinite  mystery  of  the  world. 

This  condition  is  highly  significant,  although  it  may 
not  be  possible  to  come  at  its  full  meaning.  Yet  several 
conclusions  are  warranted:  the  traditional  idea  is  inade- 
quate ;  men  are  no  longer  content  to  have  a  God  at  second- 
hand; only  so  far  as  he  is  real  to  their  experience  is  any 
idea  of  him  valid;  the  fact  that  this  idea  has  once  more 
assumed  a  fluid  form  holds  the  condition  and  promise  of 
a  genuine  development;  finally,  the  idea  of  God  is  like 
other  ideas,  perfectible,  not  in  the  sense  that  it  will  ever 
be  completely  equivalent  to  its  object,  but  that  it  is  sus- 
ceptible of  endless  growth  and  forever  approximates,  even 
if  it  falls  short  of,  its  goal. 

Already  in  orthodox  circles  great  and  even  radical 
diversity  of  interpretation  of  the  idea  of  God  has  arisen 
without  calling  in  question  the  correctness  of  the  views 
themselves  or  the  authors  of  them.  That  these  views 
concern  the  actions  and  attitude  and  not  directly  the 
nature  or  character  of  God,  is  incidental.  Any  discussion 
of  God,  except  as  it  is  based  on  his  actual  working,  is 
purely  speculative;  on  the  other  hand,  the  character  of 
God  must  be  inferred  from  his  purposive  activity.  Here 
the  widest  latitude  of  thought  has  prevailed  and  almost 
every  conceivable  divergence  of  view  is  found.  By  one 
class  of  thinkers  predestination  is  defined  as  absolute  and 
final,  by  another  as  conditioned  on  foreknowledge.  Accord- 
ing to  one  view,  the  will  of  God  determines  human  choice ; 


66  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

according  to  another,  the  initiative  of  choice  is  wholly 
within  the  human  wiU.  Theories  of  the  relation  of  origi- 
nal sin  to  the  divine  judgment,  of  the  relation  of  sin — 
"permission  of  sin" — to  the  divine  will,  of  the  imputation 
of  the  guilt  of  sin  as  related  to  the  sin  of  Adam,  have 
been  broached  with  the  greatest  diversity  of  interpreta- 
tion. The  person  of  Christ  has  been  presented  in  manifold 
conflicting  forms:  his  essence  as  eternal;  his  twofold 
divine-human  nature;  his  knowledge;  his  humiliation;  his 
suffering ;  and  many  other  items  of  his  being  and  character 
have  received  the  utmost  variety  of  statement.  Concern- 
ing the  work  of  Christ  or  the  atonement,  the  same  differ- 
ence of  treatment  is  in  evidence :  a  ransom  paid  to  Satan ; 
a  satisfaction  by  the  undeserved  death  of  the  God-man 
to  the  infinite  honor  of  God  injured  by  sin;  satisfaction 
to  the  broken  law  and  endangered  government  of  God  by 
a  penal  example  in  the  death  of  his  Son;  the  work  of 
Christ  a  satisfaction  to  the  justice  of  God  through  his 
endurance  of  the  punishment  of  sin;  the  death  of  Christ 
a  revelation  of  the  good  will  of  God  to  forgive  sin.  Regen- 
eration is  referred  to  the  miraculous  agency  of  God,  in 
which  the  soul  is  instantaneously  and  passively  renewed, 
or  to  the  co-operative  action  of  God  and  the  soul,  or  to 
the  normal  awakening  of  the  person  to  the  Christian 
ideal  under  the  influence  of  religious  education.  The  king- 
dom of  God  is  presented  as  a  human  historical  develop- 
ment in  which  the  divine  will  is  progressively  realized, 
or  as  awaiting  a  catastrophic  event  in  which  Christ  will 
suddenly  appear  to  usher  in  the  millennium.  The  doctrine 
of  the  future  life  of  souls  issues  in  a  trilemma — eternal 
punishment  of  the  wicked  and  everlasting  happiness  of  the 
saved,  conditional  immortality,  universal  restoration. 

These  and  many  other  subjects  have  been  thought  out 
and  formulated  by  theologians  almost  as  if  they  were 


PRESENT-DAY  CONCEPTIONS  OF  GOD         67 

self-contained  and  could  stand  alone;  whereas  none  of 
them  has  any  meaning  apart  from  its  relation  to  the  idea 
of  God.  It  seems,  however,  to  be  taken  for  granted  by 
each  advocate  of  a  particular  theory  that  God  will  back 
it  up.  But  unless  God  is  many-sided  and  self-contradic- 
tory— a  house  divided  against  itself — he  can  be  depended 
upon  to  carry  out  not  more  than  one,  and  perhaps  no 
single  one,  of  the  programs  outlined  above.  On  the  one 
hand,  it  might  be  supposed  that  if  the  individual  subjects, 
as  sin,  the  person  and  work  of  Christ,  the  beginning  and 
development  of  the  Christian  life,  were  investigated  first 
of  all  in  the  field  of  experience,  this  would  lead  to  a  con- 
ception of  God  whose  actions  were  disclosed  in  that  field. 
But  in  all  works  on  theology  where  these  themes  are 
systematically  unfolded,  the  doctrine  of  God  occupies  the 
first  section  and  has  therefore  been  completed  and  left 
behind  before  the  other  subjects  are  discussed.  On  the 
other  hand,  while  in  all  these  presentations  the  doctrine  of 
God  is  practically  the  same,  one  is  at  a  loss  to  account 
for  the  very  great  dissimilarity  of  purposes  and  actions 
attributed  to  him.  The  significance  of  these  wide  diversi- 
ties of  view  among  theologians  lies,  however,  in  a  two- 
fold direction:  first,  when  they  have  unified  their  own 
materials  with  reference  to  the  will  of  God  it  is  seen  that 
they  are  dealing  with  very  different  ideas  of  him;  and 
secondly,  they  have  opened  the  door  to  all  serious  think- 
ers to  seek  for  themselves  such  ideas  of  God,  however 
various  these  may  be,  as  will  best  represent  the  meaning 
of  the  world  as  reflected  in  experience. 

Hitherto  the  idea  of  God  has  been  to  a  great  degree  a 
theme  for  accredited  theologians,  and  their  judgment  has 
been  left  unquestioned  by  all  except  theologians  of  a 
diff^erent  way  of  thinking.  Whoever,  outside  of  these 
circles,   ventured    within    their   hallowed    precincts,    was 


6S  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

regarded  with  suspicion  or  condemned  as  an  intruder  into 
domains  where  only  those  had  a  right  to  think  and  speak 
who  had  been  invested  with  the  sacred  mantle.  Now,  how,- 
ever,  breaches  appear  in  the  walls,  many  of  the  ancient 
boundaries  have  disappeared,  and  incursions  are  freely 
made  into  these  fields  where  the  ultimate  meaning  of  life  is 
sought.  The  poets  have,  indeed,  never  been  barred  from 
the  company  of  the  prophets, — their  word  is  only  another 
form  of  the  prophetic  message.  But  to-day  men  with 
insight  and  aim  equal  to  that  of  prophets  and  poets  but 
without  theological  training  or  bias,  are  among  the 
"seekers  after  God."  They  make  no  appeal  to  revela- 
tion as  the  source  of  their  judgment.  They  bow  to  no 
ecclesiastical  authority  which  would  bind  their  inquiry. 
They  are  free-thinkers  in  the  highest  meaning  of  this 
term,  subject  to  no  compulsion  but  that  of  the  truth  as  it 
authenticates  itself  in  their  own  reverent  consciousness. 
Never  has  interest  in  the  idea  of  God  been  so  widely 
distributed  or  found  representatives  among  so  great  a 
variety  of  serious  and  thoughtful  writers — physicists, 
biologists,  philosophers,  psychologists,  students  of  com- 
parative religion,  novelists,  historians,  sociologists,  and 
specialists  in  many  other  lines  of  human  endeavor.  The 
feeling  shared  by  all  of  these  is  that  the  idea  of  God  has 
too  long  been  a  subject  of  purely  speculative  interest. 
Ideas  once  associated  with  him  were  no  doubt  at  that  time 
vital  and  are  still  intelligible  enough,  but  they  are  felt  to 
be  antiquated.  They  no  longer  function ;  they  are  worn 
out ;  for  the  present  generation  of  thinking  men  they  seem 
remote,  ineffective,  unmeaning. 

This  attitude  of  mind  has  recently  become  acute.  The 
remainder  of  this  chapter  will  be  devoted  to  a  presenta- 
tion of  some  of  the  more  recent  endeavors  to  restate  the 
idea  of  God  in  terms  fitted  to  meet  the  needs  of  our  own 


PRESENT-DAY  CONCEPTIONS  OF  GOD         69 

time.  Already  in  the  latter  half  of  the  last  century  John 
Stuart  Mill  and  Matthew  Arnold  created  uneasiness  and 
brought  down  upon  themselves  bitter  reproach  by  repre- 
sentatives of  the  established  order  on  account  of  their 
suggested  modifications  of  the  customary  doctrine  of  God, 
— one,  by  setting  goodness  over  against  omnipotence,  as 
Epicurus  and  Hume  had  already  done,  by  insisting  that 
goodness  must  be  the  same  in  God  as  in  men,  and  by  being 
willing  to  be  damned  if  such  was  to  be  the  alternative  for 
his  preference  of  intelligible  goodness  to  an  unlimited, 
irresponsible,  merciless  power  in  God,  the  other,  for  bring- 
ing God  down  from  inaccessible  heights  of  dogmatic  the- 
ology to  the  experience  of  living  men — the  "enduring 
Power,  not  ourselves,  that  makes  for  righteousness." 


n 


In  our  generation  Professor  William  James  and  later 
H.  G.  Wells  have  done  more  than  any  other  two  writers 
to  liquify  the  idea  of  God  and  cause  it  to  flow  freely 
again  in  the  channels  grooved  deep  by  experience.  Pro- 
fessor James'  conception  of  God  as  finite  has  already 
been  described.  He  is  dissatisfied  with  the  traditional 
static  Absolute ;  he  feels  that  it  is  impossible  to  establish 
sympathetic  relations  with  such  an  Absolute;  the  meta- 
physical properties  attributed  to  God  have  neither  intelli- 
gible nor  practical  meaning ;  the  scholastic  arguments  are 
unable  to  prove  the  truth  of  moral  qualities  in  such  a 
being;  the  existence  of  this  being  could  never  be  estab- 
lished ;  and  even  if  his  existence  were  established  it  could 
make  no  possible  difference  in  our  experience; — all  this 
forced  him  to  seek  elsewhere  than  in  metaphysics  or  tradi- 
tional theology  for  an  idea  of  God  that  would  "work." 


70  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

This  he  found  In  a  God  who  is  finite  either  in  knowledge 
or  in  power,  perhaps  in  both.-^ 

According  to  Mr.  Wells  there  are  three  aspects  of  real- 
ity to  be  considered  in  our  approach  to  God.  (1)  The 
ultimate,  unfathomable  mystery  of  the  world,  which  he 
designates  as  the  "Veiled  Being,"  with  which  we  are  in  no 
way  concerned.  Whatever  else  it  is,  it  is  not  the  Absolute 
and  Unconditioned,  but  whether  it  is  simple  or  complex  or 
divine  is  beyond  our  power  to  conceive.  Whether  God 
knows  any  more  about  this  ultimate  Being  than  we  do  isi 
also  uncertain.  (2)  A  Life  Force  or  Will  to  Live,  dis- 
closed in  nature,  proceeding  in  some  inconceivable  man- 
ner from  the  Veiled  Being,  thrusting  itself  forth  into  the 
myriad  forms  of  existence,  giving  to  each  its  distinctive 
quality — strength,  agility,  cunning,  love,  hate,  greed, 
beauty,  delight,  weariness,  disgust,  and  fear  of  death. 
Some  have  called  this  the  Gnostic  Demiurge,  others  the 
Dark  God  of  the  Manicheans,  and  still  others  Mother 
Nature.  (S)  In  all  this  welter  of  experience  we  have  be- 
come aware  of  a  new  reality.  "God  comes  we  know  not 
whence  into  the  conflict  of  life.  He  works  in  men  and 
through  men.  He  is  a  spirit,  a  single  spirit,  and  a  single 
person;  he  has  begun  and  he  will  never  end.  He  is  the 
immortal  part  and  leader  of  mankind.  He  has  motives, 
he  has  characteristics,  he  has  an  aim.  He  is  by  our 
poor  scales  of  measurement  boundless  love,  boundless 
courage,  boundless  generosity.  He  is  thought  and  stead- 
fast will.  He  is  our  friend  and  brother  and  the  light 
of  the  world.  That  briefly  is  the  belief  of  the  modem 
mind  with  regard  to  God."  This  knowledge  of  God 
is  based  entirely  upon  experience.  "It  has  encountered 
God.     It  does  not  argue  about  God:  it  relates."     This 


*Cf.  A  Pluralistic  Universe,  pp.  311-812. 


PRESENT-DAY  CONCEPTIONS  OF  GOD         71 

God  is  "neither  all  wise  nor  all  powerful,"  nor  is  he 
the  "Maker  of  heaven  and  earth."  He  "presents  him- 
self as  finite."  The  doctrine  of  Mr.  Wells  is  summed 
up  in  two  opposite  positions :  first,  complete  agnos- 
ticism in  the  matter  of  God,  the  Creator,  and,  sec- 
ondly, entire  faith  in  the  matter  of  God  the  Redeemer. 
God  is  thus  conceived  of  "as  a  finite  intelligence  of  bound- 
less courage  and  limitless  possibilities  of  growth  and  vic- 
tory, who  has  pitted  himself  against  death,  who  stands 
close  to  our  inmost  beings,  ready  to  receive  us  and  to  use 
us,  to  rescue  us  from  the  chagrins  of  egotism  and  take  us 
into  his  immortal  adventure."  We  seem  here  to  have  a 
reality  which  began  with  the  human  race,  growing  with 
its  growth,  the  ideal  which  gathers  up  into  itself  not  only 
all  the  finer  achievements  of  humanity  but  also  all  its 
unmeasured  possibilities  as  well,  "the  underlying  human 
memory,  the  increasing  human  will,"  the  spirit  In  us  which 
is  forever  urging  to  the  realization  to  what  Is  potential 
in  us,  which,  since  we  are  destined  to  an  immortal  exist- 
ence. Is  therefore  in  Itself  everlasting.  And  because  the 
values  here  are  personal.  Involving  all  and  more  than  the 
values  of  Individual  human  lives,  God  Is  superlatively  per- 
sonal, yet  not  in  the  technical  orthodox  sense.^ 

A  doctrine  of  God  having  some  points  of  resemblance  to 
and  many  more  of  difference  from  that  of  Mr.  Wells  is 
presented  by  Samuel  Butler.^  The  world  as  we  experi- 
ence it  is  divided  into  "three  great  concentric  phases  of 
life":  (1)  The  simple  cell  of  the  organism  which  is  a 
perfect  unit  or  person;  (2)  Each  organism  whether  vege- 
table, animal,  or  human.  Is  a  living  unit  or  person;  (3) 
The  totality  of  which  organic  existence  as  disclosed  to  us 


V 


*Cf.  Qod,  The  InviHbls  King. 

*Ood  the  Known  and  Ood  the  Unknovm. 


72  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

in  evolution — animals,  plants,  and  the  human  race — unite 
to  form  the  all-inclusive  Person  or  God.  Each  of  these 
forms  of  existence  has  a  dual  phase,  mind  and  body.  The 
cell  is  to  some  degree  conscious,  but  knows  little  or 
nothing  of  the  larger  organic  unity  of  which  it  forms  a 
part.  In  like  manner  each  of  the  larger  units,  whether 
vegetable,  animal  or  human,  is  only  dimly  aware  of  the 
still  larger  unit  or  personality  of  God  of  which  it  is  an 
integral  part.  The  consciousness  of  God  transcends  our 
consciousness  even  as  ours  transcends  that  of  the  single 
cell.  Our  God  is  a  visible  personality,  inconceivably  vast 
yet  limited,  present  in  all  tangible  forms  on  the  earth, 
capable  of  waste  and  repair,  of  sensation,  movement,  and 
memory,  existing  through  immeasurable  time,  quasi-omni- 
potent  and  quasi-allwhe,  growing  as  the  outcome  of  all 
past  lives,  with  a  moral  government  exercised  through  us. 
This  God  is  distinguished  from  the  pantheistic  and  ortho- 
dox conception.  The  God  of  pantheism  is  impersonal. 
The  God  of  the  orthodox  is  also  rejected,  since  it  too  as 
being  purely  spiritual  is  impersonal.  Whether  outside  of 
the  God  of  our  world  and  the  Gods  of  other  worlds  there 
is  a  fourth  concentric  phase,  a  still  higher,  more  inclusive 
unit  or  personality  is  unknown  to  us.  Yet  from  consid- 
eration of  the  origin  of  matter,  the  primordial  cell,  and 
the  arrangements  by  which  the  earth  is  fitted  for  life,  we 
are  drawn  on  to  the  supposition  of  a  vaster  Person  behind 
our  God  and  the  Gods  of  all  other  worlds,  with  soul  and 
body,  knowing  beforehand  what  he  wanted,  who  called 
our  God  and  all  others  into  existence.  We  are  indeed 
members  of  our  God,  but  of  the  Unknown  God  we  are 
children. 

In  this  exceedingly  novel  presentation  Mr.  Butler  seeks 
a  reconciliation  of  many  conflicting  claims — the  rights  of 
metaphysics,  the  findings  of  experience,  the  various  strata 


PRESENT-DAY  CONCEPTIONS  OF  GOD         73 

of  scientific  knowledge,  the  consciousness  of  values,  the 
sense  of  mystery,  the  feeling  of  reverence  which  shades  off 
into  awe,  with  a  somewhat  vague  reminder  of  the  three- 
fold aspect  of  the  official  doctrine  of  God. 


m 


From  the  social  point  of  view  two  very  interesting  and 
fruitful  suggestions  are  offered.  The  first  is  by  the  la- 
mented Professor  Rauschenbusch,  who  proposes  three 
requisites  for  a  doctrine  of  God.  ( 1 )  It  must  be  free  from 
despotic  or  aristocratic  elements,  in  order  that  it  may 
become  democratized.  (2)  It  must  in  no  degree  be  impli- 
cated in  the  unjust  sufferings  arising  from  remediable  so- 
cial conditions,  that  is,  love  must  be  drawn  into  the  fore- 
ground to  furnish  the  principle  for  divine  action.  (3) 
Through  the  spread  of  a  monotheistic  faith,  it  must  be- 
come the  bond  of  racial  unity;  freedom,  justice,  and  soli- 
darity must  be  reflected  in  the  conception  of  God. 

A  second  presentation  is  by  two  writers  of  wide  social 
experience.  The  new  consciousness  of  the  worth  of  the 
rational  self,  of  the  power  of  social  solidarity,  of  evolu- 
tion as  the  development  of  the  inner  principle  of  the 
world,  the  presentiment  of  the  immeasurable  possibilities 
which  await  realization  in  the  cosmic  movement  of  which 
man  is  a  part, — these  and  other  conditions  are  contribu- 
tory to  a  fresh  statement  and  solution  of  the  problem  of 
the  world  in  terms  of  the  social  consciousness.  From  the 
point  of  view  of  developing  humanity  arises  a  new  defini- 
tion of  the  God-idea.  This  proceeds  from  a  union  of  the 
scientific  and  the  social  interest.  "This  new  spirit,  form- 
ing itself  as  it  were  upon  the  restless  sea  of  humanity,  will, 
without  doubt,  determine  the  future  sense  of  God.    .    .    . 


74  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

The  deistic  conception  of  an  age  now  completely  past, 
that  God  is  some  distant  monarch,  will  fade  into  the  dark- 
ness with  the  social  system  which  gave  it  rise;  and  society 
as  a  federal  union,  in  which  each  individual  and  every 
form  of  human  association,  shall  find  free  and  full  scope 
for  more  abundant  life,  will  be  the  large  figure  from  which 
is  projected  the  conception  of  God  in  whom  we  live  and 
move  and  have  our  being."  -^ 

"It  is  accordingly  this  'large  figure*  not  simply  of 
human  but  of  cosmic  society  which  is  to  yield  our  God 
of  the  future.  It  is  the  figure  of  myriad  lives,  and  yet  of 
one  vast  group  life,  in  ceaseless  activity.  There  is  ijo 
place  in  the  figure  for  an  eternally  perfect  being,  and  no 
need;  no  need,  for  the  vast  society  by  its  own  inherent 
mass-dialetic — of  struggle  and  adaptation,  co-operation 
and  conflict — is  working  out  its  own  destiny;  no  place,  for 
the  society,  democratic  from  end  to  end,  can  brook  no 
such  class  distinction  as  that  between  a  supreme  being 
favored  with  eternal  and  absolute  perfection  and  the  mass 
of  beings  doomed  to  the  lower  ways  of  imperfect  struggle. 
It  is  the  large  figure  out  of  which  is  projected  the  concep- 
tion of  God  that  is  ourselves^  in  ^^^hom  and  of  whom  we  lit- 
erally are;  the  God  that,  in  every  act  and  intention,  we, 
rcith  all  our  countless  fdlows,  are  realizing.  Nor  indeed 
is  it  a  God,  as  idealistic  absolutists  would  have  it,  in  whom 
our  imperfect  actions  vanish  in  perfection,  but  one  in 
whom  they  are  the  means  whereby  out  of  an  imperfect 
present,  a  less  imperfect  future  is  wrought.  It  is  a  God 
that  in  one  respect  is  in  the  making,  growing  with  the 
growth  of  the  world;  suffering  and  sinning  and  conquer- 
ing with  it;  a  God,  in   short,  that  is  the  world  in  the 


^Studies  in  Philosophy  and  Psychology,  by  former  students  of 
Charles  Edward  Garman;  R.  A.  Woods  "Democracy  a  New  Unfold- 
ing of  Human  Power,"  p.  98. 


PRESENT-DAY  CONCEPTIONS  OF  GOD         76 

unity   of  its   mass-life   ...    a   God   growing  with   the 
worldr  1 

Here  we  have  a  mystical  presentation,  compounded  of 
all  the  element,'-  which  constitute  the  complexity,  the 
unity,  the  greatness,  and  the  appeal  of  the  developing 
social  consciousness.  One  is  reminded  of  Comte  and  his 
Religion  of  Humanity.  Unquestionably  this  substitute 
for  the  official  idea  of  God  represents  the  only  concept- 
and  aspiration  which  vast  bodies  of  men  and  women  set 
before  themselves  as  a  religion  and  to  it  yield  the  consum- 
ing devotion  of  their  hearts.  Provision  is  made  for  love: 
"Since  the  condition  of  mutuality  or  love  is  the  highest 
condition  which  we  are  able  to  conceive,  we  may  rightly 
say  that  God  is  love — not  indeed  a  personal  lover,  but 
that  deep-lying,  ever  persistent,  ever  growing  tendency 
toward  mutuality  of  life  which  is  at  once  the  foundation 
of  our  own  existence  and  the  promise  of  its  consummate 
realization."  ^ 

IV 

Turning  from  the  social  to  the  philosophical  realm, 
attention  is  directed  to  an  approach  to  the  idea  of  God 
by  way  of  the  New  Realism.  This  doctrine  divides  the 
real  into  values,  non-values  or  the  neutral,  and  evil.  It 
is  to  be  distinguished  from  the  theory  of  the  Absolute 
One,  of  whom  the  good  and  the  evil  are  only  differentia- 
tions ;  both  good  and  evil  are  indeed  actual,  but  evil  is  by 
its  very  nature  transient  and  is  destined  to  disappear  in 
the  Absolute  One  in  whom  all  oppositions  meet  and  are 
overcome.  Why  only  the  evil  and  not  the  good  ultimately 
vanishes  does  not  appear.     Other  advocates  of  this  phil- 


*  Hibberf  Journal:  H.  A.  Overstreet,  "The  Democratic  Conception 
«  Hibberf.  Journal,  Idem,  Vol.  XIII,  p.  171. 
of  God,"  Vol.  XI,  pp.  409-410. 


76  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

osophy  of  the  Absolute  hold  that  evil  is  good  in  the  mak- 
ing, and  that  this  cleiim  is  in  accord  with  the  theory  of 
evolution,  to  the  effect  that  whatever  is  a  means  or  is  inci- 
dental to  the  good  is  itself  a  good.  The  New  Realism, 
however,  rejects  this  for  two  reasons:  (1)  it  is  rationally 
inconclusive,  since  there  may  be  some  irreducible  evils; 
(2)  men  actually  fight  the  evil  as  such,  and  this  would 
not  be  the  case  if  it  were  either  a  phase  of  the  good  or 
transformable  into  the  good.  Accordingly,  evil  is  not  a 
value  but  is  radically  opposed  thereto.  In  the  definition 
of  God  therefore  we  do  not  include  evil  and  ugliness,  nor 
what  is  neutral  in  respect  to  value,  but  only  values.  God 
is  the  sum  of  values — truth,  goodness,  beauty,  justice — 
both  as  these  are  eternal  "in  a  heaven  by  themselves"  and 
as  they  are  the  efficient  cause  of  the  same  qualities,  to- 
gether with  love  and  reverence  and  virtue,  among  men. 
In  a  word,  God  is  Value.  And  it  follows  that  if  he  is 
personal,  he  is  more  than  personality,  just  as  ^he  social 
order  among  men  is  more  than  the  personality  of  each 
individual  member.  He  is  also  both  transcendent  and  im- 
manent: transcendent  as  truth  and  goodness  and  beauty 
subsist  eternally  in  a  world  apart  from  space  and  time; 
immanent  as  these  exist  in  our  human  social  world  in  con- 
crete forms  of  the  divine  ideals.  Moreover,  since  God  and 
nature  belong  to  different  realms  of  thought,  he  is  super- 
natural, yet  not  as  contradictory  to  nature.  He  is  the 
power  which  works  in  and  with  men,  giving  light  to  their 
reason,  purifying  and  exalting  their  emotional  reaction  to 
the  ideal  good,  and  empowering  the  will  in  every  moral 
struggle  and  conquest.  Here,  then,  is  a  renascence  of  the 
idealism  of  Plato  which  has  haunted  and  inspired  the 
yearning  of  men  for  more  than  two  thousand  years. 
According  to  the  New  Realism,  not  all  that  is  real  is  ideal 
but    all    ideals    are    real:    the    supreme    ideals    are    the 


PRESENT-DAY  CONCEPTIONS  OF  GOD         77 

supremely  real.  The  particular  concrete  real  which  em- 
bodies the  ideal,  however  it  approximates  perfection, 
never  becomes  identical  with  it  but  remains  forever  numer- 
ically distinct  from,  although  forever  kindred  with,  it. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  perfect  ideal  abides  in  undimmed 
and  matchless  splendor  through  all  human  approaches  to 
Truth,  Goodness,  Justice,  and  Beauty,  to  Love  and 
Reverence.-^ 

According  to  another  exponent  of  the  New  Realism  the 
universe  is  striving  toward  a  not  yet  realized  perfection. 
The  ascent  has  been  from  pure  space-time  or  matter 
through  life  and  consciousness  toward  a  goal  which  is  not 
that  of  a  personal  God  but  a  "quality  of  Deity."  God 
does  not  yet  exist,  save  as  the  universe  is  striving  toward 
Deity.  At  present  the  highest  development  reached  is 
religion:  "the  sentiment  in  us  that  we  are  caught  in  the 
movement  of  the  world  to  a  higher  level  of  existence." 
But  this  is  not  the  end;  the  movement  registered  in 
religion  is  striving  to  a  still  higher  point  in  which  the 
quality  of  Deity  emerges.  When  this  is  reached  the  pos- 
sessor of  it,  or  God,  will  not  be  an  individual,  for  he  would 
then  be  finite.  On  the  other  hand,  as  the  universe  is  infi- 
nite, so  the  perfection  toward  which  it  strives  as  its  goal 
will  be  infinite  and,  as  realized,  the  infinite  actual  God. 
Each  stage  of  the  ascent  to  perfection  has  presented  two 
aspects, — one  actual  and  persisting,  the  other  ideal  but 
ever  passing  into  actuality,  at  last  to  become  the  perfect 
actual  or  God.  Accordingly,  God  is  to  be  conceived  of 
not  as  the  absolute  Originator  of  the  World  nor  as  a 
present  existing  Reality  whether  immanent  or  transcend- 
ent or  both,  but  as  that  to  which  the  ideal  energy  of  the 


^Cf.  E.  G.  Spaulding,  The  New  Rationalism,     R.  B.  Perry,  The 
New  Realism. 


78  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

universe  tends,  a  quality  of  perfection  which  is  only  an- 
other name  for  Deity.  ^ 


Another  idea  more  in  line  with  the  common  notion  of 
God  as  personal  conceives  of  all  existence  as  pervaded  by 
an  active  spiritual  reality  from  which  it  receives  its  direc- 
tion and  meaning.  This  is  to  be  distinguished  from  both 
the  theistic  and  the  pantheistic  view  of  the  world, 
although  it  may  be  in  agreement  with  these  at  special 
points.  The  position  is  that  God  is  the  immanent  source 
of  all  that  is.  All  phenomena  are  caused  by  his  will;  all 
laws  are  description  of  the  constant  methods  of  his  work- 
ing; creation  is  a  continuous  forth-putting  of  his  energy 
— ^his  providence;  gravitation  is  one  of  the  forms  of  his 
conservation  of  the  universe.  He  is  thus  the  Infinite 
Spirit  that  dwells  in  the  infinite  universe.  "In  him  we 
live  and  move  and  have  our  being."  Various  designations 
may  be  given  to  him  according  as  different  aspects  of  his 
being  are  presented,  in  this  following  the  Hebrew  people 
in  the  successive  but  always  incomplete  names  by  which 
they  described  their  many-sided  experience  of  God.  Not 
inappropriate  therefore  as  names  of  God  will  be:  "the 
Infinite  and  Eternal  Energy  from  which  all  things  pro- 
ceed," "Vital  Force,"  which  is  the  principle  of  creative 
evolution,  "Father,"  of  the  Christian  Scriptures  and  of 
^Christian  experience,  and  the  less  specific  term  "God," 
which  since  it  lacks  a  fixed  a  priori  connotation  may  em- 
brace a  wide  variety  of  suggestive  meanings.  This  Being 
pervades  the  entire  world  as  the  spirit  pervades  the  body. 


*Cf.  Space,  Time  and  Deity:  the  Gifford  Lectures,  1916-1918,  by 
S.  Alexander,  Vol.  II,  p.  361. 


PRESENT-DAY  CONCEPTIONS  OF  GOD         79 

So  immediate  is  his  action  throughout  the  universe  that 
there  is  no  room  for  second  causes.  Accordingly,  there 
are  no  hierarchies  of  being  as  intermediaries  between  God 
and  the  world,  and  especially  between  God  and  men.  Per- 
sonality is  not  to  be  refused  to  him  on  the  ground  of 
anthropomorphism.  We  cannot  escape  interpreting  real- 
ity in  terms  of  the  human  consciousness,  the  highest  in 
terms  of  the  highest.  Personality  is  our  most  significant 
category  and  represents  the  supreme  quality  of  the  worth- 
iest life  that  we  know.  There  may  indeed  be  qualities  in 
God  higher  than  any  in  man,  but  at  least  the  highest  that 
belongs  to  man  is  not  alien  to  him.  However,  the  chief 
point  is  the  immanent  and  pervasive  energy  of  the  divine 
in  our  world.  Its  distinction  from  the  traditional  doc- 
trine of  God  is  its  rejection  of  any  form  of  transcendence: 
God  has  no  life  apart  from  the  world,  hence  no  place  is 
found  for  an  essential  Trinity  with  an  "inter-trinitarian 
procession"  of  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit,  existing 
before  and  apart  from  the  creation,  eternal.  We  know 
and  can  know  of  no  activity  in  God  other  or  greater  than 
that  which  is  manifest  in  the  phenomenal  universe. 
Since  there  is  no  divine  transcendence,  there  is  no  media- 
tion between  God  and  the  world  and  especially  men.  The 
traditional  doctrine  of  the  Spirit  as  immanent,  permeat- 
ing, and  active  in  all  existences  according  to  their  rank  in 
the  scale  of  being  corresponds  more  nearly  to  the  view 
under  consideration.  Yet  the  divergences  of  one  from  the 
other  are  so  many  and  serious  that  neither  party  would 
accept  the  implication  of  the  other.  It  differs  not  less 
from  the  common  theistic  position,  since  in  addition  to 
immanence  this  involves  transcendence.  The  difficulty 
of  reconciling  these  two  points  of  view,  which  has  always 
beset  the  traditional  theist,  is  therefore  wholly  relieved. 
It  may  be  alleged  that  this  is  accomplished  by  resort  to 


80  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

violent  surgery — the  elimination  of  an  essential  property 
in  God;  but  according  to  this  doctrine  no  loss  is  to  be 
feared:  such  a  property  has  never  existed.  Moreover, 
the  gains  from  this  conception  far  overbalance  the  losses, 
for  from  the  region  of  the  transcendent  has  arisen  most 
of  the  confusion  of  thought,  the  insoluble  mysteries,  and 
the  distracting  divisions  of  theological  controversy.^ 


VI 


In  unconfessed,  perhaps  unrecognized,  alliance  with  the 
position  just  described  are  two  others  which  at  first  view 
appear  dissimilar  not  only  with  it  but  also  with  each 
other.  According  to  one  of  these  the  place  of  God  in  the 
world  is  taken  by  Christ.  The  Trinitarian  formula  is 
indeed  applied  to  God, — he  is  Father,  Son,  and  Holy 
Spirit, — but  the  terms  seem  remote  and  unreal.  "The 
Father  by  himself  is  the  divine  nature,  latent,  unexpressed, 
and  unrevealed":  he  is  therefore  so  far  as  experience  is 
concerned  a  negligible  quantity.  The  Holy  Spirit  the 
"incarnate  Christ  now  made  omnipresent  and  omnipo- 
tent." Again  but  for  some  vague  and  valueless  theologi- 
cal reference,  the  Holy  Spirit  as  possessing  a  distinct 
subsistence,  may  be  wholly  ignored;  we  know  him  only  as 
the  Spirit  of  the  incarnate  Christ.  The  living  God  whom 
we  see  in  nature,  in  whom  we  live  and  move  and  have  our 
being,  is  none  other  than  the  Christ:  he  is  the  immanent 
and  revealed  God.  In  this  presentation  God  as  Father  is 
entirely  beyond  our  reach;  he  is  all  the  same  to  us  as  if 
non-existent.     The  Holy  Spirit  is  so  far  identified  with 


*Cf.  Joseph  Le  Conte,  Evolution  and  It$  RelaHon  to  Religio'us 
Thought.  Charles  W.  Eliot,  The  Durable  Satisfactions  of  Life,  pp. 
167  ff. 


PRESENT-DAY  CONCEPTIONS  OF  GOD         81 

Christ  both  as  incarnate  and  as  present  and  active  among 
men  that  he  seems  to  be  only  another  name  for  a  function 
already  completely  absorbed  by  Christ.  Whether  in  cre- 
ation or  redemption,  therefore,  Jesus  Christ  is  the  only 
God  we  know.  He  is  the  originator  and  upholder  of  the 
universe.  "The  system  of  forces  which  we  call  the  physi- 
cal universe  is  the  immediate  product  of  the  mind  and 
will  of  God  in  exercise,  Christ  is  the  creator  and  upholder 
of  the  universe."  Furthermore,  the  attraction  of  gravi- 
tation and  the  medium  of  knowledge  are  only  other  names 
for  Christ;  he  is  also  the  principle  of  induction.  The 
universe  with  all  its  law  and  rationality  is  Christ,  and  it 
follows  that  he  is  the  principle  of  evolution.  To  add 
that,  notwithstanding  the  omnipresence  of  Christ  in  the 
world  as  the  sole  divine  spirit  and  power  in  it,  he  is  before 
and  above  it,  contributes  nothing  that  can  function  in  our 
experience.  The  only  God  known  to  us  is  Christ,  and  the 
only  Christ  known  to  us  is  in  the  world;  beyond  this 
brief  summary  all  affirmations  are  speculative. 

According  to  the  second  position,  the  place  of  God  and 
the  essential  Christ  is  taken  by  God  the  Holy  Spirit. 
The  idea  of  God  as  Father,  as  guardian,  hence  as  exter- 
nal, as  above  and  separate  from  us  and  of  his  kingdom  as 
in  heaven,  is  relinquished.  We  are  to  think  of  "an  inter- 
nal Spirit  working  within  us — a  constraining,  immanent 
influence,  a  vital,  propelling  impulse  vibrating  through 
us  all,  expressing  itself  and  fulfilling  its  purpose  through 
us,  and  uniting  us  together  in  one  vast  spiritual  unity."  ^ 

vn 

There  are  many  writers  to  whom  the  customary  doc- 
trine  of  God  is   a  jargon   of  unmeaning  metaphysical 

*  Sir  Francis  Younghusband,  A  Review  of  Religion, 


82  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

terms,  who  are,  however,  unwilling  to  dispense  with  the 
word  "God."  For  them  it  carries  precious  values  without 
which  our  lives  would  be  hopelessly  impoverished.  These 
values  have  for  so  long  been  associated  with  the  word 
that  if  it  were  surrendered  its  disappearance  would  jeop- 
ardize the  very  interests  which  have  been  embraced  and 
symbolized  by  it.  Ernest  Renan,  confronted  with  this 
dilemma,  himself  having  no  sympathy  with  the  contents  of 
the  orthodox  dogma,  said  that  "The  word  God  being 
respected  by  humanity,  having  for  it  a  long  acquired 
right,  and  having  been  employed  in  all  beautiful  poetry, 
to  abandon  it  would  overthrow  all  habits  of  language. 
.  .  .  Tell  the  simple  to  pass  their  lives  in  aspiration 
after  truth,  and  beauty,  and  moral  goodness;  and  your 
words  will  be  meaningless  to  them.  Tell  them  to  love 
God ;  and  they  will  understand  you  perfectly.  .  .  .  Un- 
der one  form  or  another  God  will  always  be  the  sum  of 
our  supersensible  needs,  the  category  of  tlie  ideal.''''  ^ 

In  harmony  with  this  suggestion,  the  late  George  Bur- 
man  Foster  says,  "The  word  God  is  a  symbol  to  designate 
the  universe  in  its  ideal  forming  capacity."  And  a  mod- 
em Platonist,  whose  vision  of  "the  infinite  mystery" 
kindles  the  same  exalted  mood  as  burned  in  the  reverent 
spirit  of  the  great  idealist,  refers  to  "the  good  that  is 
only  another  name  for  God."  ^ 

Such  an  idea  of  God  is  in  general  the  one  presented  by 
leaders  of  the  Society  of  Ethical  Culture.  Its  aim  is  (1) 
to  enshrine  moral  ideals  and  tendencies  as  objects  of 
supreme  reverence;  (2)  because  of  this  to  protest  jeal- 
ously against  the  deification  of  superhuman  powers.  The 
question  whether  the  God  of  traditional  theology  exists 

*  The  Poetry  of  the  Celtic  Races,  and  Other  Studies,  by  Ernest 
Renan,  pp.  136-137. 

*  George  A.  Gordon,  Aspects  of  the  Infinite  Mystery,  p.  49. 


PRESENT-DAY  CONCEPTIONS  OF  GOD         83 

is  without  interest.  Even  if  the  existence  of  such  a  God 
were  to  be  proved,  no  use  could  be  made  of  this  result 
in  their  religious  services.  According  to  Felix  Adler, 
while  we  must  affirm  an  Ultimate  Reality,  we  can  know 
only  this  of  it,  that  it  is  the  cause  of  the  spiritual  per-  i 
fection  which  is  the  flying  goal  of  our  hope.^  We  need, 
therefore,  to  substitute  Humanity  for  Divinity;  not 
humanity  as  it  is,  but  as  slowly  transformed.  The  ideal 
is  social,  not  of  one  Infinite  Being  but  an  infinitude  of 
beings,  in  increasing  organic  unity,  permeated  by  the 
same  spirit,  raised  to  the  highest  conceivable  power.  The 
moral  ideal  is  that  of  a  "multiple  God,"  a  "commonwealth 
of  spirits,"  therefore  democratic.  Another  very  sug- 
gestive writer  says  that  "to  ask  is  there  a  God,  is  to  ask 
whether  there  be  in  very  fact  any  source  from  which 
supreme  blessings  will  be  gained  if  one-  attends  stead- 
fastly and  reverently  to  it."  He  maintains  that  "any 
object  toward  which  steadfast  attention  is  turned,  in  // 
ordeF  to  derive  the  greatest  blessings,  is  a  God."  He 
believes,  too,  that  the  social  ideal  is  such  an  object.^ 
Still  another  representative  of  the  Society  of  Ethical  » 
Culture  defines  God  as  the  totality  of  good  in  the  world.^ 
This  means  first  that  God  is  the  moral  idea  in  which  all 
actual  and  possible  personal  values  are  integrated;  sec- 
ondly, he  is  the  desire  to  seek  this  good  for  the  sake  of 
the  blessedness  it  offers;  and  thirdly,  he  is  whatever  in 
any  degree  satisfies  the  ideal  demands  of  our  personal  and 
social  life.  The  reality  may  be  designated  by  many  names 
and  symbolized  as  it  has  been  in  the  entire  religious  experi- 
ence of  men  by  the  widest  variety  of  idealized  objective 


*  The  Religion  of  Duty,  p.  27. 

•Stanton  Coit,  The  Sonl  of  America,  pp.  191,  200.    Cf.  The  Ethical 
Movement;  It»  Aims  and  PrincipU^,  p.  190. 
'  Horace  J.  Bridges,  The  Religion  of  Experience,  p.  71. 


84  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

forms — customs,  institutions,  laws,  and  worship.  The 
essential  thing  is  the  values  which  have  been  distilled  in 
the  experience  of  the  race,  which  men  cherish  as  the  high- 
est they  know,  particularly  those  which  are  common  to 
them  in  their  ideal  social  relations.  Goethe  sums  up  this 
attitude  in  the  often  quoted  words: 

"Im  Innern  ist  ein  Universum  auch, 
Daher  der  Volker  loblicher  Gebrauch, 
Dass  jeglicher  das  Beste,  was  er  kennt, 
Er  Gott,  ja  seinen  Gott  benennt, 
Ihm  Himmel  und  Erden  tJbergiebt, 
Ihn  fiirchtet  und  womoglich  liebt."  -^ 

It  is  claimed  that  this  substitution  of  the  ideal  social 
^  interests  of  humanity  for  the  God-idea  of  the  past  in  no 
way  lessens  the  impulse  to  sympathy  and  service  in  rela- 
tion to  one's  fellowmen,  and  thus  to  the  attainment  of 
personal  virtue;  on  the  contrary,  it  enriches  and  intensi- 
fies it,  since  interest  is  not  drawn  off  to  a  superhuman 
object  but  is  wholly  concentrated  on  that  which  absorbs 
all  its  energy  and  love.  The  ideal  to  which  society  devotes 
itself,  instead  of  being  separated  from  the  immediate 
object  of  its  endeavor,  is  within  humanity  and  inseparable 
from  it. 

The  cleft  thus  suggested  between  the  idea  of  God  in 
Ethical  Culture  and  that  of  Christian  tradition  is  not, 
however,  as  deep  as  it  appears  to  be.  With  few  excep- 
tions the  immanence  of  God  has  been  a  cardinal  article 


*  "Within  us  all  a  universe  doth  dwell; 
And  hence  each  people's  usage  laudable. 
That  every  one  the  Best  that  meets  his  eyes 
As  God,  yea,  e'en  his  God  doth  recognize; 
To  him  both  earth  and  heaven  surrenders  he 
Fears  him  and  loves  him  too,  if  that  may  be," 


PRESENT-DAY  CONCEPTIONS  OF  GOD         85 

of  faith  in  the  church,  and  this  has  become  vivid  and 
vitalized  by  the  doctrine  of  the  Living  Christ  and  the 
Holy  Spirit  as  the  indwelling  presence  of  God.  In  this 
way  the  transcendent,  absentee  aspect  of  God  has  been  at 
least  relieved,  if  not  completely  overcome.  The  aim  has 
been  to  live  the  life  of  God  under  human  conditions,  that 
is,  to  incarnate  the  spirit  of  Christ  in  the  personal  con- 
sciousness, and  to  realize  the  spirit  of  God  in  the  social 
aims  and  co-operation  of  the  Christian  community.  The 
social  ideals  of  the  Christian  church  have  indeed  not 
always  been  as  worthy  as  those  of  the  Societies  of  Ethical 
Culture.  With  this  admission,  we  must,  however,  add: 
(1)  the  past  social  ideals  of  the  church  were  inferior  to 
the  developed  ideals  of  the  church  to-day;  (2)  the  highest 
social  ideals  of  the  church  are  to-day  in  no  degree  inferior 
to  those  of  the  Ethical  Societies;  (S)  Ethical  Societies 
are  themselves  indebted  to  the  evolution  of  social  ideals  in 
the  church  for  the  content  of  their  principles  and  aims; 
(4)  the  church  and  the  Societies  of  Ethical  Culture  draw 
their  inspiration  from  essentially  the  same  source;  it  is 
a  question  partly  of  names  and  partly  of  method.  If, 
on  the  one  hand,  the  Ethical  Societies  ignore  a  God  who 
is  wholly  transcendent,  on  the  other  hand,  the  church 
more  often  conceives  of  its  God  in  terms  of  the  personal 
and  social  ideal,  immanent  in  all  the  spiritual  movements 
of  men.  And  both  may  with  one  accord  confess  that  God 
is  "the  Real  Being  from  whom  the  highest  conceivable 
good  is  derived  if  we  attend  to  him." 

There  is  a  large  group  of  writers — men  of  high  serious- 
ness of  purpose — to  whom  the  dogmatic  formulas  of  the 
creeds  are  felt  to  be  an  inadequate  expression  of  the 
Supreme  Reality  of  the  world:  scientists,  as  Huxley  and 
Clifford,  who  in  utmost  seriousness  bowed  down  before 
the  inviolable  sacredness  of  the  order  of  nature ;  socialists, 


/ 


86  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

as  Robert  Blatchford,  concerned  with  the  needs  of  strug- 
gling masses;  naturalists,  as  John  Burroughs,  who  find 
in  nature  the  revelation  of  ideal  values ;  philosophical 
students  of  human  experience,  as  Overstreet,  who  look  to 
democracy  in  its  social  and  cosmic  development  for  the 
emergence  of  the  divine.  It  would  be  an  abuse  both  of 
language  and  of  understanding  to  call  these  men  atheists, 
skeptics,  or  even  unbelievers.  Beyond  question,  if  the 
Athanasian  propositions  are  authoritative  and  final,  such 
men  are  to  be  condemned.  Who  would,  however,  be  will- 
ing to  judge  them  by  such  a  standard?  Here  it  suffices 
to  say  that  to  none  of  these  men  is  the  individual  the 
highest  reality  of  the  world;  to  all  of  them  single  facts 
and  personal  experiences  are  elements  in  a  larger  whole 
which  is  in  process  of  unfolding  in  the  ordered  course  of 
the  world-evolution.  Most  men  who  occupy  relatively  the 
same  position  as  the  writers  just  referred  to  are  willing 
that  the  term  God  should  be  interchanged  with  other 
terms  as  "tendency  in  the  universe,"  or  "nature,"  or 
"Absolute,"  or  even  itself  given  up,  provided  only  that  its 
value  for  life  is  retained.  By  whatsoever  name  men  desig- 
nate this  value,  "it  is  something  not  themselves  and  greater 
than  themselves,  something  which  by  its  very  existence 
makes  everything  supremely  worth  while,  overrides  and 
subsumes  evil,  intensifies  and  makes  omnipresent  Good, 
and  concentrates  and  satisfies  in  itself  those  ideal  impulses 
that  otherwise  would  be  tortured  and  broken  about  an 
imperfect  self."  ^  Even  though  the  customary  conception, 
and  especially  the  name  of  God,  is  given  up  and  others 
substituted,  as  the  "Unknown  and  Unknowable,"  "the 
Power,  not  ourselves,  that  makes  for  righteousness,"  or 
"Nature,"  all  phrases  leave  much  to  be  desired  if  they 


^  G,  Lowes  Dickinson,  Religion:   A  Criticism  and  a  Forecast. 


PRESENT-DAY  CONCEPTIONS  OF  GOD         87 

"fail  to  include  the  most  essential  quality  of  the  concep- 
tion they  attempt  to  express,  namely  its  awful  and  mys- 
terious majesty.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  one  Eng- 
lish word  for  that  conception  must  ever  be — God."  ^ 


VIII 


In  Christian  Science  the  term  "God"  represents  a  con- 
ception which  has  little  in  common  with  other  modern 
ideas  of  God.  Christian  Science  employs  many  words  as 
definition  or  rather  as  synonyms  of  God — Principle, 
Mind,  Spirit,  Truth,  Love.  It  teaches  that  there  is  but 
one  Being,  incorporeal,  omnipotent,  omnipresent,  omni- 
scient, infinite  and  absolute  substance.  God  is  the  only 
Mind.  All  true  or  real  life  is  a  spiritual  expression  of 
God,  and  is  therefore  perfect  as  God  is  perfect.  Man  is 
in  no  sense  material,  nor  is  he  composed  of  material  ele- 
ments, as  blood,  brains,  bones,  or  other  physical  prop- 
erties; on  the  contrary,  he  is  spiritual  and  perfect,  the 
image  of  Love.  He  is  eternal  and  has  no  mind  separate 
from  God  of  which  he  is  the  expression.  Since  God  is  the 
principle  of  man,  and  man  is  the  idea  of  God,  man  cannot 
sin.  Since  God  is  omnipotent,  God  can  effectuate  only 
that  which  is  perfect;  accordingly  he  cannot  create  an 
imperfect  world,  nor  can  he  engender  in  man  freedom  to 
sin.  The  perfection  of  God  makes  it  impossible  for  him 
to  be  a  party  to  the  sin,  sickness,  suffering,  and  death  of 
the  material  or  unreal  world.  Since  God  is  omniscient, 
he  can  know  only  the  perfect;  the  material  world,  being 
imperfect,  cannot  be  known  by  him  as  we  know  it.  He 
could  be  conscious  of  the  unreal  and  temporal,  of  sin  and 


*  Richard  I^e  Gallienne,  The  Religion  of  a  Literary  Man. 


88  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

sorrow,  of  suffering  and  death  only  if  he  himself  became 
/  sinful  and  finite,  that  is,  if  he  possessed  the  imperfect 
y  human  consciousness  bj  which  he  might  misrepresent  to 
himself  our  spiritual  creation  as  material. 

We  do  not  inquire  concerning  the  immediate  historical 
genesis  of  Christian  Science,  or  the  personal  sources 
responsible  for  its  beginnings.  Far  more  valuable  to  us 
is  an  analysis  of  the  content  of  its  idea  of  God  as  related 
to  the  idea  of  God  in  idealistic  systems  of  thought.  The 
fundamental  principle  here  is  unquestionably  pantheistic: 
"God  is  all  in  all" ;  "All  in  all  is  God."  It  is  not  the  ulti- 
mate pantheism  of  Paul,  nor  is  it  the  unqualified  pan- 
theism of  Spinoza:  evil  is  no  part  of  the  necessary, 
although  free,  self-expression  of  the  Infinite.  It  is  a 
purely  spiritual  pantheism.  All  reality  is  spiritual,  and 
all  spiritual  reality  is  God.  This  may  be  defined  in  part 
as  metaphysical,  but  still  more  as  an  ethical  idealism. 

The  theology  of  Christian  Science  has  interesting  affini- 
ities  with  the  philosophy  of  Plato  and  Aristotle.  It 
draws  from  Plato  a  part  of  its  metaphysics  and  ethics. 
The  only  reality  is  ideal.  The  ideal  is  eternal.  All  that 
exists  is  real,  so  far  as  it  partakes  of  or  is  a  revelation  of 
the  Absolute  and  Changeless  Eternal.  This  reality  is 
Intelligence  or  Mind.  It  is  Thought  in  the  highest  de- 
gree, indeed,  Absolute  Thought,  which  transcends  and 
therefore  eludes  exhaustive  logical  definition.  All  human 
souls,  so  far  as  they  are  pure  intelligence,  are  eternal  and 
in  idea  are  perfect,  however  for  the  period  of  their  earthly 
existence  they  may  be  under  the  delusion  of  sense.  The 
absolute  reality  is  not  merely  intelligence  but  the  absolute 
Good.  For  man  the  ideal  good  is  won  partly  through  an 
insight  into  the  pure,  incorruptible  essence  of  the  human 
soul,  akin  to  God,  thrust  for  a  brief  space  into  the  eva- 
nescent unreality  of  earthly  existence,  and  partly  by  mak- 


PRESENT-DAY  CONCEPTIONS  OF  GOD         89 

ing  the  ideal  good  of  eternity  the  supreme  and  only  good 
of  mortal  life.  There  is  a  tendency  in  the  Socratic  direc- 
tion to  identify  knowledge  and  virtue,  and  this  appears 
to  be  as  true  for  God  as  for  men. 

Its  affinity  with  Aristotle's  conception  appears  in  its 
relation  to  his  designating  term  for  God  as  pure  intelli- 
gence. The  Supreme  Being  is  utterly  self-contained  and 
self-sufficient,  without  sensations,  perceptions,  appetites, 
or  feelings  which  take  the  form  of  wiU.  Since  his  knowl- 
edge is  concerned  only  with  the  perfect,  he  knows  nothing 
of  the  finite  world  which  exists  outside  of  himself.  His 
intelb'gence,  being  infinite,  is  directed  only  to  the  infinite 
and  absolute  reality,  namely,  himself.  Thus  his  life  is 
that  of  pure  self-contemplation.  As  far  as  God  is  con- 
cerned, our  finite  world  and  all  its  imperfection  is  the 
same  as  if  it  were  non-existent.  There  is  indeed  this  vari- 
ation from  Aristotle,  that  whereas  in  Aristotle  the  divine 
intelligence  is  oblivious  of  all  outside  of  itself,  in  Christian 
Science  God's  knowledge  embraces  man,  since  man  is 
perfect;  the  difference  is,  however,  more  apparent  than 
real,  for,  according  to  Christian  Science,  man  is  not  a 
part  of  the  finite  world,  and  hence  imperfect  and  unreal, 
but  as  a  self-manifestation  of  God  is  perfect  and  neces- 
sarily included  in  the  divine  self-consciousness. 

When  Christian  Science  presents  "mercy"  among  the 
attributes  of  God,  one  sees  that  it  has  not  completely 
freed  itself  from  a  use  of  terms  to  which  it  can  assign  no 
meaning.  It  holds,  on  the  one  hand,  that  man  is  incap- 
able of  sin  and  suffering,  and  on  the  other  hand,  that  to 
God  sin  and  suffering  are  absolutely  non-existent.  But 
"mercy"  is  meaningless  apart  from  ill-desert  or  suffering 
in  man  and  apart  from  God  who  both  knows  and  has 
compassion  on  human  misery  and  sin. 

One  looks  in  vain  in  the  Christian  Science  conception  of 


90  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

God  for  any  point  of  union  between  it  and  the  teaching 
of  Jesus ;  the  two  have  nothing  in  common  except  the  name 
"God."  The  utmost  contrast  drives  them  hopelessly 
apart.  If  one  is  true,  the  other  is  false.  It  would  be  a 
misstatement  to  say  that  the  Christian  Science  idea  of 
God  is  a  development  of  the  Christian  idea ;  its  essence  is 
Greek  rather  than  Hebrew.  It  is  no  less  repugnant  to 
Jewish  than  to  Christian  theology.  The  Greek  concep- 
tion of  God  with  which  this  idea  has  the  closest  affinity, 
was  never  permanently  influential  in  the  religious  life  of 
Greece  and  Rome,  nor  had  it  power  to  maintain  itself  as 
an  idea  by  itself;  whatever  permanence  it  enjoyed  was 
derived  from  its  alliance  with  vital  elements  of  the  Chris- 
tian faith.  One  may  discover  the  secret  of  Christian 
Science  in  its  optimistic  ignoring  of  the  privations  which 
disturb  and  darken  human  joy,  in  its  inculcation  of  the 
Stoic  attitude  toward  pain  and  death,  coupled  with  the 
conviction  that  goodness  is  the  essential  heart  of  things, 
and  that  all  evils  are  superficial  and  temporary  and  yield 
to  mental  suggestion,  but  these  all  grow  out  of  its  pecu- 
liar idea  of  God. 


IX 


An  interesting  side-light  is  thrown  on  the  present  atti- 
tude of  a  goodly  number  of  educated  men  in  a  report  of 
Professor  Leuba  of  a  questionnaire  on  "The  Belief  in  God 
and  Immortality."  He  attempts  no  complete  exposition 
of  the  term  "God."  It  fully  satisfies  his  purpose  to  say 
that  it  "designates  beings  with  whom  can  be  maintained 
the  relations  implied  in  all  historical  religions  in  which  a 
God  or  gods  are  worshipped,  i.  e.,  direct  and  affective 
relations.  A  personal  God  as  here  understood  is  there- 
fore not  necessarily  an  anthropomorphic  but  certainly  an 


PRESENT-DAY  CONCEPTIONS  OF  GOD         91 

anthropopathic  being."  He  addressed  his  questions  to  a 
carefully  selected  list  of  scientific  men  and  received  replies 
from  a  majority  of  these.  Dividing  the  respondents  into 
two  groups  of  lesser  and  greater  eminence,  he  tabulates 
affirmative  replies  as  follows:  from  scientists,  48.^  per 
cent  of  the  first  and  31.6  per  cent  of  the  second  rank; 
from  sociologists,  29.2  per  cent  of  the  lesser,  and  19.4 
per  cent  of  the  greater  eminence ;  from  psychologists  32.1 
per  cent  of  the  lesser,  13.2  per  cent  of  the  greater.  This 
part  of  the  inquiry,  limiting  reference  to  belief  in  God 
as  personal,  from  whom  answers  to  prayers  may  be  ex- 
pected, was  in  many  respects  neither  so  conclusive  nor  so 
significant  as  would  at  first  appear.  While  the  investiga- 
tion uncovers  a  very  suggestive  condition — in  its  lowest 
terms,  an  aloofness  from,  if  not  positive  rejection  of,  the 
traditional  idea  of  God,  yet  one  may  not  without  further 
ado  label  all  those  who  replied  in  the  negative  as  atheists. 
For  there  are  many  who  regard  God  as  personal  but  have 
long  since  ceased  to  believe  in  objective  answers  to  prayer. 
Again,  there  is  an  increasing  number  of  thoughtful  men 
who  avow  belief  in  God,  yet  maintain  that  not  personality 
but  super-personality  or  some  less  anthropomorphic  term 
should  be  applied  to  the  Reality  of  realities.  Moreover, 
Professor  Leuba  explains  that  one  reason  why  some  of 
those  addressed  declined  to  reply  was  their  misconception 
of  his  aim,  and  he  adds  that  instead  of  preparing  statis- 
tics on  philosophic  opinions  about  God  and  his  relation 
to  nature  and  to  men,  his  "sole  interest  was  to  find  out 
how  many  of  those  accepted  a  particular  conception  of 
God  and  his  relation  to  men."  As  compared  with  the  tra- 
ditional belief  in  God  as  final,  the  result  of  this  qiLestion- 
naire  seems  very  disconcerting.  And  yet  it  is  not  dis- 
quieting. When  one  considers  the  seriousness  of  scientific 
men,  the  reverence  for  reality  wherever  it  presents  itself 


92  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

to  their  experience,  their  absorption  in  the  field  of  their 
investigation,  their  unwillingness  to  express  a  judgment 
on  matters  which  lie  beyond  their  special  task,  and  finally 
the  fact  that  professed  theologians  differ  radically  on  the 
very  subjects  under  discussion,  one  is  not  surprised  that 
the  men  inquired  of  returned  so  many  negative  replies  to 
the  question  "concerning  a  particular  conception  of  God." 


IV.     THE  THEISTIC  ARGUMENTS— IN 
GENERAL 


No  SINGLE  aspect  of  the  idea  of  God  has  passed 
through  as  many  vicissitudes  as  have  the  so-called  theistic 
arguments.  A  survey  of  the  principal  stages  which  have 
marked  the  changing  affirmations  and  points  of  view  will 
make  this  statement  clear.  We  may  conveniently  divide 
these  into  several  periods,  marked  by  general  character- 
istics :  the  ancient — partly  naive  and  partly  reasoned,  the 
medieval,  the  late  XVIII  century  (English),  the  revolu- 
tion introduced  by  Kant,  and  the  more  recent  views 
springing  from  the  doctrine  of  evolution,  the  psychology 
of  religion,  and  other  present-day  methods  of  interpret- 
ing reality.  The  arguments  commonly  adduced  in  proof 
of  the  being  or  nature  of  God  are  the  cosmological,  the 
teleological,  and  the  ontological;  these  have  been  supple- 
mented by  several  others,  as  the  historical,  the  consensus 
gentium,  and  the  moral. 

n 

In  the  first  period  our  attention  is  drawn  to  two  types 
of  thought — the  simple  intuitive  views  of  the  Hebrews, 
and  the  highly  speculative  position  of  the  Greeks. 
Everywhere  in  Hebrew  thought  the  existence  of  their 
God  was  taken  for  granted.  The  apparent  arguments 
put  forth  by  their  great  prophets  never  formed  a  basis 
for  their  belief,  but  were  instead  a  confirmation,  a  beau- 

93 


94  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

tiful  and  fitting  confirmation  of  a  conviction  already 
established  beyond  the  possibility  of  shaking.  The  ques- 
tion whether  he  who  formed  the  organs  by  which  we  are  in 
contact  with  the  world  should  not  himself  possess  the 
same,  carried  its  own  self-evident  answer.  And  long  after- 
ward the  apostle  whose  thought  was  tinged  with  contem- 
porary idealism  beheld  in  all  visible  things  a  manifestation 
of  the  unseen  divine  reality.  Nothing  was,  however,  fur- 
ther from  their  intention  than  to  support  by  argument 
what  seemed  to  them  self-evident,  and  therefore  convinc- 
ing and  incontrovertible.  The  being  who  was  thus 
revealed  was  indeed  not  one  of  pure  spirituality,  but  this 
fact  does  not  in  any  way  alter  the  force  of  our  conten- 
tion. The  world  was  the  purposive  disclosure  of  a 
rational  will,  to  be  interpreted  through  human  qualities, 
or  where  these  failed,  through  God's  specific  self-revela- 
tion, and  if  this  was  lacking  the  appeal  was  made  to  faith 
in  the  unsearchable  riches  of  the  divine  will.  Paul  might 
argue  concerning  other  questions,  as  for  example  the 
institutions  of  the  Jewish  church,  but  he  shared  with  all 
others  the  unshakable  assurance  of  the  being  of  God.  He 
had  therefore  need  of  no  formal  argument  to  establish 
the  existence  of  God. 

For  the  two  great  thinkers  of  Greece  the  idea  of  God 
was  the  postulate  of  their  interpretation  of  the  world. 
The  changing  aspects  of  the  world,  its  incompleteness,  it» 
dramatic  tendency  toward  something  other  and  higher 
than  itself  became  intelligible  only  in  the  light  of  a  per- 
fect reality  of  which  all  finite  things  were  but  partial  sug- 
gestions. They  approached  this  idea  from  diff^erent 
angles,  and  their  conception  of  God  both  as  to  his  nature 
and  as  to  his  relation  to  the  world  was  not  identical,  but 
this  in  no  way  invalidates  the  fundamental  fact  that  for 
both  of  them  equally  the  meaning  of  the  world  was  to  be 


THE  THEISTIC  ARGUMENTS  95 

sought  not  in  itself  but  in  God.  It  is  not  so  much  an  argu- 
ment from  effect  to  cause,  from  thought  to  being,  from 
ends  perceived  to  a  purposeful  intelligence,  as  that  in  the 
very  structure  of  their  thought  was  the  implication  of 
God.  The  world  as  they  regarded  it  was  conceived  some- 
what as  follows:  its  ideal  destination  according  to  Plato 
involved  that  what  was  real  in  it  must  be  disengaged  from 
the  sensuous  aspect  and  rise  into  the  supersensible  sphere, 
there  perfectly  to  realize  its  end  in  union  with  the  abso- 
lute good  or  God ;  according  to  Aristotle  it  was  to  strive 
after  and  become  like  God,  but  since  it  was  forever  sep- 
arated from  him  by  an  impassable  gulf,  it  could  never 
become  one  with  him. 

In  his  analysis  of  consciousness  Plato  laid  bare  two 
ultimate  forms  of  thought,  one  dealing  with  abstract  con- 
ceptions, the  other  with  necessary,  eternal  ideas.  Since 
these  ideas  constitute  the  characterstic  nature  of  the 
soul,  it  is  evident  that  the  soul  is  of  the  same  essence  with 
absolute  truth,  absolute  beauty,  absolute  good  or  God. 
In  one  sense  he  who  seeks  God  goes  outside  of  himself, 
but  in  anther  and  truer  sense  he  finds  God  within.  This 
can  hardly  be  called  an  argument  for  the  being  of  God; 
it  is  rather  an  intuition,  an  analysis,  and  an  evaluation  of 
the  eternal  and  absolute  quality  of  mind.  He  employs 
the  vehicle  of  mythology  to  convey  his  meaning,  but  even 
so  the  meaning  is  clear, — all  that  is  real  in  the  soul  is  to 
be  referred  to  God,  not  indeed  as  static  but  as  dynamic, 
and  as  partaking  of  the  truth  and  goodness  of  God.  Thus 
the  argument  from  cause  has  validity,  although  not  in  the 
form  which  arose  later.  Since  thought  is  central  in  the 
world,  the  highest  Idea  or  God  is  the  starting-point  of  all 
our  interpretation  of  the  world — "the  light  of  all  our 
seeing.'* 


96  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

In  Aristotle  the  theistic  argument  took  two  forms :  one 
based  on  the  gradual  perfection  of  ends  in  nature,  the 
other  derived  from  an  analysis  of  motion — the  argument 
of  the  Prime  Mover.  According  to  the  latter  argument 
the  world  is  self-existent  and  is  characterized  by  eternal 
motion.  Motion  involves  both  something  mobile  and  an 
immobile  Prime  Mover;  or  otherwise  stated,  it  involves 
both  potentiality — a  possibility  of  becoming — and  a 
reality  to  which  neither  change  nor  addition  is  to  be 
alleged  to  make  it  complete.  The  potentiality  of  the 
world  expresses  itself  in  striving  after  and  realizing  ideal 
ends,  but  since  these  are  not  immanent  in  the  world  but 
only  perfectly  realized  in  God,  one  who  would  explain  the 
world  must  affirm  a  Being  who  perfectly  and  eternally  is 
what  the  world  eternally  aims  to  become;  a  Being  infi- 
nitely self-contained  and  self-sufficient,  an  absolute  self- 
consciousness,  of  supreme  felicity,  the  cause  of  the  world 
not  as  efficiently  originating  it  but  attracting  it  as  simple 
beauty  attracts  its  object  for  which  the  world  has  inher- 
ent fitness.  Accordingly,  the  world,  although  self-exist- 
ent, is  not  self-sufficient :  its  ends  are  not  from  itself  but 
from  God.  It  matters  not  to  the  argument  that  God  is 
wholly  absorbed  in  the  felicity  of  his  own  self-conscious 
intelligence  and  knows  nothing  of  the  world,  or,  on  the 
other  hand,  that  the  world  can  come  into  no  reciprocal 
relation  with  God.  The  principle  is  that  the  imperfect 
is  conditioned  by  the  perfect,  all  becoming  presupposes 
the  complete,  and  striving  toward  the  ideal  would  be  pur- 
suit after  a  phantom  unless  the  ideal  was  already  actual. 
If  therefore  the  world  is  to  have  meaning,  this  is  to  be 
found  not  in  itself  but  in  God.  This  is  the  course  of 
the  various  well  known  forms  of  the  argument  for  the 
existence  of  God  from  the  incompleteness  and  contingency 
of  the  world.    By  Christian  writers  it  was,  however,  as  will 


THE  THEISTIC  ARGUMENTS  97 

later  appear,  set  in  a  very  different  frame  from  that  of 
Aristotle. 


in 


Anselm,  who  is  the  earliest  of  the  great  thinkers  of 
the  church  to  construct  formal  arguments  for  the  exist- 
ence of  God,  proposes  two  ways  of  approach.  In  the  first 
he  maintains  that  the  most  universal  is  the  most  real 
being  (ens  recdissimum)  and  the  most  real  is  the  most 
perfect  being  (ens  perfectissimum).  All  finite  greatness 
and  goodness  are  such  by  reason  of  partaking  of  abso- 
lute greatness  and  goodness.  He,  however,  than  whom 
nothing  greater  can  be  thought  is  such  not  by  participa- 
tion in  anything  else  but  in  himself  per  se.  The  cause  of 
existing  things  is  therefore  not  in  themselves — they  can 
be  thought  as  non-existent, — ^but  in  a  single  cause  which  is 
necessarily  both  self-existent  and  self-sufficient.  This  cos- 
mological  argument,  derived  from  Platonic  idealism,  is 
supplemented  by  the  ontological  argument  which  reasons 
from  thought  to  being.  The  idea  of  the  greatest  possible 
or  perfect  being  is  universal.  But  this  idea  is  not  com- 
plete unless  existence  belongs  essentially  to  it;  otherwise 
one  could  conceive  of  a  still  more  perfect  being,  that  is, 
one  who  had  metaphysical  existence:  an  actually  existing 
being  has  more  perfection  than  one  existing  only  ideally. 
To  the  objection  that  one  might  with  equal  cogency  argue 
from  the  idea  to  the  existence  of  the  Fabled  Island,  if 
only  perfection  were  attributed  to  it,  Anselm  had  no  sat- 
isfactory reply  to  off*er.  He  failed  to  show  the  nature 
of  the  necessity  of  this  idea  in  consciousness  and  to  prove 
that  necessary  thought  and  absolute  existence  were  bound 
up  together.  For  several  centuries  deep  thinkers  have 
pondered  the  problem  thus  thrown  out,  feeling  the  attrac- 


98  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

tion  of  it,  unable  to  deny  to  it  all  validity,  coupled  with  a 
secret  hope  that  a  solution  somewhere  awaits  it. 

Descartes  added  to  the  conception  of  Anselm  an  argu- 
ment which  involves  two  principles.  First,  the  idea  of 
God,  that  is,  of  a  perfect  being,  could  not  arise  in  the 
human  mind  since  the  human  mind  is  finite  and  imperfect ; 
hence  it  must  be  referred  to  a  perfect  cause  or  God; 
therefore  God  exists.  Secondly,  the  contingency  of  all 
finite  things,  since  the  reasons  for  their  being  do  not  lie 
in  themselves,  requires  the  assumption  of  a  being  whose 
ground  of  existence  is  in  himself  alone :  self-existence  is  a 
necessary  element  of  perfection,  and  therefore  of  God. 
The  entire  cogency  of  this  argument  lies  not  in  the  force 
of  the  inference  from  the  idea  of  God  to  his  existence,  but 
if  the  existence  of  God  is  assumed,  then  naturally  the 
quality  of  perfection  follows. 


IV 


The  first  ominous  warning  with  reference  to  the  theistic 
arguments  came  from  the  philosopher  who  shares  with 
Kant  the  distinction  of  blazing  a  new  path  for  theistic 
thought,  the  end  of  which  no  one  can  foresee.  Hume  ^  in 
a  posthumous  work,  allowed  a  certain  validity  to  the  cos- 
mological  argument.  He  affirms  that  the  existence  of 
Deity  is  plainly  ascertained  by  reason.  The  inference  as 
to  the  nature  of  this  Being  is  from  the  order  and  design 
in  nature,  and  is  limited  to  the  attributes  of  intelligence 
and  design.  "The  cause  or  causes  of  order  in  the  universe 
probably  bear  some  remote  analogy  to  human  intelli- 
gence."     This   judgment   is,   however,   qualified   by   the 


^Dialogues  Concerning  Natural  Religion,  1779. 


THE  THEISTIC  ARGUMENTS  99 

alternative  question  whether  the  material  universe  as  well 
as  the  mind  may  not  be  self -existent  and  contain  the 
spring  of  order  in  itself.  The  present  order  of  the  world 
arising  from  long  continued  motion  and  transpositions  is 
self-supporting  and  perhaps  eternal;  here  each  part  is 
related  to  every  other,  the  whole  having  the  appearance 
of  art  or  contrivance.  This,  if  it  could  be  established, 
would  dispose  of  the  ontological  argument;  it  would  also 
essentially  change  the  idea  of  the  nature  of  the  Being 
whose  existence  Hume  in  common  with  all  rational  minds 
affirms. 

Although  he  allowed  that  the  existence  of  God  was  evi- 
dent in  the  physical  order,  yet  he  was  unable  to  attribute 
to  him  any  moral  qualities.  From  a  consideration  of  the 
conduct  of  events  in  a  supposed  particular  providence  in 
human  historical  life,  he  reverses  the  well  nigh  universal 
judgment;  for  him  the  world,  instead  of  being  a  sphere 
in  which  a  purpose  of  good  is  disclosed,  presents  the  spec- 
tacle of  such  conflict  and  confusion  that  no  inference  can 
be  drawn  concerning  the  divine  justice,  benevolence,  mercy, 
and  rectitude.  Nor  is  relief  to  be  sought  in  the  choice 
between  a  being  who  is  almighty  but  of  limited  goodness 
'and  one  who  is  perfectly  benevolent  but  of  finite  power. 
On  an  inductive  survey  of  human  life  the  only  conclusion 
which  is  warranted  by  the  facts  is  that  God  is  entirely 
indifferent  to  moral  values,  whether  of  good  or  evil,  even 
as  he  is  indifferent  to  heat  and  cold,  to  drought  and  mois- 
ture. Aristotle  had  already  presented  the  idea  of  God  as 
one  who  is  wholly  oblivious  of  both  the  physical  and  the 
moral  world,  the  Epicureans  had  isolated  their  gods  in  a 
region  wholly  withdrawn  from  the  world  of  men. 

Augustine  and  Calvin,  making  God  the  predestinating 
cause  of  sin  as  well  as  of  goodness,  had  at  the  same  time 
shown  that  evil  and  good  were  alike  necessary  to  God, 


100  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

since  both  were  rooted  in  the  divine  will.  Spinoza  con- 
ceived of  particular  forms  of  good  and  evil  as  evanescent 
but  equally  necessary  forms  of  the  Absolute.  Hume 
infers  a  God  of  boundless  wisdom  and  infinite  and  unvary- 
ing power,  but  finds  no  warrant  for  attributing  to  him 
any  moral  purpose  or  interest  in  human  virtue.  Whatever 
meaning  therefore  the  idea  of  God  may  have,  it  "affords 
no  inference  that  affects  human  life,  or  can  be  the  source 
of  any  action  or  forbearance."  In  this  connection  two 
other  suggestions  of  Hume  from  a  very  different  point 
of  view  must  not  be  passed  by.  (1)  In  his  Enquiry  Con- 
cerning Human  Understanding  he  conceives  of  cause  as  a 
relation  which  the  mind  by  reason  of  long  association 
establishes  between  events,  as  heat  and  light;  it  is  there- 
fore purely  subjective,  limited  to  the  phenomenal  world, 
and  incapable  of  metaphysical  reference.  The  question 
as  to  the  cause  of  the  world  lies  beyond  the  power  of  the 
human  understanding.  (2)  Since  the  world  is  "singular," 
that  is,  there  is  no  other  world  with  which  to  relate  it,  an 
attempt  to  connect  the  notion  of  cause  with  it  is  futile. 
Thus  the  cosmological  argument  loses  its  cogency.  It 
may  be  a  question  which  of  these  two  general  points  of 
view  represents  Hume's  final  position. 


Kant  arrives  at  a  position  diametrically  opposed  to 
that  of  Hume  in  the  Dialogues.  Whereas  Hume  had 
affirmed  the  validity  of  the  rational  argument  for  the 
being  of  God  but  denied  the  force  of  the  moral  argument, 
Kant  aimed  to  show  the  utter  baselessness  of  the  rational 
arguments — the  traditional  cosmological,  ontological  and 
teleological — and  to  frame  a  moral  argument  which  would 


THE  THEISTIC  ARGUMENTS  101 

rest  upon  an  impregnable  foundation.  Bj  dividing  the 
world  into  two  wholly  disparate  sections — the  noumenal 
and  the  phenomenal,  by  a  critical  theory  of  knowledge 
according  to  which  phenomena  alone  fall  within  the  scope 
of  human  understanding,  while  by  the  way  of  the  specu- 
lative reason  the  ultimate  reality  remains  both  unknown 
and  unknowable,  he  has  made  necessary  a  totally  new 
approach  to  the  idea  of  God.  This  is  primarily  subjec- 
tive, through  the  pathway  of  experience.  The  starting 
point  is  a  postulate  which  is  proposed  for  verification.  If 
at  the  outset  the  postulate  appears  arbitrary,  it  is  not 
intended  to  remain  so;  indeed  the  aim  is  by  moral  en- 
deavor to  transform  the  assumption  into  an  experience. 
"I  will  that  there  be  a  God,  that  my  existence  in  this 
world  be  also  an  existence  outside  the  chain  of  physical 
causes  and  in  a  pure  world  of  the  understanding,  and 
lastly  that  my  duration  be  endless."  ^  According  to 
Kant  we  live  in  two  worlds,  one  a  causal  order  in  which 
necessity  rules,  the  events  of  which  lie  beyond  man's 
causal  power,  since  he,  too,  is  a  member  of  the  chain,  the 
other  a  sphere  of  ideal  values  which  are  wholly  within  the 
power  of  man  to  realize.  In  this  latter  sphere  freedom 
is  postulated  as  the  indefeasible  condition  of  virtue.  A 
second  condition  is  the  duration  of  immortality  in  which 
freedom  may  attain  virtue.  But  since  the  summum  bonum 
includes  happiness  as  well  as  virtue,  since  there  is  no 
ground  in  the  moral  law  for  happiness,  and  since  happi- 
ness is  dependent  upon  nature  which  takes  no  account  of 
either  man's  power  or  his  deserts,  and  is  on  this  account 
beyond  his  reach,  we  have  to  add  to  the  postulates  of 
freedom  and  immortality  the  postulate  of  God  as  the 
necessary   condition   for  the    completion   of   the   highest 

*  Theory  of  Ethics,  p.  241,  transl.  by  Abbott. 


102  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

good.  Here  is  postulated  a  cause  of  nature  In  whom  is 
found  the  principle  of  the  harmony  of  nature  with 
rational  wills.  The  action  of  this  being  involves  intelli- 
gence, and  his  causality,  will.  Accordingly,  "the  postu- 
late of  the  highest  derived  good  (the  best  world)  is  like- 
wise the  reality  of  a  highest  original  good,  that  is  to  say, 
of  the  existence  of  God.  .  .  .  Thus  it  is  morally  neces- 
sary to  assume  the  existence  of  God." 

When  therefore  Kant  says,  "I  will  that  there  be  a  God, 
that  my  existence  in  this  world  be  also  an  existence  out- 
side the  chain  of  physical  causes  and  in  a  pure  world  of 
the  understanding,  and  lastly  that  my  duration  be  end- 
less," his  position  is  in  a  high  degree  subjective,  and  he 
is  giving  expression  to  a  supreme  article  of  faith;  at  the 
same  time  he  intends  to  offer  an  incontrovertible  argu- 
ment for  the  being  of  God.  He  made  his  appeal  to  life, 
and  in  life  rather  than  in  the  speculative  reason  would 
be  found  as  he  believed  the  vindication  of  the  idea  of 
God.  His  argument  is  open  to  serious  criticism,  both  for 
what  it  includes  and  for  what  it  omits.  One  might  even 
maintain  that  with  such  a  theory  of  virtue  the  conception 
of  God  was  superfluous.  In  spite  of  criticism,  however, 
his  argument  opened  the  way  to  a  new  approach  to  the 
meaning  of  God,  wherein  such  moral  and  religious  values 
as  he  had  no  appreciation  of  have  become  central  and 
decisive.  As  a  result  the  ancient  metaphysical  paths 
have  been  largely  abandoned  or  else  laid  out  anew,  and 
the  moral  argument  has  become  a  populous  thoroughfare 
to  the  interpretation  of  God. 

VI 

The  influence  of  Kant's  criticism  of  the  theistic  argu- 
ments may  be  sought  in  three  directions:  1,  in  certain 


THE  THEISTIC  ARGUMENTS  103 

leading  theologians  in  Great  Britain  and  America;  2,  in 
those  who  have  been  influenced  by  Hegel ;  3,  in  those  who 
have  taken  the  pragmatic  path. 

It  is  a  singularly  significant  fact  that  for  the  most 
part,  until  late  in  the  last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, one  finds  little  indication  that,  with  few  exceptions, 
English  and  American  theologians  had  read  Kant,  or  if 
they  had  read  him,  had  felt  the  force  of  his  criticism. 
The  theology  of  Great  Britain  was  insular,  that  of  the 
United  States  provincial,  and  both  were  ruled  by  the 
Scottish  common-sense  realism.  Hume,  when  not  de- 
nounced as  a  skeptic,  was  ignored.  Kant's  great  work. 
The  Critique  of  Pure  Reason^  was  published  in  1781,  re- 
vised edition  in  1787,  but  Paley,  whose  Natural  Theology 
appeared  in  1802,  was  uninfluenced  by  Kant;  he  had  not 
read  him  and  therefore  had  no  suspicion  that  his  own 
work  was  to  meet  an  antagonist  far  mightier  than  it.  The 
Bridgewater  Treatises,  which  aimed  to  prove  the  "power, 
wisdom,  and  goodness  of  God  as  manifested  in  the  crea- 
tion," were  all  cast  on  Paley's  lines.  Even  in  the  first  half 
of  the  last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  theolo- 
gians who  still  advocated  the  theistic  arguments  in  their 
traditional  form,  present  an  interesting  spectacle.  Some 
regard  all  of  the  traditional  arguments  as  valid,  others 
offer  a  perfunctory  defense  of  them  as  perhaps  a  dis- 
agreeable job  to  be  got  through  with,  while  still  others 
mix  together  arguments  which  are  inconsistent  with  one 
another.  The  elder  Hodge,  for  example,  states  but  does 
not  defend  the  ontological  argument,  yet  claims  the  two 
other  arguments  as  syllogistically  sound:  the  younger 
Hodge  maintains  that  all  are  correct  and  conclusive. 
A.  H.  Strong  is  pro  and  con  through  his  entire  presenta- 
tion but  finally  defends  the  traditional  position.  Dr. 
Shedd,    following   his    Platonic-Augustinian    proclivities, 


104  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

argues  at  great  length  for  the  ontological  proof.  Pro- 
fessor Flint  conditions  the  cosmological  argument  on  the 
impossibility  of  an  infinite  regress  of  finite  causes,  main- 
tains the  design  argument  as  in  full  force,  but  qualifies 
his  assent  to  the  ontological  argument.  Professor  Miley 
refers  to  an  earlier  work  of  Kant  on  the  "Grounds  of 
Proof  for  the  Existence  of  God,"  wherein  he  finds  Kant 
akin  to  Samuel  Clarke,  but  appears  to  be  ignorant  of  the 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason;  he  adds  that  he  could  with  pro- 
priety omit  the  ontological  argument,  but  affirms  that  the 
theistic  conclusion  of  the  cosmological  argument  in  its 
certainty  is  little  less  than  demonstration,  and  that  the 
teleological  argument  remains  unimpaired  in  its  cogency. 
J.  S.  Banks  classifies  all  the  arguments  as  a  posteriori,  re- 
gards each  as  sound  as  far  as  it  goes,  not  indeed  as  dem- 
onstration but  with  a  high  degree  of  certainty.  Profes- 
sor W.  N.  Clarke,  disinclined  to  metaphysics,  ignores  the 
ontological  but  accords  full  force  to  the  other  arguments. 
J.  Macpherson  fumbles  with  the  cosmological  and  teleo- 
logical arguments,  but  in  the  end  comes  out  where  others 
had  come  out  before  him:  with  the  younger  Hodge  and 
Flint  and  Fisher,  he  validates  the  cosmological  argument 
on  the  ground  of  the  absurdity  of  the  infinite  regress ;  he 
does,  however,  throw  down  the  ontological  argument. 
These  are  samples  of  influential  writers  who  seem  never  to 
have  felt  the  tremendous  impact  of  Kant.  They  do  not 
all  write  as  if  nothing  had  happened ;  their  dogmatic  slum- 
bers are  not  without  disturbing  dreams.  Professor  Samuel 
Harris  was  the  only  American  orthodox  theologian  who 
grappled  with  the  fundamental  question  raised  by  Kant's 
great  work.  He  maintains  that  the  existence  of  God  must 
be  as  necessary  as  the  idea  of  God.  With  keen  dialectics 
he  endeavors  to  ground  the  cosmological  argument  on 
causation  which  conducts  to  a  First  Cause.     In  support 


THE  THEISTIC  ARGUMENTS  106 

of  the  teleological  argument  he  adduces  a  five-fold  evi- 
dence from  nature  as  (1)  symbolic,  (2)  orderly,  (3)  pro- 
gressive, (4)  telic,  (5)  harmonious  and  unified  with  a 
spiritual  system.  This  constitutes  for  him  a  verification 
of  the  theistic  hypothesis,  that  the  cosmos  is  grounded  in 
reason,  and  that  the  Absolute  Power  manifested  in  it  is  a 
Rational  Power,  the  Universal  Reason  energizing,  the  per- 
sonal God.  It  is  an  unaccountable  fact  that  men  like  Pro- 
fessors Park  and  Henry  B.  Smith  return  after  prolonged 
study  in  German  universities  as  innocent  of  Kant  as  if  he 
had  never  lived.  On  the  other  hand,  liberal  theologians,  of 
whom  Professor  F.  D.  Hedge  was  the  most  illustrious 
instance,  had  found  in  Kant  and  especially  in  his  successor 
Hegel  profoundly  suggestive  material  for  developing  the 
idea  of  God. 


VII 


With  reference  to  those  who  have  been  influenced  by 
Hegelian  idealism,  Kant's  solution  of  the  theistic  argu- 
ments may  be  regarded  as  fundamentally  sound — point- 
ing out  the  right  approach,  and,  if  not  final,  as  inviting 
to  a  deeper  analysis  by  which  Kant's  ultimate  dualism 
may  be  resolved  into  a  unity.  The  latter  is  the  path 
struck  out  by  the  Hegelian  idealism.  We  have  then  to 
inquire  what  this  type  of  idealism  tries  in  general  to  do. 
(1)  That  which  is  essential  in  consciousness  pushes  out 
in  every  direction,  permitting  nothing  to  stand  in  the  way 
of  its  reaching  universal  validity.  Fichte  held  that 
reality  must  be  interpreted  by  what  we  know  to  be  most 
real,  namely,  consciousness  or  thought.  For  idealism 
there  is  no  such  object  as  "thing  in  itself,"  unknowable 
because  unrelated  to  the  human  mind,  nor  is  there  any- 
where an  opaque  and  inaccessible  somewhat  whose  bare 


106  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

existence  we  can  only  assert  or  assume.  (2)  The  ethical 
is  not  to  be  alienated  from  the  natural,  but  both  are  con- 
ceived of  as  essential  and  complementary  aspects  of  real- 
ity, and  indeed  of  personality.  Mind  and  nature,  instead 
of  being  independent  of  each  other,  are  members  of  an 
organic  whole.  Apart  from  mind  nature  has  no  signifi- 
cance, apart  from  nature  mind  has  no  actuality.  Nature 
reveals  mind  and  mind  finds  itself  in  nature.  (3)  The 
finite  consciousness  presupposes  the  infinite  consciousness, 
and  only  as  it  discovers  the  infinite  consciousness  within 
itself  does  the  finite  spirit  realize  its  true  being.  There 
is  no  complete  individual  life  or  separate  thought;  these 
have  in  themselves  as  such  no  absolute  worth;  only  as 
they  are  embraced  in  the  unity  of  the  Absolute  Thought 
or  Life  have  they  meaning  or  reality.  We  may  distin- 
guish, but  we  cannot  separate  the  finite  from  the  infinite ; 
otherwise  we  make  the  infinite  finite.  All  distinctions  of 
the  finite  from  the  infinite  are  only  for  the  sake  of  affirm- 
ing their  higher  unity.  (4)  Having  thus  reached  the 
ultimate  unity  of  thought  and  being,  we  are  on  a  vantage- 
ground  from  which  the  theistic  arguments  are  presented. 
Pfleiderer  and  John  Caird,  leading  representatives  of 
this  general  point  of  view,  agree  that  the  value  of  these 
proofs  lies  in  their  tracing  the  steps  by  which  the  human 
spirit  has  risen  to  a  consciousness  of  God,  but  they  are 
not  at  one  concerning  the  rational  value  of  the  cosmologi- 
cal  and  teleological  arguments.  According  to  Caird,^ 
the  cosmological  argument  involves  a  necessary  or  infinite 
Being  which  is  a  negation  of  the  finite.  This  position 
becomes  a  stepping-stone  to  a  higher  notion  of  the  infinite, 
as  that  which,  instead  of  annulling,  includes  and  explains 
the  finite.     The  logical  defects  of  the  teleological  argu- 


^An  Introduction  to  the  Philosophy  of  Religion, 


THE  THEISTIC  ARGUMENTS  107 

ment,  according  to  which  the  infinite  is  related  to  the  finite 
world  by  the  bond  of  an  arbitrary  will,  impel  toward  a 
higher  and  final  movement  of  thought.  Pfleiderer  ^  dis- 
covers in  the  manifold  acting  powers  of  the  world  not 
independent  substance,  but  manifestations  of  a  causal 
unity  which  is  the  ground  of  particular  things,  the  uniform 
relations  of  which  are  the  conditions  of  co-operation  and 
law.  ^  The  teleological  argument  means  that  the  cause 
of  the  world  answers  to  organic,  striving  life,  and  is  there- 
fore purposeful,  omnipotent  reason  which  we  designate  as 
God.  Both  Caird  and  Pfleiderer  agree  in  the  view  that 
evolution,  which  is  only  another  name  for  "essential  tele- 
ology," presents  a  form  of  this  proof  which  is  positive  and 
constructive,  to  wjiich,  therefore,  Kant's  criticism  does 
not  apply. 

Concerning  the  ontological  argument,  Pfleiderer  says: 
"The  unity  of  the  laws  of  thought,  which  are  not  drawn 
from  the  outer  world,  and  the  real  laws  of  being,  which 
are  not  created  by  our  thought,  is  a  fact  of  experience  of 
the  most  uncontrovertible  kind."  The  only  possible  expla- 
nation of  this  is  "the  presupposition  of  a  common  ground 
of  both,  in  which  thought  and  being  must  be  one,"  and 
this  "connection  of  thought  and  being  .  .  .  points  back 
to  the  unity  of  the  two  in  the  infinite  Spirit."  God  is 
"ground  and  guarantee  of  the  truth  of  our  thinking."  ^ 
Caird  held  that  the  meaning  of  the  ontological  proof  lies 
in  this,  "that  as  spiritual  beings  our  whole  conscious  life 
is  based  on  a  universal  self-consciousness,  an  Absolute 
Spiritual  Life,  which  is  not  a  mere  subjective  notion  or 
conception,  but  carries  with  It  the  proof  of  its  necessary 

*  The  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

*Cf.    Lotze,   Mikrokosmos,   Vol.    II,  pp.   596    f,   621    ff.      Bownc, 
Theism,  p.  60. 

•  Op.  cit,  Vol.  II,  pp.  273-274. 


108  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

existence  or  reality."  ^  These  are  impressive  statements 
of  the  ontological  argument  from  the  idealistic  point  of 
view.  The  following  words  may  be  added  from  Edward 
Caird:  "God  is  the  unity  of  intelligence,  conceived  as 
necessarily  related  or  manifested  in  a  world  of  space  and 
time,  yet  through  that  world  returning  into  itself.  In 
other  words,  the  ontological  argmnent — the  argument 
from  thought  to  being — when  relieved  of  its  syllogistic 
and  therefore  analytic  form,  is  simply  the  expression  of 
that  highest  unity  of  thought  and  being  which  all  knowl- 
edge presupposes  as  its  beginning  and  seeks  as  its  end.'  ^ 
Reference  to  other  thinkers  may  complete  the  idealistic 
presentation.  According  to  Lotze,  the  cosmological  proof 
conducts  neither  to  necessity  nor  to  unity  of  the  Uncon- 
ditioned, but  only  to  the  reality  of  a  "Power  immanent 
in  all  existence  and  operative  in  all  change.'^  The  teleo- 
logical  argument  is  invalid.  The  refutation  of  the  onto- 
logical argument  has  been  ineffectual.  It  would  be  intol- 
erable if  what  is  greatest,  most  beautiful,  and  most  worthy 
is  simply  an  idea,  without  existence  or  power,  in  the  world 
of  reality.  "If  what  is  greatest  did  not  eodst,  then  what 
is  greatest  would  not  be ;  and  it  is  impossible  that  what  is 
greatest  of  all  conceivable  things  should  not  be."  ^  The 
positions  of  the  late  Professor  Bowne  are  essentially  those 
suggested  by  Lotze.  He  is,  however,  satisfied  to  reach  in- 
telligence in  the  world-ground.  By  an  inductive  process 
he  infers  intelligence  from  the  cosmic  order  or  the  struc- 
ture of  the  universe,  from  activity  according  to  rule  and 
with  reference  to  future  ends,  and  from  human  intelligence. 
By  a   speculative  process  he  likewise  infers  intelligence 


*  Op.  cit,  p.  159. 

^The  Critical  Philosophy  of  Immarmel  Kant,  Vol.  II,  p.  128. 

'  Microcosmos,  Vol.  II,  p.  661. 


THE  THEISTIC  ARGUMENTS  109 

from  the  constitution  of  reason,  from  the  nature  and  im- 
plications of  knowledge  which  involves  a  rational  universe, 
a  knowing  human  mind,  identity  of  thought  with  principles 
of  being,  and  such  an  adjustment  of  mind  to  reality  that 
thoughts  shall  represent  objective  facts;  that  is,  the  intel- 
ligible exists  only  for  and  through  thought.^ 

A  recent  setting  of  the  ontological  argument  by  W.  E. 
Hocking  maintains  that  we  first  build  up  the  idea  of  God 
pragmatically,  by  asking  what  reason  we  have  in  the  unity 
of  our  world,  in  the  presence  there  of  anything  changeless 
and  absolute,  and  in  the  existence  of  a  personal  deity.  He 
shows  how  God  is  found  in  human  experience  at  large 
and  develops  in  religious  experience,  and  how  our  knowl- 
edge of  fellow-men  depends  on  original  knowledge  of  God 
and  not  vice  versa,  albeit  these  are  reciprocal  in  their 
action.  His  ontological  argument  then  resolves  itself  into 
the  statement :  "Not  I  have  an  idea  of  God,  therefore  God 
exists;  but  I  have  an  idea  of  God,  therefore  I  have  an 
experience  of  God."  ^ 

VIII 

Turning  now  to  those  who  have  been  profoundly 
influenced  by  the  pragmatic  aspect  of  Kant's  theory,  we 
come  upon  two  outstanding  instances,  Mansel  and  Ritschl. 
Mansel,  who  derived  the  basis  of  his  contention  from  Sir 
William  Hamilton's  "Philosophy  of  the  Conditioned," 
threw  down  all  rational  cosmology  and  turned'  to  revela- 
tion as  the  sole  source  of  our  knowledge  of  God,  the 
Trinity,  and  the  incarnation.  Here  the  business  of  reason 
is  not  to  discover  truth,  to  ascertain  what  God  is,  but 
only  what  he  will  have  us  think  of  him  as  conditioned  by 

*  Op.  cit,  p.  182. 

*  The  Meaning  of  God  in  Human  Experience,  p.  814. 


110  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

revelation.  Ritschl,  influenced  by  Schleiermacher  and 
Lotze,  yet  owing  most  to  Kant,  rejected  all  theoretic 
judgments  concerning  God  and  placed  his  entire  reliance 
on  value- judgments.  The  argument  therefore  resolves 
itself  into  a  single  form,  the  teleological-moral :  according 
as  the  postulate  verifies  itself  in  experience,  it  gathers 
validity.  One  starts  indeed  with  a  great  certainty,  but 
this  initial  assurance  passes  into  knowledge  won  through 
experience. 

Although  Herbert  Spencer's  point  of  view  concerning 
the  idea  of  God  was  in  general  agnostic,  yet  he  reminds 
us  of  Fichte  and  Schopenhauer  in  his  assertion  that  the 
Ultimate  Reality  is  of  the  same  nature  as  that  which 
wells  up  in  the  human  consciousness — a  new  form  of  the 
ontological  argument.  This  position,  if  it  could  be  sub- 
stantiated, would  off^er  a  new  setting  for  the  presentation 
of  Anselm  and  Descartes.  Its  pantheistic  flavor  would, 
however,  have  been  exceedingly  distasteful  to  them. 

Sabatier  bases  his  conviction  of  the  being  of  God  on 
the  experience  of  the  pious  consciousness  and  on  the  neces- 
sities of  the  developing  personality.  His  aflinity  with 
Kant  and  Ritschl  is  disclosed  in  the  fact  that  he  is  con- 
cerned only  with  a  Being  who  answers  to  moral  and 
religious  needs.  His  argument  does  not  lead  to  a  Supreme 
Being — an  Absolute  who  exists  in  and  for  himself  apart 
from  the  world — nor  does  it  conduct  directly  to  a  Creator 
of  the  universe  who  controls  the  forces  with  which  science 
has  to  do.  Piety,  however,  demands  a  God  who  preserves 
the  soul  inviolate  against  all  disturbing  forces,  whether 
within  or  without.  Following  Schleiermacher,  the  nature 
of  the  Redeemer  is  deduced  from  the  content  of  the  relig- 
ious experience.  We  are  accordingly  treated  to  a  twofold 
way  of  approach  to  the  idea  of  God:  he  is  the  postulate 
which    guarantees    the   ideal    Christian    experience,    and 


THE  THEISTIC  ARGUMENTS  111 

he  is  such  a  being  as  may  be  inferred  from  that  experi- 
ence.^ 

IX 

At  the  end  of  this  survey  we  are  not  surprised  that  the 
traditional  "proofs"  of  the  being  of  God  are  widely  dis- 
credited. Professor  James  hardly  exaggerates  when  he 
says:  "That  vast  literature  of  proofs  of  God's  existence 
drawn  from  the  order  of  nature  which  a  century  ago 
seemed  so  overwhelmingly  convincing,  to-day  does  little 
more  than  gather  dust  in  libraries,  for  the  simple  reason 
that  our  generation  has  ceased  to  believe  in  the  kind  of 
God  argued  for.  Whatever  sort  of  a  being  God  may  be, 
we  know  to-day  that  he  is  nevermore  that  mere  external 
inventor  of  'contrivances'  intended  to  make  manifest  his 
'glory'  in  which  our  great-grandfathers  took  such  satis- 
faction, though  just  how  we  know  this  we  cannot  possibly 
make  clear  by  words,  either  to  others  or  to  ourselves."  ^ 
Reference  is  here  made  to  such  works  as  Paley's  famous 
Natural  Theology  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, and  later  the  Bridgewater  Treatises.  It  is  impossi- 
ble for  us  now  to  overestimate  the  profound  and  quieting 
impression  made  by  these  works  on  disturbed  and  thought- 
ful minds.  Their  day  has,  however,  passed;  only  belated 
theologians  yield  them  homage  and  rely  upon  their  out- 
worn principles  and  methods.  To  the  modem  mind  these 
"proofs"  when  presented  in  their  traditional  garb  stalk 
about  with  the  unsubstantiality  of  ghosts. 

"They  were  mighty,  but  they  vanished; 
Names  are  all  they  left  behind  them.'* 


*  Cf.  Outlines  of  a  Philosophy  of  Religion,  pp.  816  ff. 

*  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,  pp.  78-74. 


112  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

Even  if  we  are  no  longer  convinced  by  these  arguments, 
we  do  not  therefore  conclude  that  belief  in  the  existence 
of  God  is  left  without  support.  Men  have  never  believed 
in  God  only  after  they  proved  his  existence;  on  the  con- 
trary, they  were  certain  that  they  had  experienced  God 
before  they  sought  for  the  rational  meaning  or  ground 
of  that  experience.  The  term  "God"  here  signifies  the 
Power  other  and  greater  than  themselves  which  men  have 
always  and  everywhere  depended  on.  The  particular 
name  by  which  they  designated  this  Power  is  indifferent, 
so  far  as  the  present  reference  is  concerned.  We  rejoice 
if  we  are  able  to  illumine  our  faith  by  the  light  of  reason, 
but  faith  stands  fast  in  spite  of  any  and  all  articulate 
reasons.  With  Job  plunged  into  darkness  and  defeat,  the 
heart  cries,  "Though  he  slay  me,  yet  will  I  trust  him!" 
Belief  in  God  is  not  innate,  but  the  tendency  to  such 
belief  is  the  constant  and  inexpugnable  structure  of  our 
consciousness.  While,  therefore,  the  theistic  arguments, 
as  precisely  formulated  by  earlier  generations,  may,  indeed 
must,  be  discarded,  and  the  reasons  which  were  adduced 
in  support  of  them  have  lost  their  meaning,  yet  the  values 
which  they  symbolized  remain  unimpaired. 

In  the  form  in  which  they  appeared  at  the  close  of  the 
eighteenth  century  and  as  they  are  now  commonly  elab- 
orated, they  are  subject  to  two  criticisms.  (1)  They 
are  a  priori,  leading  to  an  abstract  result:  God  is  con- 
ceived of  as  pure  being,  a  necessarily  existing  being,  an 
all-perfect  being,  a  being  than  whom  a  greater  cannot  be 
thought,  or  "thing  in  itself," — in  a  word,  a  reality  irre- 
spective of  concrete  qualities.  Indeed,  the  question  is 
often  raised  by  the  advocates  of  this  way  of  thinking 
whether  the  argument  is  to  prove  the  being  or  the  nature 
of  God.  This  is  especially  true  of  the  cosmological  and 
ontological  arguments.     The  adventure  in  search  of  pure 


THE  THEISTIC  ARGUMENTS  113 

being  is,  however,  vain.  Hegel  has  warned  us  that  pure 
being  is  pure  nothing.  Apart  from  definite  properties, 
the  existence  of  God  has  no  meaning.  The  only  God  we 
can  know  is  not  abstract  and  static,  but  dynamic  and 
purposeful.  A  danger  similar  to  that  of  an  earlier  day 
confronts  us  in  the  substitution  of  the  Infinite,  the  Abso- 
lute, and  the  Unconditioned  for  being,  or  even  if  we  put 
consciousness  in  the  place  of  existence  and  then  treat 
consciousness  as  a  purely  static  affair.  It  would  be  idle 
to  attempt  to  prove  a  divine  consciousness  as  such  stripped 
of  essentially  dynamic  properties.  There  may  or  may  not 
be  such  a  consciousness,  but  either  way  it  could  have  no 
concern  for  us.  Only  so  far  as  consciousness  is  revealed 
in  purposeful  action  can  it  be  of  interest  or  meaning. 

(2)  A  more  serious  criticism  has  to  do  with  the  way  in 
which  the  theistic  arguments  are  employed  to  prove  the 
truth  of  particular  ideas  of  God  or  the  existence  of  radi- 
cally different  kinds  of  God.  Since  the  arguments  are 
a  priori  one  would  suppose  that  the  first  question  would 
have  been,  What  kind  of  God  do  I  wish  to  prove  the 
existence  of?  The  term  "God"  represents  a  vast  variety 
of  notions,  some  of  which  are  incompatible  with  others; 
they  are  indeed  so  self-contradictory  that  if  one  exists 
the  others  cannot.  It  is  a  remarkable  fact  that  few  of 
those  who  deal  with  the  theistic  arguments  appear  to  be 
aware  of  this  dilemma.  The  God  of  Aristotle  is  not  the 
God  of  the  Hebrew  prophets.  The  God  of  Jesus  is  not 
that  of  the  Nicene  Fathers.  Calvin,  Socinus,  and  Ar- 
minius  use  the  word  God  with  no  attempt  at  criticism, 
but  each  one  attaches  a  different  meaning  to  it.  Spinoza 
and  Leibnitz  are  worlds  apart  in  the  conception  of  God. 
Kant  in  the  Critique  of  the  Pure  Reason  and  Paley  in  his 
Natural  Theology  are  at  variance  in  respect  to  the 
Supreme  Being,     There  is  no  common  definition  of  God 


114  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

back  of  the  manifold  conceptions  which  the  theistic  argu- 
ments seek  to  validate.  Accordingly,  in  seeking  to  prove 
the  existence  of  God  it  makes  all  the  difference  whether 
it  is  the  God  of  Plato  or  of  Athanasius  or  of  Jonathan 
Edwards  or  of  Herbert  Spencer.  For  no  reality  is  ever 
abstract,  nor  is  there  an  undifferentiated  substratum 
which  will  be  equally  necessary  and  invariably  present  in 
every  idea  of  God,  be  it  that  of  Plotinus,  Marcus  Aurelius, 
or  Schleiermacher,  with  which  therefore  the  theistic  argu- 
ments are  concerned.  If  we  reduce  the  idea  of  God  in 
Thomas  Aquinas  and  Duns  Scotus  to  its  lowest  terms,  we 
shall  care  nothing  for  the  pale  residuum.  No  one  would 
give  a  second  thought  to  a  possibly  common  element  in 
the  conception  of  Spinoza  and  Leibnitz.  If  the  nature 
and  properties  of  God  are  as  Spinoza  affirms,  then  God 
necessarily  exists  and  acts  from  the  necessity  of  his  nature, 
the  free  cause  of  all  things.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  there 
are,  as  Leitnitz  alleges,  finite  monads  and  pre-established 
harmony  is  the  law  of  all  action,  then  the  assumption  of 
an  infinite  Monad  or  God  is  logically  required;  or  the 
argument  may  equally  well  be  turned  the  other  way,  in 
which  case  the  assumption  of  an  infinite  Monad  of  the 
kind  here  in  question  is  justified  by  the  character  of  the 
finite  monads  and  the  relations  existing  between  them. 
Yet,  so  far  as  our  idea  of  God  differs  from  both  of  these, 
we  shall  have  to  seek  other  arguments  to  substantiate 
the  existence  of  our  God.  This  general  judgment  is 
applicable  to  every  idea  of  God  in  relation  to  the  theistic 
arguments.  If  none  of  the  traditional  definitions  of  God 
is  valid  for  us,  the  grounds  of  belief  in  such  a  God  become 
insufficient  and  others  must  be  sought  for  our  present-day 
need. 

From   another  point   of  view  the   same   conclusion  is 
reached.     Since  every  one  of  theistic  arguments  has  been 


THE  THEISTIC  ARGUMENTS  115 

determined  by  a  particular  corresponding  world-view,  and 
every  one  of  these  world-views  has  given  place  to  the  mod- 
em scientific  view  of  the  world,  these  arguments  are 
placed  in  a  critical  position.  They  cannot  continue  to 
function  in  their  traditional  form  and  implications.  If 
they  are  to  persist,  they  must  adjust  themselves  to  the 
new  situations,  or,  if  this  is  impossible,  they  must  be  sur- 
rendered in  favor  of  other  and  more  defensible  positions. 


V.  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD  AND  THE 
DOCTRINE  OF  CAUSE 


We  now  enter  upon  a  survey  of  the  idea  of  God  and  its 
relation  to  the  doctrine  of  cause — the  so-called  cosmolog- 
ical  argument — with  the  aim  of  ascertaining  its  present 
standing. 

The  cosmological  argument  is  to-day  in  a  more  precari- 
ous position  than  it  has  been  at  any  time  since  Kant 
published  his  Critique.  The  following  considerations 
which  are  drawn  from  a  doctrine  of  the  world,  the  prin- 
ciple of  cause,  the  nature  of  man,  and  the  idea  of  God 
will  disclose  the  invalidity  of  this  argument  and  the  need 
of  carrying  over  its  value  from  causality  to  teleology. 


n 


Two  doctrines  of  the  world  have  been  proposed;  one, 
as  advocated  by  Aristotle,  that  it  was  without  beginning, 
eternal,  yet  not  static.  The  church  stamped  this  concep- 
tion as  pagan,  contrary  to  reason  and  the  Scriptures,  and 
subversive  of  the  divine  absoluteness  and  sovereignty,  sub- 
stituting for  it  the  declaration  that  by  a  jiat  God  created 
the  world  is  six  days  out  of  nothing.  In  this  doctrine 
were  two  implications.  (1)  The  existence  of  the  world 
was  to  be  referred  to  a  single  divine  principle,  in  opposi- 

116 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  CAUSE  117 

tion  to  dualism  or  its  eternal  self-existence.  (2)  The 
creation  originated  not  in  necessary  emanation  but  in  the 
freely  acting  will  of  God.  Creation  is  thus  conceived  of 
as  an  event,  having  a  commencement.  Professor  Flint,  in 
his  oft-quoted  and  widely  approved  Theism  ^  has  given  a 
classical  statement  of  this  doctrine.  He  declares  that 
^Hhe  question  in  the  theistic  argument  from  causality"  is 
"to  prove  the  universe  to  have  been  an  event — to  have 
had  a  commencement."  The  inquiry  has  therefore  to  be 
raised  whether  or  not  the  universe  "bears  the  marks  of 
being  an  event."  And  his  conclusion  is  that  instead  of 
matter  having  existed  from  eternity  "a  creation  took 
place  .  .  .  and  the  present  system  of  nature  and  its 
laws  originated  at  an  approximately  assignable  date  in 
the  past."  In  support  of  this  view  both  in  Professor 
Flint's  Theism  and  in  similar  works  one  is  referred  to  the 
mutability  of  matter;  the  atom  as  bearing  the  marks  of 
being  a  manufactured  article;  the  dissipation  of  energy 
which  involves  at  one  end  a  beginning  and  at  the  other 
end  a  running  down  of  cosmic  energy ;  the  impossibility  of 
an  infinite  regress  of  finite  causes ;  and  the  assertion  that 
the  notion  of  cause  is  satisfied  only  when  one  postulates  a 
ground  outside  of  the  causal  series, — an  uncaused  cause 
which  is  marked  by  efficiency  and  sufficient  reason.  Cor- 
responding to  this  doctrine  of  the  creation  is  an  idea  of 
God, — a  being  dwelling  apart  in  eternal  self-centered, 
transcendent  isolation,  to  whom  the  act  of  creation  is  an 
episode  and  the  world  thus  brought  into  existence  an  inci- 
dent. Such  a  doctrine  of  God  as  the  Absolute  perpetu- 
ates in  religious  thought  a  point  of  view  which  is  not 
defensible  in  philosophy.  And  it  has  given  rise  to  a  doc- 
trine of  irresponsible  divine  sovereignty,   the  source   of 

*  Pp.  101  ff. 


118  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

the  baneful  theory  of  election,  limited  atonement,  and 
irresistible  grace.  In  this  conception  no  attempt  was 
made  to  define  matter,  although  the  shadow  of  Democritus 
darkened  the  background ;  and  souls  were  regarded  as  sub- 
stances and  hence  efficiently  created  even  as  the  world 
itself. 


Ill 


The  common  doctrine  of  creation  includes  two  totally 
different  notions  of  divine  action — one  by  which  the  ma- 
terial of  the  world  was  brought  into  existence,  the  other, 
the  shaping  of  this  material  into  the  various  inorganic  and 
organic  forms.  Even  if  one  were  inclined  to  credit  the 
arguments  by  which  changes  in  the  world  were  referred 
to  the  external  formative  agency  of  God,  he  would  find 
these  utterly  irrelevant  to  the  question  of  a  "creation  out 
of  nothing," — a  term  to  which  no  intelligible  meaning 
can  be  assigned.  The  frequently  repeated  declaration 
that  we  have  in  human  action  an  analogy  of  the  absolute 
originative  power  of  God  is  only  another  instance  of 
the  fatal  fallacy  of  words.  Whatever  else  man  has  done, 
he  has  created  nothing.  As  to  the  material  of  the  world 
which  is  the  subject  of  scientific  observation,  analysis, 
and  interpretation,  however  the  atomic  elements  are  re- 
solved into  electrons  and  these  into  something  yet  more 
simple,  we  have  to  assume  as  an  unquestioned  postulate 
that  the  properties  of  hydrogen,  oxygen,  carbon,  and  the 
other  elements  have  existed  from  the  earliest  conceivable 
time;  they  are  now  as  revealed  by  spectrum  analysis 
changelessly  the  same  throughout  the  universe,  alike  on 
earth  and  on  the  most  distant  perceptible  suns,  whatever 
their  age  or  temperature; 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  CAUSE  119 

"In  form's  embrace  the  atoms  run 
Like  planets  'round  an  unseen  sun. 
Their  world  of  form  they  cannot  pass ; 
Their  universe  in  one  small  mass."  ^ 

And  even  if  the  atoms  themselves  may  be  conceived  of 
as  having  had  a  beginning  of  their  present  form,  the 
energy  out  of  which  they  arose  must  be  affirmed  as  eternal. 

Moreover,  it  is  a  violent,  irrational,  and  wholly  unwar- 
ranted use  of  the  judgment  to  affirm  an  absolute  begin- 
ning of  either  the  existence  or  the  order  of  the  world. 
For  we  have  here  a  total  misconception  of  the  meaning 
of  cause.  What  we  term  cause  has  no  other  signification 
than  uniform  and  concomitant  variation  among  phenom- 
ena. All  the  processes  of  the  physical  world  are  ruled 
by  mechanical  necessity.  Contingency  which  used  to  be 
alleged  to  account  for  the  changing  variation  among 
phenomena  simply  does  not  exist.  Mechanical  causation 
as  an  antecedent  process  is  universal,  but  mechanical 
causation,  as  origination  of  the  elements  of  the  world  or 
their  properties,  is  inconceivable.  Any  other  theory  of 
cause  introduces  a  perfectly  superfluous  and  futile  notion 
into  our  thought  of  reality. 

On  the  assumption  that  cause  as  employed  in  the  tra- 
ditional sense  is  a  universal  principle,  we  cannot  stop 
short  of  the  so-called  First  Cause,  but  must  inquire  for 
the  cause  of  it.  To  say  that  this  is  a  child's  question  is 
itself  puerile.  To  say  that  God  is  causa  sui  does  not  help, 
it  only  arbitrarily  shoves  the  inquiry  a  step  further  back, 
but  leaves  it  still  unsolved.  The  universe,  so  far  as  its 
nature  and  forms  are  concerned,  may,  as  Hume  intimated, 
be  self-existent,   or,   as  Aristotle  held,   eternal,  yet  this 


'  Grace  T.  Davis. 


120  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

would  not  be  tantamount  to  denial  of  the  existence  of 
God ;  it  would,  however,  involve  a  particular  theory  of  his 
relation  to  the  world.  That  the  world  is  intelligible  does 
not  prove  a  cause  which  lies  beyond  itself  as  absolutely 
originating  it,  for  the  same  demand  would  in  turn  have 
to  be  made  of  the  alleged  Creator  as  intelligible.  The 
fact  that  relations  between  atoms  are  susceptible  of 
mechanical  and  mathematical  formulation,  that  there  is 
uniformity  among  phenomena,  that  a  rational  principle 
is  discovered  in  the  process  of  the  world,  does  not  neces- 
sarily thrust  us  back  beyond  the  universe  itself.  The 
world  as  we  know  it  has  a  nature  and  that  nature  is  char- 
acterized by  order;  the  question  then  arises  how  this 
order  of  nature  came  to  be.  If,  in  our  consideration  of 
this  order,  we  still  feel  the  need  of  the  notion  of  cause, 
we  may  have  to  reinterpret  it,  with  the  result  that  efficient 
or  first  may  give  way  to  final  cause.  In  this  way  the 
cosmological  will  be  absorbed  into  and  identified  with  the 
teleological  argument. 

IV 

A  still  more  critical  situation  appears  in  the  relation  of 
consciousness  and  personality  to  the  idea  of  creation. 
Even  if  one  could  establish  the  absolute  origination  of 
substance,  this  would  be  utterly  irrevelant  to  the  genesis 
of  spirits.  That  persons  have  always  been  considered  as 
having  a  diff^erent  origin  from  the  inanimate  and  the  ani- 
mal world  is  evident  in  the  many  theories  to  account  for 
the  beginnings  of  souls.  These  may  be  eternal  and  there- 
fore uncreated,  or,  as  Origen  maintained,  created  at  the 
beginning  of  the  creative  action,  or  each  soul  immedi- 
ately created  in  connection  with  the  human  embryo,  or  it 
may  be  referred  to  hereditary  generation,  or  to  other  more 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  CAUSE  121 

scientific  explanation.  In  whatever  way,  we  seek  to  trace 
the  beginnings  of  consciousness  and  personality,  one 
path  is  barred:  we  cannot  refer  its  origination  to  divine 
fiat,  "Soul"  or  "spirit"  is  not  an  existence  void  of  content 
but  can  be  described  only  in  terms  of  experience  as  feel- 
ings, thoughts,  memories,  imaginations,  purposive  actions, 
character;  plainly  this  is  not  and  cannot  be  the  product 
of  instantaneous  creative  power.  Unless  soul,  spirit,  and 
personality  are  defined  in  terms  of  substance  instead  of 
consciousness,  as  an  instantaneously  complete  product 
instead  of  progressive  reaction  to  its  environment, — a 
definition  which  neither  psychology  nor  experience  will 
allow, — it  has  no  relation  to  a  First  Cause.  From  this 
way  of  conceiving  of  it,  the  divine  image  becomes  not  the 
starting-point  but  the  goal  and  a  flying  goal  at  that. 
And  again  as  in  the  previous  pararaph  we  no  longer  look 
backward  but  forward,  the  creative  becomes  the  final 
cause,  and  the  cosmological  gives  places  to  the  teleolog- 
ical  argument. 


From  the  idea  of  God  a  similar  conclusion  is  reached. 
This  becomes  evident  from  several  considerations.  (1)  No 
sufficient  reason  has  ever  been  adduced  for  the  initiation 
of  creative  activity  from  a  condition  of  the  divine  con- 
sciousness in  which  such  activity  was  absent.  Indeed  such 
a  transition  is  in  the  highest  degree  inconceivable.  The 
difficulty  is  not  solved  by  referring  the  idea  to  "revela- 
tion," since  revelation  contains  no  hint  of  such  a  concep- 
tion. Those  through  whom  the  revelation  is  alleged  to 
have  come  were  wholly  unaware  of  even  the  existence  of  a 
problem  of  this  nature.  The  question  must  be  answered 
if  at  all  by  the  same  rational  power  which  raises  it,  which 


122  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

is  that  of  great  thinkers  as  Plato  and  Aristotle.  (2)  It 
may  make  little  difference  in  our  notion  of  the  world 
whether  it  is  to  be  referred  to  an  instantaneous  fiat  or  to 
an  eternal  process  of  change  or  becoming,  but  the  bearing 
of  this  alternative  on  the  idea  of  God  is  extremely  signifi- 
cant. If,  for  example,  we  have  ground  for  maintaining 
that  God  is  forever  creating  instead  of  creating  once  for 
all,  we  shall  no  longer  have  occasion  to  picture  him  as 
existing  in  solitary  felicity  before  the  creation, — however 
we  solve  the  riddle  of  time, — and  then  as  creating  and 
again  after  an  indefinite  period  as  absorbing  all  things 
into  himself,  so  that  in  the  end  as  before  the  beginning  he 
is  all  in  all.  On  the  contrary,  if  he  is  purposive  will,  he 
must  will  something.  All  speculation  concerning  God  as 
he  would  be  in  him.self  apart  from  the  world  is  vain ;  vain 
also  the  assumption  that  he  would  be  the  same  apart 
from  the  world.  The  Trinitarian  life  of  God  which  the- 
ologians have  alleged  to  account  for  the  divine  activity 
before  the  creation;  the  distinction  between  foreknowl- 
edge and  prescience,  between  omniscience  and  all-knowing- 
ness  of  God;  the  doctrine  of  decrees  according  to  which 
before  the  creation  God  determined  in  himself  what  he 
would  have  become  of  every  human  being, — these  and 
many  other  related  theories  of  the  divine  consciousness 
are  without  warrant  in  our  thought  of  God.  Accord- 
ingly, so  far  as  the  cosmological  argument  involves  any 
of  these  conceptions  of  God  it  is  invalid. 

(3)  The  tenability  of  the  common  idea  of  creation  is 
rendered  still  more  precarious  by  the  fact  that  the  farther 
back  we  go  in  time,  the  less  evidence  we  come  upon  for  the 
ends  of  the  creative  action  which  we  attribute  to  God  or 
for  the  God  whom  our  ideals  require  as  their  postulate. 
There  are  nebulae,  worlds  in  process  of  formation  and 
dissolution,  molecules  in  an  infinite  variety  of  activity,  but 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  CAUSE  123 

none  of  the  values  which  give  theism  its  supreme  signifi- 
cance— love,  justice,  personal  goodness;  indeed,  the  far- 
ther back  we  penetrate  into  the  past  the  less  need  we  feel 
for  a  Creator  in  any  compelling  sense.  Moreover,  we  can 
assign  no  reason  why  a  Being  whose  highest  quality  is 
love  should  bring  a  world  into  existence  in  which  for  an 
immeasurable  time  appeared  no  beings  capable  of  con- 
scious response  to  his  goodness.  To  say,  on  the  one 
hand,  that  man  is  the  end  which  moved  God  to  create 
must  be  referred  to  overweening  conceit,  or,  on  the  other 
hand,  that  the  ultimate  reason  why  God  created  the  world 
is  inscrutable,  is  to  give  up  argument  at  the  precise  point 
where  argument  is  most  needed. 


VI 


The  assumption  that  God  cannot  be  the  Saviour  unless 
he  is  at  the  same  time  the  absolute  originator  of  the 
world  is  open  to  serious  question.  In  the  entire  field  of 
Hebrew  prophetic  thought  or  in  that  of  the  early  Chris- 
tian community  no  such  doctrine  is  to  be  found.  It  is 
utterly  alien  from  the  spirit  of  Jesus.  At  a  later  time 
matter  was  handed  over  to  Satan  and  evil  spirits,  and 
under  the  influence  of  Greek  thought  became  the  home  of 
dark  necessity.  Salvation  meant  deliverance  from  the 
visible  world  and  all  its  destructive  forces.  In  every 
Christian  land  to-day  are  groups  of  Christian  people  who 
continue  this  tradition,  looking  for  the  speedy  coming  of 
the  Lord  to  take  them  out  of  this  "present  evil  world." 
Prose  writers  as  Bunyan,  poets  as  Bernard  of  Cluny, 
F.  W.  Faber,  and  Christina  Rossetti,  and  evangehsts  as 
Dwight  L.  Moody,  have  voiced  their  homesickness  and 
their  longing  for  the  celestial  country.     Such  a  doctrine 


124  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

of  the  world  is,  however,  pessimistic.  It  is  inconsistent 
with  the  scientific  spirit.  It  is  a  repudiation  of  the  very 
cosmological  argument, — that  God  is  the  creator  of  the 
world, — which  those  who  occupy  this  general  theological 
point  of  view  maintain.  In  postponing  salvation  to  an- 
other life  it  robs  the  present  of  the  meaning  which  natu- 
rally belongs  to  it.  Both  the  gospel  as  a  principle  of 
individual  and  social  regeneration  under  a  law  of  evolution 
and  salvation  as  signifying  the  conservation  of  social 
values  are  perverted  so  as  simply  to  present  the  steps  by 
which  one  may  prepare  for  a  purely  fanciful  future. 
According  to  this  conception  both  this  world  and  the  next 
are  unreal, — this  one  because  we  do  not  truly  live  until 
after  death,  the  next  because  it  does  not  grow  out  of  and 
continue  this  life.  God,  if  he  is  anything,  is  the  God  of 
reality ;  in  this  view  he  would  be  superfluous,  and  in  any 
case  he  could  not  be  the  creator  of  the  world. 

It  has  been  assumed  that  unless  God  was  the  absolute 
originator  of  the  world, — the  God  here  conceived  of  is 
that  of  the  Nicene  Creed, — ^we  would  have  no  sufficient 
ground  for  the  hope  of  salvation.  It  is,  for  example, 
alleged  that  unless  he  had  created  the  material  universe 
he  could  not  control  it,  and  that  unless  he  absolutely  con- 
trolled it  he  would  be  unable  to  conserve  the  most  precious 
interests  of  human  life.  Several  considerations,  however, 
go  far  toward  nullifying  the  force  of  this  contention. 
( 1 )  A  certain  indiff^erence  of  the  universe  to  moral  values. 
This  appears  first  in  the  infinite  time  which  elapsed  before 
man  emerged  on  the  earth;  and  we  are  told  by  compe- 
tent scientists  that  a  time  is  coming  again,  however  dis- 
tant, when  so  far  as  this  earth  is  concerned  moral  values 
will  have  entirely  disappeared.  Again,  on  this  earth 
where  moral  values  are  in  process  of  creation  by  man,  the 
embodiments  of  these  are  with  infinite  disregard  destroyed 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  CAUSE  125 

by  material  forces — volcanoes,  earthquakes,  floods,  tidal 
waves,  fires,  pestilence,  incurable  diseases,  and  the  slower 
but  not  less  surely  exterminating  erosion  and  decay. 
Furthermore,  there  is  an  aspect  of  unconcern  of  the  order 
of  nature  for  moral  values  which  is  evident  in  the  fact  that 
mechanical  causation  rules  from  end  to  end  of  the  uni- 
verse. All  the  exact  sciences  derive  their  cogency  from 
the  assumption  and  verification  of  this  law  of  action 
among  all  physical  phenomena.  Between  this  causation 
and  moral  values  there  appears  to  be  no  common  term 
which  shall  reveal  more  than  a  connection  in  space  and 
time ;  at  least  there  is  no  essential  relation. 

(2)  In  spite  of  universal  changeless  mechanical  causa- 
tion moral  values  have  appeared.  They  have  been  in  ex- 
istence as  long  as  man  has  been  on  the  earth,  and  were 
foreshadowed  before  that  in  the  instinctive  life  of  ani- 
mals. In  human  experience  they  never  exist  isolated  and 
detached  from  connection  with  the  mechanical  order. 
Neither  Plato  nor  indeed  Aristotle  in  his  doctrine  of  the 
Absolute  conceived  of  it  in  total  separateness  from  the 
physical  world.  Kant  declared  that  the  only  perfectly 
good  thing  in  the  world  was  a  good  will,  but  as  he  gave  this 
will  no  content  and  no  environment — a  purely  abstract 
and  formal  designation,  he  was  unable  to  assign  to  it  its 
full  meaning.  Only  that  will  is  good  which  wills  some- 
thing that  is  concrete  and  becomes  an  embodiment  of 
value.  It  is  in  connection  with  willing  that  all  moral 
values  are  created  and  conserved,  even  if  their  form  and 
continuance  depend  also  upon  the  structure  and  function 
of  the  material  world.  The  history  of  moral  values  thus 
produced  may  be  traced  in  the  development  of  the 
achievements  and  institutions  of  civilization.  If  now  one 
concludes  that  the  world  is  not  to  be  referred  to  divine 
causality  in  the  way  the  traditional  theology  conceived 


126  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

of  it,  that  the  world  is  more  or  less  neutral  in  relation  to 
moral  values,  that  at  length  every  visible  symbolic  em- 
bodiment with  the  living  human  consciousness  in  which  it 
was  real  is  utterly  to  disappear  from  the  earth,  even  this 
does  not  annul  the  fact  that  salvation  is  here  and  now  in 
process  of  realization  in  individual  and  social  regenera- 
tion. 

(3)  If  we  define  "salvation"  as  the  creation  and  con- 
servation of  personal  values,  together  with  the  customs 
and  institutions  in  which  these  are  enshrined,  we  shall  not 
miss  the  cosmology  which  has  for  so  long  been  claimed  as 
essential  to  it.  That  we  have  the  power  to  produce  values 
cannot  be  disputed  and  it  equally  cannot  be  denied  that 
this  is  the  highest  aim  which  we  can  set  before  ourselves. 
We  need  have  no  fear,  therefore,  lest  the  hope  of  salva- 
tion will  become  insecure  unless  we  can  refer  the  absolute 
origination  of  the  universe  to  God.  If  God  did  not  thus 
create  the  world  and  salvation  is  a  fact,  then  the  two 
positions  are  not  incompatible. 


VI.    THE  IDEA  OF  GOD  AND  THE 
DOCTRINE  OF  ENDS 


The  teleological  argument  proceeds  on  the  basis  that 
the  presence  of  ends  in  nature  is  a  proof  of  design,  and 
from  design  thus  indicated  is  drawn  the  inference  of  a 
designer  both  intelligent  and  good;  the  designer  is  then 
identified  with  God.  Although  Kant  discredited  this 
argument  as  failing  to  justify  the  conclusion  derived  from 
it,  yet  he  called  it  the  clearest,  oldest,  and  best  suited  to 
the  human  reason.  From  Socrates  until  a  recent  time  it 
has  been  received  with  a  well-nigh  universal,  unquestion- 
ing assent.  It  arose  and  flourished,  however,  when  there 
existed  a  very  different  conception  of  the  world  and  of 
the  relation  of  God  to  the  world  from  that  which  now 
prevails.  In  the  last  century  and  a  half  it  has  suffered 
two  attacks,  either  of  which  would  have  been  impossible 
at  an  earlier  day,  and  each  threatened  to  destroy  the  last 
vestige  of  its  validity.  Kant's  criticism  has  been  referred 
to  already.  A  still  more  serious  crisis  arose  with  the  Dar- 
winian theory  of  natural  selection.  Conditions  which  had 
been  accounted  for  by  special  acts  of  an  intelligent  De- 
signer had  now  to  receive  a  different  interpretation.  Not 
that  adaptations  were  no  longer  acknowledged;  on  the 
contrary,  these,  even  greater  in  number  and  more  won- 
derful in  character  than  were  formerly  alleged,  were  freely 
recognized  and  attributed  not  to  special  design  but  to  the 

127 


128  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

action  and  reaction  of  resident  forces,  mechanical  or 
otherwise.  Organizations  which  have  succeeded  in  estab- 
lishing suitable  responses  to  their  environment  have  sur- 
vived, while  others  in  the  degree  to  which  they  have  been 
unable  to  effect  such  responses  have  either  perished  or 
dragged  out  an  impoverished  existence.  By  this  process 
then  and  according  to  this  law  every  form  of  organization 
without  exception  has  come  to  be  what  it  is.  The  earlier 
claims  as  to  the  part  played  by  natural  selection  in  the 
development  of  life  may  have  been  exaggerated,  but  after 
all  due  allowance  has  been  made,  enough  is  left  forever  to 
do  away  with  the  teleology  of  Paley  and  the  Bridgewater 
Treatises.  This  does  not  mean  that  in  the  operation  of 
Natural  Selection  all  teleology  has  ceased  to  figure  in  our 
interpretation  of  the  world,  for,  as  we  have  seen,  a  greater 
and  more  marvelous  complexity  of  adaptation  has  been 
brought  to  light  than  was  ever  dreamed  of  in  the  earlier 
thinking.  It  does,  however,  mean  that  teleology  must  be 
otherwise  conceived.  So  far  as  events  are  themselves  con- 
cerned, it  will  make  no  difference  whether  they  are  referred 
to  Natural  Selection  or  divine  causality.  In  either  case, 
as  Bishop  Butler  in  another  connection  remarked,  things 
are  what  they  are,  and  things  will  be  what  they  will  be. 
If  we  have  any  longer  need  of  God,  and  if  he  is  to  sustain 
any  relation  to  the  facts  of  life,  it  must  be  not  as  an 
external  control  but  as  an  immanent  purposive  will,  in- 
separable from  Natural  Selection.  By  the  term  "Natural 
Selection"  we  may  describe  the  phenomenal  aspect  of 
development  in  the  region  of  scientific  causes,  and  by  the 
term  "Teleology"  we  may  refer  to  the  inner  principle  of 
divine  action  operative  in  the  realization  of  ends. 

In  addition  to  the  aspects  of  life  in  which  the  law  of 
Natural  Selection  prevails,  there  are  others  from  which 
it  is  or  appears  to  be  absent.     These  are  presupposed  but 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ENDS  129 

not  created  by  it.  They  are  essentially  teleological, 
although  of  a  different  type  from  the  traditional  teleology 
— the  persistent  law  of  heredity,  the  tendency  to  variation, 
to  self-preservation  and  to  the  preservation  of  the  species. 
These  are  all  purposive  principles,  immanent  in  the  organ- 
ism, active  with  reference  to  ends. 


n 


The  fact  that  teleology  has  persisted  through  so  long 
a  period  among  men  of  the  highest  scientific  and  philo- 
sophical genius  indicates  that  it  has  a  permanent  place 
in  the  conception  of  the  world.  Fundamental  to  the 
metaphysics  of  Aristotle  were  the  two  kinds  of  cause, 
efficient  and  final.  Efficient  cause  finds  its  sole  sphere  in 
matter  and  it  operates  by  necessity ;  the  final  cause  is  the 
reason  which  the  efficient  cause  serves.  Accordingly  we 
have  in  our  study  of  nature  to  "consider  the  character 
of  the  material  nature  whose  necessary  results  have  been 
made  available  by  rational  nature  for  a  final  cause."  ^ 
These  are  the  two  aspects  of  the  world  to  which  study 
has  to  be  directed  and  one  is  no  less  real  than  the  other. 
There  is  no  conflict  between  them,  but  each  supplements 
the  other  and  completes  the  explanation  of  the  whole. 

Bacon  held  that  the  world  presented  itself  to  us  in  a 
twofold  way — as  a  mechanism  and  as  teleological.  In  the 
scientific  interpretation  of  it,  however,  mechanism  must 
be  separated  from  teleology.  Final  causes  are  indeed 
there,  but  in  the  pursuit  of  physical  science  they  preju- 
dice and  so  handicap  inquiry.  For  this  reason  he  refers 
to  them  as  "vestal  virgins,"  yet  not  to  discredit  them  as 

^De  Partibus  Anvmalium,  III,  2,  665b,  20. 


ISO  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

such,  since  in  their  own  region  they  are  no  less  valid  than 
are  mechanical  causes.^ 

Leibnitz  formulates  the  age-long  problems  in  terms  of 
pre-established  harmony.  Mechanical  causation  is  uni- 
versal: every  event  is  rigidly  fixed  in  the  order  in  which 
it  occurs.  According  to  this  system  bodies  act  (to  sup- 
pose the  impossible)  as  if  there  were  no  souls  at  all.^  No 
scientist  could  ask  for  a  more  rigid  and  unbroken  con- 
nection of  events  in  the  physical  world.  There  is  final 
cause  also,  but  this  is  inserted  at  the  beginning  by  the 
thought  and  purpose  of  God.  Here  theology  is  invoked 
to  find  the  cause  both  of  the  mechanical  necessity  and  of 
the  teleology  which  gives  the  world  its  double  character. 

Hume,  who  has  often  been  reproached  for  his  negative 
attitude  in  general,  has  no  question  that  teleology  is  pres- 
ent in  the  world.  "A  .  .  .  design  strikes  everywhere 
the  most  careless,  the  most  stupid  thinker;  and  no  man 
can  be  so  hardened  in  absurd  systems  as  at  all  times  to 
reject  it."  ^  In  view  of  positions  suggested  by  Hume  in 
his  further  discussion,  the  term  "design"  as  used  by  him 
is  ambiguous  and  may  well  be  the  tribute  he  pays  to  the 
usage  of  his  day.  Design  is  unmistakable  in  the  order 
of  nature.  He  appears  to  hesitate  between  two  explana- 
tions of  the  existing  order.  At  one  time  he  says,  "For 
ought  we  know  a  priori,  matter  may  contain  the  source  or 
spring  of  order  originally,  within  itself,  as  well  as  mind 
does."  *  In  elucidating  this  conjecture  he  refers  to  a 
tendency  toward  dynamic  equilibrium  which  had  been  sug- 


*  "Advancement  of  Learning,"  Works,  Vol.  I,  p.  198,  PhUa.,  1852. 
'Cf.  Monadology,  pp.  80-81,  209,  transl.  by  Montgomery,  Chicago, 

1908. 

*  Dialogues  Concerning  Natural  Religion,   Green  and   Grose  ed.. 
Vol.  II,  p.  456. 

*0p.  cit,,  p.  896. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ENDS  131 

gested  by  Lucretius.^  Referring  to  the  two  aspects  of 
nature — perpetual  agitation  and  unvarying  constancy — 
he  says:  "The  continual  motion  of  matter,  therefore,  in 
less  than  infinite  transpositions  must  produce  this  economy 
or  order;  and  by  Its  very  nature,  that  order,  when  once 
established,  supports  itself,  for  many  ages.  If  not  to  eter- 
nity, ...  Its  situation  must  of  necessity  have  all  the 
same  appearance  of  art  and  contrivance,  which  we  observe 
at  present."  ^  Yet  he  appears  not  wholly  satisfied  with 
this  theory,  for  In  another  section  he  refers  the  present 
order  of  nature  to  a  divine  source.  Cleanthes  remarks: 
"The  order  and  arrangement  of  nature,  the  conscious 
adjustment  of  final  causes,  the  plain  use  and  Intention  of 
every  part  and  organ ;  all  these  bespeak  In  the  clearest 
language  an  Intelligent  cause  or  author.  ...  I  have 
found  a  Deity ;  and  here  I  stop  my  Inquiry."  ^  In  an 
impartial  Inspection  of  the  world,  however,  he  discovered 
evidences  of  wisdom  and  power  which  are  Infinite;  "The 
cause  or  causes  of  the  universe  prohahly  hear  some  remote 
analogy  to  hrjuman  intelligen<;e;"  *  but  if  benevolence  and 
mercy  are  to  be  attributed  to  this  Deity  they  are  Inscrut- 
able, since  there  Is  no  resemblance  between  these  and  the 
same  qualities  In  men.  The  antithesis  of  Epicurus  remains 
unresolved:  "Is  he  willing  to  prevent  evil,  but  not  able.'^ 
Then  he  Is  Impotent.  Is  he  able  but  not  willing.?  Then 
he  is  malevolent.  Is  he  both  able  and  willing?  Whence 
then  is  evil  ?"  ^  From  the  order  of  the  world  Hume  drew 
the  sure  Inference  of  Intelligence  In  the  cause  or  causes, 
but  he  could  reach  no  conclusion  which  had  any  bearing 

*  On  the  Nature  of  Things,  p.  168,  transl.  by  H.  A.  J.  Munro. 
^Dial,  p.  427. 
*0p.  cit.,  p.  410. 
*0p.  cit.,  p.  467. 
■Op.  cit.,  p.  440. 


132  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

whatever  upon  our  human  life.  The  significant  thing  is 
that  Hume  found  final  causes  in  the  world, — which  the 
scientific  man  is  concerned  with, — ^in  a  universal  and  un- 
varying order.  Even  if  there  were  moral  aspects  of 
human  life  which  baffled  his  inquiring  spirit,  he  must  be 
reckoned  as  one  who  more  than  any  other  in  the  eighteenth 
century  established  teleology  upon  an  impregnable  basis. 

In  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  Lotze  is  the 
principal  representative  of  mechanism  and  teleology. 
Mechanism  is  to  be  affirmed  of  the  entire  phenomenal 
world.  Causation  is  not  so  much  necessity  as  contem- 
porary and  successive  changes — uniform  and  concomi- 
tant variation — among  phenomena.  All  things  are  part 
of  a  unitary  substance,  based  on  substantial  unity  of  being 
which  underhes  and  conditions  all  events:  a  change  in 
one  part  involves  a  corresponding  change  in  all  other 
parts.  The  order  of  the  world  is  therefore  uniform  and 
unvarying.  On  the  other  hand,  teleology  rests  on  a  foun- 
dation as  secure,  even  if  not  as  broad,  as  that  of 
mechanism.  This  arises  from  the  discovery  of  meaning  in 
the  world.  Causation  implies  law  and  order;  teleology 
concerns  the  ends  served  by  law  and  order.  Yet  meaning 
is  not  everywhere  discoverable.  Some  ends  appear  trivial ; 
others  baffle  the  moral  judgment;  still  others  permit  no 
definition,  save  that  of  malevolence.  This  mixed  im- 
pression does  not,  however,  invalidate  teleology. 

Among  contemporary  thinkers  Professor  B.  Bosanquet 
is  the  most  outstanding  representative  of  this  general 
point  of  view.  He  maintains  that  "the  mechanical 
appearance  must  be  granted  to  be  universal  and  un- 
broken." ^  Yet  he  also  affirms  teleology ;  "we  can  freely 
suppose  the  world  plan  to  be  immanent  in  the  whole,  in- 


*  The  Principle  of  Individuality  and  Value,  p.  146. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ENDS  133 

eluding  finite  mind  and  also  mechanical  nature."  ^ 
Although  mechanism  is  contrasted  with  teleology,  yet 
the  contrast  is  "rooted  in  the  very  nature  of  totality, 
which  is  regarded  from  two  complementary  points  of  view, 
as  an  individual  whole,  and  as  constituted  of  interacting 
members."  This  position  is  still  further  and  with  great 
learning  defended  in  two  discriminating  works  by  Pro- 
fessor F.  L.  Henderson  of  Harvard  University,  The  Fit- 
ness of  the  Environment  and  The  Order  of  Nature.  His 
final  words  in  the  latter  book  are:  "According  to  the 
theory  of  probabilities  this  connection  between  the  prop- 
erties of  matter  and  the  process  of  evolution  cannot  be  due 
to  mere  contingency.  Therefore  since  the  psycho-chemi- 
cal relationship  is  not  in  question,  there  must  be  a  func- 
tional relationship  of  another  kind,  somewhat  like  that 
known  to  physiology.  This  functional  relationship  can 
only  be  described  as  teleologlcal."  ^  In  the  body  of  the 
work  attention  is  directed  to  many  phenomena  which  war- 
rant the  teleological  reference,  a  few  of  which  may  be 
cited;  the  tendency  which  Hume  suggested  to  dynamic 
equilibrium,  to  order,  stability,  and  the  varied  conditions 
of  material  objects;  systems  and  gravitation;  the  con- 
servation and  degradation  of  energy;  the  living  thing, 
natural  selection,  the  different  cycles — metereological, 
organic,  harmonious.  Not  the  least  significant,  indeed, 
perhaps  the  most  significant,  contribution  of  Professor 
Henderson  to  the  subject  of  teleology  is  his  discus- 
sion of  the  relation  of  the  properties  of  hydrogen,  carbon, 
and  oxygen  to  the  order  of  nature.  "There  is  in  truth, 
not  one  chance  in  countless  millions  that  the  many  unique 
properties  of  carbon,  hydrogen,  and  oxygen,  and  espe- 


^Op.  cit,  p.  146. 
»P.  211. 


134  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

cially  of  their  stable  compounds,  water  and  carbonic  acid, 
which  chiefly  make  up  the  atmosphere  of  a  new  planet, 
should  simultaneously  occur  in  the  elements  other  than 
through  the  operation  of  a  natural  law  which  somehow 
connects  them  together  .  .  .  the  connection  between 
these  properties  of  the  elements  almost  infinitely  improb- 
able as  the  result  of  contingency,  can  only  be  regarded, 
is  in  truth  only  fully  intelligible  even  if  mechanistically 
explained  as  a  preparation  for  the  evolutionary  process. 
.  .  .  Therefore  the  properties  of  the  elements  must  for 
the  present  be  regarded  as  possessing  a  teleological  char- 
acter." 1 


m 


We  are  now  to  inquire  as  to  the  place  of  teleology  in 
animal  and  human  life.  Here  the  concept  of  teleology  is 
still  further  confirmed.  Impulse,  instinct,  and  more  cer- 
tainly self-conscious  behavior  are  inexplicable  when  robbed 
of  their  purposive  element.  The  question  is  not  primar- 
ily concerning  the  degree  to  which  the  ends  involved  in 
action  are  preconceived.  The  ends  themselves  are  dif- 
ferent from  those  referred  to  in  the  preceding  paragraph, 
more  complicated,  of  many  degrees  of  value,  becoming 
higher  the  higher  we  ascend  the  scale  of  individual  and 
social  activity.  Of  all  ranges  of  existence  known  to  us, 
naturally  it  is  the  human  in  which  the  teleological  import 
is  most  convincingly  evident.  Here  where  the  ideal  pre- 
sents itself  in  consciousness  in  an  endless  variety,  where 
values  determine  the  form  and  the  content  of  action, 
where  alone  the  supreme  values  of  the  world  come  to 
expression,    is    found    that    aspect    of    existence    where 


»Op.  cit,  pp.  18T-188,  190,  192. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ENDS  185 

meaning  appears  in  most  condensed  and  convincing  pro- 
fusion. 

1.  The  meanings  which  arise  in  animal  and  human 
life  are  not  to  be  detached  from  both  the  mechanism  and 
the  teleology  which  have  already  been  referred  to  in  the 
inorganic,  purely  mechanical  processes.  On  the  one  hand, 
experience  discloses  no  way  in  which  meaning  may  exist 
apart  from  mechanism.  Even  the  idea  of  God,  however 
defined,  is  without  content  when  isolated  from  the  mechan- 
ism of  the  world  by  which  it  is  conditioned.  And,  on  the 
other  hand,  severed  from  the  meanings  which  have  been 
developed  outside  of  and  are  contemporary  with  human 
life,  there  would  be  no  meanings  in  human  life  itself;  in 
part,  these  are  simple  continuations  of  the  lower  values 
and  in  part  a  development  of  these.  And  we  have  to  add 
that  where  the  relation  of  continuity  or  development  has 
not  yet  been  discovered,  it  must  be  presupposed;  we  have 
a  right  to  hope  that  further  knowledge  and  finer  analysis 
will  disclose  the  nature  of  the  connection  between  the  more 
simple  and  the  more  complex  collocation  of  atoms,  and 
between  the  lower  and  the  higher  values. 

2.  The  animal  and  human  organism  in  which  teleology 
is  disclosed  is  a  psycho-physical  unity.  The  ultimate 
nature  of  what  constitutes  organism  we  do  not  know. 
According  to  experience  neither  the  psychical  nor  the 
physical  exists  in  the  form  of  life  without  its  contrasting 
and  complementary  "other."  Nor  do  we  know  the  exact 
relation  between  the  psychical  and  the  physical  aspects  of 
the  organism.  Theories  of  consciousness  as  epiphenom- 
enon,  or  as  one  element  in  parallelism,  which  may  be 
traced  to  Spinoza  and  Leibnitz,  or  as  acting  and  being 
acted  upon  by  the  physical,  are  under  discussion,  but  no 
that  can  at  present  be  said  is,  that  thoughts  which  are 
decisive  conclusion  has  been  reached.     Perhaps  the  most 


136  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

non-material  and  not  mechanical  appear  to  modify 
mechanical  and  material  action.  But  whatever  the  truth 
is,  teleology  is  here  the  determining  principle.  In  any 
case  meaning  is  a  fact  in  this  correlaton. 

3.  As  to  the  question,  whether  some  teleology  is  to  be 
referred  to  human  choice  and  activity,  the  whole  history 
of  civilization  is  the  answer.  If  one  compares  the  face  of 
the  earth  to-day  with  its  appearance  at  any  time  since 
man  began  to  control  its  forces,  he  discovers  the  vast 
variety  of  ends  which  have  been  already  realized.  While 
animals,  even  the  most  highly  developed,  leave  only  slight 
and  at  best  very  brief  changes  in  the  world  as  result  of 
their  action,  the  changes  produced  by  man  are  great  and 
enduring,  and  even  so  are  only  the  beginning  of  what  is 
yet  to  be.  By  agriculture,  architecture,  commerce,  in 
the  region  of  chemistry,  electricity,  and  thermo-dynamics, 
the  uses  to  which  the  forces  of  nature  are  put  in  the  serv- 
ice of  human  welfare,  are  incontrovertible  evidence  of 
teleology.  It  is  true  that  if  man  were  suddenly  and  com- 
pletely to  be  swept  out  of  existence,  every  one  of  the 
changes  originated  by  him  would  begin  at  once  to  dissolve 
and  disappear;  for  while  Nature  lends  herself  to  his  uses 
and  serves  his  purposes,  yet  she  has  undergone  lio  radi- 
cal transformation,  she  is  at  heart  Nature  still,  and  where 
man  ceases  to  interpose  she  reverts  at  length  to  her  own 
ways  and  the  bringing  to  pass  of  her  own  ends.  We  can- 
not, therefore,  maintain  that  consciousness  as  we  know  it 
is  the  directing  cause  of  all  the  ends  in  nature.  In  the 
bodily  organism  itself  none  of  the  fundamental  functions 
are  under  the  direct  control  of  consciousness.  They 
began  to  be  before  consciousness  in  an  explicit  form 
appeared.  As  Kant  suggested,  the  reason  has  higher  uses 
than  to  control  the  physical  organism;  this  is  left  to 
reflex  action  and  instinct.    Reason  cannot  teach  the  heart 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ENDS  137 

to  beat,  the  stomach  to  digest  food,  or  the  legs  to  walk. 
Indeed  the  bodily  functions  are  best  performed  when  the 
consciousness  is  wholly  oblivious  of  them.  Instances  of 
organs  and  functions  of  the  body  existing  below  the 
threshold  of  consciousness,  serving  definite  ends,  are  in 
great  profusion  adduced  by  Paley  in  his  Natural  Theology/ 
— a  thesaurus  of  facts  by  no  means  out  of  date — to  be 
supplemented,  If  one  so  wishes,  by  Schopenhauer,  Darwin, 
and  Janet.  In  every  form  of  life  below  the  human  the 
purposive  action  of  organisms  is  infinitely  more  subtle, 
sure,  and  wonderful  than  is  to  be  found  in  human  self- 
conscious  purpose;  on  this  one  has  only  to  consult  von 
Hartmann  in  his  Philosophy  of  the  Unconscious  and  Fabre 
in  his  fascinating  stories  of  insect  life. 

4.  A  further  question  rises,  whether  the  finite  con- 
sciousness and  its  purpose  are  themselves  an  Integral  part 
of  the  universal  teleology.  If  there  is  a  world-plan, — and 
our  conception  of  the  world  as  a  universe,  of  the  two  laws 
of  thermodynamics,  and  of  evolution  is  meaningless  with- 
out it, — it  would  seem  that  there  must  be  Included  in  it 
not  merely  mechanism,  but  also  consciousness,  together 
with  all  the  products  of  its  action.  From  a  theological 
point  of  view,  a  doctrine  corresponding  to  this  has  been 
fundamental  to  Calvinism  (cf.  The  Westminster  Confes- 
siony  Chap.  III).  How  to  reconcile  such  a  postulate  with 
our  conviction  of  freedom,  slight  as  that  freedom  may  be. 
Is  at  present  beyond  our  reach;  this,  however,  instead  of 
discrediting,  only  adds  another  to  the  many  unsolved  prob- 
lems, one  may  even  say  antinomies,  in  our  world-view. 
That  the  purpose  of  the  individual  grows  out  of  the  uni- 
versal, that  it  is  taken  up  into  and  becomes  a  part  of  a 
wider  social  purpose  and  even  of  the  mechanical  process 
of  nature,  is  a  commonplace  of  experience  and  a  recog- 
nized fact  of  history  and  science. 


188  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

IV 

A  final  question  remains,  as  to  what  conclusion  may  be 
drawn  from  the  facts  before  us  in  their  bearing  on  the 
idea  of  God.  We  are  indeed  enjoined  against  trying  to 
proceed  further:  "Science  must  put  aside  the  problems 
which  thus  arise;  and  philosophy  must  deny  to  all  men 
the  right  to  found  a  system  of  natural  theology  upon  the 
fact.-^  Yet  in  spite  of  this  injunction,  we  must  press 
forward  to  several  well-grounded  positions,  and  we  must 
be  modest  in  our  inferences  and  conclusions. 

1.  A  universal  teleology  justifies  the  assertion  of  a 
universal,  immanent,  purposive  principle  to  which  the 
adaptation  and  ends  are  to  be  referred.  There  is  no  indi- 
cation of  an  external  force,  contriving,  adjusting,  bring- 
ing to  pass  results  for  which  the  elements  of  the  world 
have  no  inherent  fitness.  The  activity  is  purposive  and 
always  purposive.  The  ends  are  not  all  of  equal  value, 
nor  indeed  could  they  be,  since  they  are  of  infinite  variety. 
Nor  may  they  all  be  judged  by  human  uses  and  stand- 
ards. They  are,  however,  all  equally  necessary  as  indis- 
pensable parts  of  the  whole.  Some  ends  are  realized  which 
lie  outside  of  any  actual  human  experience. 

"Full  many  a  gem  of  purest  ray  serene 

The  dark  unfathomed  caves  of  ocean  bear; 
Full  many  a  flower  is  born  to  blush  unseen. 
And  waste  its  sweetness  on  the  desert  air."  ^ 

But  the  hidden  gem  which  human  eye  will  never  see  and 
the  flower  whose  fragrance  no  human  sense  will  ever  per- 


*  Henderson,  The  Order  of  Nature,  p.  118. 
*Gray,  Elegy  in  a  Country  Churchyard. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ENDS  139 

celve  are  elements  in  the  universal  order.  Moreover,  some 
embodiments  of  ends  stretch  out  beyond  possible  human 
experience,  as  suns  which  are  so  far  distant  from  our 
planet  that  their  light  will  never  be  brought  within  the 
vision  of  man.  Still  further,  there  are  ends  so  remote 
from  the  interests  of  men,  so  utterly  indifferent  or  even 
hostile  to  him  that  they  are  beyond  comprehension  or 
reconciliation  with  his  existence,  and  yet  are  integral 
parts  of  the  vast  unity  of  ends  of  the  universe.  And 
although  these  ends  are  innumerable,  complicated,  confus- 
ing, sometimes  at  cross-purposes,  perhaps  inscrutable,  yet 
they  are  no  less  truly  ends  and  must  be  included  in  the 
all-embracing  Reality.  The  prophet  gave  expression  to 
a  feeling  something  like  this  when,  speaking  for  God,  he 
exclaimed,  "as  the  heavens  are  higher  than  the  earth,  so 
are  my  ways  higher  than  your  ways,  and  my  thoughts 
than  your  thoughts." 

2.  It  is  not  necessary,  indeed  it  is  not  possible,  to  refer 
all  teleology  to  self-conscious,  selective  intelligence  as 
external.  Teleology  may  have  two  meanings:  first,  con- 
scious design  due  to  preformed  divine  purpose.  This  is 
the  common  theological  notion  of  it.  Secondly,  ends  in 
nature  are  referred  to  an  inherent  principle  or  tendency 
to  organization  and  harmony  of  the  elements  of  the  world. 
With  respect  to  conscious  purpose  as  involved  in  the 
argument  of  design,  whether  it  be  to  or  from  design,  the 
criticism  remains  in  force.  The  argument  to  be  valid 
would  have  to  substantiate  (1)  a  universal  order  which 
can  spring  only  from  design;  (2)  which  is  not  inherent 
but  foreign  to  the  nature  of  things  and  accidentally 
attached  to  them;  (3)  of  which  the  only  assignable  cause 
is  a  free  intelligent  agent;  (4)  from  the  necessity  of  the 
facts  of  the  world  thus  accounted  for,  the  unity  of  the 
cause  is  to  be  inferred,  with  certainty  within,  with  prob- 


140  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

ability  beyond,  the  region  of  observation.^  The  argument, 
however,  conducts  only  to  an  Architect,  not  a  Creator, 
to  very  great  but  not  infinite  Power.  Since  Kant's  criti- 
cism other  objections  have  been  added  and  to-day  the 
argument  in  its  traditional  form  is  set  aside.  Moreover, 
with  this  form  of  the  argument  the  facts  of  dysteleology 
have  never  been  reconciled.  Hume  called  attention  to 
"the  curious  contrivances  of  nature,  in  order  to  embitter 
the  life  of  every  human  being."  ^  Since  biology  took  the 
field,  just  as  the  adaptation,  so  the  "contrivances" — ^war- 
ring and  destructive  organisms — ^have  become  known  in 
immeasurably  increased  and  perplexing  variety.  If  one 
attributes  these  to  the  purposive  activity  of  an  all-wise, 
all-powerful,  and  all-loving  God,  and  then  with  St.  Paul 
exclaims,  "How  unsearchable  are  his  judgments,  and  his 
ways  past  finding  out !"  he  simply  abandons  the  argument 
in  its  most  critical  point  and  takes  refuge  in  the  inscruta'- 
bility  of  the  world. 

We  turn  therefore  to  the  other  definition  of  teleology 
which  seeks  the  explanation  of  it  in  the  nature  of  Reality. 
Spinoza  broke  ground  here,  although  he  was  not  in  posi- 
tion to  work  his  lead  without  the  aid  of  modem  scientific 
tools.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  active  elements  of 
which  the  universe  is  compounded,  there  is  an  abstract 
possibility  of  an  immeasurable  number  of  universes, 
included  in  which  is  naturally  the  present  order.  The 
present  material  order  is,  however,  conditioned,  if  not 
determined,  by  the  properties  of  the  atoms  and  their 
psychical  concomitants.  There  is  everywhere  complete 
absence  of  any  external  force,  originating  or  shaping 
conditions  and  results  in  an  arbitrary  manner.     Within 


*Cf.   Kant,   Critique  of   the  Pure  Reason,  pp.   636-537,   Mueller's 
transl. 
2  Dial,  etc..  Vol.  II,  p.  436. 


TPIE  DOCTRINE  OF  ENDS  141 

limits  there  are  degrees  of  freedom,  in  the  scientific  sense, 
according  to  which  the  ultimate  particles  of  the  universe 
produce  all  results.  The  results  produced,  of  whatever 
kind,  have  a  teleological  character  and  they  have  arisen 
in  a  fitness  of  the  environment  without  which  they  would 
never  have  become  what  they  are.  In  the  action  of  the 
ultimate  particles  and  their  psychical  concomitants, 
together  with  their  relations  with  one  another,  there  is 
an  essential  and  changeless  tendency  toward  co-ordinat- 
ing activity,  combinations,  systems,  adjustments,  and 
ranges  of  development  which  involve  meaning.  To  us  the 
meaning  appears  to  be  more  complex  and  richer  in  value 
in  the  animal,  and  especially  in  the  human  realm — the 
sphere  of  individual  and  social  ideals. 


We  have  now  to  inquire  whether  the  source  of  this 
universal  purposive  activity  is  self-conscious  or  may  be 
described  as  consciousness.  According  to  the  traditional 
view  which  arose  when  God  was  conceived  of  as  indepen- 
dent of  the  world  and  essentially  separate  from  it,  he  was 
the  absolute,  self-conscious,  originating  cause  of  all.  The 
belief  found  expression  in  the  doctrine  of  decrees :  before 
the  creation  of  the  universe  God  determined  within  himself 
what  he  would  have  come  to  pass  with  every  single  thing. 
Naturally  there  was  no  proof  of  such  a  doctrine ;  although 
the  authors  of  it  claimed  to  draw  it  from  the  Scriptures, 
yet  the  biblical  writers  had  no  means  of  discovering  or 
by  revelation  becoming  aware  of  it.  Prophecy  as  pre- 
dictive which  was  formerly  urged  in  support  of  divine 
foreknowledge  is  itself  hopelessly  in  need  of  corrobora- 
tion.    Ethically  the  doctrine,  whether  that  of  Calvin  or 


142  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

that  of  the  Westminster  Confession,  breaks  down.  No 
more  acceptable  is  Leibnitz's  theory  of  pre-established 
harmony,  originating  in  an  optimistic  choice  by  an  omnis- 
cient will.  The  doctrine  of  omniscience  may  be  so  defined 
as  to  assert  that  all  the  changes  and  events  of  the  uni- 
verse, past,  present,  and  to  come,  are  eternally  in  the 
divine  mind,  but  the  definition  is  purely  a  priori  and  can 
never  be  substantiated  in  experience.  There  is,  however, 
in  this  conception  the  presentiment  of  a  deep  truth:  real- 
ity as  a  whole  being  infinite,  of  which  the  visible  universe 
is  a  part,  is  marked  by  intelligence  or  order,  and  the  form 
of  the  present  order  or  intelligence  not  only  is  what  it  is 
by  reason  of  all  the  past,  that  is,  it  contains  the  past  in 
its  entirety,  but  also  bears  within  it  the  promise  and  po- 
tency of  all  that  is  to  be.  In  one  sense  time  is  "the  moving 
finger  of  eternity";  in  another  and  most  real  sense,  it  is 
the  process  of  eternity,  of  the  All-Real  in  changeless 
transition.  But  whether  the  All-Real  is  "conscious"  or 
not,  will  depend  upon  the  meaning  which  we  assign  to 
consciousness.  If  we  identify  it  with  the  principle  of 
order  or  intelligence,  the  answer  is  plain ;  yet  in  doing  so 
we  give  consciousness  a  significance  which  is  only  par- 
tially warranted  by  our  experience;  the  word  order  or 
intelligence  is  preferable  to  consciousness.  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  we  take  the  human  consciousness  as  a  stand- 
ard, we  cannot  exhaustively  describe  God  as  self-conscious 
or  even  as  conscious. 

Self-consciousness  is  a  late  comer  in  the  evolution  of 
reality,  at  least  in  one  of  the  most  insignificant  of  all  the 
bodies  which  float  in  space.  There  was  an  inconceivably 
long  period  before  it  appeared  in  our  world,  and  we  are 
told  by  competent  authorities  that  there  will  be  an  im- 
measurable period  after  it  has  ceased  to  exist  in  its  human 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ENDS  143 

limitation — itself  but  a  moment  in  the  Eternal  Silence. 
Self-consciousness  as  we  know  it  is  made  up  of  sensations, 
perceptions,  feelings,  intuitions  and  discursive  thought, 
recallings  and  forgetting,  imaginings  and  dreamings,  pur- 
poses, passions,  acquiescence,  hopes  and  fears,  faith,  love, 
pains,  sorrows,  disappointments,  social  action  and  reac- 
tion. A  reality  of  which  these  were  not  characteristic 
experiences,  whatever  else  it  might  be,  would  not  be  con- 
scious in  any  sense  of  the  word  true  to  human  experience. 
The  human  self-consciousness  is  further  marked  by  sev- 
eral aspects  or  stages :  an  initial  impulse  from  a  previous 
condition  of  inertia  in  that  direction;  interest  determin- 
ing a  longer  or  shorter  attention ;  goodness  as  a  result  of 
effort  becoming  habit  in  which  the  feeling  of  effort  ceases. 
The  condition  of  attention  is  that  we  cease  to  attend ;  of 
knowledge  that  we  ignore;  of  recalling  that  we  forget; 
and  of  all  conscious  processes  that  they  pass  into  the 
sub-conscious,  until  at  the  end  of  life  we  lose  ourselves  in 
the  Great  Unconsciousness.  On  the  other  hand,  to  speak 
of  consciousness  as  infinite  or  perfect  is  to  exclude  the 
very  condition  of  its  existence.  According  to  Aristotle 
the  consciousness  of  God  is  pure  and  perfect  intelligence ; 
it  is  that  eternally  which  man,  that  is,  the  philosopher, 
strives  to  become.  But  this  is  to  raise  to  the  nth  power  a 
single  aspect  of  man's  life  and  to  imagine  that  he  could 
realize  this  in  total  abandonment  of  all  that  gives  to  ex- 
perience its  meaning  or  value.  Plato's  supreme  Idea  was 
that  of  an  absolute  Good,  a  formless,  colorless,  change- 
less Reality,  detached  from  the  material  world,  essentially 
alien  from  it,  perfect  in  itself.  The  church  doctrine  of 
the  being  of  God  not  only  denied  to  him  "body,  parts,  and 
passions,"  but  defined  him  as  complete  within  himself,  in 
total  isolation  from  the  world.    It  follows,  therefgre,  that 


144  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

God  would  not  think  as  we  do, — the  infinite  content  of 
his  consciousness  would  be  present  as  an  eternal  in- 
tuition; his  purposes  would  be  unlike  ours, — ^he  would 
changelessly  and  from  eternity  will  whatsoever  comes 
to  pass.  The  traditional  contrast  between  the  human 
and  divine  consciousness  is  perfectly  presented  in  the 
well-known  stanza: 

"Our  lives  through  various  scenes  are  drawn, 
And  vexed  with  trifling  cares; 
While  thine  eternal  thought  moves  on 
Thine  undisturbed  affairs." 

We  may  sing  such  words, — they  were  written  when 
theology  was  ruled  by  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  the  School- 
men, and  not  by  Darwin  and  the  modem  scientific  spirit, 
— -but  like  many  of  our  hymns  the  words  are  unreal  to  us. 
If  God  were  such  a  being  we  could  never  know  him,  and 
even  if  it  were  possible  to  know  him,  he  might  be  an  object 
of  intellectual  interest,  but  he  could  awaken  In  us  no  devo- 
tion. This  is  not  consciousness,  however  the  aim  Is  to 
exalt  the  life  of  God  to  the  highest  degree,  but  a  theologi- 
cal construction. 

There  are  many  forms  of  cosmic  activity  to  which  the 
term  "conscious"  seems  not  to  apply.  There  are,  for  ex- 
ample, the  organization  of  systems,  gravitation,  cohesion, 
the  conservation  and  degradation  of  energy,  radio-activ- 
ity, and  growth  of  living  beings.  The  question  now  Is  not 
whether  back  of  these  phenomena  there  Is  consciousness, 
but  whether  we  can  frame  any  description  of  conscious- 
ness which  shall  embrace  these  activities  as  constituent 
elements  of  it.  To  this  question  a  negative  reply  must  be 
returned.     We  must  accordingly  seeks  some  other  word 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ENDS  146 

than  consciousness,  but  we  know  of  no  single  one  which  is 
capable  of  wholly  expressing  it.  It  must  be  understood 
that  we  do  not  degrade  but  rather  exalt  the  meaning  of 
this  reality  when  we  disallow  consciousness  as  the  alone 
characteristic  of  it;  there  is,  on  the  contrary,  infinitely 
more  in  this  cosmic  force  than  is  contained  in  conscious- 
ness as  we  experience  it. 

If  now  from  our  knowledge  of  the  universe  we  inquire 
whether  in  the  teleological  activity  which  we  have  affirmed 
we  can  discover  forethought  or  preconceived  plan,  our 
reply  would  depend  in  part  on  definition.  If  we  insist  on 
forethought  as  an  element  in  plan,  it  might  be  difficult  to 
establish  such  a  position.  On  the  other  hand,  if  one  were 
allowed  to  select  his  facts,  ignoring  all  others  which  were 
in  conflict  with  them,  although  not  less  significant,  one 
could  make  out  a  plausible  case  for  purpose  determined  by 
forethought  and  choice.  No  doubt,  too,  one  can  so  define 
omniscience  as  to  include  knowledge  of  all  future  events, 
possible  and  actual;  but  since  this  is  only  a  definition 
of  an  a  'priori  notion  and  is  neither  based  on  an  induction 
of  facts  nor  capable  of  verification,  it  is  not  authoritative 
for  us  in  the  study  of  the  problem  at  hand.  In  the  older 
works  on  the  evidences  of  Christianity  and  in  those  to-day 
which  follow  the  traditional  method,  the  argument  from 
prophecy  is  so  treated  as  to  prove  the  fact  of  divine  pre- 
science, particularly  in  the  field  of  human  action.  This 
was  based  on  the  conviction  that  an  essential  function  of 
prophecy  was  prediction.  It  was  further  based  on  the 
assumption  of  a  miraculous  inspiration  by  which  the 
sacred  writers  became  the  amanuenses  or  mediators  in 
communicating  the  purpose  of  God  with  reference  to 
future  events.  The  prophets  did  not  need  to  be  aware  of 
what   they  wrote;   this  might  be  wholly  enigmatical  to 


146  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

them.  Their  writing  was  in  no  sense  determined  by  their 
insight  into  the  tendencies  and  hopes  of  the  national  con- 
sciousness; it  was  enough  that  they  set  down  with  accu- 
racy the  divine  message.  Several  considerations,  however, 
rob  this  argument  of  all  its  force. 

Prediction  is  no  longer  regarded  as  essential  to  proph- 
ecy. Not  that  the  prophet  did  not  often  gaze  intently 
into  the  future,  and  there  on  its  ominous  or  inviting  back- 
ground behold  reflected  the  meaning  of  the  aims  and 
struggles  of  his  people.  The  theory  of  inspiration  which 
was  essential  to  this  view  of  prophecy  as  predictive  is  sup- 
ported by  an  appeal  neither  to  the  documents  nor  to  the 
psychology  of  the  writers.  These  men  were  religious 
teachers,  poets,  statesmen,  searchers  after  spiritual  real- 
ity, trusted  counselors  or  courageous  rebukers  of  kings ; 
and  the  least  truthful  thing  one  could  say  of  them  would 
be  that  they  were  tools,  passive  tools  of  divine  revelation, 
and  did  not  know  what  they  wrote.  We  might  further 
ask,  how  one  could  know  that  the  word  of  the  prophet  was 
an  immediate  and  infallible  message  of  God,  and  not  the 
product  of  his  own  contemplative  and  purposeful  spirit. 
Of  many  predictions  uttered  with  solemn  assurances  of 
their  certainty,  some  were  reversed  within  a  generation 
of  their  utterance,  others  by  reason  of  changing  condi- 
tions were  unfulfilled,  and  still  others  in  the  very  nature  of 
the  case  were  never  possible  of  fulfillment.  From  proph- 
ecy, therefore,  we  cannot  establish  the  fact  of  infallibly 
precise  and  complete  divine  foreknowledge  of  events  to 
come. 

VI 

In  the  order  of  nature  there  is  a  "hit  or  miss"  method 
which  seems  difficult  to  reconcile  with  definite  foreknowl- 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ENDS  147 

edge.  From  this  point  of  view  two  aspects  of  the  world 
are  equally  evident;  one  is  an  element  of  certainty  in 
events,  the  other  is  an  element  of  chance.  Tables  of  mor- 
tality figure  an  average  number  of  deaths  among  the 
assured,  but  there  is  a  margin  of  variation  above  and 
below  this  number,  and  no  insurance  company  will  venture 
to  point  out  the  individual  beneficiaries  who  will  die  in  a 
given  year.  In  the  meteorological  cycle  the  amount  of 
rainfall  of  each  year  in  a  century  is  fairly  uniform,  but 
the  months  and  days  in  which  a  certain  amount  will  be 
precipitated,  cannot  be  foretold.  Seeds  that  are  sown  by 
the  wind  are  provided  with  springs  and  hooks  and  wings 
and  parachutes  and,  as  in  the  case  of  the  water  cat-tail, 
a  thousand  seeds  will  be  blown  in  all  directions  and  per- 
haps nine  hundred  and  ninety-nine  of  them  perish,  but  a 
chance  wind  will  carry  one  to  a  congenial  soil.  And 
nature  is  not  balked. 

"So  careful  of  the  type  she  seems, 
So  careless  of  the  single  life." 

Thus  the  evidence  of  plan  is  overwhelmingly  manifest 
— order,  stability,  purposiveness,  adaptation,  realization 
of  ends;  in  some  aspects  of  the  world  too  more  than  in 
others — the  astronomical  cycle,  the  behavior  of  atoms  in 
compounds  and  systems;  while  in  the  region  of  organic 
existences  the  accidental,  the  non-significant,  the  mal- 
adjustment is  often  in  evidence.  In  order  to  meet  the 
problem  thus  arising  in  natural  theology  it  has  been 
aflfirmed  that  God  governs  the  universe  by  general  laws 
and  second  causes.  In  any  system  originated  by  divine 
wisdom  a  certain  amount  of  imperfection  and  failure  is 
inevitable;  this  is  to  be  referred  to  the  nature  of  the  sys- 


148  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

tern  which  is  on  the  whole,  with  all  the  infelicities  inci- 
dental to  it,  the  best  possible.  The  merit  of  this  theory 
lies  in  its  recognition  of  patent  facts,  but  in  its  assump- 
tion of  divine  foreknowledge  it  begs  the  very  thing  which 
is  most  in  need  of  proof. 

Another  method  which  appears  to  characterize  the 
order  of  nature  is  that  of  "trial  and  error."  The  creative 
activity,  instead  of  proceeding  in  direct  and  unending 
lines,  at  times  moves  forward  till  arrested  by  blind  alleys 
or  turns  backward  on  its  track.  It  produces  gigantic, 
unwieldly  forms  of  organic  life,  and  as  if  disappointed  at 
their  impossible  bigness  puts  an  end  to  them  but  preserves 
them  in  fossil  form,  as  if  to  remind  itself  not  to  repeat 
the  futile  endeavor.  The  remains  of  extinct  species  on 
land  and  sea  testify  not  only  to  the  fecundity  of  nature 
but  also  to  a  certain  groping  and  unforeseeing  aspect  of 
her  action.  It  may  of  course  be  objected  that  if  we  knew 
perfectly  the  nature  of  the  power  operating  in  the  world 
and  the  principles  of  its  action,  we  might  see  that  it  moves 
in  straight  lines  and  inerrantly  to  its  goal.  But  this  hides 
an  a  priori  premise,  is  an  appeal  to  our  ignorance,  and  is 
without  validity  in  view  of  the  fact  that  of  the  countless 
secular  trails  struck  out  by  nature  many  have  been  devi- 
ated from  or  abandoned.  The  method  of  trial  and  error 
is  possible  by  reason  of  the  large  degree  of  freedom  in  the 
world, — a  freedom  which  allows  of  development  in  the  way 
of  variation  as  well  as  of  heredity,  of  struggle  as  well  as 
of  natural  selection,  of  many  successes  as  well  as  of  many 
failures.  Freedom  is,  however,  not  merely  caprice  but 
active  in  accordance  with  general  laws  and  a  special  en- 
vironment. However  far  it  may  proceed,  it  is  always 
ultimately  checked  by  the  fitness  of  the  environment; 
having  pushed  to  th§  limit,  it  ii]^y  defeat  itself  by  the 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ENDS  149 

very  egregiousness  of  its  achievement.  The  wind-swept 
wave  lifts  itself  to  a  dizzy  and  unstable  height  only  to 
fall  back  once  more  to  the  sea  level,  and  the  megatherium 
developing  bigness  to  the  furthest  degree  exhausts  the  im- 
pulse and  capacity  of  animal  structure  and  function  and 
so  knells  its  own  doom. 

This  method  of  trial  and  error  appears  also  in  the 
social  organism.  No  form  of  human  social  life  is  stable. 
Society  is  a  continuous  experiment.  One  type  of  organi- 
zation is  no  sooner  established  and  its  value  proved  than 
its  defects  also  emerge — an  inevitable  shadow  cast  by  the 
ideal — and  force  an  endeavor  after  a  better  adjustment 
of  the  social  order.  The  shores  of  history  are  strewn 
with  the  wrecks  and  discards  of  past  trials,  tribal  organi- 
zation, theocracies,  despotisms,  oligarchies,  kingdoms  and 
empires,  representative  governments,  democracies;  and 
always  something  more  workable  and  attractive  beckons 
the  race  onward.  In  an  enthusiastic  passion  for  democ- 
racy, the  poet  sings: 

"God  said,  I  am  tired  of  kings, 
I  suflPer  them  no  more."  ^ 

But  kings  were  created  by  the  same  power  which  throws 
them  down.  At  a  stage  of  human  experience  when  they 
were  the  only  recourse,  God  set  them  up.  They  seemed 
ideal,  and  indeed  were  the  only  possible  ideal,  for  the  time 
being;  with  them  a  new  millennium  dawned.  Yet  after- 
ward, for  the  further  uses  of  humanity,  they  are  outgrown 
and  have  to  be  cast  aside.  What  will  be  the  final  form 
of  social  organization  no  one  can  predict,  for  in  the  first 


*  Emerson,  Boston  Hymn, 


150  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

place  there  is  to  be  no  final  form,  and  secondly,  the  experi- 
ment must  go  on  as  long  as  human  life  endures.  Some- 
thing of  value  will  be  retained ;  the  old  is  transformed  into 
the  new.  What  is  unworkable  and  a  hindrance  in  the 
social  experiment  is  rejected.  The  different  experiments 
are  going  on  side  by  side  contemporaneously,  and  side 
by  side  kingdoms  and  empires  and  republics  and  democra- 
cies, no  one  of  which  is  more  than  a  brief  stopping-place 
in  human  progress. 

In  explanation  of  this  experience,  the  law  of  evolution 
is  appealed  to.  It  is  alleged  that  in  the  process,  a  certain 
amount  of  waste  and  reversion  to  type  is  unavoidable. 
Moreover,  what  is  fitted  for  one  stage  of  development  is 
by  that  very  fact  unsuited  for  another.  This  does  not, 
however,  prove  that  the  Power  operating  through  evolu- 
tion has  chosen  this  in  preference  to  any  other  method  of 
realizing  ends.  For  creative  evolution  is  eternal.  There 
was  no  "before"  when  a  choice  could  be  made.  And  we 
have  not  the  slightest  reason  for  supposing  that  any 
other  than  the  present  order  of  human  events  is  or  has 
ever  been  possible  on  the  earth. 

The  use  of  the  terms  "hit  or  miss"  and  "trial  and 
error"  should  not  lead  us  to  the  judgment  that  the  method 
thus  characterized  is  imperfect.  It  is  not  a  question  of 
perfect  or  imperfect.  Such  words  and  the  notion  they 
suggest  are  out  of  place  here.  If  the  term  "perfect" 
has  any  meaning,  it  must  be  in  reference  to  the  possible. 
If  no  other  order  than  the  existing  one  has  any  place  in 
our  thought,  then  to  all  intents  and  purposes  the  present 
order  is  perfect  and  the  error  is  as  truly  a  part  of  the 
perfection  as  is  the  attainment. 

Moreover,  in  spite  of  the  handicaps  referred  to — the 
"misses"  and  the  "errors" — ^whatever  is  true  in  the  rest 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ENDS  161 

of  the  universe,  here  on  this  earth  and  in  the  circle  of  our 
experience,  with  all  their  apparent  failures,  nature  and 
human  life  do  not  fail.  Fire  and  flood  may  devastate 
here,  but  there  tall  forests  grow  in  secure  luxuriance  and 
yellow  harvests  yield  abundant  grain;  pestilence  and  war 
may  decimate  one  nation,  but  in  another,  peace  and 
health  are  plentiful  and  the  death-rate  normal.  In  the 
meteorological  cycle,  the  average  of  heat  and  cold,  rain, 
sun  and  shine,  light  and  darkness  varies  but  little  from 
century  to  century;  within  this  range  human  life  flour- 
ishes, indeed  it  could  exist  in  no  other. 


vn 


The  force  of  these  considerations  does  not,  however,  in 
any  way  militate  against  the  certainty  that  the  universe 
is  pervaded  by  "plan."  The  structure  and  constitution 
of  the  world,  the  co-ordination  and  behavior  of  its  parts, 
the  unity  and  adaptation  throughout  the  entire  range  of 
experienced  reality,  the  fact  that  we  employ  such  terms 
as  nature,  organization,  system,  and  evolution,  the  very 
term  universe  in  which  these  are  embraced,  betrays  the 
common  conviction  that  plan  is  everywhere.  That  we 
are  not  yet  able  fully  to  define  nature,  and  that  the  prin- 
ciple of  organization  remains  in  great  part  hidden  from 
us  does  not  detract  from  the  judgment  referred  to.  The 
instruments  of  scientific  investigation  and  discovery  and 
the  sciences  themselves — astronomy,  geology,  biology, 
chemistry,  and  chemical  analysis — all  imply  the  existence 
of  an  order  which  is  as  wide  as  the  reach  of  human  intelli- 
gence, and  is  moreover  presupposed  for  all  regions  inacces- 
sible to  man's  utmost  reach. 


162  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

When  we  use  the  term  "plan,"  the  question  presents 
itself  whether  this  involves  what  we  usually  associate  with 
it — a  purpose  fully  formed  before  its  execution  is  entered 
upon.  This,  which  seems  to  be  the  ideal,  is  rarely  if  ever 
the  method  and  fact  of  experience.  However  wisely  and 
with  long  forethought  we  determine  the  form  of  future 
action,  we  are  confronted  by  contingencies  which  require 
revision,  correction,  enlargement,  abandonment,  or  the 
substitution  of  another  scheme  more  promising.  Great 
works  of  art  are  never  like  Minerva  in  an  instant  thrown 
out  perfect  in  conception;  on  the  contrary,  they  unfold 
from  the  germinal  idea,  developing  according  to  their  pe- 
culiar genius  steadily  from  within,  growing  as  a  tree 
grows,  its  form  implicit  in  the  seed,  expanding  true  to  its 
type  according  to  an  immanent  impulse.  If  the  work 
is  a  tragedy,  each  event  grows  out  of  what  preceded, 
and  it  determines  that  which  follows,  ever  moving  steadily 
forward  to  the  catastrophe;  its  coherent  and  developing 
detail,  however,  instead  of  being  present  all  at  once  in 
the  initial  concept  of  the  drama,  emerges  gradually  with 
its  inner  necessary  connection  in  the  progress  of  the 
author's  thought.  The  magnificent  system  of  the  Roman 
Catholic  church,  together  with  its  impressive  dogmas, 
was  indeed  implicit  in  the  apostolic  age  and  has  grad- 
ually developed  as  an  organism  according  to  a  per- 
fectly intelligible  type;  but  the  present  consciousness 
of  the  church,  its  dogmas,  and  the  forms  of  worship 
and  administration  were  at  the  outset  only  potencies 
among  many  other  potencies  of  ecclesiastical  develop- 
ment. There  is  also  a  plan  of  human  life;  Dr.  Bushnell 
states  it,  "Every  man's  life  a  plan  of  God."  Among 
many  people  there  is  a  belief  that  a  guardian  genius 
presides  over  the  birth  of  each  child,  to  guide  him  into 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ENDS  163 

the  realization  of  the  plan  of  his  life.  Others,  as  Plato, 
regard  this  life  as  only  reminiscence  and  recovery  of 
a  former  state  of  perfection  in  which  alone  lies  life's 
true  plan.  Theologians  have  affirmed  that  every  event 
in  man's  earthly  existence  was  foreknown  and  predeter- 
mined in  the  thought  of  God ;  the  life  of  each  man  there- 
fore simply  repeats  in  earthly  form  what  was  eternally 
present  as  a  purpose  in  the  mind  of  God.  Of  such  a  plan, 
however,  in  the  mind  of  God,  in  the  sense  outlined,  we 
have  and  can  have  no  knowledge.  What  we  know  is  that 
in  the  successive  generations  of  living  men,  there  is  some- 
thing which  for  the  want  of  a  better  word  we  call  "plan," 
according  to  which  personality  and  character  develop. 
This  it  is  which  determines  the  structure  and  function  of 
the  human  body  and  the  human  consciousness.  It  is 
implicit  in  the  nature  of  man;  it  is  presupposed  in  all 
his  acts ;  out  of  it  arises  his  authoritative  and  convincing 
ideal.  We  see,  therefore,  that  "plan"  is  not  necessarily 
dependent  on  forethought,  whether  perfect  or  partial. 
It  requires  only  development  on  structural  lines  by  which 
functional  activity  is  in  part  determined,  be  the  activity 
that  of  the  inorganic,  the  organic,  or  consciousness.  The 
question  of  its  absolute  origination  is  irrelevant — there 
is  no  such  origination;  such  origination  as  there  is  is 
progressive  and  may  be  traced  in  the  stages  of  its  develop- 
ment. Accordingly,  the  originative  activity  is  immanent, 
gradual,  continuous,  ever  changing,  yet  ever  the  same, 
without  beginning  and  without  end. 

In  our  experience  we  find  nowhere  complete,  perfect, 
and  permanent  expression,  but  only  approximations,  with 
many  failures,  in  the  products  of  this  ideal-forming  ten- 
dency. Here,  neither  unrelieved  pessimism,  nor  unqualified 
optimism,  but  only  meliorism,  and  that  in  modest  measure, 


154  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

is  warranted.  Aristotle's  dictum  that  the  perfect  must 
already  exist,  else  all  striving  after  the  perfect  would  be 
without  rational  ground,  rests  upon  an  assumption  which 
is  not  justified  by  experience.  Impulse  and  effort  are 
not  for  the  perfect,  save  as  the  perfect  is  conceived  in  a 
purely  abstract  fashion;  men  strive  for  what  appears  to 
be  concretely  better  than  existing  conditions.  No  truer 
statement  of  the  point  in  question  has  ever  been  made 
than  in  the  following  by  Professor  Dewey: 

"The  ultimate  ideal  (standard)  seems  to  me  to  be 
chiefly  what  keeps  all  moral  discussion  from  getting  on. 
.  .  .  We  can  talk  intelligently  about  the  beginning  of  a 
specific  concern  and  so  we  can  talk  about  its  end,  actual 
or  desirable,  but  when  we  go  beyond  some  specific  matter, 
I  think  we  talk  nonsense.  I  am  more  and  more  convinced 
that  all  reflection  is  an  analysis  of  some  specific  situa- 
tion, and  that  moral  theory  can  only  give  the  general 
tools  for  such  analysis.  As  a  sort  of  limit  of  comprehen- 
siveness, or  adequacy,  of  such  analysis,  the  term  ultimate 
or  absolute  ideal  may  have  a  meaning,  but  in  no  other 
sense." 

Every  one  who  stops  to  consider  is  aware  that  indi- 
vidual, in  the  sense  of  absolute,  perfection  is  beyond  finite 
reach.  Such  perfection,  if  it  is  to  be  held  as  valid,  is 
possible  only  to  the  total  Reality  of  which  each  indi- 
vidual is  an  integral  part.  And  such  "perfection"  would 
have  to  include  evil  as  well  as  good,  limitation  no  less  than 
completion,  infinite  diversity  and  not  simply  undifferen- 
tiated sameness.  Nor  is  it  something  that  is  wholly  in  the 
future ;  it  already  is ;  it  has  always  existed ;  it  will  never 
end.  But  this  concerns  us  only  in  an  abstract  way.  Even 
so,  it  does  not  conduct  us  beyond  an  immanent  tele- 
ology. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ENDS  165 

VIII 

The  results  thus  Indicated — the  unity  of  the  world, 
and  indeed  the  whole  process  of  evolution — can  be  referred 
to  one  principle  only,  that  is,  to  an  inner  tendency  to 
unity  and  co-ordination  and  development.  This  tendency 
is  present  throughout  the  entire  inorganic  world.  Instead 
of  an  aimless  and  unending  play  of  forces,  moving  to  and 
fro,  whirling  in  fixed  and  separate  orbits,  like  the  tide 
ever  returning  to  the  same  line — an  eternal  recurrence  to 
the  original  starting-point — there  is  a  process  in  which 
ends  are  realized,  a  necessary  condition  for  the  appearance 
of  life.  This  tendency  is  in  every  atom,  but  it  is  super- 
atomic;  it  is  in  every  inorganic  combination,  but  it  is 
super-inorganic;  it  is  in  every  organic  existence,  but  it  is 
super-organic;  it  is  in  the  ethical  endeavor  of  every  in- 
dividual, but  it  is  super-individual;  it  is  the  secret  force 
in  all  social  progress,  but  it  is  super-social.  That  is  to 
say,  the  tendency  in  which  lies  the  controlling  direction 
of  all  things  is  forever  active  and  forever  unexhausted 
by  any  and  all  ever-changing  finite  forms.  It  is  not 
merely  that  the  possible  permutations  and  combinations 
are  infinite;  if  this  were  all,  the  result  might  be  a  mere 
kaleidoscopic  shuffle  of  unstable  and  meaningless  combina- 
tions. It  is  not  simply  action  or  movement,  but  tendency. 
It  may  for  long  periods  be  inevident;  it  is  never  wholly 
quiescent.  It  waits  only  for  the  fit  environment,  which 
other  contemporaneous  activities  produce,  in  order  to 
invoke  the  inherent  capacity  to  further  fulfillment.  The 
tendency  to  development  through  variation  is  the  secret 
of  the  entire  creative  process.  An  instance  of  this  law 
is  that  of  the  little  four-toed  eohippus  of  millions  of 
years  since,  as  his  fossil  remains  reveal  the  several  stages 


166  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

of  his  evolution — four  toes,  three  toes,  two  toes,  to  the 
one-toed  magnificent  creature,  the  horse  of  to-day.  This 
tendency  which  is  seen  actually  at  work  in  the  creation 
of  the  horse  is  everywhere  active  in  all  organic  forms  of 
existence. 

We  have  to  observe  that  this  tendency,  instead  of  oper- 
ating on  independent,  isolated  lines,  irrespective  of  all 
others,  co-ordinates  its  activity  so  as  to  constitute  en- 
vironment. Particular  forms  of  life  can  exist  only  if 
other  forms  also  exist.  And  all  are  dependent  on  certain 
degrees  of  heat  and  cold,  light  and  darkness,  humidity 
and  dryness,  gravity  and  countless  other  conditions,  many 
of  which  are  unknown  to  us.  Hume  called  attention  to 
the  connection  here  referred  to:  "It  is  in  vain  to  insist 
upon  the  uses  of  the  parts  in  animals  or  vegetables  and 
their  curious  adjustments  to  each  other.  I  would  fain  know 
how  an  animal  could  subsist,  unless  its  parts  were  so  ad- 
justed." ■'■  A  previous  question  arises,  as  to  the  simul- 
taneous, co-ordinating,  teleological  activity  by  which  the 
adjustment  is  produced.  The  conviction  is  irresistible 
that  we  have  here  to  do  with  a  unitary  force  whose  activity 
is  twofold — toward  individuation  by  which  the  organism 
comes  into  and  is  maintained  in  existence,  and  toward 
totality  in  which  the  individual  becomes  an  integral  part 
of  a  harmonious  whole.  For  this  we  invoke  no  external 
power,  arbitrarily  manipulating  the  ultimate  particles  of 
the  universe;  instead,  we  discover  that  we  are  here  in 
the  presence  of  a  fundamental  characteristic  of  Reality, 
namely,  a  creative  tendency  toward  ends  of  whatever  kind. 
We  may  define  this  tendency  by  various  terms,  as  Nature, 
Cosmic  Force,  the  Will  to  Live,  Creative  Impulse,  Infinite 


^Op.   cit.,  p.   105. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ENDS  167 

and  Eternal  Energy,  or,  taking  into  consideration  the 
ethical  values  which  have  emerged  in  evolution,  we  may 
say  the  Power,  not  ourselves,  that  makes  for  righteous- 
ness, or,  having  regard  to  the  experience  and  custom  of 
the  Anglo-Saxon  people,  we  may  call  it  God. 

The  tendency  here  referred  to  is  toward  infinite  vari- 
ability and  infinite  development.  The  atoms  are  of  such 
a  constitution  and  their  mutual  relations  are  such  as  to 
permit  an  inconceivably  vast  number  of  combinations, 
components,  phases,  systems,  and  organisms.  It  is  pre- 
cisely here  that  the  suggestion  of  Lucretius  has  its  truth. 
"For  verily  not  by  design  did  the  first  beginnings  of  things 
station  themselves  each  in  its  right  place  by  keen-sighted 
intelligence,  nor  did  they  bargain,  sooth  to  say,  what 
motions  each  should  assume,  but  because  the  first  begin- 
nings of  things,  many  in  number  and  in  many  ways 
impelled  by  their  own  weights,  have  been  wont  to  be  carried 
along  and  to  unite  in  all  manner  of  ways  and  thoroughly 
to  test  every  kind  of  production  possible  to  their  mutual 
combinations,  therefore  it  is  that  spread  abroad  through 
great  time,  after  trying  unions  and  motions  of  every  kind, 
they  at  length  meet  together  in  those  masses  which  sud- 
denly brought  together  become  often  the  rudiments  of 
great  things  of  earth,  sea,  and  heaven,  and  the  race  of 
living  things."  *  Spinoza  has  been  reproached  for  his 
proposition  that  since  thought  and  extension  are  infinite, 
they  must  of  necessity  express  themselves  in  all  possible 
forms,  not,  however,  all  at  once,  or  at  every  instant,  but 
eventually,  in  the  limitless  range  and  duration  of  phenom- 
enal existence.^  The  entire  activity  of  the  world  is  de- 
termined along  certain  structural  lines,  and  it  is  within 

*  On  the  Nature  of  Things,  p.  168,  tr.  by  Monro. 

*  Ethics,  Part  I,  Prop.  XXXV. 


158  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

these  that  the  variations  occur.  This  must  be  regarded 
not  as  a  limitation,  but  rather  as  a  perfection.  It  is  what 
Aristotle  referred  to  when  he  spoke  of  "the  material  na- 
ture whose  necessary  results  have  been  made  available 
by  rational  nature  for  a  final  cause."  If  we  interpret 
"rational  nature"  by  the  present-day  term  "laws  of  na- 
ture," we  can  perceive  the  bearing  of  his  most  suggestive 
statement.  All  the  variations  are  rightly  assumed  to  be 
according  to  law,  that  is,  they  are  intelligible,  even  if 
their  principle  has  not  yet  been  fully  ascertained.  Every 
one  of  these  variations  is  at  the  same  time  a  revelation  of 
universal  and  continuous  activity  of  the  unifying  power 
at  the  heart  of  things.  In  this  unifying  activity  we  may 
find  a  part  of  our  definition  of  God.  And  we  need  have 
no  fear  lest  we  belittle  God  if  we  think  of  his  working  as 
completely  absorbed  in  the  universe.  A  universe  infinite 
in  space  and  time,  with  an  infinite  possibility  of  combina- 
tion and  system,  is  a  field  broad  enough  for  infinite  power, 
wisdom,  and  goodness.  Moreover,  if  any  energy  were  to 
be  alleged  in  addition  to  what  is  here  involved,  it  would 
be  purely  supposititious;  it  could  never  come  within  the 
scope  of  human  experience  or  apprehension.  Such  sup- 
posititious energy  is  therefore  wholly  negligible;  not  only 
so,  but  it  becomes  a  serious  handicap  to  a  constructive 
idea   of  God. 

Reference  has  been  made  to  the  psychical  aspect  which 
accompanies  physical  phenomena  in  the  sphere  of  life. 
Greek  philosophers  thought  of  all  the  heavenly  bodies  as 
living  beings.  The  Stoics  conceived  of  the  universe  as 
pervaded  and  determined  by  a  dynamic  rational  princi- 
ple. At  present,  within  the  sphere  of  personal  life,  where 
the  problem  of  action  is  most  complex  and  difficult,  many 
thinkers  propose  a  "vitalistic"  explanation.    Without  at- 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ENDS  169 

tempting  to  adjudicate  concerning  this  theory,  attention 
is  directed  to  the  psychical  factor  concomitant  with  every 
physical  form  of  life,  whether  beast,  bird,  or  fish,  or  even 
vegetative  existence.  The  physical  and  the  psychical  are 
in  the  most  thorough-going  correspondence.  If  we  use 
the  term  "conscious,"  we  should  say  of  the  spider,  the 
wasp,  the  rattlesnake,  the  shark,  the  tiger,  the  eagle,  and 
indeed  of  every  animal  life,  that  in  each  is  a  conscious 
principle  which  answers  perfectly  to  its  physical  organism, 
in  each  different  as  the  physical  organism  is  different. 
These  psychical  accompaniments  appear  to  rise  out  of  a 
common  background  of  reality,  so  that,  however  differen- 
tiated, they  are  never  wholly  separate  from  their  source. 
Here  is  an  infinitely  subtle  and  varied  activity  producing 
infinitely  varied  and  subtle  aspects  of  life.  And  this  con- 
stitutes a  further  revelation  of  the  Reality  which  is  cre- 
atively active  in  the  world. 

The  tendency  to  develop  the  psychical  in  connection  with 
the  physical  appears  in  a  supreme  degree  in  the  human 
experience.  This  may  be  traced  along  two  main  lines — 
the  individual  and  the  social  aspect  of  personal  life.  While 
they  never  exist  apart  from  each  other,  yet  for  purposes 
of  study,  each  may  be  isolated  from  the  other.  The  rich- 
ness of  the  individual  aspect  is  discovered  in  the  revela- 
tions of  psychology,  in  the  manifold  forms  of  conscious- 
ness, and  even  more  in  the  mysterious  and  exhaustless 
treasures  of  the  sub-conscious  self.  The  content  of  con- 
sciousness is  still  further  disclosed  in  the  products  of  the 
human  spirit,  in  literature,  art,  music,  science,  philosophy, 
invention,  finance,  commerce,  exploration,  and  yet  more 
in  the  inexhaustible  impulse  of  which  these  are  the  pro- 
gressive but  always  imperfect  expression.  If  the  self  is 
a  "force  which  can  draw  from  itself  more  than  it  contains, 


160  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

yield  more  than  it  receives,  give  more  than  it  has,"  ^ 
then  here  is  a  point  at  which  the  tendency  active  in 
the  world  is  realizing  the  ends  of  individual  personal  life. 
Side  by  side  with  this  is  the  tendency  to  social  evolu- 
tion, disclosed  in  the  language,  customs,  laws,  and  insti- 
tutions which  have  come  into  existence  in  the  developing 
life  of  man.  How  diverse  and  significant  these  are  only 
the  student  of  history  knows.  No  dreamer  can  imagine, 
nor  can  any  prophet  comprehend  "the  vision  of  the  world 
and  the  wonder  that  would  be."  Splendid  as  are  the 
already  achieved  moral  results  when  referred  to  purely 
human  intention  and  agency,  they  are  not  explained  from 
human  agency  and  intention  alone ;  they  involve  a  psychi- 
cal activity  of  far  wider  scope  co-ordinating  and  com- 
pleting individual  activity.  Human  purposes  are  merged 
into  and  become  part  of  a  larger  plan  which  seems  to  be 
in  process  of  realization, — a  plan  which  cannot  indeed 
be  effected  without  man's  agency,  yet  for  which  man's 
consciously  directed  agency  does  not  suffice.  Instances 
of  what  is  here  meant  are  not  far  to  seek.  Joseph  said 
to  his  brethren,  "Ye  meant  evil  against  me,  but  God 
meant  it  for  good  to  bring  to  pass  as  it  is  this  day,  to 
save  much  people  alive."  ^  In  his  address  at  Pentecost, 
Peter  employed  the  same  principle,  but  with  a  more  rigid 
reference  to  a  divine  purposeful  activity,  which  took  up 
into  its  plan  the  perverse  and  short-sighted  aims  of  the 
Jewish  rulers:  "Jesus  of  Nazareth  .  .  .  being  delivered 
up  by  the  determinate  counsel  and  foreknowledge  of  God, 
ye  by  the  hands  of  lawless  men  did  crucify  and  slay; 
whom  God  raised  up,"  and  "hath  made  him  both  Lord 

*  Bergson,  Mind-Energy,  p.  39,  transl.  by  H.  Wildon  Carr. 
'Gen.  1:20. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ENDS  161 

and  Christ,  this  Jesus  whom  ye  crucified."  ^  An  unknown 
writer  of  the  Exile  gave  unwitting  expression  to  this 
principle  in  his  reference  to  the  Persian  king,  Cyrus,  who 
was  consciously  absorbed  in  pressing  forward  the  con- 
quests of  his  kingdom,  and  yet  was  at  the  same  time  a 
chosen  servant  of  Jahweh,  fulfilling  the  will  of  God  for 
his  people.^  Alexander  meant  only  to  subdue  the  nations 
of  the  East,  but  he  knew  nothing  of  the  roads  he  was 
preparing  for  the  Greek  language  and  the  Greek  ideals 
to  invade  the  civilization  of  those  lands,  and  later  for  the 
Roman  rule  to  extend  its  powerful  sway  over  the  same 
peoples.  Both  Luther  and  Wesley  set  out  to  correct 
abuses  of  their  respective  churches,  and  the  great  Luth- 
eran and  Methodist  communions  are  only  the  more  immedi- 
ate and  obvious  fruits  of  their  endeavor.  Columbus 
sought  only  a  new  route  to  India  and  the  Pilgrims  a  free 
church  in  a  free  land,  but  a  new  Continent  and  a  new 
Republic  crowned  their  simple  but  sublime  endeavor.  In 
his  Second  Inaugural,  Lincoln,  referring  to  the  conflict 
between  the  North  and  the  South,  wrote  that  "Each  looked 
for  an  easier  triumph  and  a  result  less  fundamental  and 
astounding."  In  the  recent  War  certain  definite  ends 
were  present  to  those  who  precipitated  the  struggle,  yet 
not  a  single  one  of  these  has  been  realized ;  others  unfore- 
seen and  infinitely  more  significant  are  now  taking  their 
place  on  the  field  of  history.  In  our  survey  of  the  past 
we  cannot  escape  the  conviction  that  a  continuously 
active  ideal  tendency  is  realizing  ends  richer  and  more 
enduring  than  the  transient,  fragmentary,  conscious  pur- 
poses of  our  human  world. 

» Acts  ii,  22-24,  86. 
«  Isa.  xliv,  28— xlv,  6. 


162  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

"There's  a  divinity  that  shapes  our  ends, 
Rough  hew  them  how  we  will." 

We  must  not,  however,  present  this  to  ourselves  as 
something  external,  arbitrary,  and  coercive,  but  as  an 
immanent  impulsion  toward  a  more  inclusive  unity,  better 
balanced,  more  harmonious,  and  greater  ends.  Here  again 
is  a  further  disclosure  of  the  essential  nature  of  Reality. 

It  is  in  the  nature  rather  than  in  the  fact  of  ends  that 
the  character  of  the  tendency  referred  to  is  revealed. 
Plato  in  the  farthest  reach  of  his  speculative  gaze  beheld 
the  Good  as  the  eternal,  transcendent  summit  of  being, 
the  end  toward  which  all  existence  strives.  And  a  poet 
in  our  own  time  has  written, 

"O  yet  we  trust  that  somehow  good 
Will  be  the  final  goal  of  iU."  ^ 

Experience  has  not,  however,  left  this  word  "good"  to 
dwell  in  an  inaccessible  height  or  to  remain  an  indetermi- 
nate something  which  haunts  the  imagination,  but  for- 
ever eludes  definition  in  human  life ;  experience  has  instead 
brought  it  down  to  earth  to  make  its  home  with  men. 
The  good  is  not  a  glittering  abstraction,  but  a  concrete 
reality  with  many  facets,  presented  variously,  now  this, 
now  that — truth,  justice,  beauty,  goodness,  sacrifice, 
social  welfare.  The  one  end — the  good — is  thus  divided 
into  many  ends,  and  these  again  instead  of  remaining 
abstract  become  particular  and  concrete,  incorporated  in 
words  and  deeds  and  a  spirit  of  life.  Wherever  men  and 
women  exist,  they  are  urged  onward  by  an  inner,  indefeas- 


Tennyson,  In  Memoriam,  Canto  liv. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  ENDS  1«8 

ible  impulse  to  be  truthful,  just,  loving,  to  live  for  others, 
and  to  create  social  well-being.  This  impulse  is  back  of 
all  choice,  back  of  all  thought,  back  of  all  desire,  having 
its  source  in  the  value-creating  principle  of  the  world. 
To  this  principle  are  to  be  referred  the  great  loyalties, 
heroisms,  sacrifices,  sympathy,  and  co-operation  of  the 
social  consciousness.  In  every  phase  of  social  activity 
the  ethical  ideal  is  in  process  of  enlargement  and  revision, 
in  respect  of  definition,  functional  efliciency,  and  emanci- 
pation from  the  stupefying  power  of  tradition,  with  more 
or  less  of  groping  and  experimentation,  yet  withal  becom- 
ing at  every  point — industrial,  economic,  political,  educa- 
tional, community-wise,  religious — more  truly  human  and 
therefore  more  divine. 

This  inherent  tendency  of  Reality  to  realize  the  highest 
individual  and  social  values,  instead  of  being  exhausted  by 
any  and  all  existing  conditions,  contains  the  promise  and 
potency  of  an   immeasurable  advance.      This   is   evident 
from  two  considerations :   (1)  The  capacity  of  the  psychi- 
cal aspect  of  being  for  an  infinite  content.     (2)  The  fitness 
of  the  world  for  embodying  an  infinite  variety  of  ends. 
If  one  asks  concerning  the  relation  of  the  psychical,  ideal- 
forming,  and  efficient  tendency  of  Reality  to  the  ends  in 
process  of  becoming,  he  is  met  by  two  answers :  one,  which 
has  held  the  field  from  an  early  time,  that  the  ends  are 
partial  and  progressixe  disclosures  of  an  infinite,  trans- 
cendent content;  the  other,  of  more  recent  origin,  that 
the  psychical  aspect  of  reality,  which  at  every  instant 
completely  expresses  itself  in  the  ends  realized,  changes 
as  these  change  and  is   as  these  are:  hence,  if  at  any 
moment  we  could  comprehend  all  the  ends  which  are  then 
existent,   we   would    at    the   same   time   comprehend   the 
entire  content  of  the  psychical  Reality.     In  case  we  find 


164  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

neither  the  static  nor  this  particular  dynamic  theory  sat- 
isfactory, we  may  turn  to  another  conception,  that  while 
Reality  is  as  it  manifests  itself  at  every  instant  through- 
out the  universe,  yet  its  immanent  causality  contains  the 
possibility  of  an  infinite  variety  of  not-yet-realized  values. 
It  is,  however,  necessary  to  suppose  neither  that  in  the 
Ultimate  Reality  all  that  is  yet  to  be  is  present  in  the 
form  of  consciousness,  nor  indeed  that  all  that  is  past 
exists  in  the  form  of  explicit,  conscious  memory.  It  is 
another  question  whether  Truth,  Justice,  Beauty,  and 
Goodness,  as  absolute  entities,  subsist  "in  a  heaven  by 
themselves,"  independent  of  the  world  of  space  and  time, 
in  some  way  the  secret  source  and  explanation  of  the  finite 
forms  of  truth,  justice,  beauty,  and  goodness. 


VII.    THE  IDEA  OF  GOD  IN  RELATION 
TO  EVIL 


We  are  now  to  consider  the  relation  of  evil  to  the  ends 
in  process  of  realization  by  the  creative  action  of  Reality. 
"Evil"  and  "ends"  seem  to  be  mutually  contradictory:  if 
ends  are  to  be  referred  to  a  Creative  Good  Will,  then  evil 
appears  to  require  a  totally  different  cause.  The  two 
have  always  existed  contemporaneously  in  the  same  world 
of  human  experience,  both  equally  real,  neither  one  able 
to  overcome  or  abolish  the  other.  Naturally  all  the  early 
theories  concerning  e\il  took  their  rise  in  the  world-view 
of  different  peoples.  For  Greek  thinkers  there  was  a 
deeper  element  of  life  than  free-will  and  responsibility — 
primordial,  dark,  non-rational — a  background  of  fate  and 
necessity  and  Nemesis,  over  which  gods  and  men  had  no 
control;  before  it  they  were  powerless,  and  their  only 
right  attitude  was  one  of  submission.  For  the  Persian 
Zoroaster  the  contrast  of  good  and  evil  was  absolute, 
symbolized  by  light  and  darkness,  presided  over  by  Ahura 
Mazda  and  Ahriman.  While  these  co-existed  in  the  same 
world  and  in  the  same  human  breast,  their  mutual  antag- 
onism was  absolute,  reconciliation  was  impossible,  and 
neither  could  triumph  save,  as  the  other  was  destroyed. 
The  book  of  Job  brings  to  the  solution  of  this  problem  all 
the  resources  available  to  the  moral  and  religious  con- 
sciousness of  the  group  in  which  it  originated,  but  the 

165 


166  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

author  of  it  sought  in  vain  for  an  explanation  of  the 
dilemma  in  the  nature  of  the  world  or  in  man's  relation 
to  it,  in  man's  moral  condition  or  in  the  known  principles 
of  the  divine  action.  The  problem  had  therefore  to  be 
given  up  as  insoluble,  or  rather  the  problem  was  merged 
into  the  far  larger  problem  of  the  divine  providence  to 
which  one  resigns  himself  in  uncomplaining  and  confident 
trust.  Augustine  as  a  philosopher,  following  his  great 
Master  Plato,  thought  of  evil  as  defect  of  being,  privation 
of  good,  and  therefore  as  that  in  the  world  from  which 
the  divine  was  more  or  less  absent ;  between  good  and  evil 
there  was,  however,  no  absolute  opposition ;  evil  was  rela- 
tive and  might  gradually  give  place  to  good.  To  Augustine 
as  a  theologian,  concerned  with  the  vindication  of  the 
divine  sovereignty,  evil  found  its  explanation  in  the  divine 
will ;  here  good  and  evil  were  sublimated  to  a  shadowy  dis- 
tinction. Since  Spinoza  identified  reality  and  perfection 
and  held  that  from  the  essential  nature  of  God  everything 
arises  by  an  eternal  necessity,  he  had  no  place  for  evil 
except  in  our  mistaken  notions  of  perfection  and  imper- 
fection: sub  specie  aeternitatis,  everything  is  good;  only 
from  the  finite  point  of  view  may  one  speak  of  evil. 
According  to  Leibnitz,  evil  involves  three  aspects — meta- 
physical, physical,  and  moral.  As  metaphysical,  it  is  to 
be  referred  to  the  imperfection  inherent  and  essential  in 
finiteness.  As  moral,  it  is  inevitable  in  a  finite  moral  order, 
even  in  the  best  of  all  possible  worlds.  As  physical,  it 
is  a  necessary  result  of  the  metaphysical  or  moral  limita- 
tion of  finite  existences.  Accordingly,  the  relation  of 
God  to  it  is  either  causative  as  its  source,  or  at  least 
permissive,  since  he  beholds  it  as  a  means  to  the  greatest 
good.  For  Kant,  evil,  which  is  moral  evil,  has  its  source 
in  a  deed  of  intelligible  freedom,  not  indeed  temporal,  but 


IN  RELATION  TO  EVIL  167 

non-  or  extra-temporal;  this  evil  is  a  "radical  badness" 
whence  all  other  evils  spring;  there  are  no  shadings  by 
which  it  may  approach  and  gradually  melt  into  good.  A 
doctrine  in  some  respects  cognate  with  this  has  been  advo- 
cated by  Mueller  and  others:  moral  evil  is  referred  to  a 
prenatal  free  act,  resulting  in  the  fall  of  all  souls  pre- 
vious to  their  entrance  into  this  world.  In  this  way 
universal  sinfulness  as  selfishness  is  explained. 

Other  theories  having  a  metaphysical  reference  have 
appeared.  No  one  of  them  is,  however,  new.  (1)  In  the 
common  doctrine  of  the  church  it  is  assumed  that  by 
reason  of  the  ignorance  and  frailty  of  men  evil  is  inev- 
itable; it  is  in  a  sense  permitted  and  certainly  overruled  / 
in  the  interest  of  a  higher  good.  When,  therefore,  one 
passes  in  retrospect  the  long  way  over  which  one  has 
come,  recalling  his  sicknesses  and  losses,  his  pains  and 
griefs,  and  even  his  sins,  he  yet  thanks  God  for  it  all. 
(2)  Evil  is  explained  as  an  error  of  mortal  mind,  a  false 
belief,  an  illusion:  it  has  no  reality.  All  that  is  real  is 
"infinite  Mind  and  its  infinite  manifestations."  Since  man 
as  real  is  from  the  essence  of  God  he  is  "incapable  of  ^ 
sin,  sickness,  and  death."  Accordingly,  sin,  suffering, 
sorrow,  disease,  and  all  mortal  woes  are  delusive  phe- 
nomena, to  be  denied  by  a  spiritual  understanding  of 
divine  reality  as  not  only  without  objective  existence,  but 
even  any  right  in  the  human  mind.  (B)  According  to 
Professor  Royce,  evil  in  general  is  constituted  b}^  all 
finite  facts  as  such,  that  is,  regarded  as  individual  and 
separate,  and  therefore  incomplete,  in  relation  to  true 
Being.  Since  we  are  destined  to  find  our  satisfaction  only 
in  the  perfect  Idea  and  the  absolute  Will,  all  that  falls 
short  of  this  is  occasion  of  unrest,  longing,  and  disap- 
pointment.   Yet  sub  specie  aeternitatis,  evil  is  never  total ; 


\ 


168  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

the  fact  in  which  it  appears  is  undefined  save  by  reference 
to  all  other  finite  facts  and  to  the  absolute  Idea  and  Will. 
Moral  evil  is  to  be  traced  to  the  will  of  a  free  agent,  but 
even  so  it  does  not  become  an  isolated,  disconnected  deed ; 
somewhere  and  at  some  time  it  must  be  atoned  for  either 
by  the  evil-doer  or  by  another;  in  some  way  the  evil  will 
must  be  thwarted  and  overruled  and  supplemented  by  his 
own  or  another's  will,  even  the  absolute  Will. 


n 


Leaving  the  a  priori  path  of  metaphysics,  modem  think- 
ers have  sought  in  experience  a  solution  of  the  problem 
of  evil  in  relation  to  God.  Hume,  who  blazed  the  way  for 
so  many  inquiries  in  various  directions,  is  fruitful  in 
suggestions  here.  He  calls  attention  to  four  circum- 
stances in  which  evil  arises.  (1)  The  function  of  pain  as 
incitement  to  the  activity  and  preservation  of  animal  life. 
(2)  Evil  as  incidental  to  a  world  conducted  by  general 
laws.  (3)  The  frugal  conditions  in  which  all  the  powers 
and  faculties  of  living  beings  exist.  (4)  The  imperfect 
workmanship  of  the  great  machine  of  nature.  So  far  as 
these  considerations  find  a  place  for  evil  and  assign  a 
meaning  to  it,  they  relate  it  to  ends  which  are  in  process 
of  realization  in  the  order  of  the  world.  Other  solutions 
have  been  more  recently  proposed.  One,  the  pragmatic, 
holds  that  both  good  and  evil  are  relative  to  each  other 
and  to  the  time ;  there  is  therefore  no  absolute  evil ;  what  V 
is  evil  to-day  may  be  good  to-morrow.  If,  through  better 
adjustment,  that  which  was  evil  ceases  to  be  ineffective 
and  "works,"  to  that  degree  it  ceases  tp  be  evil  and 
becomes  good. 


IN  RELATION  TO  EVIL  169 

The  evolutionary  view  recognizes  two  aspects  of  evil — 
physical,  in  the  animal  world  and  in  relation  to  men,  and 
moral,  as  related  to  man  alone.  In  the  struggle  for  exist- 
ence animals  have  been  confronted  by  conditions  which 
are  from  one  point  of  view  hostile  and  destructive,  but 
from  another  advantageous  and  promotive  of  fuller  life. 
Every  function,  and  indeed  every  organ  of  animal  life, 
has  been  created  by  the  united  action  of  two  forces :  one, 
an  inner  tendency  to  development,  to  which  reference  has 
already  been  made ;  the  other,  reaction  to  an  environment 
which  is  at  the  same  time  both  unfavorable  and  favorable, 
which  calls  out  the  resisting  and  adaptive  capacity  of  the 
organism.  The  structure  and  color  and  quality  of  every 
living  thing  record  the  kind  of  enemies  it  has  been  con- 
fronted with  and  the  degrees  to  which  it  has  met  the 
challenge.  Many  species,  unable  to  turn  their  changed 
environment  to  account,  have  disappeared.  Millions  of 
individuals  have  been  destroyed  by  enemies  always  on  the 
watch  for  prey,  yet  in  the  long  struggle  for  existence  the 
fittest  have  survived.  Swiftness,  strength,  cunning,  alert- 
ness, endurance,  beauty,  witness  to  obstacles  encountered, 
often  fatal,  yet  finally  in  great  part  overcome.  Evil  has 
been  omnipresent — fear,  hunger,  accident,  violent  death, 
and  a  host  of  disturbing  conditions.  Constituted  as  our 
world  is,  these  are  indispensable  to  fullness  of  life.  That 
which  robbed  has  enriched,  and  that  which  killed  has  made 
alive.  By  the  alchemy  of  the  Creative  Good  Will  a  part 
at  least  of  the  evil  has  been  transmuted  into  good.  And 
what  is  true  of  physical  evil  in  relation  to  animals  is 
even  more  true  in  relation  to  man. 

The  same  law  holds  good  in^  the,  moral^eYQlutjon  of 
hurnanity^  Here  evil  has  been  described  as  themisuse 
or  survival  of  tendencies_and_habits  in  a  higher  stage  of 


170  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

development,  where  they  are  no  longer  sanctioned.  It  is 
further  claimed  that  both  individual  and  social  deyelop- 
inent ^  i&  from  innpcence^througli, conflict  to  virtue ;  but 
since  the  path  is  devious  and  unfamiliar,  and  solicitations 
crouch  by  the  way,  inexperience  betrays  the  unwary,  and 
mistake  and  failure  are  inevitable.  The  conflict  of  the 
spiritual  with  the  animal  impulses,  of  the  individual  with 
the  social,  has  issued  in  such  defeat  and  degradation  and 
selfism  that  to  some  it  seems  as  if  the  way  out  of  the 
dilemma  would  be  either  to  suppress  or  else  to  exterminate 
the  animal  for  the  sake  of  the  spiritual  and  the  individual 
in  the  interest  of  the  social;  whereas  the  ideal  is  satisfied 
only  by  the  mutual  and  harmonious  action  and  reaction  of 
the  two  conflicting  yet  complementary  elements  of  experi- 
ence. Good  and  evil  have  a  common  root.  To  the  same 
impulse,  the  same  appetite,  the  same  desire,  the  same 
social  relation  may  be  traced  the  most  splendid  virtue  and 
the  most  hideous  vice. The  natural  impulses  and  appe- 
tites are,  however,  as  such,  neither  good  nor  evil;  they 
are  simply  the  raw  material  out  of  which,  are  fashioned 
the  glory  and  shame  of  personal  life.  In  themselves  they 
are  non-moral;  man's  most  difllcult  and  splendid  task  is 
to  moralize  them.  For  uncounted  ages  before  the  advent 
of  the  human  race  animals__.}ia.d  been  developing  the 
impulses  and  appetites  which  were  the  springs  of  their 
existence.  They  were  not,  however,  without  foreshadow- 
ings  of  the  higher  personal  qualities  of  man  who  was  to 
crown  their  history,  for  they  had  already  developed 
spontaneous  and  unreflecting  love,  sympathy,  tender- 
ness, loyalty,  heroism,  and  sacrifice.  And  to-day,  before 
the  moral  consciousness  awakens  in  the  child,  the  animal 
impulses  and  appetites  have  already  taken  possession  of 
the  infant  self, — they  are  indeed  the  self ;  and  they  behave 


IN  RELATION  TO  EVIL  .     171 

as  if  there  were  never  to  be  anything  else  in  the  unfolding 
human  life.  When  the  higher  self  begins  to  awaken  and 
assert  its  right  of  control,  it  is  met  by  a  lower  nature 
already  vastly  more  powerful,  before  which  it  goes  down 
again  and  again  in  defeat.  One  may  feel  that  if  the  sen- 
suous nature  were  not  there  to  oppose  and  overthrow  the 
higher  self,  the  higher  self  would  develop  in  unhindered, 
ideal  strength,„.  "The  light  dove,  dividing  the  air  in  her 
flight  and  feeling  its  resistance,  might  perhaps  imagine 
that  she  could  succeed  much  better  in  a  vacuum."  With- 
out the  sensuous  nature  and  its  opposition,  however,  the 
higher  self  could  not  develop  at  all.  Thus  the  evil  is  good 
in  disguise. 

"Let  us  not  always  say, 

*Spite  of  the  flesh  to-day 
I  strove,  made  head,  gained  ground  upon  the  whole!' 

As  the  bird  wings  and  sings. 

Let  us  cry,  'AU  good  things 
Are  ours,  nor  soul  helps  flesh  more,  now,  than  flesh  helps 
soul!"'i 

This  becomes  only  another  instance  of  the  universal  law, 
that  "our  antagonist  is  our  helper." 

In  addition  to  the  conflict  set  up  in  the  individual  ex- 
perience between  the  lower  and  the  higher  self,  there  is  a 
not  less  precarious  condition  which  owes  its  existence  to 
two  social  relations.  (1)  No  sooner  does  one  begin  to 
assert  his  simple  individual  impulses  than  he  is  met  by 
checks  which  originate  in  the  customs,  prescriptions,  and 
ideals  of  his  social  environment.    How  momentous,  indeed 


*  Browning,  Rabbi  B$n  Ezra, 


172  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

how  ominous  this  experience  is  for  the  moral  conscious- 
ness is  suggested  by  St.  Paul  in  a  revealing  word:  "When 
the  law  came,  sin  revived,  and  I — died!"  To  him  it 
seemed  as  if  the  fierce  resistance  which  blazed  up  under 
the  touch  of  social  restraint  already  existed  within  him  as 
a  latent  power,  a  spark  of  evil  which  awaited  only  this 
occasion  to  burst  into  flame.  He  interpreted  the  experi- 
ence as  if  the  entire  meaning  was  embraced  in  the  opposi- 
tion and  struggle  of  the  lower  and  the  higher  nature.  He 
had,  however,  only  to  include  in  the  "higher  nature"  the 
social  group  into  which  he  was  born,  with  its  institutions 
and  ideals,  and  hence  its  claim  upon  him,  to  understand 
that  personality  is  undeveloped  save  in  harmonious  and 
happy  adjustment  of  individual  and  social  interests,  and 
that  in  this  adjustment  conflict  is  unavoidable.  Instead 
of  the  consciousness  of  the  initial  antagonism  between 
the  two  being  an  evil,  and  the  conflict  and  even  momen- 
tary defeat  of  the  "mind"  by  the  "flesh,"  of  the  social  by 
the  individual  an  "evil,"  it  is  an  indispensable  condition 
of  self-realization. 

(2)  The  other  condition  referred  to  is  birth  into  a 
social  heredity  by  which  one  is  plunged  into  an  environ- 
ment already  saturated  with  ancient  and  still  powerful 
wrong-doing  of  the  race.  Yet  this  condition  is  not  wholly 
evil ;  that  it  does  not_preclude  virtue  .is  evinced  by  the  fact 
that  in  the  darkest  periods  of  history  and  the  most  cor- 
rupt civic  centers  there  have  appeared  men  and  women 
and  even  children  of  majestic  personal  worth.  And  not 
only  is  this  true,  but  even  knowledge  of  good  is  possible 
only  on  a  background  of  knowledge  of  evil.  A  German 
poet  has  written:  I  learned  truth  from  liars,  hypocrites, 
and  scandal-mongers,  the  nature  of  charitableness  from 
fault-finders  and  scoff^ers,  love  from  haters,  egotists,  and 


IN  RELATION  TO  EVIL  173 

envious  persons,  to  be  silent  from  tattlers,  truth  from  flat- 
terers, loyalty  from  the  fickle,  and  steadfastness  from 
weather-vanes.  Moreover,  goodness  reaches  its  goal  only 
in  conditions  which  subject  it  to  severest  trial  and 
threaten  its  very  existence.  The  more  desperate  the 
straits  into  which  it  is  thrust  the  more  glorious  the  tri- 
umph. "These  which  are  arrayed  in  the  white  robes  .  .  . 
are  they  which  come  out  of  the  great  tribulation,  and  they 
washed  their  robes  and  made  them  white." 

"Then  welcome  each  rebuff 

That  turns  earth's  smoothness  rough, 
Each  sting  that  bids  nor  sit  nor  stand  but  go. 

Be  our  joys  three-parts  pain ! 

Strive  and  hold  cheap  the  strain ; 
Learn  nor  account  the  pang ;  dare,  never  grudge 

the  throe."  ^ 


III 


There  are  to-day  two  aspects  of  the  moral  and  spiritual 
ideal  which  were  subordinate  and  little  thought  of  in  the 
ancient  Greek  and  Hebrew  world,  the  impulse  to  which 
may  be  traced  directly  to  evil.  These  are  in  addition  to 
the  highest  virtues  known  to  them :  for  Plato,  love  of  the 
true,  the  good,  and  the  beautiful;  for  Aristotle,  high- 
mindedness  which  lifted  itself  above  all  common  and  igno- 
ble things  or  found  its  satisfaction  in  divine  contempla- 
tion; for  the  Stoic,  an  undisturbed  self-mastery;  for  the 
Epicurean,  happiness  resulting  from  rationally  moderated 
desires, — all  in  high  degree  individual  and  self-centered. 


*  Browning,  op.  cit. 


174  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

Among  the  Hebrews  the  ideal  was  both  religious  and 
social:  as  religious  it  was  defined  as  a  severe,  uncontami- 
nated  holiness ;  as  social  it  prescribed  justice  between 
those  who  were  of  the  same  family  or  nation.  "What  doth 
Jahweh  require  of  thee,  but  to  do  justly,  to  love  kindness, 
and  to  walk  humbly  with  thy  God?" 

Splendid  and  indispensable  as  all  these  virtues  are,  they 
have  been  crowned  with  two  others  not  less  shining,  both 
of  which  owe  their  rise  and  development  to  evil.  The  first 
has  for  its  aim  the  alleviation  and,  as  far  as  possible,  the 
removal  of  particular,  temporary  privation  and  suffering. 
In  the  ancient  world  few  agencies  existed  for  the  relief  of 
physical  ills  and  fewer  still  were  fostered  by  charity. 
Owing  to  various  theories  as  to  the  cause  and  meaning  of 
suffering  there  was  an  indifference  to  it  which  was  anti- 
podal to  the  mind  of  to-day.  The  modern  attitude  was 
prefigured  by  Jesus  in  a  parable  of  judgment ;  in  the  order 
which  he  came  to  establish  he  introduced  a  new  type  of 
virtue  which  found  its  sole  opportunity  in  various  forms 
of  suffering  and  need.  It  was  to  be  a  prime  excellence  to 
feed  the  hungry,  to  clothe  the  naked,  to  minister  to  the 
sick  and  to  those  who  were  in  prison.  This  spirit  received 
a  powerful  impulse  from  him  in  his  compassionate  healing 
of  the  sick.  Dating  from  that  hour  with  varying  fortunes, 
the  story  of  charities  in  Christendom  is  a  remarkable  wit- 
ness to  the  growing  sensitivity  to  pain  and  want,  to  dis- 
ease and  every  kind  of  physical  defect.  In  the  Great  War 
this  spirit  burst  into  glorious  bloom;  in  our  own  country 
outstanding  instances  were  the  Jewish  Relief  Society,  the 
Knights  of  Columbus,  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.  and  the  Y.  W. 
C.  A.,  Christian  churches,  singly  and  in  combination, 
units  of  physicians  and  nurses,  and  the  Society  with  widest 
appeal  and  most  efficient  service,  the  Red  Cross,  the  most 


IN  RELATION  TO  EVIL  176 

comprehensive  embodiment  and  expression  of  good  will 
wherever  calamity,  famine,  war,  pestilence,  or  any  other 
form  of  physical  evil  has  laid  its  devastating  hand  upon 
the  welfare  of  men.  In  addition  to  these  agencies  are 
innumerable  others,  often  little  known,  for  the  relief  of 
human  suffering,  for  prisoners,  for  the  sick,  the  blind,  the 
insane,  for  the  deformed,  the  unfortunate,  the  dependent, 
and  even  for  the  protection  of  birds  and  kindness  to 
animals. 

The  second  aspect  of  the  Christian  ideal  is  called  into 
play  in  relation  to  conditions  which  either  beget  sin  or 
are  directly  begotten  by  sin,  whether  the  sin  is  from  igno- 
rance or  weakness  or  perversity  of  will,  or  from  unworthy 
and  contaminating  environment.  The  aim  and  motive  thus 
awakened  were  defined  by  Jesus,  both  negatively  and  posi- 
tively, "I  came  to  seek  and  to  save  the  lost."  "I  am 
come  that  they  may  have  life,  and  may  have  it  abun- 
dantly." All  permanent  rescue  from  evil  is  with  a  view 
to  fullness  of  life ;  neither  can  be  realized  apart  from  the 
other;  and  evil  is  not  the  last  word.  The  greater  the  evil 
the  greater  the  energy  of  good  to  bring  it  to  naught. 
"Where  sin  abounded,  grace  abounded  more  exceedingly." 
In  no  way  is  the  excellence  of  the  good  so  truly  revealed 
as  in  its  bearing  toward  evil — patient,  sympathetic,  undis- 
couraged,  resorting,  if  need  be,  to  temporary  expedient, 
but  never  satisfied  with  anything  short  of  its  radical  elim- 
ination or  transmutation.  Here  is  the  sphere  and  func- 
tion of  the  community  founded  by  Jesus  and  of  all  others 
kindred  with  it.  The  vast  missionary  activity  of  our 
time,  whether  home  or  foreign,  and  all  the  agencies  which 
have  sprung  from  the  same  spirit — educational,  medical, 
sanitary,  industrial,  economic,  charitable — find  their 
meaning  in  individual  and  social  regeneration.    Outside  of 


176  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

the  circle  of  the  church  there  are  innumerable  agencies 
which  aim  at  the  eradication  of  evils:  Women's  Clubs, 
Societies  for  Civic  Betterment,  Societies  for  Advancement 
of  Science,  Medical  Societies.  Animated  by  the  same 
spirit  are  peaceful  political  changes  brought  about  by  the 
ballot,  together  with  upheavals  and  overthrow  of  govern- 
ment by  violent  means.  All  of  these  and  many  others  are 
integral  parts  of  a  great  movement,  to  gain  control  of 
nature's  forces  by  discovering  the  secret  of  their  action, 
and  control  of  social  forces  by  discovering  the  laws  of 
their  harmonious  and  beneficent  working,  with  the  single 
aim  of  deliverance  from  evil  into  fullness  of  life. 

If  we  seek  for  the  element  common  to  all  the  individual 
and  social  endeavors  to  relieve  suffering,  to  remove  sin, 
and  eradicate  every  kind  of  evil,  we  shaU  find  its  full 
explanation  neither  in  one  person  nor  in  particular  groups 
of  persons,  but  in  "an  inward  perfecting  principle,"  of 
which  the  activity  of  persons  and  the  persons  themselves 
are  a  product.  A  tacit  acknowledgment  of  this  is  involved 
in  the  terms  with  which  recent  movements,  accelerated  by 
the  World  War,  have  been  characterized:  "A  wave  of 
idealism  has  swept  over  our  world";  "A  new  democracy 
has  been  bom" ;  "A  spirit  of  freedom  has  taken  possession 
of  the  human  consciousness";  "A  new  feeling  of  justice 
has  been  awakened  in  humanity";  "A  new  sense  of  the 
community  of  human  interests  has  drawn  the  nations 
together  and  created  higher  ideals  of  national  and  inter- 
national responsibility."  One  may  allege  that  this  is  just 
a  figurative  way  of  speaking,  and  that  therefore  one  has 
no  need  of  recourse  to  aught  save  human  agency.  Accord- 
ingly, the  explanation  of  this  altruistic  atmosphere  and 
achievement  is  sought  in  the  capacity  of  the  human  spirit 
for  development   and  in   the  psychology    of  the   crowd. 


IN  RELATION  TO  EVIL  177 

These  are  indeed  real  and  have  to  be  reckoned  with;  but 
after  we  have  assessed  their  highest  efficiency  at  its  full 
value,  we  are  aware  of  a  remainder,  a  something  more,  a 
power,  an  activity  which  comprehends  and  gives  fuller 
meaning  both  to  the  developing  human  spirit  and  to  the 
common  social  consciousness.  This  is  no  other  than  the 
purposive  principle  already  so  often  adduced,  which 
impels,  controls,  and  carries  forward  all  human  endeavor. 
The  nature  of  this  principle,  as  it  embodies  itself  in  the 
social  consciousness  in  relation  to  evil,  is  disclosed  in 
sympathy,  justice,  patience,  resourcefulness,  hope,  cour- 
age, wisdom,  scientific  method,  self-sacrifice.  These  are 
particular  aspects,  shmings  through  of  the  Reality  in 
whom  "we  live  and  move  and  have  our  being." 


IV 


It  might  be  supposed  that  in  a  world  pervaded  by  an 
ideal-forming  tendency  of  the  kind  here  suggested,  there 
would  be  no  evil.  This,  however,  loses  sight  of  several 
considerations.  (1)  We  have  to  take  the  world  as  it  is. 
There  is  evil  in  it,  as  there  has  always  been  ever  since  life 
appeared,  and  as  there  will  continue  to  be  while  human 
life  endures.  This  is  conditioned  in  part  on  the  nature  of 
things,  and  in  part  on  the  indeterminate  freedom  which 
emerges  in  the  process  of  life.  (2)  While  by  the  action 
of  this  ideal-creating  principle  form  arises  from  the 
unformed,  beauty  from  what  was  not  beautiful,  virtue 
from  the  non-moral,  and  social  consciousness  and  activity 
are  blended  from  many  individual  wills,  yet  form,  beauty, 
virtue,  and  social  consciousness  are  never  perfect.  If  evil 
is  to  be  identified  with  the  imperfect,  then  evil  must  for- 


178  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

ever  be.  In  any  case,  the  "World-creating  God"  works 
only  with  imperfect  materials  and  produces  and  can  pro- 
duce only  imperfect  results,  whether  these  results  are 
things  or  persons.  At  best  they  are  approximations  ;  there 
is  always  a  "more"  either  of  quantity  or  quality.  The 
ideal  ever  beckons,  yet  is  never  fully  realized. 

(3)  The  common  judgment  of  mankind  is  and  has 
always  been  that  this  is,  on  the  whole,  a  good  world.  If, 
with  the  hedonist,  good  is  defined  in  terms  of  happiness, 
there  is,  whether  among  animals  or  men,  more  good  than 
evil,  more  pleasure  than  pain,  more  joy  than  misery. 
Moreover,  no  one  who  looks  back  on  his  own  past  or  the 
past  of  the  human  race  wishes  that  there  had  been  no 
pain  or  supposes  that  happiness  would  have  been  greater 
without  the  shadow  of  evil.  If  good  and  evil  are  defined 
in  terms  of  ethics,  there  is  and  has  been  from  the  first 
more  truth  than  falsehood  (even  in  the  Garden  of  Eden !), 
more  virtue  than  vice,  more  justice  than  injustice,  more 
sympathy  than  disregard  of  others'  welfare.  In  addition, 
some  forms  of  evil  have  either  disappeared  or  become 
greatly  mitigated;  many  new  forms  of  good  have  arisen, 
the  very  coming  forth  of  which  was  conditioned  by  evil. 
Some  new  evils  have  sprung  up  which  could  have  origi- 
nated only  in  the  historical  conditions  which  gave  them 
birth,  but  even  these  are  met  by  a  corresponding,  mightier 
good.  It  was  no  mere  hallucination  of  an  idle  dreamer  when 
Jesus,  the  very  incarnation  of  Good  Will,  beheld  Satan  as 
lightning  fallen  from  his  seat  of  power.  Moral  evil  in  a 
social  form  exists  only  by  sufferance  of  the  good.  The 
good  will  never  consents  to  moral  evil  or  acquiesces  in 
it  when  it  is  recognized  as  such.  That  evil  will  gradually 
diminish  there  is  every  reason  to  believe;  that  it  will  at 
length  wholly  disappear,  there  is  little  ground  to  expect. 


IN  RELATION  TO  EVIL  179 

(4)  In  the  long  run,  the  nature  of  things  favors 
righteousness  and  is  against  evil.  One  could  not  define 
righteousness  better  than  to  call  it  an  attitude  or  action 
which  is  in  accord  with  the  nature  of  things,  and  evil  as 
an  attitude  or  action  which  ignores  or  opposes  the  nature 
of  things.  To  say  that  the  nature  of  things  is  wholly 
indifferent  to  good  and  evil  would  be  to  deny  the  uniform 
testimony  of  experience.  Individual  evils  survive  from 
generation  to  generation,  but  the  proverbs  of  every  people, 
which  are  the  distillation  of  experience,  bear  witness  to 
their  ineffectiveness  and  impermanence.  Yet  in  spite  of 
the  great  moral  teachers  and  the  total  experience  of  the 
race,  it  is  one  of  the  most  difficult  lessons  that  humanity 
has  to  learn,  that  particular  moral  evils  are  evanescent. 
This  was  the  haunting  problem  which  agitated  the  spirit 
of  the  Psalmist  as  he  contemplated  the  wicked — their 
prosperity,  their  immunity  from  trouble,  their  arrogance, 
their  satiety,  their  unbridled  boasting,  their  covering  the 
righteous  with  confusion.  He  was  stunned  and  dumb 
at  the  contrast  between  them  and  the  quiet,  humane,  and 
devout  servants  of  Jahweh.  His  envy  at  their  lot  and  his 
rebellious,  atheistic  doubt  gave  place  to  peace  only  when 
he  "went  into  the  sanctuary  of  God  and  considered  their 
latter  end."  For  him  the  house  of  God  symbolized  the 
moral  order  of  the  world  which,  notwithstanding  all 
appearance  to  the  contrary,  was  inviolate  and  would  react 
with  infallible  retribution  against  all  who  set  it  at  naught. 
(5)  The  world  is  not  organized  on  the  pacifist  plan. 
The  glacier  plows  its  path  deep  into  the  iron  heart  of 
the  hills,  thunderstorms  plunge  headlong  over  the  moun- 
tains, and  cyclones  spread  havoc  over  cultivated  fields  and 
populous  cities.  The  "Power,  not  ourselves,"  is  no  milk 
and  water  energy,  no  subject  done  up  in  cotton-and-wool, 


180  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

no  gentleman  in  a  dress  suit,  a  drawing-room  dilettante, 
unwilling  to  roughen  his  hands  or  soil  his  garments  in  the 
necessarily  coarse  work  of  the  world;  on  the  contrary, 
this  "Power"  is  mighty,  swift  and  direct-moving,  not 
always  tender,  sometimes  violent,  and  always  resistless. 
Forms  of  this  Energy  are  indeed  the  dove  and  the  lamb, 
but  nature  has  not  in  vain  developed  talons  and  beaks, 
teeth  and  nails,  stings  and  poisons,  strong  paws  and  pow- 
erful tails,  animals  fierce  and  devouring, — all  integral  and 
necessary  in  a  world  which  is  tending  toward  fullness  of 
life.  Men  and  women  are  not  ghosts,  but  flesh  and  blood, 
with  appetites  and  passions  and  prejudices  and  deter- 
mined wills.  Institutions  and  aims  which  have  become 
consolidated  by  generations  of  thought  and  struggle  and 
habit  are  not  suddenly  dissipated  by  the  waving  of  a  magi- 
cian's wand.  In  some  instances  by  a  silent  and  gradual 
evolution  of  the  higher  forces  immanent  in  the  condition 
itself  they  are  transformed;  in  others  they  have  to  be 
overcome  and  reduced  to  naught  by  crushing  power.  To 
find  God  in  one  process  and  refuse  to  find  him  in  the 
other  is  arbitrary  and  unwarranted.  Neither  a  philos- 
ophy of  nature,  nor  a  philosophy  of  history,  nor  a  philos- 
ophy of  redemption  justifies  the  word  of  the  prophet, 
that  the  Lord  was  not  in  the  mighty  wind,  nor  in  the 
earthquake,  nor  the  fire,  but  only  in  "the  sound  of  gentle 
stillness."  One  may  wish  that  it  were  so,  and  that  the 
particular  idyllic  dream  of  other  prophets  was  already 
or  could  ever  be  realized.^  Such  visions  are,  however,  the 
Eldorados  of  our  hope,  the  Utopias  of  our  imagination. 
They  may  haunt  and  console  the  troubled  spirits  of  men, 
but  they  are  not  real,  and  in  the  nature  of  the  case  cannot 
be.     We  live  in  no  such  world  and  God  lives  in  no  such 


*Cf.  Isa.  XXXV ;  Rev.  xxi-xxii,  16. 


IN  RELATION  TO  EVIL  181 

world,  for  no  such  world  either  exists  or  subsists.  In 
the  only  world  of  which  humanity  has  experience,  the 
higher  good  has  been  realized  in  part  by  the  overcoming 
of  one  evil  by  another ;  and  this  is  also  one  of  God's  ways. 


These  considerations  have  a  profound  bearing  on  our 
idea  of  God.  They  show,  among  other  things,  that  the 
most  significant  fact  about  our  human  world  is  not  man 
and  his  deeds — glorious  as  these  are — but  a  "Power,  not 
ourselves,  that  makes  for  righteousness."  The  Cosmic 
Reality  is  all  that  science  affirms  and  more;  but  for  us 
its  supreme  quality  is  ethical.  In  defining  this  Reality  as 
ethical  we  may  use  the  religious  word  "God,"  or,  appeal- 
ing to  experience,  call  it  "Nature,"  or  we  may  employ 
abstract  terms  as  "Justice"  and  "Goodness,"  yet  in  all 
alike  we  mean  the  same  thing.  We  do  not  know,  although 
we  may  believe  that  beyond  the  planet  on  which  we  live 
there  are  moral  values  in  process  of  evolution:  nor  need 
we  inquire  how  far  such  values  exist  in  the  animal  world. 
It  is  enough  for  us  that  these  values  are  real,  and  that 
they  constitute  the  highest  elements  in  our  definition  of 
Nature  or  God.  They  have  not  come  up  in  a  straight 
line  or  without  hindrance.  Their  course  has  been  zigzag, 
interrupted  at  one  point,  resumed  at  another,  on  the 
whole  gaining  in  purposive  content ;  yet  not  without  fight- 
ing against  and  sloughing  off  evil.  Besides  the  ethical 
and  the  spiritual  there  have  been  other  rich  acquisitions, 
scientific  and  esthetic,  but  the  most  precious  gains  are 
here.  They  have  made  themselves  at  home  in  human  life 
and  are  preserved  both  in  the  consciousness  of  man  and 


182  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

in  his  language,  customs,  institutions,  and  ideals.  Never- 
theless, not  to  man  alone  is  to  be  attributed  their  creation 
and  conservation;  a  Power  within  him  and  beyond  him 
has  energized  for  this  result.  There  is  a  conspiracy 
throughout  the  entire  world  with  this  as  the  aim  of  its 
action.  It  was  a  feeling  of  this  sort  which  inspired  the 
prophet  to  write :  "And  it  shall  come  to  pass  in  that  day, 
I  will  answer,  saith  Jahweh,  I  will  answer  the  heavens, 
and  they  shall  answer  the  earth,  and  the  earth  shall  answer 
the  grain  and  the  new  wine  and  the  oil,  and  they  shall 
answer  Jezreel."  -^  But  the  opposite  is  also  true.  Another 
prophet  voiced  the  deep  conviction  that  the  overthrow  of 
moral  evil  is  to  be  referred  not  to  man  alone,  but  to  a 
power  mightier  than  man  which  reinforces  and  crowns  his 
utmost  endeavor.  "From  heaven  fought  the  stars,  from 
their  courses  they  fought  against  Sisera."  ^ 

If  we  inquire  as  to  the  way  in  which  the  "Power,  not 
ourselves,"  is  overcoming  both  physical  and  moral  evil, 
we  shall  discover  that  it  is  not  by  one  but  by  many  ways. 
The  aim  of  this  inquiry  is  to  ascertain  what  light  is  thus 
thrown  upon  the  nature  of  God ;  in  no  way  is  that  nature 
more  clearly  revealed  than  in  the  history  of  evil.  And 
yet  so  many  baffling  mysteries  have  been  associated  with 
the  problem  of  evil  and  God's  relation  to  it,  that  the  pious 
heart  has  ever  been  ready  to  confess  that  "His  ways  are 
not  our  ways,  nor  are  his  thoughts  our  thoughts."  ^  St. 
Paul,  after  an  effort  to  adjust  his  thought  of  God  to  evil, 
exclaims,  "How  unsearchable  are  his  judgments,  and  his 
ways  past  tracing  out."  *    Involved  in  this  attitude  is  a 


*  Hos.  ii,  21. 
2  Judg.  V,  20. 
»Is.  Iv,  8. 
*Rom,  xi,  8. 


IN  RELATION  TO  EVIL  183 

suggestion  that,  since  God  is  so  different  from  man,  he 
may  act  on  other  principles  than  those  by  which  man's 
action  is  determined.  This  has  carried  with  it  two  other 
implications  concerning  these  principles  and  methods. 
First,  that  these  are  hidden  from  man,  and  secondly,  that 
although  man  could  not  discover  them,  they  have  been  in 
part  at  least  supernaturally  revealed  to  the  human  under- 
standing. The  first  attitude  is  that  of  the  agnostic;  the 
second  that  of  the  traditional  theologian.  If,  however, 
the  position  of  the  agnostic  is  valid,  it  would  be  all  the 
same  whether  God  had  any  relation  to  evil  or  not,  or 
indeed  whether  there  is  a  God  at  all.  The  second  attitude 
is  exceedingly  unsatisfactory:  it  involves  many  notions  of 
revelation,  various  and  contradictory  contents  of  the 
alleged  revelation,  and  interpretations  as  different  as  the 
presuppositions  of  the  different  schools  of  theology.  We 
are  therefore  thrown  back  upon  a  study  of  human  experi- 
ence, that  is,  we  are  forced  to  adopt  the  inductive  method 
of  inquiry. 

We  turn  our  attention  first  to  physical  evils.  Outside 
of  earthquakes,  floods,  tornadoes,  and  other  cataclysms, 
no  form  of  evil  is  remediless.  Scientific  men,  working  in 
different  fields  of  research,  are  confident  that  all  accidents 
and  diseases,  and,  by  wiser  economic  and  sanitary  admin- 
istration, all  famines  and  pestilences  will  be  replaced  by 
healthy,  wholesome  human  life.  Whatever  Kant  may  say. 
Nature  is  not  a  niggardly  step-mother.  We  are  her  chil- 
dren and  in  the  wealth  of  her  resources  is  provision  for 
every  physical  good.  She  gives  with  no  grudging  hand; 
yet  she  is  not  inconsiderate  and  prodigal.  Of  him  who 
would  receive  of  her  bounty,  she  requires  only  an  open 
mind,  docility,  patience,  insight,  application  of  means  to 
ends.     Once  the  right  key  of  knowledge  has  been  found, 


184  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

there  is  no  secret  chamber  of  medical,  surgical,  sanitary, 
or  economic  riches  but  is  at  the  disposal  of  him  who 
seeks.  Meanwhile,  for  such  evils  as  we  still  have  to  bear, 
there  are  physical  and  mental  alleviations,  and  there  are 
remedies  which  heal  or  palliate  if  they  do  not  cure — sym- 
pathy, fortitude,  prayer,  and  co-operative  charity.  From 
the  religious  point  of  view,  "To  those  who  love  God,  all 
things  work  together  for  good";  in  the  field  of  science 
and  physical  welfare,  to  those  who  know  Nature — the 
dynamic  form  of  God — all  things  work  together  for  good. 


VI 


With  reference  to  moral  evil  there  are  two  ways,  in 
addition  to  those  already  mentioned,  in  which  the  Cosmic 
Energy  is  active.  According  to  the  first,  evil  is  self- 
destructive  or  is  brought  to  naught  by  means  of  evil.  The 
world  is  so  organized  that  many  evils  as  lying,  avarice, 
theft,  hypocrisy,  and  slander  correct  themselves  or  carry 
about  with  them  the  seeds  of  their  own  dissolution.  More- 
over, there  are  evils  which  appear  to  go  unchecked  until 
they  reach  their  climax  and  their  doom.  Their  natural 
history  has  been  described  by  an  observant  moralist: 
"Lust  when  it  hath  conceived  beareth  sin;  and  sin  when 
it  is  full  grown  bringeth  forth  death."  *  In  like  manner 
cities  and  nations  have  perished  through  their  vices — 
covetousness,  luxury,  licentiousness,  cruelty,  improvidence 
and  economic  waste.  The  nature  of  Reality  is  such  that 
it  will  not  tolerate  attempts  to  set  up  within  its  domain 
kinds  of  life  which  are  radically  hostile  to  its  energetic 

^Jas.  i,  16. 


IN  RELATION  TO  EVIL  185 

and  all-powerful  ends.  Evil  is  also  brought  to  naught  by 
means  of  evil — by  the  same  or  by  a  different  kind  of  evil. 
An  instance  of  this  is  war.  Jesus  said,  "They  that  take 
the  sword  shall  perish  with  the  sword."  We  are  told  that 
war  can  be  vanquished  only  by  the  pacifist  way.  Without 
stopping  to  argue  whether  there  is  only  one  path  by  which 
war  can  be  made  to  cease,  it  is  enough  to  say  that  a  par- 
ticular warlike  attack  may  be  utterly  defeated  by  a 
stronger  opposing  attack.  But  this  way  of  overcoming 
one  evil  by  another  is  condemned  as  unethical.  And  God's 
skirts  are  cleared  of  all  complicity  in  such  conflicts  by 
the  assertion  that  such  conflicts  are  in  direct  contradic- 
tion to  the  principle  of  the  divine  nature.  The  Ancient 
Hebrews,  however,  took  a  very  different  view  of  their 
God.  He  who  had  been  a  storm-  and  later  a  war-God 
entered  the  lists  with  them  to  beat  down  people  and  gods 
hostile  to  them.  A  writer  in  the  Old  Testament  does  not 
hesitate  to  use  the  most  daring  hyperbole:  "Jahweh  is  a 
man  of  war" ;  and  as  if  one  might  shrink  from  identifying 
Jahweh  as  a  man  of  war,  he  quickly  adds :  "  Jahweh  is  his 
name."  ^  Nor  may  we  overlook  the  splendid  passage  in 
Isaiah:  the  single-handed,  vengeful,  victorious  warrior, 
striding  along  on  his  return  from  the  battle-field  and  the 
slaughter  of  his  enemies,  his  bright  red  garments  dyed  in 
blood, — a  pictare  which  kindled  the  imagination  and  in- 
spired the  terrible  vision  of  the  seer  of  Patmos :  the  celes- 
tial warrior,  his  garments  sprinkled  with  blood,  smiting 
the  nations,  ruling  with  a  rod  of  iron,  treading  the  wine- 
press of  the  fierceness  of  the  wrath  of  God.^  This  may 
seem  to  us  harsh,  cruel,  ungodlike,  far  removed  from  the 


*Ex.  XV,  8. 

»Isa.  Ixix,  15-18;  Ixiii,  1-6;  Rev.  xix,  18-15. 


18(J^  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

spirit  of  the  Suffering  Servant  and  of  Jesus.  Yet  in  the 
last  century,  in  a  great  national  crisis,  one  who  was  imbued 
with  the  spirit  of  love  wrote : 

"Mine  eyes  have  seen  the  glory  of  the  coming  of 
the  Lord ; 

He  is  trampling  out  the  vintage  where  the  grapes 
of  wrath  are  stored ; 

He  has  loosed  the  fateful  lightnings  of  his  terri- 
ble, swift  sword; 


Our  God  is  marching  on !"  ^ 

It  seems  but  yesterday  when  a  staggering  blow  was 
aimed  at  the  peace  and  welfare  of  the  world.  A  huge  evil, 
prepared  to  destroy  the  civilization  of  a  thousand  years, 
arming  itself  with  weapons  which  seemed  irresistible,  set 
forth  on  its  arrogant  career  of  conquest,  but  just  as  its 
hand  was  fast  closing  upon  the  prize,  was  paralyzed  by 
a  yet  more  powerful  force.  When  diplomacy  had  failed 
and  the  mighty  struggle  was  precipitated,  only  one  course 
presented  itself — to  bring  to  the  conflict  all  the  resources 
of  govomment,  all  the  engines  of  destruction,  the  inex- 
haustible enthusiasms  of  youth,  all  the  sacrificial  offerings 
of  religion  and  humanity,  in  a  word,  all  the  energies  of 
mighty  nations  for  the  sake  of  ends  dearer  to  men  than 
life  itself.  To  suppose  that  God  was  not  in  the  roar  and 
carnage  of  battle,  in  sinking  ships  and  flying  airplanes 
with  their  heroic  daring  and  sacrifice  of  human  lives,  but 
only  afterward  in  the  conference  of  the  Powers  to  settle 
terms  of  peace  and  discuss  resumption  of  diplomatic, 
territorial,  and  economic  relations,  would  be  tantamount 

*  Julia  Ward  Howe,  The  Battle  Hymn  of  the  Republic, 


IN  RELATION  TO  EVIL  187 

to  excluding  him  altogether  from  any  part  in  the  great 
struggle.  No,  our  God  is  a  "Man  of  war"  as  well  as  of 
peace.  There  is  in  him  a  terrible  as  well  as  a  tender  side. 
It  was  the  same  Jesus  who  drove  the  money-changers  from 
the  temple  court,  who  also  wept  over  the  doomed  city, 
who  shuddered  with  anger  at  men's  unbelief,  who  also 
spoke  the  word  of  forgiveness  to  the  penitent  sinner.  War 
is  not  for  the  sake  of  war,  nor  peace  for  the  sake  of 
peace,  but  both  war  and  peace  are  with  reference  to 
ends  without  which  neither  would  have  meaning  or  jus- 
tification. 

When  we  say  that  particular  moral  evils  are  overcome 
by  other  evils,  as  by  a  superior  force  in  war,  what  we 
mean  is,  that  the  evils  so  overcome  are  for  the  time  being 
depotentiated,  rendered  impotent  to  continue  their  effec- 
tive working.  The  disposition  of  which  the  evil  is  an 
expression  is  not  necessarily  changed,  and  conditions  being 
favorable,  it  may  break  out  again  in  wrong-doing.  Trees 
are  felled,  rocks  blasted,  swamps  drained,  large  tracts 
burned  over — all  so  far  negative — only  that  on  this 
ground  there  may  spring  up  happy  homes,  fruitful  har- 
vests, schools,  churches,  business,  and  a  commonwealth  of 
human  good.  The  old  things  are  passed  away;  whether 
they  will  become  new  depends  on  something  other  than  the 
destructive  process.  The  only  radical  and  permanent 
cure  of  evil  is  replacement  of  it  by  truth,  justice,  loyalty, 
love. 

In  Greek  thought  the  question  of  overcoming  moral  evil 
had  risen  scarcely  above  the  horizon.  Sophocles  conceived 
that  to  one  who  was  threatened  by  unjust  and  fright- 
ful torture  and  even  death,  but  a  single  course  was 
open — obedience  to  a  higher  than  a  human  authority, 
namely, 


188  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

"Unwritten  laws,  eternal  in  the  heavens; 
Not  of  to-day  or  yesterday  are  these, 
But  live  for  everlasting,  and  from  whence 
They  sprang  none  knoweth."  -^ 

Socrates  knew  only  that  it  was  better  to  suffer  evil 
than  to  do  it;  the  suffering  was  borne  with  reference  to 
the  laws  of  the  state  and  in  obedience  to  an  inner  divine 
behest.  Aristotle  would  have  his  magnanimous  man  ignore 
minor  evils,  while  for  such  as  were  of  sufficient  gravity  he 
would  strike  back  with  scornful  and  unsparing  hand.  The 
Stoic  would  receive  with  undisturbed  spirit  such  evils  as 
men  thrust  upon  him,  and  he  would  teach  others  to  bear 
these  with  equanimity.  The  message  of  the  Hebrew 
prophets  was  concentrated  primarily  on  the  national  and 
later  on  the  racial  religious  interests;  the  people  were  to 
cultivate  holiness  in  social  and  personal  life.  Moral  evil 
was  to  be  put  away  by  amendment  of  life  and  by  sacrifice, 
but  the  aim  was  limited  to  the  evil  of  the  community. 
Little  or  no  consideration  was  given  to  the  wiping  out 
of  sin  among  those  who  were  outside  of  the  Jews.  The 
ideal  is  well  symbolized  in  the  New  Jerusalem  of  the  Reve- 
lation. The  walled  city  lay  four  square;  within  it  dwelt 
only  the  redeemed  who  had  been  delivered  from  every 
earthly  ill,  now  crowned  with  unalloyed  and  perpetual  bliss. 
None  from  within  ever  passed  outward  through  the  gates 
to  share  their  blessed  life  with  the  "nations,"  but  from 
without  the  nations  bring  their  glory  and  honor  to  enrich 
the  fullness  of  joy  of  those  within.  With  Jesus,  however, 
a  new  day  dawned.  It  was  not  enough  for  him  to  offer 
blessings  to  the  needy  among  his  immediate  neighbors ;  he 
must  "go  to  the  next  towns"  also.    It  was  not  enough  that 


Antigone,  transl.  by  J.  H.  MahafFy. 


IN  RELATION  TO  EVIL  189 

his  disciples  "be  with  him,"  and  enjoy  his  high  compan- 
ionship ;  he  must  "send  them  forth"  through  Galilee  with 
the  supreme  good;  after  his  death  the  same  impulse  car- 
ried them  into  Judaea  and  into  the  uttermost  parts  of 
the  earth.  No  one  was  to  seek  to  overcome  evil  with  evil 
and  no  one  was  to  be  overcome  by  evil. 

Evil  was  to  be  met  in  two  ways.  One  was  suggested 
by  the  precept,  "Resist  not  him  that  is  evil;  but  whoso- 
ever smiteth  thee  on  thy  right  cheek,  turn  to  him  the  other 
also"  (Matt.  v.  39)  ;  that  is,  retaliation  tends  to  increase 
anger  and  malice  in  the  wrong-doer.  On  the  other  hand, 
suppression  of  revenge,  instead  of  adding  fuel  to  the  flame 
of  the  off^ender's  wrath,  leaves  the  fire  to  bum  itself  out 
for  the  lack  of  further  provocation.  The  other  way  is 
still  more  positive  and  effectual:  "Love  your  enemies;  do 
good  to  those  that  hate  you."  "Be  not  overcome  of  evil, 
but  overcome  evil  with  good."  ^  This  path  had  already 
been  trodden  by  a  Jewish  king  under  a  prophet's  direc- 
tion,^ and  the  principle  of  it  was  found  so  true  that  it 
had  passed  into  a  proverb.^  But  it  had  never  taken  its 
place  as  a  general  law  of  life  in  the  overthrow  of  moral 
evil  until  Jesus  announced  it  his  teaching  and  made  it 
real  in  his  conduct.  Significant  as  have  been  other  dis- 
coveries concerning  an  ideal  order  of  human  life,  none 
surpasses  this  in  the  interpretation  of  moral  experience 
in  relation  to  overcoming  evil,  and  indeed  in  the  light 
which  it  throws  upon  the  meaning  of  God.  In  the  attitude 
of  those  who  love  their  enemies,  pray  for  such  as  treat 
them  with  cruel  scorn,  who  thus  seek  to  overcome  evil  with 
good,  one  beholds  the  children  of  "the  Father  which  is 


*  Luke  vi,  27 ;  Rom.  xii,  21. 
» II  Kings  vi,  21-23. 
« Prov.  XXV,  21-22. 


100  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

in  heaven."  Here  then  is  disclosed  in  the  highest  degree 
the  nature  of  the  "Power,  not  ourselves,  that  makes  for 
righteousness,"  and  the  divine  alchemy  by  which  the  spirit 
of  the  evil-doer  is  transmuted  into  good.  This  is  no  arbi- 
trary requirement.  This  is  no  obUgation  which  an  absentee 
God  has  enjoined  upon  men,  by  which  he  is  himself  not 
bound.  Here  we  penetrate  to  the  very  nature  of  things 
and  the  heart  of  reality.  Only  good  can  call  out  good 
from  the  soul  of  the  evil ;  only  love  can  waken  love.  Where 
love  is  there  is  God,  for  God  is  love.  Where  goodness  is, 
there,  too,  is  God. 


VIII.     MORAL  VALUES  AND  THE 
IDEA  OF  GOD 


A  NEW  approach  to  a  "proof"  of  the  idea  of  God  has 
been  opened  in  a  comparatively  recent  time.     For  several 
centuries  now  the  ontological  argument — from  thought  to 
being,  from  the  idea  to  the  existence  of  God — ^has  been 
regarded  by  many  as  resting  on  an  impregnable  founda- 
tion, and  it  still  wins  recognition  from  serious  and  respon- 
sible thinkers.     On  the  other  hand,  an  even  greater  num- 
ber of  philosophers  and  theologians  deny  validity  to  its 
traditional  form.    Attempts  are,  however,  made  to  rehabil- 
itate it  so  as  to  bring  it  into  accord  with  the  requirements 
of  modem  intelligence  and  world-view.     Two  of  these  are 
here  adduced.     According  to  the  first,  the  argument  is 
based  upon   a   profound   confidence   of  reason   in   itself: 
the  necessary  implications  of  thought  and  of  reality  are 
not  unlike.     Thus  the  conviction  is  irresistible  that  "the 
best  we  think   or  can   think,  must  b^" ;   or,   as   another 
writer    puts    it,    "Existence    must    correspond   with   our 
ideas."    In  the  second  view  the  ontological  argument  rises 
out  of  two  motives:  that  our  highest  ideal,  which  repre- 
sents the  highest  conceivable  being,  shall  not  be  severed 
from  reality;  that  an  intellectual  desire  is  satisfied  only 
with  completeness  in  our  conceptions.^ 


» Cf.  Pringle-Pattison,  The  Idea  of  God,  pp.  240-241,  816. 

191 


192  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

These  are  cited  not  because  one  yields  assent  to  them — 
they  are  indeed  subject  to  serious  criticism — ^but  to  indi- 
cate the  values  which  idealistic  thinkers  still  find  in  the 
a  priori  approach  to  the  existence  and  nature  of  God. 
In  any  case,  the  argument,  in  its  more  common  form,  pre- 
supposes a  gulf  between  thought  and  being ;  if  God  exists 
he  must  be  transcendental. 


The  approach  to  the  idea  of  God  to  which  attention  is 
now  to  be  directed  belongs  in  part  to  the  teleological  and 
in  part  to  the  ontological  argument.  It  concentrates 
interest  upon  the  interpretation  of  values.  So  far  as 
these  are  related  to  ends,  they  may  be  classified  as  teleo- 
logical; so  far  as  they  have  a  bearing  on  reality,  they 
belong  in  the  region  of  ontology.  If  we  would  define  God 
in  terms  of  value — and  no  other  point  of  view  offers  so 
attractive  promise  as  this — ^we  must  first  inquire  what  we 
mean  by  "value."  When  we  speak  of  values  we  think  of 
ends  which  are  desired  and  striven  for,  together  with  the 
means  by  which  the  ends  are  to  be  attained.  They  involve 
ideal  aims  and  corresponding  activities.  Values  are  of 
many  kinds — physical,  esthetic,  moral,  scientific,  philo- 
sophical, economic,  religious.  Aspects  of  these  are  happi- 
ness, welfare,  truth,  beauty,  goodness,  more  particularly 
justice,  art,  friendship,  love,  loyalty,  sacrifice.  There  are 
also  degrees  of  value,  permanent  and  changing,  higher  and 
lower,  ends  and  means. 

Before  we  proceed  further  we  must  dispose  of  one  or 
two  preliminary  questions.  The  first  is  whether  we  are 
to  conceive  of  values  as  existing  "in  a  region  above  the 
heavens,"  irrespective  of  the  human  consciousness.     Some- 


MORAL  VALUES  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD     193 

thing  like  this  appeared  to  be  the  view  of  Plato  ^  in  his 
myth  describing  the  life  of  the  gods ;  they  maintain  their 
existence  in  blissful  contemplation  of  the  divine,  super- 
sensuous,  utterly  transcendent  ideals.  In  "the  heaven 
which  is  above  the  heavens"  is  the  colorless  and  formless 
and  intangible  reality — ^justice,  temperance,  knowledge, 
and  other  realities  in  their  absolute,  eternal  essence.  This 
picture  is  indeed  one  of  surpassing  splendor,  and  in  its 
pure  sublimity  has  never  been  equaled  by  the  human  imag- 
ination: in  moments  of  detached  and  rapt  contemplation 
it  exerts  a  powerful  fascination  over  the  spirit.  Countless 
souls  have  been  inspired  and  strengthened  by  the  assurance 
that  there  is  a  world  in  which  justice,  which  here  below 
is  imperfect,  subsists  in  perfect  degree ;  where  knowledge, 
which  here  is  incomplete,  is  absolute;  where,  undisturbed 
by  human  striving  and  anguish,  is  eternal  and  changeless 
calm.  Not  that  man  may  ever  hope  to  win  such  height. 
It  is  enough  to  be  aware  that  such  a  world  is,  that  beyond 
these  shadows  there  is  Light,  that  Truth,  and  Beauty,  and 
Goodness  are.  Such  is  also  the  doctrine  of  the  New  Real- 
ism. The  ideal  is  the  only  real.  Above  time  and  space, 
in  no  sense  entering  into  or  determined  by  these,  neither 
enduring  in  time  nor  extended  in  space,  subject  neither 
to  development  nor  to  any  kind  of  change,  the  Perfect  sub- 
sists "in  a  heaven  by  itself."  It  is  independent  of  the 
world  as  we  know  it ;  it  is  not  conditioned  by  man's  intelli- 
gence or  ends.  It  subsisted  before  any  finite  creatures 
began  to  be,  and  It  would  be  the  same  if  all  finite  existences 
were  swept  into  nothingness.  This  does  not,  however, 
mean  that  if  space  and  time,  "the  choir  of  heaven  and  fur- 
niture of  earth,"  were  forever  dissolved,  all  values  would 
come  to  an  end. 


» Phaedrus,  247. 


194  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

"Though  earth  and  man  were  gone, 
And  suns  and  systems  cease  to  be, 
And  Thou  wert  left  alone, 

Every  existence  would  exist  in  Thee."  ^ 

When,  however,  we  seek  to  ascertain  the  meaning  of  all 
this  and  relate  it  to  our  actual  life,  we  are  overtaken  by 
a  sense  of  disappointment,  of  longing  destined  to  defeat, 
and  of  baffling  contradiction.  Whatever  may  be  true  of 
these  values  in  themselves,  since  they  neither  rise  out  of 
experience  nor  have  any  bearing  on  experience,  their  mean- 
ing is  remote;  even  the  content  of  them,  since  it  has  no 
intelligible  setting,  could  never  be  known ;  it  would  be  the 
same  to  us  as  if  it  did  not  exist. 

A  second  question  is,  whether  the  values  with  which  we 
are  concerned  are  simply  those  of  human  creation  and  are 
without  meaning  outside  of  the  circle  of  human  experience. 
That  values  have  arisen  in  and  have  been  created  by  the 
consciousness  of  men,  is  a  fact.  The  natural  history  of 
values  offers  an  interesting  subject  of  study — the  hour 
and  circumstances  of  the  genesis  of  particular  values,  their 
progressive  modification,  the  disappearance  of  some,  the 
transmutation  of  others,  the  persistence  of  many  in  prac- 
tically unchanged  form  and  content.  The  law  of  compen- 
sation holds  good  here  as  elsewhere  in  experience;  one 
value  is  substituted  for  another  with  no  loss,  but  instead 
a  gain  in  appreciation  and  worth.  The  facts  here  yield 
themselves  to  historical  inquiry  with  the  same  certainty 
that  is  true  of  other  human  facts.  If,  however,  it  were 
assumed  that  values  have  a  purely  human  origination  and 
exist  nowhere  but  in  the  consciousness  of  man,  it  would 

*  Emily  Bronte,  Last  Lines, 


MORAL  VALUES  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD     195 

follow  that  before  man  appeared  on  the  earth  they  were 
non-existent,  and  that  after  man  has  disappeared  they 
will  also  cease  to  be. 

Even  if  such  a  conclusion  seems   at  first  sight  war- 
ranted, it  may  not  be  left  unchallenged:  it  must  be  set 
in  relation  to  several  other  questions:    (1)  Whether  the 
human  personality  persists  after  death;  (2)  whether  there 
are  finite  consciousnesses  in  other  planets  of  our  solar  sys- 
tem or  in  other  systems  of  worlds  which  may  also  be  fitted 
for  purposeful  activity;   (3)   whether  the  universe  is   a 
congenial  sphere  for  the  creation,  increase,  and  conserva- 
tion of  values.     In  respect  to  survival  after  death,  while 
no  demonstration  is  available  to  establish  the  fact,  and 
arguments  can  only  create  an  expectancy,  yet  if  and  in 
whatever  form  the  consciousness  continues  to  survive,  by 
the  same  token  its  values  will  survive.  As  to  the  existence 
of  conscious  beings  in  other  worlds  than  ours,  when  one 
considers  the  number  of  such  worlds  and  the  high  proba- 
bility that   from  everlasting  to  everlasting  some  worlds 
are  becoming  fit  to  support  life,  that  some  are  inhabited 
with  beings  not  unlike  ourselves,  and  that  others  are  pass- 
ing into  a  condition  unsuited  to  living  beings,  it  is  far 
from  certain  that  the  ultimate  disappearance  of  terres- 
trial values  would  mean  the  total  extinction  of  values  in 
the  universe.     And  this  resolves  itself  into  the  third  ques- 
tion, as  to  the  place  of  values  in  the  structure  and  func- 
tioning of  the  world.     As  we  have  already  seen  that  the 
entire  universe  is  of  a  piece,  that  it  makes  long  prepara- 
tions for  the  creation  of  values,  that  it  lends  itself  to 
the  increase  and  conservation  of  values,  it  should  not  be 
difficult  to  believe  that  values  are  not  alien  magnitudes  in 
an  inhospitable  world,  eking  out  a  precarious  existence. 


196  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

with  annihilation  staring  them  in  the  face  as  their  final 
doom:  they  are  as  much  at  home  as  the  infinite  systems 
of  worlds,  as  light,  as  evolution,  as  consciousness  and  pur- 
poseful will.  If  then,  on  the  one  hand,  we  have  no  place 
in  the  universe  for  absolute  values,  subsisting  out  of  all 
relation  to  finite  experience,  on  the  other  hand,  we  need 
have  no  fear  lest  all  values  will  disappear  if  the  human 
consciousness  ceases  to  exist,  whether  here  or  in  a  future 
world.  In  the  most  pessimistic  outlook  only  those  values 
created  by  man  would  come  to  naught,  and  that,  too,  in  a 
restricted,  infinitesimal  point  of  space  and  time  in  the 
universe.  It  may  be  objected  to  this  that  it  will  matter 
nothing  to  us  whether  values  exist  elsewhere  in  the  event 
that  we  no  longer  sur\dve  to  be  conscious  of  them ;  but  this 
objection  has  no  bearing  on  the  argument  that  values 
are  an  eternal  fact  in  the  universe,  and  that  if  these  are, 
then  God  is. 


Ill 


Intimations  are  not  wanting  that  in  t?ie  earlier  years 
of  our  era  the  idea  of  God  was  couched  in  terms  of  value, 
and  indeed  that  there  has  been  no  moment  since  when  the 
same  fact  was  not  in  evidence.  There  is,  for  example, 
Jesus'  reply  to  the  rich  young  ruler  in  search  of  goodness 
wherein  he  referred  the  eager  inquirer  to  God  as  the  alone 
good.  Near  the  close  of  the  first  century  a  writer  declares, 
"God  is  love;  and  he  that  abideth  in  love  abideth  in  God, 
and  God  abideth  in  him."  He  says  also  that  "God  is 
light."  Augustine,  following  in  the  steps  of  his  master, 
Plato,  speaks  with  passionate  accent  of  God  as  the  Good, 
Truth  eternal,  and  Love  eternal. 


MORAL  VALUES  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD     197 

"Yes,  write  it  in  the  rock,"  Saint  Bernard  said, 
"Grave  it  on  brass  with  adamantine  pen ! 
'Tis  God  himself  becomes  apparent  when 
God's  wisdom  and  God's  goodness  are  displayed. 
For  God  of  these  his  attributes  is  made." 

To  which  Matthew  Arnold,  wholly  agreeing,  adds : 

"God's  wisdom  and  God's  goodness  — Ay,  but  fools 
Misdefine  these  till  God  knows  them  no  more. 
Wisdom  and  goodness,  they  are  God! — What  schools 
Have  yet  so  much  as  heard  this  simpler  lore?"  ^ 

A  position  having  much  in  common  with  this  is  advo- 
cated by  Fichte,  who  identified  God  with  the  Moral  Order 
of  the  World — a  view  which  to  his  contemporaries  seemed 
so  opposed  to  the  common  idea  of  God  that  he  received 
and,  indeed,  gloried  in  the  epithet  "Atheist."  Kant's 
notion  of  God  was  in  large  measure  determined  by  the 
concept  of  value;  having  shown  the  untenability  of  the 
traditional  theistic  arguments,  he  yielded  to  the  demands 
of  faith  by  postulating  God  as  the  guarantor  of  immor- 
tality and  a  moral  order  indispensable  to  the  realization 
of  the  "highest  good."  Schleiermacher  and  Ritschl  are 
much  in  accord  in  the  use  of  values  in  their  conception  of 
God;  one  finds  the  essence  of  God  to  be  love,  while  the 
other  holds  that  we  know  the  essential  nature  of  God  only 
so  far  as  this  has  value  for  our  salvation. 

IV 

The  recent  study  of  religion  from  the  point  of  view  of 
psychology  has   shown  how  the  idea  of  God  has  devel- 

*  The  Divinity. 


198  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

oped  and  is  now  defined  by  the  consciousness  of  values. 
Beginning  with  HoefFding,  the  principal  later  representa- 
tives of  this  position  are  J.  H.  Leuba,  William  James, 
Irving  King,  and  Edward  Scribner  Ames.  Hoeffding 
maintains  that  we  must  seek  the  idea  of  God  not  by  the 
philosophical  path  which  leads  to  an  abstract  goal,  but 
by  the  way  of  experience,  the  distillation  of  which  appears 
in  the  creation  and  conservation  of  values.  God  is  there- 
fore defined  not  by  metaphysics,  but  by  meaning;  not 
by  knowledge,  but  by  value.  Professor  Leuba,  describing 
the  Protestant  Anglo-Saxon  in  his  relation  to  God,  says, 
"Preposterous  as  it  may  seem,  it  is  yet  true  that  he  cares 
very  little  who  God  is,  or  even  whether  he  is  at  all.  But 
he  uses  him,  instinctively  .  .  .  for  the  satisfaction  of 
his  better  desires.  The  truth  of  the  matter  may  be  put 
this  way :  God  is  not  known,  .  .  .  he  is  wsed,  .  .  .  some- 
times as  meat  purveyor,  sometimes  as  moral  support, 
sometimes  as  friend,  sometimes  as  an  object  of  love."  ^ 
Professor  James  ^  defends  a  similar  thesis.  The  God  of 
the  prophets  "was  worth  something  to  them  personally. 
They  could  use  him.  .  .  .  They  chose  him  for  the  sake 
of  the  fruits  he  seemed  to  them  to  yield.  So  soon  as  the 
fruits  began  to  seem  quite  worthless;  so  soon  as  they 
conflicted  with  indispensable  human  ideals,  or  thwarted 
too  extensively  other  values;  .  .  .  the  deity  grew  dis- 
credited and  was  ere  long  discarded  and  forgotten.  When 
we  cease  to  admire  or  approve  what  the  definition  of  a 
deity  implies  we  end  by  deeming  that  deity  incredible." 
Professor  Ames ;.  after  exhibiting  the  dynamic  character 
of  ideas,  says  that  "A  person's  idea  of  God  may  be  taken 
as  comprehending  the  highest  ideal  interests  known  or  felt 


^Monist,  Vol.  XI,  p.  571. 

*  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,  p.  ^9. 


MORAL  VALUES  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD     199 

by  him."  The  genesis  of  this  idea  is  social  and  is  followed 
by  the  tendency  toward  suitable  impulses;  it,  "like  any 
other  general  idea,  signifies  a  system  of  habits,  and  in 
this  case  as  elsewhere,  the  presence  of  the  idea  has  for  its 
normal  effect  the  initiation  of  those  habitual  attitudes  and 
endeavors."  ^ 


If  the  truth  of  this  position  is  allowed,  and  one  does 
not  see  how  it  can  be  gainsaid,  then  we  have  not  to  seek 
outside  of  the  human  consciousness  for  a  self-evidencing 
"proof"  of  the  existence  of  God.  Wherever  one  is  con- 
scious of  values,  there  one  is  conscious  of  God ;  or,  where 
value  is  there  is  God.  If  we  discover  truth,  beauty,  jus-- 
tice,  goodness,  sacrifice,  service,  we  behold  God.  And  the 
evidence  is  cumulative.  In  its  later  stages  it  is  more 
cogent,  but  not  necessarily  more  convincing.  To  an 
Isaiah  or  a  St.  Paul,  God  was  as  real  as  to  any  modern 
theist.  To  the  theist  of  to-day,  however,  while  the  con- 
tent of  his  idea  is  in  part  the  same  as  that  of  the  earlier 
seer,  it  is  in  part  new  and  richer,  as  more  adequate  inter- 
pretations of  reality  are  developed  through  experience. 
This  principle  is  appealed  to  in  the  Fourth  Gospel :  Jesus 
says  that  it  is  expedient  for  him  to  go  away,  so  that  the 
Spirit  given  in  his  stead  may  guide  the  disciples  into 
all  the  truth.  They  were  to  be  handed  over  to  the  tuition 
of  experience  in  order  that  the  values  to  which  they  had 
already  been  awakened  might  unfold  in  higher  degree.  In 
these  expanding  values  they  were  to  be  aware  of  the 
Spirit.     St.  PauP  declares  that  one  is  to  search  for  the 


*  The  Psychology  of  Religious  Experience,  p.  813. 
»Rom.  X,  6-8. 


200  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

supreme  values  neither  in  the  heights  above,  nor  in  the 
depths  below :  "The  word  is  nigh  thee,  in  thy  mouth  and 
in  thy  heart." 

This  way  of  approach  to  the  idea  of  God  clears  up  a 
difficulty  referred  to  on  a  previous  page.  It  was  there 
said  that  men  have  sought  for  proofs  of  the  existence  of 
God  which  they  appeared  to  think  were  valid  for  any 
kind  of  being  to  which  the  name  of  God  might  be  assigned 
— the  God  of  Aristotle  or  Augustine,  of  Plotinus  or 
Bruno,  of  Kant  or  Hegel.  Here,  however,  God  is  primar- 
ily determined  and  defined  only  so  far  as  values  are  actu- 
ally in  process  of  realization  in  human  experience:  as 
these  are,  so  he  is.  No  a  priori  proof  is  offered  and  none 
is  relevant.  As  rapidly  as  old  values  are  enlarged  in  mean- 
ing or  new  values  emerge,  they  incorporate  themselves 
into  the  idea  of  God;  if,  on  the  other  hand,  older  values 
have  imdergone  modification  or  ceased  to  function,  the 
fact  registers  itself  in  a  corresponding  change  in  the  idea. 
This  does  not  imply  that  aU  thinkers  will  agree  as  to 
what  is  "value"  in  human  life,  but  it  does  mean  that  what- 
ever they  recognize  as  value  will,  by  virtue  of  that  recog- 
nition, become  an  integral  part  of  their  idea  of  God.  Con- 
ceptions of  God  will  vary  as  the  consciousness  of  values 
varies ;  and  these  will  grow  according  to  well  known  laws 
of  development.  But  all  "proofs"  of  the  being,  existence, 
or  nature  of  God  are  superfluous,  a  misdirection  of  energy, 
and  futile. 


VI 


A  further  question  arises  concerning  the  relation  of 
these  value-judgments  to  reality:  Do  they  involve  the  ex- 
istence  of   that   which   they   affirm,   or   are   they   purely 


MORAL  VALUES  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD    201 

subjective?  Several  solutions  of  the  problems  have  been 
proposed.  One  with  varying  shades  of  emphasis  was 
offered  by  Ritschl  and  his  followers.  According  to  these 
thinkers,  there  are  in  general  two  kinds  of  judgments, 
€ach  with  a  different  intellectual  function — theoretical 
judgments  and  value- judgments.  Theoretical  judgments 
are  concerned  with  causes  which,  existing  independently 
of  the  individual,  lie  within  the  field  of  scientific  observa- 
tion, experiment,  and  verification;  they  involve  that  view 
of  the  world  with  which  science  and  philosophy  have  to 
do,  and  that  action  of  the  mind  in  which  cognition  is  dis- 
interested, although  not  without  the  feeling  of  worth. 
Value- judgments  are  concerned  with  religious  purposes 
and  ends,  which  awaken  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain 
conditioned  on  their  value  for  the  self.  "Every  cognition 
of  a  religious  sort  is  a  direct  judgment  of  value."  ^  Ac- 
cordingly, value- judgments  are  all  those  propositions 
which  are  held  to  be  valid  concerning  the  soul,  the  world, 
Jesus  Christ,  and  God,  if  salvation  is  to  be  a  realized 
hope.  An  instance  of  this  is  in  Luther's  statement  that 
"Whatever  the  heart  clings  and  trusts  to,  that  is  really 
God."  Another  instance  of  this  is  that  in  our  contempla- 
tion of  the  grace  and  truth  of  Christ,  his  lordship  over 
the  world,  and  his  success  in  founding  his  community,  he 
has  for  us  the  value  of  God,  and  we  therefore  ascribe 
Godhead  to  him. 

Ritschl^  has  been  reproached,  (1)  with  introducing  a 
fatal  dualism  into  knowledge,  and  (2)  with  insincerity  in 
alleging  that  value- judgments  create  but  do  not  guarantee 
the  existence  of  that  which  they  affirm.  Such  a  charge  is 
from  the  Ritschlian  point  of  view,  entirely  groundless; 


*  Ritschl,  Justification  and  Reconciliation^  p.  898. 
'DorS  Wesen  der  Christlichen  ReUgion,  p.  102. 


202  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

nor  was  anything  further  from  Ritschl's  intention.  Kaftan 
says,  "The  truth  of  the  propositions  of  faith  mean  and 
can  mean  nothing  less  than  that  they  are  objectively  true." 
The  upholders  of  this  conception  believe  that  reality  may 
be  more  truly  known  in  its  dynamic  than  in  its  static 
aspect,  that  it  is  more  adequately  revealed  in  its  purposive 
than  in  its  causal  activity.  The  findings  of  science  are 
not  questioned,  indeed  in  their  own  field  they  are  valid  and 
trustworthy,  but  no  scientist  is  capable  of  penetrating 
into  and  pronouncing  judgment  upon  supersensuous  spir- 
itual realities — the  world  of  meaning  and  ends.  Funda- 
mental to  this  attitude  is  Lotze's  discrimination  between 
mechanism  and  teleology.  In  religious  experience  and 
knowledge,  therefore,  one  is  always  in  the  immediate  pres- 
ence of  the  object  of  his  value- judgment.  More  real  is 
the  knowledge  thus  affirmed  than  that  of  the  scientist  by 
as  much  as  knowledge  that  has  reached  the  stage  of  inter- 
pretation is  higher  than  that  which  is  purely  descriptive. 
This  statement  is,  however,  subject  to  a  measured  quali- 
fication, to  the  effect  that  no  description,  however  bare,  is 
wholly  destitute  of  interpretation,  nor  can  interpretation 
be  entirely  severed  from  description.  The  difference  lies 
rather  in  the  degree  to  which  in  the  value- judgment  the 
interpretation  is  carried. 

A  second  way  of  solving  the  problem  whether  in  value- 
judgments  we  are  in  touch  with  reality,  is  by  an 
analysis  of  experience.  This  discloses  the  law  that  objects 
are  real  to  us  in  proportion  as  they  are  active  and  pur- 
poseful. Knowledge  does  not  lend  itself  to  a  sharp  dis- 
crimination between  factual  judgments  and  value- judg- 
ments. Professor  Ames  offers  two  considerations  in  sup- 
port of  this  position.  (1)  All  thinking  is  essentially 
teleological,  that  is,  it  involves  value.     (2)  We  think  of 


MORAL  VALUES  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD    203 

God  in  terms  of  personality,  that  is,  of  purposive  activity. 
Since  we  know  a  person  only  by  what  he  does,  it  would  be 
a  contradiction  in  terms  to  define  God  as  pure  existence  or 
as  a  static  being.  "The  idea  of  God,  when  seriously  em- 
ployed, serves  to  generalize  and  to  idealize  all  the  values 
one  knows.  ...  It  signifies  the  justice  which  govern- 
ment symbolizes,  the  truth  which  science  unfolds,  and  the 
beauty  which  art  strives  to  express."  ^ 

With  reference  to  the  question  under  consideration 
Professor  Hocking  ^  has  made  a  unique  suggestion.  He 
first  prepares  the  way  for  this  by  showing  that  ideas  are 
not  purely  subjective  but  are  themselves  a  disclosure  of 
reality.  There  are  many  ideas  which  appear  to  involve 
objectivity,  as  space,  causality,  beauty,  goodness,  that 
which  is  sublime,  holy,  obligatory.  Since  these  qualities 
are  valid  for  others  who  contemplate  them  no  less  than  for 
ourselves  they  may  be  attributed  to  the  objects  themselves. 
"It  is  not  without  precedent,  then,  that  an  idea  should 
convey  with  itself  some  apparent  title  to  reality ;  it  is  not 
impossible  that  some  idea,  as  perchance  the  idea  of  God, 
should  be  able  to  make  this  title  good."  He  then  reverses 
the  traditional  method  of  the  ontological  argument.  In- 
stead of  arguing  from  the  idea  of  God  to  the  existence  of 
God,  he  declares,  "I  have  an  idea  of  God,  therefore  I  have 
an  experience  of  God." 

If  now  we  cannot  escape  the  conviction  that  reality  itself 
is  present  in  our  experience  we  may  take  the  further  step 
that  it  lies  within  our  power  to  enlarge  and  correct  our 
idea  of  reality,  that  is,  the  idea  of  God,  by  a  more  ade- 
quate experience.  Analogies  of  this  are  found  in  other 
fields  of  interest.    We  may,  for  example,  have  a  mistaken 

*  Op.  cit.,  p.  818. 

*  The  Meaning  of  Ood  in  Human  Experience,  p.  814. 


204  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

or  imperfect  notion  of  an  object;  we  may  regard  a  rock 
or  molecule  as  static.  This  is  because  the  experience 
being  crude  and  incomplete  is  taken  at  its  face  value  and 
regarded  as  final.  On  the  other  hand,  as  experience  be- 
comes refined  and  avails  itself  of  the  tools  which  it  has 
itself  created,  it  beholds  the  static  transmuted  into  the 
dynamic,  rest  giving  place  to  motion,  and  the  immutably 
fixed  to  ceaseless  change;  the  solid  earth  melts,  and  the 
universe  and  every  single  thing  in  it  appears  in  swift  and 
eternal  flux.  Change  alone  is  changeless  and  motion  is 
rest.  The  experience  of  the  idea  of  God  has  undergone  a 
similar  transformation  and  this  reflects  itself  in  the  trans- 
formation of  the  idea  of  God.  The  idea  thus  follows 
and  interprets  experience.  Soon  after  Jesus'  death  the 
apostle  who  had  supposed  that  God  cared  primarily  for 
the  Jews  and  only  in  a  subordinate  way  for  the  non-Jews 
were  surprised  by  a  remarkable  display  of  divine  grace 
and  power  among  the  Gentiles — an  event  which  compelled 
a  revaluation  of  the  purpose  and  character  of  God.^  In 
the  fourth  to  the  sixth  century  A.  D.  the  church's  experi- 
ence of  God  seemed  to  repeat  itself  with  a  monotonous 
finality  and  the  idea  of  God  corresponding  to  that  experi- 
ence was  fixed  in  the  dogmatic  formulas  of  the  Nicene  and 
Athanasian  Creeds.  In  recent  times,  however,  new  experi- 
ences have  overtaken  and  bombarded  the  Christian  con- 
sciousness with  disclosures  from  physical  science,  history, 
social  studies,  political  ideals,  and  changes  in  national 
constitutions.  In  order  to  suffice  for  these  vastly  enlarged 
experiences,  the  idea  of  God  has  had  to  burst  its  fettered 
formulas  and  spread  out  over  all  the  data  which  have 
forced  themselves  upon  the  human  consciousness.  The 
critical  question  for  us  is  not  whether  we  can  argue  from 


Acts  x-xi,  18. 


MORAL  VALUES  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD     205 

the  idea  to  the  existence  of  God,  but  whether  we  have  the 
courage  and  the  wisdom  to  interpret  God  in  terms  which 
shall  be  in  harmony  with  the  intelligence  of  to-day. 

If  we  have  rightly  estimated  the  place  of  values  in  our 
experience  and  their  meaning  for  our  interpretation  of  the 
world,  it  is  evident  that  we  have  no  longer  need  of  the 
ontological  argument  in  its  traditional  form,  and  further- 
more that  we  need  not  be  disturbed  by  Kant's  demolition 
of  it.  Ever  since  it  was  proposed  by  Anselm  a  suspicion 
as  to  its  validity,  at  least  in  the  way  he  presented  it,  has 
assailed  every  thinker  who  advocated  it;  many  tried  their 
hand  at  revamping  it;  and  the  time  had  arrived  when 
some  competent  mind  should  either  establish  it  on  a  secure 
foundation  or  else  reveal  its  inherent  and  fatal  defect.  The 
present  statement  is  in  no  way  subject  to  the  above  criti- 
cism. Here  is  no  inference  from  an  idea  to  reality.  One 
does  not  argue  from  an  idea  away  to  something  which  it  is 
supposed  to  represent.  One  does  not  go  behind  or  beyond 
the  idea  of  God  to  the  existence  of  God.  In  the  very  con- 
sciousness of  value  is  the  consciousness  of  God, 


IX.     THE  FINITE  AND  THE  INFINITE 


Theologians  are  practically  agreed  that  God  is  infin- 
ite. This  has  reference  both  to  his  being  as  self-caused 
and  self-existent  and  as  related  to  the  world  of  which  he 
is  the  Source  and  Ground.  It  is  also  applied  to  his  attri- 
butes, as  knowledge,  power,  presence,  goodness,  and  truth. 
Infinity  is  thus  conceived  of  not  as  an  attribute  in  itself 
but  as  qualifying  all  other  affirmations  concerning  the 
being  and  attributes  of  God.  It  might  even  be  designated 
as  an  attribute  of  all  other  attributes.  This  position  has, 
however,  been  subjected  to  criticism.  One  of  the  most 
serious  efforts  in  this  direction  was  in  Mansel's  famous 
Bampton  Lectures.  In  his  Limits  of  Religious  Thought, 
following  Sir  William  Hamilton's  "Law  of  Relativity," 
he  based  his  argument  on  the  incapacity  of  the  human 
mind  to  make  affirmations  concerning  realities  which  lie 
beyond  the  rational  understanding ;  definitions  of  the  "In- 
finite," the  "Absolute,"  and  the  "First  Cause"  logically 
nullify  one  another.  If,  therefore,  only  the  judgment  of 
reason  were  taken  into  account,  the  proper  attitude  to- 
ward these  alleged  realities  would  be  a  reverent  agnosti- 
cism. That  which  is  denied  to  reason  is,  however,  possible 
to  faith:  God  may  reveal  himself  as  infinite  and  this  may 
become  a  subject  of  dogma.  The  philosophical  part  of 
this    contention   was    threshed    over    again   by    Herbert 

206 


THE  FINITE  AND  THE  INFINITE  207 

Spencer,  who  reached  a  conclusion  concerning  the  Infinite 
similar  to  that  of  Mansel. 


n 


The  conception  of  God  as  infinite  has  encountered  two 
dilemmas.  One  concerns  the  relation  of  the  Infinite  to 
finite  existences.  Various  solutions  of  the  problem  have 
been  offered,  two  of  which  are  here  cited.  (1)  Since  God  is 
the  alone  real  and  all  other  existences  are  unreal,  no 
reconciliation  is  necessary.  Yet  there  is  no  existence 
without  some  measure  of  reality,  and  either  this  reality 
belongs  to  it  or  it  is  a  form  of  the  infinite  Being.  More- 
over, since  God's  being  is  self-existent  and  all  others  are 
dependent  upon  him,  the  two  magnitudes  are  of  a  diifer- 
ent  kind  and  hence  again  no  conflict  arises.  (2)  The 
other  dilemma  emerges  with  reference  to  the  knowledge 
and  power  of  God  as  related  to  the  consciousness  of  Jesus 
and  the  free-will  and  redemption  of  man.  The  relation 
of  the  wisdom  and  power  of  God  to  the  consciousness  of 
Jesus  has  been  presented  in  such  a  variety  of  forms  that 
it  would  not  be  feasible  to  enter  into  the  refinements  of 
theological  speculation  on  this  subject.  The  general 
theory,  that  while  in  the  incarnation  the  eternal  Son  of 
God,  as  the  Second  Person  of  the  Trinity,  retained  in  full 
the  content  and  activity  of  his  divine  consciousness,  yet 
at  the  same  time,  in  greater  or  less  degree,  he  limited  the 
exercise  of  his  divine  in  relation  to  his  human  nature. 
This  doctrine  maintains  that  not  only  does  God  manifest 
himself  in  three  modes — ^Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit — 
but  as  Triunity  he  eternally  subsists  in  three  essential 
modes.     "Thus  if  the  Son  was  'upholding  all  things  by 


208  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

the  word  of  his  power'  before  the  incarnation,  he  was  no 
less  doing  the  same  while  he  was  making  'purification  of 
sins.'  From  any  one  of  the  three  centers  of  life  the  whole 
God  is  acting,  .  .  .  and  from  all  at  once,  and  from 
each  in  many  ways  at  once.  All  actions  of  each  and  all 
move  in  the  one  sphere  of  the  infinity  of  God."  ^  This 
presentation,  which  involves  an  intermittent  and  variable 
irruption  of  the  infinite  divine  consciousness  into  the  finite 
consciousness  of  Jesus,  now  in  the  way  of  knowledge,  now 
in  the  way  of  power,  has,  from  the  point  of  view  either  of 
metaphysics  or  of  psychology,  never  been  able  to  effect 
a  satisfactory  solution  of  the  problem  which  it  raises. 
Either  the  divine  is  denied  in  the  self-same  terms  in  which 
it  is  affirmed,  or  the  human  vanishes  before  the  very  defini- 
tions which  would  fix  and  preserve  its  meaning. 

A  theory  proposed  by  D.  W.  Simon  ^  deserves  consid- 
eration by  reason  of  its  ingenious  hypothesis.  It  is  to  the 
effect  that  the  incarnation  is  the  last  stage  in  the  volun- 
tary self-limitation  of  God.  The  first  stage  appears  in 
the  creation  of  the  world,  by  which  event  God  limited  the 
infinitude  of  his  being  and  attributes  in  order  to  produce 
an  "other"  in  which  he  could  realize  a  purpose  of  grace. 
In  the  creation  of  man  with  free-will  he  still  further  lim- 
ited himself  by  voluntarily  renouncing  omnipotence  and 
foreknowledge,  so  that  the  future  choices  and  action  of 
the  human  will  might  be  free  and  to  a  degree  opaque  to 
the  divine  intelligence.  The  two  stages  of  God's  self-limi- 
tation thus  referred  to  are  preliminary  to  a  final  stage — 
the  union  of  the  divine  with  the  human  nature  of  Jesus 
Christ  in  which  the  divine,  as  limited,  gradually  communi- 
cates itself  to  the  human  in  the  consciousness  of  Jesus. 


1 W.  N.  Clarke,  An  Outline  of  Christian  Theology,  p.  178. 
^Reconciliation  by  Incarnation. 


THE  FINITE  AND  THE  INFINITE  209 

This  conception,  however,  involves  so  many  untenable  pre- 
suppositions that  it  has  to  take  its  place  with  other  inade- 
quate solutions  of  the  relation  of  the  infinitude  of  God  to 
the  world.  It  assumes  that  God  is  at  the  same  time  both 
infinite  and  finite,  that  God  is  complete  apart  from  the 
world,  that  at  a  definite  instant  God  changed  from  an  un- 
creating  to  a  creating  activity,  that  by  a  volition  God  has 
renounced  omnipotence  and  omniscience  in  order  that  a 
world  and  man  may  come  into  existence  and  be  redeemed, 
and  that  the  "incarnation"  involves  the  presence  of  two 
natures  in  the  person  of  Jesus  Christ.  If  in  order  to 
defend  the  thesis  that  God  is  infinite  the  only  recourse  is 
to  such  arguments  it  is  not  strange  that  relief  has  been 
sought  in  the  conception  of  a  finite  God. 


Ill 


The  theory  that  God  is  finite  is  by  no  means  a  purely 
modem  view,  that  is,  if  "infinite"  signifies  that  God  is  all- 
inclusive.  Neither  in  the  Old  and  New  Testaments  nor  in 
Greek  philosophy  was  God  other  than  finite.  When  under 
Aryan  influence  in  one  circle  of  Hebrew  thought  God  was 
exalted  to  an  unapproachable  transcendence,  requiring 
mediatorial  agencies  between  him  and  men,  and  evil  spirits 
were  assigned  a  permanent  place  in  human  affairs,  it  is 
evident  that  God  was  one,  even  if  the  Supreme  One,  among 
many  beings  both  good  and  evil.  In  the  other  circle  of 
Hebrew  thought  which  was  far  less  affected  by  speculative 
interests,  the  God  of  the  prophets  still  spoke  to  men 
both  afar  off  and  also  near.  To  Plato  God  was  the 
supreme  Idea  or  the  Good,  but  there  were  other  ideas 
equally  self -existent,  like  the  heavenly  bodies  in  relation  to 


210  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

the  sun ;  and,  besides,  he  is  not  the  author  of  all  things : 
"God  is  not  the  author  of  evil  but  of  good  only."  ^  Aris- 
totle conceived  of  God  as  a  perfect  self-consciousness, 
whose  being  was  absolutely  independent  of  the  world  which 
was  equally  with  God  self-existent  and  eternal.  For  the 
Stoics,  God  was  a  pervasive  dynamic  force,  a  rational, 
purposive  energy,  immanent  in  all  material  things.  The 
gods  of  the  Epicureans  were  utterly  withdrawn  from  the 
world  in  a  heaven  by  themselves.  Yet  in  spite  of  limita- 
tions which  beset  the  highest  object  of  thought,  the  term 
"infinite"  in  both  Christian  and  Greek  theology  came  into 
general  use  as  "the  constituent  mark  of  the  highest  meta- 
physical reality;  it  belongs  not  only  to  the  universe  as 
extended  in  space  but  also  to  the  inmost  essence  of  things, 
and,  above  all,  to  the  deity."  ^  It  is  unquestionably  true 
also  that  it  has  become  a  matter  of  course  "to  conceive 
of  the  Supreme  Being  as  the  Infinite,  in  contrast  with  all 
finite  things  and  relations." 

A  counter  suggestion  has  in  our  time  won  for  itself  a 
hearing  among  serious  religious  thinkers.  The  main  inter- 
est here  is  that  of  religion :  religion  suffers,  if  indeed  it  is 
not  impossible,  on  the  background  of  God  as  infinite. 
Religious  experience  and  divine  personality  are  two  neces- 
sary poles  of  thought ;  if  personality  should  cease,  religion 
would  also  cease.  But  personality  and  the  Infinite  appear 
to  be  irreconcilable.  A  way  has  therefore  been  sought 
for  conserving  the  interests  of  religion :  many  believe  that 
this  is  found  in  the  conception  of  the  personal  God  as 
finite.  Accordingly  if  either  is  to  be  sacrificed  and  the 
Infinite  is  incompatible  with  religion,  then  the  Infinite 
must  be  surrendered. 


^Republic,  Bk.  II,  p.  880. 

'  Windelband,  History  of  Philoscphy,  p.  689. 


THE  FINITE  AND  THE  INFINITE  211 

IV 

The  modem  inquiry  concerning  God  as  finite  received  a 
powerful  impulse  from  David  Hume  in  his  Dialogues  Corir 
cerning  Natural  Religion.  This  was  continued  and 
brought  to  a  definite  issue  in  John  Stuart  Mill's  Three 
Essays  on  Religion.  The  motive  of  the  inquiry  was  the 
existence  of  imperfection  and  moral  evil.  Hume  intimated 
that  it  might  exceed  human  capacity  to  form  a  judgment 
on  these  subjects  and  that  our  standards  of  truth  and 
falsehood  might  not  be  applicable.  However,  he  does  not 
let  the  matter  rest  there.  He  first  raises  the  question 
whether  the  word  "infinite"  might  not,  by  reason  of  a 
certain  unreality  suggested  by  it,  be  replaced  by  a  more 
exact  and  moderate  term.  On  the  ground  of  analogy  "we 
must  forever  find  it  impossible  to  reconcile  any  mixture  of 
evil  in  the  universe  with  infinite  attributes."  On  the  other 
hand,  the  supposition  that  the  Author  of  Nature  is  finitely 
perfect  relieves  every  difficulty  which  springs  from  nat- 
ural and  moral  evil.  "A  less  evil  may  be  chosen,  in  order 
to  avoid  a  greater;  .  .  .  in  a  word,  benevolence,  regu- 
lated by  wisdom,  and  limited  by  necessity,  may  produce 
just  such  a  world  as  the  present."  Mill  is  still  more  speci- 
fic in  the  way  he  meets  the  problem.  He  abandons  the  pos- 
sibility of  "reconciling  infinite  benevolence  and  justice  with 
infinite  power  in  the  Creator  of  such  a  world  as  this."  God 
is  the  Creator,  not  as  originating  matter  and  force  and 
their  properties  which  he  has  no  power  to  alter,  but  only 
as  author  of  their  collocations  by  which  purposes  are  real- 
ized. Assuming  limitation  of  divine  power,  there  is 
nothing  to  preclude  the  supposition  of  perfect  knowledge, 
although  the  knowledge  need  not  be  infinite.  In  the  sphere 
of  moral  evil  the  divine  limitations  are  still  more  serious. 


212  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

While  the  perfect  justice  and  goodness  of  God  are  left 
unimpaired,  there  is  proof  of  insuperable  obstacles  which 
baffle  divine  power  in  working  out  benevolent  purpose. 

These  positions  have  been  impugned  by  recent  writers 
on  Theism,  as  A.  S.  Pringle-Pattison  ^  and  W.  R.  Sorley  ^ 
on  the  ground  that  both  Hume  and  Mill  judge  the  success 
or  failure  of  a  divine  action  wholly  with  reference  to  hap- 
piness ;  whereas  a  survey  of  the  world  makes  several  things 
clear:  (1)  that  the  world  does  not  exist  solely  for  the 
production  of  happiness;  (2)  that  happiness  and  misery 
are  not  distributed  according  to  individual  desert;  (3) 
that  the  world  is  to  be  conceived  of  as  a  sphere  for  the 
realization  of  ethical  ends,  as  goodness  through  sacrifice 
and  the  triumph  of  the  moral  ideal.  It  is  very  question- 
able, however,  whether  the  entire  contention  of  these 
writers  is  valid,  at  least  whether  their  emphasis  does  not 
require  a  revision.  The  world  does  indeed  afford  a  theatre 
for  the  cultivation  of  virtue ;  there  is  a  place  in  it  for  sac- 
rifice in  behalf  of  individual  and  social  well-being.  More- 
over, in  an  estimate  of  the  meaning  of  life  we  know  of 
nothing  higher  or  more  desirable  than  moral  goodness. 

Yet  ( 1 )  it  is  not  clear  that  the  argument  which  seeks  to 
prove  the  infinite  nature  of  God  from  a  consideration  of 
virtue  or  a  moral  order  is  any  more  successful  than  the 
argument  of  Mill  and  Hume  with  reference  to  happiness. 
If  God  is  conceived  of  as  solely  interested  in  virtue  as 
compared  with  happiness,  it  is  a  guestion  whether  he  has 
been  more  successful  in  providing  a  sphere  for  it  than  for 
happiness.  No  one  can  ever  prove  that  there  is  more 
virtue  than  happiness  in  the  world.  And  we  would  have 
to  make  the  same  assertion  even  if  the  qualitative  test  were 


^  The  Idea  of  Ood,  pp.  831  ff. 

^  Moral  Values  and  the  Idea  of  God,  pp.  331  ff. 


THE  FINITE  AND  THE  INFINITE  213 

applied.  (2)  Ever  since  Kant  restored  the  Stoic  em- 
phasis on  virtue  as  against  happiness,  the  current  has  set 
strongly  in  that  direction.  The  tradition  has  been  con- 
tinued even  with  those  who  acknowledge  another  master 
than  Kant.  They  hold  that  if  God  is  not  perfectly  suc- 
cessful in  the  production  of  happiness,  this  is  because  he 
cares  not  for  it  or  at  most  cares  for  it  in  a  subordinate 
degree.  This,  however,  overlooks  the  incontestable  fact 
of  experience,  that  in  the  long  run  life  presents  a  balance 
of  virtue  and  happiness.  On  the  broad  scale,  in  the  degree 
to  which  the  divine  order  succeeds  in  creating  virtue,  it 
succeeds  also  in  the  creation  of  happiness.  Virtue  becomes 
unattractive,  if  not  ugly  and  odious  by  setting  it  up  as  a 
thing  apart,  as  the  only  aim  dear  to  the  divine  will.  Yet 
our  hearts  should  teach  us  better.  And  the  Master  who 
trod  the  way  of  pain  and  renunciation  which  led  straight 
to  the  cross,  when  its  shadow  was  already  darkening  his 
steps,  turned  to  his  disciples  with  the  wish  that  his  joy 
might  be  shared  by  them  and  that  their  joy  might  be  com- 
plete. Duty,  the  rigid  and  austere  "daughter  of  the  voice 
of  God,"  not  divorced  from  joy,  is  thus  greeted  by  a  great 
spirit : 

"Stern  lawgiver!  yet  thou  dost  wear 

The  Godhead's  most  benignant  grace; 

Nor  know  we  anything  so  fair 
As  is  the  smile  upon  thy  face ; 

Flowers  laugh  before  thee  on  their  beds ; 

And  fragrance  in  thy  footing  treads."  ^ 

(3)  If,  therefore,  any  qualification  of  God  as  infinite 
is  required  on  account  of  the  limitation  of  happiness  in 

*  W.  Wordsworth,  Ode  to  Duty. 


214  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

the  world,  a  like  qualification  is  necessary  by  reason  of  the 
imperfection  of  virtue.  Happiness  has  been  treated  as  if 
it  were  a  matter  wholly  within  divine  power,  whereas 
virtue  has  been  regarded  as  within  man's  power  aided  by 
divine  grace.  But  happiness  is  no  more  determined  or 
conditioned  by  the  power  of  God  than  is  virtue.  More- 
over, we  have  seen  no  reason  for  supposing  that  the  Pur- 
posive Good  Will  has  ever  had  a  choice  between  the  pres- 
ent world  and  any  other,  conceivably  better  or  worse. 
There  is  no  evidence  that  any  degree  of  intelligence,  how- 
ever great,  could  more  wisely  control  a  universe  than  is 
the  case  in  the  one  now  existing.  Virtue  and  happiness 
are  only  two,  even  if  to  us  they  are  the  highest,  of  the 
ends  realized  by  the  Purposive  Will ;  including  these  there 
is  an  indefinite,  perhaps  infinite,  number  of  ends  forever  in 
process  of  becoming.  On  the  ground  of  the  incomplete- 
ness or  imperfection  of  happiness  or  virtue  or  both,  we 
could  not  infer  that  the  Creative  Energy  was  finite. 


One  of  the  earliest  attempts  in  America  to  show  that 
God  was  finite  was  made  by  H'prace  Bushnell  in  his  God  m 
Christ,  He  conceived  of  God  from  two  utterly  disparate 
points  of  view:  (1)  as  the  Absolute,  the  Inconceivable,  the 
Unrevealed,  with  respect  to  which  no  predicates  could  be 
affirmed;  (2)  as  a  dramatic  impersonation,  to  be  referred 
to  a  divine  generative  power  to  represent  himself  in  the 
finite,  coming  forth  in  the  interest  of  creation  and  redemp- 
tion, presenting  himself  in  three  phases  of  activity,  each 
of  which  is  finite — Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit.  It  is 
for  him  not  so  much  a  reasoned  conclusion  as  the  inter- 


THE  FINITE  AND  THE  INFINITE  215 

pretation  of  an  inner  need:  "my  heart  wants  the  Father, 
my  heart  wants  the  Son,  my  heart  wants  the  Holy 
Ghost  I"  When  this  position  is  analyzed,  it  discloses  affin- 
ities with  second  and  third  century  gnosticism,  with  Neo- 
Platonism,  and  with  certain  speculations  of  the  great 
mystics.  Its  genesis  in  Bushnell's  mind  is  not,  however,  to 
be  traced  to  these  sources;  instead  it  arose  in  response 
to  needs  similar  to  those  which  gave  birth  to  the  types  of 
thought  just  referred  to.  Yet  even  if  it  appeared  momen- 
tarily to  answer  to  a  deep  craving  of  the  religious  spirit 
in  relation  to  God,  the  price  paid  was  too  high;  it  was  a 
device  of  the  reason,  but  the  reason  will  not  be  ultimately 
satisfied  with  this  kind  of  pluralism  of  the  divine.  The 
reason  wiU  never  be  content  with  a  permanent  division  in 
the  nature  of  God,  as  if — a  contradiction  in  terms — one 
part  were  infinite,  another  finite.  Nor  is  the  way  paved 
for  such  a  conclusion  by  designating  one  aspect  of  God 
as  Absolute,  the  other  as  personal,  one  as  unrevealed,  the 
other  as  revealed.  Either  God  is  all  infinite  or  all  finite. 
The  Infinite  or  Absolute  so  far  as  unrevealed  is  wholly 
negligible ;  it  has  simply  the  value  of  zero.  According  to 
Dr.  Bushnell,  therefore,  the  finite  is  the  alone  real;  God 
is  finite  or  he  means  nothing  to  us. 

A  conception  having  certain  points  of  resemblance  to 
the  one  just  described  but  with  a  very  different  meta- 
physical background  is  advocated  by  Professor  Bradley.^ 
He  distinguishes  between  the  Absolute  and  God.  The 
Absolute  is  the  ultimate  Reality  in  its  undivided  unity; 
God  is  the  appearance  of  that  Reality,  to  which  we  are 
related  in  our  religious  experience. 

The  view  of  Dr.  Rashdall  that  God  is  finite  does  not 
differ  in  any  essential  point  from  the  customary  concep- 

^  Appearance  and  Reality, 


216  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

tion  of  God.  God's  action  is  limited ;  he  has,  for  example, 
no  arbitrary  power  in  respect  to  evil  and  pain,  to  change 
the  past,  or  to  be  unjust.  "There  are  necessities  to  which 
even  God  must  submit."  ^  These  are  not  imposed  upon 
him  from  without;  they  are  parts  of  his  essential  nature. 
In  addition  to  these  necessary  internal  limitations  are 
those  which  arise  in  the  relation  between  God  and  human, 
and  perhaps  other,  souls.  Finite  consciousness,  if  it  is  to 
have  meaning,  must  be  for  itself ;  it  may  not  therefore  be 
invaded  by  another  consciousness,  even  although  that 
other  consciousness  is  God.  This  does  not  mean  that  the 
soul  is  self-existent  or  is  opaque  to  the  divine  intelligence. 
It  is  produced  by  God,  is  wholly  dependent  upon  his  sus- 
taining will,  capable  of  knowing  God  in  part  and  of  being 
wholly  known  by  him.  Besides  these  limitations  which 
beset  the  life  of  God  there  are  others  which  have  their 
source  in  the  world,  whose  peculiar  constitution  is  to  be 
referred  to  the  divine  will.  God  will  not  violate  the  nature 
of  things  which  he  has  himself  called  into  existence.  Dr. 
Rashdall  concludes  his  argument  by  remarking:  "We 
may  still  say,  if  we  please,  that  God  is  infinite  because  he 
is  limited  by  nothing  outside  his  own  nature,  except  what 
he  has  himself  caused.  We  can  still  call  him  Omnipotent 
in  the  sense  that  he  possesses  all  the  power  there  is."  ^ 
A  theory  presented  by  the  late  Professor  G.  H.  Howi- 
son  (The  Limits  of  Evolution  and  Other  Essays,  2d  ed.) 
offers  a  unique  setting  for  God  as  finite.  He  conceives  of 
a  harmonious  society  of  minds  united  by  a  common 
rational  intelligence,  consisting  of  God  and  non-divine 
consciousnesses,  who  differ  from  him  in  the  possession  of  a 
sensuous  aspect  of  experience.     God  is  the  perfect  person 


^Philosophy  and  Religion. 
'  Op.  cit.,  p.  85. 


THE  FINITE  AND  THE  INFINITE  217 

eternally  fulfilled ;  all  the  other  selves  are  in  a  time-world, 
where  they  must  forever  strive  toward  a  goal  of  fulfill- 
ment, yet  they  are  also  perfect  in  the  sense  of  having 
power  of  self-recovery  to  wholeness  after  defect  and  even 
sin.  Accordingly,  God  is  the  central  member  of  the  divine 
society,  primus  inter  pares.  He  is  not  the  Creator  of 
other  spirits,  although  if  he  did  not  exist  they  would  not 
have  come  into  existence;  in  their  individual  being  they 
are  self-active,  with  independent  initiative.  God  is  not  the 
ruler  of  other  spirits,  since  in  this  City  of  God  both  he 
and  they  have  meaning  only  in  relation  to  the  same  ideal, 
he  perfectly,  they  in  varying  degree.  Here  are  clear 
reminiscences  of  the  Prime  Mover  and  the  self-moving 
souls  of  Aristotle  and  the  independent  yet  harmonious 
monads  of  Leibnitz.  The  central  spirit  or  God  is  perfect 
in  love;  finite  spirits,  as  in  Dante's  Beatific  Vision,^  are 
forever  drawn  forward  into  higher  reaches  of  experience, 
"By  the  Love  that  moves  the  sun  and  the  other  stars." 
If  in  spite  of  what  has  been  said  above  God  is  called  not 
finite  but  infinite,  this  is  due  to  a  peculiar  use  of  the 
term  "infinite."  Professor  Howison  holds  that  both  God 
and  all  minds  are  in  a  qualitative  sense  infinite,  only  God 
is  pre-eminently  so.  For  him  infinity  is  interchangeable 
with  eternity,  self-existence,  self-activity,  freedom.  He 
must,  however,  be  classed  with  those  who  conceive  of  God 
as  finite. 

According  to  another  presentation  already  described, 
God  is  working  out  his  purpose  not  without  hindrance 
from  real  obstacles  to  his  will,  as  space  and  time,  the 
inertia  and  intractableness  of  matter,  the  frailty  and 
resistance  of  human  and  perhaps  of  infra-human  wills. 
Thus  God  strives  and  suffers ;  it  may  be  that  even  if  he  is 

*  Paradiso,  Canto  xxxiii. 


218  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

ultimately  successful  he  is  for  the  time  being  and  in  part 
defeated,  sharing  with  us  in  our  sorrow  and  struggle,  our 
repentance  and  victory.  Thus  in  the  alternative,  "an 
Immutable  Absolute  or  a  God  who  strives,"  we  decide  for 
the  latter.  He  is  "progressive  Purpose."  Even  if  an 
unfinished  universe  involved  an  unfinished  God,  this  con- 
ception would  be  far  preferable  to  a  petrified  and  there- 
fore changeless  Absolute.  The  idea  of  God  appears  to 
imply  that  he  is  to  be  regarded  as  in  some  sense  capable 
of  existing  apart  from  the  world.  The  possibility  is  also 
suggested  that  an  unfinished  world  may  not  point  to  an 
unfinished  God :  the  perfect  God  may  be  hindered  in  work- 
ing out  his  plan.  On  the  supposition,  however,  that  this 
God  is  the  Creator  of  the  world,  he  must  be  accountable 
for  the  intractability  of  the  materials  which  he  has  brought 
into  existence  and  which  prevents  the  realization  of  his 
purpose  except  in  the  face  of  a  more  or  less  effective 
resistance. 

Two  conceptions  of  God  as  finite  which  have  so  much 
in  common  that  it  is  difficult  not  to  believe  that  one  is 
dependent  on  the  other  are  those  of  Samuel  Butler  and 
H.  G.  Wells.  Both  suppose  an  unrevealed  Reality  back 
of  the  God  whom  we  have  experienced, — a  veiled  Being  or 
a  God  who  called  our  God  into  existence.  As  to  the  Ulti- 
mate Reality,  somewhat  after  the  manner  of  Herbert 
Spencer,  we  know  only  that  it  is,  but  not  what  it  is.  Each 
describes  with  different  and  varying  features  the  God  with 
whom  we  are  concerned,  but  both  alike  subject  him  to 
definite  limitations  in  knowledge  and  power  and  perhaps 
in  goodness.  In  an  earlier  work,-^  Mr.  Wells  was  much 
more  in  accord  with  Butler  than  in  his  God,  the  Invisible 
King;  in  this  later  book  he  detaches  the  finite  God  from 

*  First  and  Last  Things. 


THE  FINITE  AND  THE  INFINITE  219 

all  control  of  nature  and  restricts  him  wholly  to  human 
life  with  its  aims  and  struggles;  herein  lies  perhaps  his 
chief  distinction  from  Butler.  The  ultimate  reference  in 
both  of  these  conceptions  to  an  unknown  Reality  behind 
and  separate  from  all  appearance  and  activity  has  a  long 
history.  Neo-Platonism  and  Gnosticism  are  two  earlier 
forms  of  this  presentation :  later,  medieval  mysticism  fur- 
nishes many  instances  of  the  same  way  of  thinking;  to 
Kant,  however,  and  those  who  were  most  immediately 
influenced  by  his  theory  of  knowledge,  we  owe  the  more 
recent  setting  of  this  conception.  Vivid  and  appealing 
as  may  be  the  picture  of  a  finite  God  as  active  in  the 
natural  world  and  in  human  life,  or  in  human  life  alone, 
it  has  never  satisfied,  and  it  will  never  satisfy  the  legiti- 
mate demand  of  religious  faith  or  rational  thought.  Men 
will  not  be  content  with  an  irreconcilable  dualism,  either 
between  God  and  the  world  or  between  one  aspect  of  God 
and  another,  between  appearance  and  reality,  or  between 
a  finite  God  and  the  Absolute.  Neither  religion  nor  meta- 
physics will  tolerate  a  permanent  barrier  between  faith 
and  knowledge.  Religion  postulates  the  unity  which  spec- 
ulative thought  seeks  to  explore  and  interpret.  It  does 
not  alter  the  case  that  aU  the  gods  of  primitive  religions 
were  finite,  or  that  in  spite  of  carefully  phrased  definitions 
to  the  contrary.  Christian  thinkers  have  in  all  other 
respects  than  that  of  definition  treated  God  as  finite. 
Nevertheless,  in  the  last  analysis,  as  Herrmann  has  shown, 
Christian  faith  involves  a  conception  of  God  as  omnipo- 
tent Love.  The  human  spirit  is,  on  the  one  hand,  aware 
of  an  inevitable  conflict  between  the  forces  of  nature  and 
the  highest  good  and  is,  on  the  other  hand,  assured  that 
since  the  God  whom  it  trusts  is  superior  to  the  natural 
world,  its  highest  good  is  safe  in  the  hand  of  Almighty 


220  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

God  as  Father.  Nothing  less  than  a  conviction  like  this 
will  ultimately  satisfy  the  Christian  assurance  of  sal- 
vation. 

Professor  James's  ^  idea  of  God  as  finite  is  a  natural 
corrolary  of  the  fundamental  propositions  of  radical  em- 
piricism, that  "our  conception  of  the  practical  conse- 
quences is  for  us  the  whole  of  our  conception  of  the  object 
so  far  as  that  conception  has  positive  significance  at  all." 
Accordingly,  his  definition  of  God  grows  out  of  certain 
irreducible  beliefs:  that  the  human  will  is  creative;  that 
evil  is  not  merely  apparent ;  that  history  is  real ;  and  that 
men  have  never  regarded  God  as  infinite.  To  these  he 
adds  other  considerations :  God  has  an  environment ;  he  is 
conditioned  by  time;  he  has  a  history  of  his  own.  The 
religious  bearing  of  this  conception  appears  in  the  state- 
ment that  "the  Divine  personality  and  ours  are  consan- 
guineous, at  least  in  this,  that  both  have  purposes  for 
which  they  care,  and  each  can  hear  the  other's  call." 
Religious  experience  is  sufficiently  supported  if  only  this 
power  is  "both  other  and  larger  than  our  conscious  selves. 
Anything  larger  will  do,  if  only  it  be  large  enough  to  trust 
for  the  next  step."  ^  It  is  precisely  at  this  point  that  one 
hesitates  and  draws  back;  it  is  not  only  the  next  step, 
however,  but  what  is  involved  in  the  next  step  that  com- 
pels us  to  pause.  Human  life  is  not  merely  succession, 
nor  does  it  move  in  individualistic  straight  lines  which 
touch  each  other  at  points  here  and  there,  but  it  rises  out 
of  a  larger  unity  to  which  one  can  assign  no  limit  of  time 
or  space,  and  it  endures  as  an  integral  part  of  the  whole 
to  which  it  gives  unique  meaning  and  expression.  We  are 
not  to  be  deterred  from  calling  God  infinite  by  reason  of 


*  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,  p.  446. 
'Op.  cit.,  p.  644. 


THE  FINITE  AND  THE  INFINITE  221 

the  difficulty,  even  the  impossibility,  of  reconciling  the 
contradictions  which  arise  between  the  infinite  and  the 
finite.  The  problem  is  as  old  as  Parmenides  and  Hera- 
cleitus.  The  One  and  the  Many  can  never  be  identified 
nor  can  they  ever  be  separated.  The  One  is  not  less  One 
because  there  are  the  Many;  and  the  Many  in  their 
infinite  variety  do  not  nullify  the  One.  An  idealistic 
mood  finds  the  meaning  of  reality  in  a  permanent  and 
changeless  identity  which  abides  behind  aU  its  evanescent 
phenomena. 

"The  One  remains,  the  many  change  and  pass."  ^ 

When,  on  the  other  hand,  experience  interprets  the 
world  it  falls  back  upon  the  atomic  theory  of  Democritus 
or  a  mood  equivalent  to  the  same,  or  else  upon  the  plural- 
ism of  Leibnitz,  qualified  by  Kant's  primacy  of  the  will. 
As  we  have  already  seen,  the  scientific  consciousness  knows 
the  world  only  as  a  unity.  The  philosophical  interpreta- 
tion of  the  universe,  even  that  of  Leibnitz,  which  seems 
to  sanction  pluralism,  and  that  of  Kant  which  appears 
to  involve  a  dualism,  rests  upon  a  fundamental  and  inde- 
structible unity.  And  theology  postulates  a  Creative 
Good  Will,  a  Purposive  Love  which  reveals  its  presence  in 
the  ends  in  process  of  realization  throughout  all  time  and 
space.  The  question  whether  this  Power  is  finite  resolves 
itself  into  the  previous  question,  whether  the  sphere  within 
which  it  energizes  is  finite.  If  space  is  boundless  and  time 
without  beginning  or  end,  if  the  universe,  both  in  extent 
and  in  duration,  is  infinite,  the  creative,  ideal-forming 
Power  within  can  be  no  less  than  it.  We  only  follow 
the  compelling  suggestion  of  science  and  philosophy  in 
affirming  the  infinitude  of  God. 

*  Shelley,  4  <?om»w. 


222  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

VI 

The  term  "Infinite"  as  applied  to  God  requires  more 
careful  analysis.  This  may  be  undertaken  from  several 
points  of  view.  (1)  If,  according  to  Neo-Platonism  and 
Kant,  as  modified  by  Hamilton  and  Mansel  and  Spencer, 
the  "Infinite"  is  to  be  defined  negatively  so  as  to  mean  all 
that  the  finite  is  not,  then  no  positive  affirmation  as  to  its 
content  is  possible.  One  may  declare  it  to  be  above  the 
world  and  the  human  spirit.  Cause  of  Causes,  Transcen- 
dent, Primordial  Being,  Pure  Form.  In  this  case,  since 
no  intelligible  property  is  to  be  attributed  to  it,  its  proper 
essence  remains  absolutely  unknown,  and  its  alleged  exist- 
ence is  all  the  same  as  non-existence.  If,  with  Spinoza, 
the  infinite  is  quantitatively  defined  as  embracing  all  real- 
ity, the  infinite  becomes  the  all,  the  finite  a  transient  mod- 
ification of  the  all.  As  to  what  God  is  in  himself,  Spinoza 
attempts  no  definition.  When  thought  rises  from  mode  to 
attribute  and  from  attribute  to  the  Most  Real  Being, 
all  determinations  fall  away  and  the  idea  of  God  appears 
without  content.  God  as  we  know  him  exists  only  as  the 
essence  of  two  infinite  attributes  and  of  the  modes  of 
these  attributes.  Thus  God  is  Nature;  on  the  one  hand, 
in  accord  with  Stoicism,  God  is  the  essential  cause  of  all 
existence,  natura  naturans,  or  nature  as  active,  and  on 
the  other  hand,  as  the  whole  of  that  which  so  comes  to 
existence,  natura  naturata.  In  a  sense  the  God  with 
whom  we  have  to  do  is  finite.  An  infinite  number  of  attri- 
butes is  indeed  alleged,  yet  we  know  of  only  two,  thought 
and  extension,  which  are  a  partial  expression  of  the  being 
of  God.  Here,  however,  the  term  "Infinite"  is  used  in  so 
many  significations  that  we  have  to  be  on  our  guard  lest 
the  infinite  in  one  reference  be  only  the  finite  in  another. 


THE  FINITE  AND  THE  INFINITE  223 

(2)  The  term  "Infinite"  is  used  to  designate  the  dis- 
tinctive and  essential  characteristic  of  the  divine  Being. 
As  a  unity  he  is  thus  set  over  against  the  world  of  the 
finite  as  consisting  of  manifold  contradictory  elements. 
That  which  in  the  finite  exists  as  fragmentary  and  inhar- 
monious is  in  the  Infinite  reconciled  and  unified.  All 
possibilities  which  in  the  finite  are  as  yet  only  possible 
or  to  be  realized  through  God,  find  their  perfect  realiza- 
tion in  him  (cf.  Aristotle).  The  Infinite  is  thus  conceived 
positively;  it  gives  to  the  finite  all  its  meaning;  and  this 
is  perhaps  the  most  common  form  in  which  recent  think- 
ers present  God  as  the  Infinite.  The  word  "Infinite" 
which  began  as  an  adjective,  has  lost  its  adjectival  refer- 
ence and  has  become  a  substantive.  As  a  substantive  it 
has  taken  its  place  with  other  words,  as  the  Absolute,  the 
Unconditioned,  and  the  Eternal,  which  have  gone  through 
a  similar  transformation. 

(3)  Another  definition  of  the  Infinite  is  more  in  accord 
with  experience  and  its  implications.  This  restores  it  to 
its  earlier  meaning.  The  Infinite  is  thus  not  something 
conceivably  isolated  from  the  world  of  reality  as  we  know 
it,  existing  apart  in  a  heaven  by  itself.  Reduced  to  its 
adjectival  form,  it  fulfills  a  more  modest  function — it 
assigns  a  further  meaning  to  the  realities  of  experience. 
We  can  form  no  image  of  Infinite  Reality.  However  far 
we  extend  the  limits  of  an  object,  as  a  line,  from  one  stage 
to  another,  we  reach  only  an  arbitrary  point  beyond  which 
advance  is  always  possible.  The  imagination  which  neces- 
sarily deals  only  with  outlines  and  limits  cannot  trans- 
cend its  own  nature.  We  are  unable  to  grasp  Infinite 
Reality  as  a  concrete  magnitude.  There  are  no  identifica- 
tion marks  by  which  we  can  distinguish  an  infinite  from 
an  immeasurable  entity.     For  a  working  theory  of  energy 


224  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

or  purpose,  the  immeasurable  has  the  value  of  the  infinite. 
The  universe  extends  beyond  the  reach,  not  only  of  all 
existing,  but  of  all  possible  instriunents  of  human  explora- 
tion; the  question  whether  it  is  actually  or  only  conceiv- 
ably infinite  is  one  which  justly  claims  attention  of  physi- 
cists, astronomers,  and  mathematicians.  If  they  decide 
for  an  infinite  universe,  as  a  majority  of  them  do,  we  shall 
make  such  use  of  their  position  in  its  bearing  on  the  idea 
of  God  as  seems  warranted. 

If  we  speak  of  infinite  time  and  infinite  space,  of  infinite 
power  and  infinite  purpose,  we  attribute  to  these  all  that 
it  is  possible  for  thought  to  affirm  of  time  and  space,  of 
power  and  purpose  as  these  exist  anywhere  in  any  shape 
or  degree.     We  must  not,  however,  allow  the  negative 
form  of  the  word  to  deceive  us,  as  if  it  were  a  denial  or 
a  contradiction  of  what  is  given  in  the  finite.     In  our 
experience  we  are  indeed  aware  not  of  infinite  space  and 
time,  but  only  of  a  concrete  aspect  of  these,  and  the  same 
is  true  of  power  and  purpose.     We  are  content  to  believe 
that  all  space  and  time  which  we  have  not  yet  experienced 
would  be  the  same  to  all  possible  as  to  actual  experience, 
and  that  the  power  and  purpose  which  we  are  conscious 
of  in  the  narrow  span  of  our  earthly  existence  are  an 
integral  part  of  a  purposive  activity  everywhere  present 
and  in  process  of  expression.     Just  as  the  elements  which 
compose   the  individual   atoms   of   an   earthly   body   are 
identical  in  structure  with  the  atoms  in  any,  however  dis- 
tant, star,  and  as  life  is  a  product  of  conditions  which 
exist  not  only  on  this  planet  but  may  exist  in  all  the 
realms   of   space,   so  every   experience  is  what  it  is  by 
reason  both  of  its  immediate  environment  and  of  all  that 
has  been  and  is  in  the  universe  as  a  whole.     If,  therefore, 
we  find  order  and  intelligence  in  any  form  of  existence,  if 


THE  FINITE  AND  THE  INFINITE  225 

we  discover  purposive  ends  in  particular  events,  we  have 
a  right  to  extend  the  range  of  their  meaning  to  make 
them  integral  parts  of  universal  order  and  purpose.  We 
begin  with  the  finite,  but  by  an  inner  logic  of  interpreta- 
tion we  cannot  stop  short  of  the  All.  In  this  way  we 
reach  the  sense  of  "Infinite"  as  we  apply  the  term  to 
God.  If  we  define  God  as  Nature,  "the  ideal  tendency  of 
things,"  ^  the  "Creative  Good  Will,"  ^  then  wherever  we 
are  aware  of  any  becoming,  of  any  movement  toward 
higher  ends  or  urge  toward  the  production  and  conserva- 
tion of  values,  we  must  follow  the  rational  impulsion  and 
pass  beyond  the  single  event  to  include  the  whole  of  real- 
ity in  the  sweep  of  our  thought.  Fitly  to  characterize 
this,  the  word  "Infinite"  springs  to  our  lips. 


*  James,  A  Pluralistic  Universe,  p.  124. 

*  E.  W.  Lyman,  The  Experience  of  Qod  in  Modern  Life,  p.  36. 


X.     THE  ABSOLUTE  AND  THE   IDEA 

OF  GOD 


At  the  present  time  the  Absolute  Is  approached  from 
three  different  angles — the  metaphysical,  the  ethical,  and 
the  pragmatic.  The  metaphysical  approach  is  repre- 
sented by  Professor  Royce,  the  brothers  Edward  and 
John  Caird,  and  Professor  J.  Watson.  Professor  Royce  ^ 
identifies  the  Absolute  with  Reality  which  is  "the  expres- 
sion of  a  single  system  of  thought,  the  fulfillment  of  a 
single  conscious  purpose,  or  the  realm  of  one  internally 
harmonious  experience."  In  the  most  general  sense  the 
Absolute  is  the  totality  of  being  viewed  in  its  ideal  aspect. 
It  may  be  defined  in  terms  of  thought,  as  perfectly  ful- 
filled in  the  life  of  the  world ;  of  will,  as  eternally  accom- 
plished; of  experience,  as  completely  organized  and  self- 
conscious;  of  truth,  as  transparent  to  itself;  of  life,  as 
in  accordance  with  Idea,  "with  no  unanswered  questions 
and  no  unfulfilled  desires."  "This  absolute  experience  is 
related  to  our  finite  experience  as  an  organic  whole  to  its 
fragments."  ^  The  very  f ragmentarlness  of  our  world 
has  meaning  only  with  reference  to  a  world  beyond.  All 
that  Is  finite — pain,  Ignorance,  longing,  strife,  restless- 
ness, the  struggle  to  escape  from  our  Incompleteness — 


*  The  World  and  the  Individual,  Vol.  I,  p.  40. 
'  The  Conception  of  Ood,  p.  44. 

226 


THE  ABSOLUTE  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD    227 

points  beyond  itself  to  its  fulfillment  and  perfection  in 
the  Absolute;  of  each  of  these  the  "whole  meaning  is  now 
and  will  always  remain  one  with  the  entire  life  of  God."  ^ 
These  are  the  authentic  forms  in  which  the  Absolute  longs 
and  strives  in  us  for  the  peace  which  we  seek  in  vain  on 
earth  and  find  only  in  eternity. 

Edward  Caird  holds  that  the  idea  of  God  is  that  of 
"an  absolute  Power  or  Principle."  The  religious  con- 
sciousness "is  the  consciousness  of  a  Being  who  embraces 
all  our  life  and  gives  unity  and  direction  to  it,  .  .  .  the 
consciousness  that  our  finite  experience  presupposes  and 
rests  upon  a  principle  which  comprehends  all  its  various 
contents  and  transcends  all  its  differences,  .  .  .  that, 
beyond  all  the  objects  we  perceive  without  us,  and  beyond 
all  the  states  and  activities  of  the  self  within  us,  there 
is  a  unity  which  manifests  itself  in  both,  and  from  which 
neither  can  be  separated."  ^ 

According  to  Professor  Watson,^  the  marks  of  the 
Absolute,  that  is,  of  a  rational  universe,  are:  (1)  It  must 
be  an  absolute  unity,  (2)  it  must  be  self -differentiating, 
(3)  its  differentiations  must  form  a  coherent  system.  The 
unity  is  neither  identity  nor  an  aggregate  of  parts,  but 
it  comprehends  all  possible  differences,  even  those  which 
are  finite.  No  differences  can  arise  outside  of  the  Abso- 
lute; and  since  the  Absolute  is  perfect,  no  transition  is 
possible  within  it  to  either  better  or  worse.  Moreover, 
since  the  Absolute  is  a  coherent  system,  a  change  in  any 
single  aspect  of  it  involves  a  corresponding  change  in  all 
other  aspects.  (4)  The  unity  is  self-conscious  and  mani- 
fests its  nature  in  all  being,  and  particularly  in  man.     (5) 


*  The  World  and  the  Individual,  Vol.  II,  p.  276. 
'  The  Evolution  of  Religion,  Vol.  I,  pp.  67,  82. 

•  The  Interpretation  of  Religious  Experience,  Vol.  II,  pp.  48  ff. 


228  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

It  may  be  designated  as  the  Absolute  or  God;  it  is  to 
reflective  thought  the  Absolute,  to  the  religious  conscious- 
ness God. 

The  aim  of  these  thinkers  is  to  work  out  a  unified 
theory  of  the  world.  In  realizing  this  aim,  two  tendencies 
are  in  evidence:  one  springing  from  experience,  the  other 
from  speculation.  Unreflective  experience  breaks  the 
world  up  into  fragments,  where  everything  is  concrete, 
distinct  if  not  separate,  where  the  principle  of  individ- 
uation is  the  key  which  unlocks  the  meaning  of  reality. 
On  the  other  hand,  speculative  thought  never  rests  until 
it  has  discovered  the  identity  in  diiFerence;  the  one  of 
which  the  many  are  the  expression ;  the  law  which  explains 
particulars;  the  whole  which  embraces  the  parts;  the 
Reason  which  is  the  essence  of  even  the  apparently  irra- 
tional ;  the  will  which  impels  all  partial  and  even  conflict- 
ing purposes.  Reflection  is  never  content  to  remain  purely 
empirical,  but  seeks  to  complete  itself  in  the  region  of 
speculation.  The  different  sciences  push  out,  each  on  its 
own  line,  into  the  most  comprehensive  generalization ;  each 
also  relates  itself  to  the  findings  of  other  sciences  to  fill 
out  its  interpretation  of  the  world.  The  result  is  a  uni- 
fied system  of  reality,  predicated  not  only  of  that  part  of 
the  world  which  has  come  under  observation,  but  of  that 
also  which  lies  beyond  the  scope  of  present  or  even  of 
possible  human  observation.  In  the  region  of  conscious- 
ness, of  intelligence,  and  of  purposiveness,  the  same  unity 
is  sought  as  that  which  has  been  established  by  the  physi- 
cal sciences.  On  the  other  hand,  the  point  of  view  and 
the  method  of  speculation  are  radically  different  from 
those  of  experience — to  ground  the  world  in  the  principle 
of  unity. 

The  great  thinkers   are  unanimous  in   the  conviction 


THE  ABSOLUTE  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD    229 

that  the  world  is  susceptible  of  rational  explanation — 
the  world  is  intelligible. 

"One  God,  one  law,  one  element." 

For  Plato  it  was  the  idea  of  the  Good,  for  Aristotle  the 
perfect  self-consciousness,  for  Augustine  divine  sov- 
ereignty, for  Spinoza  substance,  for  Leibnitz  the  Monad 
of  monads,  for  Hegel  the  unity  of  thought  and  being,  for 
Schopenhauer  Will,  for  Schleiermacher  the  feeling  of 
absolute  dependence  reflecting  the  Absolute  Cause,  and 
now  for  Royce  and  his  fellow  idealists  reality  is  Absolute 
Experience  and  Unity.  God  is  the  Absolute  Experience 
of  which  all  finite  experience  is  a  fragmentary,  although 
integral,  part.  God  is  the  Absolute  Unity  which  tran- 
scends and  yet  includes  the  oppositions  of  the  finite.  Ac- 
cordingly, the  Absolute,  instead  of  being  set  free  from 
all  relations,  as  the  term  itself  seems  to  imply,  is  neces- 
sarily inclusive  of  all  relations. 

To  interpret  the  Absolute  Reality  as  Professor  Royce 
does  in  terms  of  Experience — a  completely  organized 
Experience — is  beset  with  grave  objections.  The  concep- 
tion is  purely  arbitrary  and  incapable  of  verification.  It 
is  a  new  form  of  the  ontological  argument.  It  assumes 
that  because  we  can  combine  words,  each  of  which  has  in 
itself  a  definite  meaning  so  as  to  make  an  intelligible  state- 
ment, therefore  a  corresponding  reality  exists.  When, 
however,  the  individual  words  of  the  statement  are  sub- 
jected to  analysis  and  definition  and  then  reunited  as 
before,  they  seem  to  have  changed  their  individual  mean- 
ing and  are  no  longer  applicable  to  the  reality  which  they 
were  supposed  to  describe.  In  the  new  combination 
further  terms,  as  thought  and  will,  are  indeed  employed, 
but  these  present  a  static,  not  a  dynamic  entity ;  and  even 


230  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

such  action  as  is  suggested  is  self-identical  and  not  that 
of  movement  and  action.  There  is  transcendent  and 
changeless  fullness  of  being,  but  it  has  no  history;  it 
never  comes  out  on  the  field  of  human  experience.  The 
time-process,  the  irrevocableness  of  events,  the  develop- 
ment of  personality  may  be  true  of  the  finite  series,  but 
no  more  than  in  Aristotle  can  the  Absolute  be  brought 
within  the  category  of  experience,  and  hence  be  made 
intelligible. 

In  attributing  a  completely  organized  experience  to  the 
Absolute  we  simply  do  not  know  what  we  are  talking 
about.  Even  if  we  were  to  allow  the  possibility  of  such  a 
condition,  we  have  no  knowledge  of  all  that  would  be 
necessary  to  fill  up  its  measure.  The  experience-contents 
of  the  Absolute  as  alleged  by  Professor  Royce  consist  of 
the  external  world  of  science,  that  is,  of  atoms  and  their 
mechanical  whirl,  of  the  field  of  consciousness  in  a  small 
corner  of  the  universe,  together  with  "the  answers  to  our 
present  problems  and  the  satisfaction  of  our  present  long- 
ings." -^  Professor  Menzes  pronounced  this  representa- 
tion of  the  Absolute  to  be  inadequate,  on  the  ground  that 
it  seems  to  be  lacking  in  spirituality  and  worth.  Contents 
so  impoverished  fall  far  short  of  a  commanding  concep- 
tion of  God.  If  one  raises  the  several  elements  of  human 
experience  to  the  highest  degree,  one  is  hardly  justified  in 
regarding  these  as  equal  to  the  number  of  properties  in 
the  Absolute  or  any  of  them  as  satisfactory  in  comparison 
with  the  same  quality  affirmed  of  the  Absolute.  The 
writer  just  cited  does  not  see  how  moral  greatness  is  to 
be  reconciled  with  such  an  Absolute.  There  is  no  moral- 
ity without  progress,  and  progress  implies  growth.  Moral- 
ity is  realized  through  struggle  and  achievement,  and  that 

^  Cf.  The  Conception  of  God,  "Criticism"  by  Professor  Menzes,  p.  98. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD    231 

too  not  at  a  point  here  and  there,  but  in  the  whole  range 
of  action,  and  not  merely  with  reference  to  the  outer 
world,  but  in  the  entire  inmost  depths  of  the  Absolute; 
thus  the  conditions  for  the  realization  of  goodness  are 
wanting.  As  between  the  two — an  eternally  complete 
experience  and  goodness — a  choice  will  have  to  be 
made;  their  incompatibility  precludes  the  retention  of 
both. 

A  fruitful  source  of  fallacy  with  reference  to  the  Abso- 
lute lies  in  its  supposed  relation  to  time.  There  are  two 
ways  in  which  existence  or  reality  may  be  presented — as 
static  and  its  being  or  conscious  life  as  eternally  self- 
identical,  or  as  dynamic  and  its  action  as  eternally  pur- 
poseful. If  it  is  conceived  as  static  it  would  in  no  sense 
be  subject  to  the  temporal  order  or  in  any  essential  rela- 
tion to  it.  On  the  other  hand,  finite  reality  would  be 
subject  to  the  order  of  time.  It  is  without  bearing  on 
the  general  question  whether  from  one  point  of  view  time 
is  relative  to  the  various  phenomenal  existences  according 
to  the  particular  life-span  or  the  rapidity  of  its  response 
to  environment.  With  Professor  Bradley,  one  may  even 
admit  the  existence  of  "any  number  of  independent  time- 
series."  ^  Do  what  we  will  with  time,  however,  there  are 
two  aspects  of  it  which  we  shall  never  be  in  position  to 
obliterate.  One  is  the  objective  reality  of  time;  the  other 
is  that  whatever  differences  characterize  the  reaction  of 
all  existence-forms  to  their  environment,  there  is  for  all 
alike  an  identical,  instantaneous  moment,  a  Now  which 
divides  future  from  past :  behind  it  is  the  no-longer ;  before 
it  the  not-yet.  This  moment  is  not  relative  but  absolute, 
that  is,  it  is  the  same  for  all  finite  existences — the  chang- 
ing aspects  of  the  infinite  universe.     It  is  indeed  a  "spe- 

^  Appearance  and  Reality,  p.  211. 


232  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

cious  present,"  since  it  no  sooner  appears  than  it  van- 
ishes; nevertheless,  its  very  instantaneity  is  real,  unless 
we  are  ready  to  resolve  this  phenomenon  into  an  appear- 
ance that  is  illusory.  At  this  instant  the  physical  atoms 
are  in  combinations  which  have  never  been  before,  and 
in  an  endless  future  will  never  be  repeated.  At  this 
instant  also  the  content  of  all  finite  consciousness,  of 
the  sub-conscious,  and  of  the  unconscious  is  unique  in 
its  long  history,  whether  here  or  in  other  systems  of 
worlds;  this  has  never  been  the  same  as  at  the  moment 
under  consideration  and  will  never  be  the  same  again. 
We  place  ourselves  in  an  embarrassing  position,  however, 
if  we  persist  in  regarding  the  Absolute  as  complete  and 
static  and  in  referring  the  finite  to  the  incomplete  dynamic 
order.  For  if  the  finite  is  an  integral  part  of  the  Absolute 
and  the  Absolute  is  static,  the  finite  must  be  also  static ; 
but  if  the  finite  is  dynamic  we  cannot  refuse  to  the  Abso- 
lute the  same  dynamic  property. 

If  the  question  were  otherwise  stated,  there  might  be 
a  relative  justification  for  the  static  as  well  as  for  the 
dynamic  conception.  If,  for  example.  Being  is  regarded 
as  a  whole,  whether  as  quality  or  quantity,  it  is  an  infinite 
fullness  without  diminution  or  enlargement,  from  age  to 
age  changelessly  identical  in  its  constitutive  elements  and 
potency.  But  if  we  regard  the  Absolute  in  terms  of 
organized  experience  we  behold  its  constitutive  elements 
and  potencies  passing  into  an  infinite  variety  and  succes- 
sion of  forms ;  everywhere  is  activity,  everywhere  process, 
everywhere  change,  everywhere  free  creative  action,  ten- 
dency to  equilibrium  which  dissolves  again  into  instability, 
evolution  fulfilling  itself  in  ways  which  discontinue  past 
achievements  or  merge  them  into  other  orders.  In  relation 
to  this  process  with  an  endless  variety  of  finite  aspects 


THE  ABSOLUTE  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD    233 

there  is  a  conceivable  past  and  a  conceivable  future,  but 
in  reality  there  is  no  past  and  no  future  in  separation 
from  the  present.  Not  that  the  past  and  the  future  are 
utterly  without  meaning.  The  present  aspect  of  any  and 
every  part  of  the  universe  depends  on  all  past  moments 
and  registers  the  issue  of  all  the  permutations  and  com- 
binations which  have  marked  the  movements  of  the  all- 
inclusive  Reality;  it  contains  also  the  promise  and 
potency  of  all  that  is  to  be.  If,  on  the  one  hand,  we 
seek  by  a  single  word  to  characterize  the  complete  scope 
of  this  process,  either  as  a  whole  of  which  each  momen- 
tary stage  is  a  fragment,  or  as  duration  in  its  entirety 
as  an  undivided  entity,  we  can  designate  it  by  no  more 
adequate  term  than  Eternity.  But  if,  on  the  other  hand, 
we  regard  the  universe  and  every  single  thing  in  it  from 
the  point  of  view  of  either  actual  or  possible  change  of 
movement  and  possible  embodiments,  we  find  it  through- 
out subject  to  the  time-process  which  is  necessitated  by 
the  very  structure  of  reality.  The  Absolute  is  therefore 
not  complete  without  existence  and  this  involves  time;  it 
involves  also  infinite  possible  changes  which  are  accord- 
ingly never  exhausted.  An  experience  as  completely 
organized  is  therefore  out  of  the  question.  "The  type 
of  the  highest  reality  is  to  be  sought  for  not  in  any  fixed 
Parmenidean  circle  of  achieved  being,  but  in  an  ideal  of 
good  which,  while  never  fully  expressed  under  the  form 
of  time,  can  never  become  actual,  and  so  fulfill  itself  under 
any  other."  * 

The  theory  that  between  our  sorrow  and  longing  and 
the  Absolute  is  such  a  relation  that  each  is  necessary 
to  the  completeness  of  the  other,  is  confronted  with  a 
two-fold  difficulty.     (1)  From  the  side  of  the  Absolute. 

*  J.  H.  Muirhead,  Encyclopedia  Britannica,  Vol.  XIV,  "Idealism." 


234  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

According  to  Professor  Royce,^  the  Absolute  is  a  com- 
pletely organized  experience  with  no  unanswered  questions 
and  no  unfulfilled  desires,  yet  the  divine  experience  is  com- 
plete only  through  human  pain  and  striving.  "God  who 
here,  in  me,  aims  at  what  I  now  temporarily  miss,  not 
only  possesses,  in  the  eternal  world,  the  goal  after  which 
I  strive,  but  comes  to  possess  it  even  through  and  because 
of  my  sorrow."  So  many  presentations  leave  the  Abso- 
lute independent,  self-sufficient,  detached,  and  utterly 
beyond  human  knowledge,  that  it  is  a  relief  to  find  one 
who  would  overcome  this  isolated  transcendence  by  hold- 
ing fast  the  reciprocal  dependence  of  God  and  man.  We 
are,  moreover,  deeply  impressed  with  the  prophetic  unc- 
tion, the  dithyrambic  fervor,  the  measured  and  lofty  dic- 
tion corresponding  to  the  elevation  of  the  theme,  a  cer- 
tain finality  of  utterance  which  belongs  only  to  the  seer. 
Yet  in  spite  of  all  this  we  are  not  convinced.  The  posi- 
tion might  win  our  qualified  assent  if  we  had  only  to 
reconcile  the  pain  and  sorrow  of  good  men  with  the  good- 
ness, of  the  Absolute;  this  would  present  a  hard  but  not 
perhaps  insoluble  problem.  The  fact  of  moral  evil,  how- 
ever, raises  questions  of  a  wholly  different  nature.  On 
the  one  hand.  Professor  Royce  says  "that  every  finite  pur- 
pose .  .  .  is  a  partial  expression  and  attainment  of  the 
divine  will,  and  also  that  every  finite  fulfillment  of  pur- 
pose .  .  .  is  a  partial  fulfillment  of  the  divine  meaning." 
On  the  other  hand,  he  affirms  that,  although  we  have  all 
sinned  and  come  short  of  the  glory  of  God,  "yet  in  just 
our  life,  viewed  in  its  entirety,  the  glory  of  God  is  com- 
pletely manifest";  our  evil  will  is  comprehended  and 
reconciled  within  the  perfect  whole  because  it  is  "supple- 
mented, is  overcome,  is  thwarted,  is  overruled,  by  what 

*  The  World  and  the  Individual,  Vol.  II,  p.  409. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD    255 

expresses  some  other  will;  only  in  this  way  is  the  final 
perfection  won."  * 

What  is  said  here  may  be  true  of  the  Absolute  from 
the  point  of  the  eternal  world,  but  judged  by  experience 
it  is  only  in  part  true.  Unless  we  can  reduce  moral  evil 
to  ignorance  and  inattention,  dissolving  out  of  it  as  illu- 
sion those  elements  which  experience  as  a  mordant  has 
fixed  in  the  conscience  of  the  race,  we  cannot  assert  that 
the  glory  of  God  is  completely  revealed  in  our  life  just 
as  it  is,  or  in  our  will  in  so  far  as  it  is  evil.  We  should 
have  also  to  ignore  in  the  absolute  consciousness  all  those 
moral  qualities  which  the  experience  of  men  has  found  to 
be  inexpugnable.  It  may  be  a  correct  psychological  de- 
scription of  an  evil  deed  to  characterize  it  as  attention  to 
a  partial  good  or  by  inattention  to  a  larger  good.  It 
may  be  a  just  ethical  estimate  of  sin  that  it  is  not  wholly 
bad,  since  there  is  no  absolute  evil,  and  that  there  is  a 
heart  of  good  in  things  evil.  It  may  furthermore  be 
true  that,  whether  they  mean  it  or  not,  even  despite 
themselves,  the  souls  in  hell,  if  such  there  be,  serve  God. 
Yet  there  is  more  in  moral  evil  than  a  momentarily  imper- 
fect or  mistaken  idea.  The  descriptions  of  moral  evil  by 
the  great  moralists  and  tragic  poets  are  by  no  means  out 
of  date.  Aristotle,  referring  to  the  Socratic  identifica- 
tion of  knowledge  and  virtue,  raised  several  objections  to 
it  which  are  equally  valid  when  directed  against  Professor 
Royce's  view.  The  simple  fact  is  that  every  one  does 
not  always  do  as  well  as  he  knows  even  at  the  instant  of 
evil  action.  And  it  is  entirely  possible  that  the  evil-doer 
may  persist  in  his  course  so  that  "a  choice  becomes  an 
action,  an  action  a  habit,  a  habit  a  character,  and  a  char- 
acter a  destiny."     This  position  is  not  merely  theoretical, 

» Op.  cU.,  Vol.  II,  p.  866. 


256  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

but  is  supported  by  experience;  naturally,  however,  from 
experience  no  final  judgment  on  this  matter  of  destiny 
for  every  individual  can  be  verified,  yet  one  may  follow 
strong  indications.  There  may  be  moral  evil  as  long  as 
human  life  endures  on  the  earth ;  and  if  human  personality 
survives  the  shock  of  death,  moral  evil  may  go  on  renew- 
ing itself  in  the  consciousness  of  the  evil-doer.  Whether 
or  not  moral  evil  is  finally  to  be  expunged  from  the  human 
consciousness,  it  is  here  now,  a  fact  not  to  be  ignored 
nor  explained  away,  as  outstanding,  as  real  as  is  good- 
ness, and  conceivably  no  less  permanent.  If,  then,  one 
admits  that  moral  badness  is  a  fact  in  present  human 
experience — and  one  cannot  deny  this  without  denying 
experience  itself — one  gets  no  relief  from  one's  funda- 
mental problem  by  supposing  that  such  badness  may  ulti- 
mately disappear.  If  in  the  eternal  world  the  Absolute 
already  possesses  the  fulness  of  knowledge  and  good  and 
felicity  which  the  finite  strives  for  or  perversely  rejects, 
one  does  see  how  he  can  come  to  possess  it  through  human 
experience. 

When  one  considers  both  the  altogether  insignificant 
span  of  years  in  which  the  human  consciousness  has 
existed  with  its  pain  and  struggle  and  sin,  and  the  far 
longer  and  yet  still  insignificant  span  in  which  humanity 
is  yet  to  survive  on  the  earth,  one  cannot  ignore  the  bear- 
ing of  this  consideration  on  the  alleged  consciousness  of 
the  Absolute.  Again  we  ask.  Is  this  eternally  complete, 
or  was  it  incomplete  before  man's  appearance,  and  will  it 
again  be  incomplete  when  man  has  disappeared  from  the 
face  of  the  earth?  It  is  hard  to  understand  how  com- 
pleteness and  incompleteness  are  compatible  in  the  same 
consciousness,  or  how  a  goal  eternally  possessed  can  still 
be  striven  for  by  the  divine  will.     To  affirm  that  all  finite 


THE  ABSOLUTE  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD    237 

sorrows  and  struggles,  imperfections  and  sins  are  integral 
parts  of  the  Absolute  and  are  eternally  present  to  the 
divine  mind  as  distinct  constituents  of  his  unruffled  and 
beatific  consciousness,  is  to  resolve  finite  experience  into 
illusion  and  to  construe  the  Absolute  in  terms  of  a  static, 
eternal  Now.  In  this  conception  of  the  Absolute  the 
introduction  of  the  will  is  an  after-thought;  as  in  all 
thorough-going  idealism,  it  is  superfluous.  This  entire 
point  of  view  simply  exchanges  one  set  of  difficulties  which 
originate  in  the  idea  of  time  for  another  not  less  serious 
which  have  their  source  in  the  idea  of  the  Eternal.  It 
would  be  preferable  to  confess  that  the  problem  not  only 
is  not  solved  in  this  way,  but  is  even  insoluble,  than  to  be 
content  with  an  explanation  which  leaves  all  the  essential 
questix>n3  unanswered. 

(2)  If,  on  the  one  hand.  Professor  Royce's  theory  fails 
to  reconcile  the  Absolute  with  the  facts  of  human  experi- 
ence, on  the  other  hand,  it  is  no  less  inadequate  in  its 
claim  that  the  Absolute  is  necessary  to  explain  the  long- 
ing and  struggle  of  the  human  spirit  for  the  attainment 
of  the  ideal.  He  says  that  "we  long  for  the  Absolute,"  so 
far  as  this  is  "the  longing  of  the  Absolute  in  us  for  the 
peace  which  belongs  not  to  Time,  but  only  absolutely  to 
Eternity."  While  we  may  not  be  able  to  prove  or  to  dis- 
prove the  part  which  the  Absolute  plays  in  our  struggle 
for  virtue  and  our  desire  for  peace,  we  are  at  least  in 
position  to  describe  the  psychological  content  and  object 
of  our  longing.  We  most  effectively  desire  only  that 
which  we  can  define.  We  use  the  term  "perfection"  or 
the  Absolute,  but  the  meaning  we  assign  to  it  falls  short 
of  what  is  implied  in  it.  To  say  that  a  denial  of  the 
Absolute  involves  a  knowledge  of  it  is  hardly  more  than 
a  play  upon  words.    Attempts  to  win  an  idea  of  the  Abso- 


238  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

lute,  as  in  the  great  mystics,  have  resulted  in  robbing  it 
of  all  intelligible  content  and  resolving  it  into  pure  nega- 
tivity. We  do  not  long  for  perfection,  for  we  do  not 
know  what  perfection  would  be,  nor  do  we  believe  that 
what  we  do  long  for  will  melt  by  imperceptible  gradations 
into  final  perfection.  We  can  form  no  conception  of  a 
perfect  character  or  a  perfect  society.  What  is  regarded 
as  final  in  personality  or  social  structure  for  one  period 
becomes  for  a  later  time  a  transition  stage  to  something 
higher;  and  the  further  stage  is  judged  to  be  higher  with 
reference  not  to  an  absolute  standard,  but  to  its  more 
adequate  functioning  and  to  undeveloped  possibilities 
which  are  felt  to  be  immanent  in  the  existing  condition. 
To  say  that  we  do  not  long  for  perfection,  that  we  are 
not  and  shall  never  be  perfect,  does  not  imply  that  we 
know  perfection,  but  it  does  mean  that,  however  we  are 
related  to  the  Absolute,  we  are  finite  still,  and  that  all 
our  possible  achievements,  be  they  never  so  glorious,  are 
and  must  forever  remain  limited  and  imperfect.  If  the 
Absolute  be  set  up  as  our  goal,  then  indeed  are  we  doomed 
to  inevitable  short-coming  and  defeat.  Because  not  this, 
but  something  more  and  better  beckons  us  forward,  we 
live  by  hope  which  carries  with  it  the  energy  of  its  own 
fulfillment. 

"Thou  are  the  Way. 

Hadst  thou  been  nothing  but  the  goal, 
I  cannot  say 

If  thou  hadst  ever  met  my  soul. 
I  cannot  see — 

I,  child  of  process — if  there  lies 
An  end  for  me 

Full  of  repose,  full  of  replies."  ^ 

*  Alice  Meynell,  Poems,  p.  28. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD    239 

II 

The  ethical  argument  for  the  Absolute  may  be  stated 
by  Dr.  Rashdall  ^ :  "An  Absolute  Moral  Law  or  moral 
ideal  cannot  exist  in  material  things.  And  it  does  not 
exist  in  the  mind  of  this  or  that  individual.  Only  if  we 
believe  in  the  existence  of  a  Mind  for  which  the  true  moral 
ideal  is  already  in  some  sense  real,  a  Mind  embracing 
whatever  is  true  in  our  moral  judgments,  can  we  ration- 
ally think  of  the  moral  ideal  as  no  less  real  than  the  world 
itself.  Only  so  can  we  believe  in  an  absolute  standard 
of  right  and  wrong,  which  is  as  independent  of  this  or 
that  man's  actual  ideas  and  actual  desires  as  the  facts 
of  material  nature.  The  belief  in  God  ...  is  the  log- 
ical presupposition  of  an  'objective'  or  absolute  Morality. 
A  moral  ideal  can  exist  nowhere  and  nohow,  but  in  a  mind ; 
an  absolute  moral  ideal  can  exist  only  in  a  Mind  from 
which  all  Reality  is  derived." 

We  have  here  a  restatement  in  terms  of  ethics  of  the 
well-known  cosmological  argument  of  Descartes,  that 
since  the  mind  of  man  could  not  originate  the  idea  of 
the  Perfect,  another  source  must  be  sought  for  it,  namely, 
a  Perfect  Being.  If,  however,  the  Perfect  is  interpreted 
as  the  ethical  ideal,  the  immediate  attention  is  transferred 
from  the  field  of  metaphysics  to  that  of  values,  but  the 
same  logic  is  carried  over  to  the  new  application.  Since 
an  absolute  moral  ideal  cannot  exist  in  an  individual  con- 
sciousness, on  the  ground  that  the  individual  thought  is 
finite  and  hence  limited  and  imperfect,  its  true  source 
must  be  referred  to  an  absolutely  perfect  Being;  it  is 
therefore  self-evident,  on  the  one  hand,  that  a  finite  cause 
cannot  produce  an  infinite  effect,  and,  on  the  other  hand, 

» The  Theory  of  Good  and  Evil,  Vol.  II,  p.  212. 


240  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

that  if  an  infinite  effect — an  absolute  moral  ideal — ap- 
pears in  the  finite  mind,  it  must  have  been  created  by  an 
Absolute  Mind  in  which  this  ideal  already  exists.  In  sup- 
port of  this  position,  Professor  Sorley  ^  adduces  two 
arguments.  The  first  is  drawn  from  analogy — the  eternal 
validity  of  abstract  truth  which  the  mind  discovers  but 
does  not  create.  The  second  is  derived  from  the  objec- 
tive, eternal  authority  of  ideals  of  goodness  which  are 
valid  independently  of  human  assent  or  even  recognition, 
which  accordingly  demand  a  divine  mind  for  their  eternal 
realization. 

Several  considerations  render  this  position  exceedingly 
precarious  if  not  wholly  untenable.  (1)  With  reference 
to  an  absolute  ethical  ideal.  The  assumption  that  a  per- 
fect ideal  is  a  necessary  implication  of  an  imperfect  ideal 
is  a  paralogism,  yet  one  with  a  distinguished  history.  The 
term  "imperfect"  appears  to  have  no  meaning  apart  from 
the  term  "perfect."  But  when  we  refer  to  experience, 
we  know  and  can  know  only  the  imperfect.  All  forms  of 
existence  are  subject  to  ceaseless  change;  their  nature  is 
dynamic;  they  function  with  a  greater  or  less  degree  of 
regularity,  harmony,  and  efficiency  which  may  conceivably 
be  enhanced  indefinitely.  The  Patent  Office  demonstrates 
that  improvement  in  all  kinds  of  machinery  is  under  way ; 
breeders  of  animals  are  continually  bettering  the  quality 
of  their  stock;  horticulturalists  are  constantly  aiding 
nature  to  produce  more  beautiful  flowers  and  more  excel- 
lent fruit.  We  rightly  think  of  all  of  these  physical 
adjustments  and  living  organisms  as  perfectible;  not  that 
they  either  will  or  can  attain  a  stage  beyond  which  nothing 
higher  is  possible,  but  that  they  are  susceptible  of  yet 
further  degrees  of  development.    This  does  not  mean  that 

^  Op.  cit,  pp.  352-353. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD    241 

at  some  moment  in  the  future  there  will  be  a  perfect  ship, 
a  perfect  horse,  a  perfect  apple,  or  a  perfect  rose.  Still 
less  does  it  imply  that  any  one  of  these  exists  anywhere 
perfectly  as  an  idea.  Outside  of  the  field  of  the  ethical 
ideal  no  one  would  think  of  saying  that  there  exists  a 
perfect  idea  in  the  mind  of  the  Absolute,  toward  which 
creative  evolution  strives  but  never  attains,  and  at  last 
only  approximates.  One  does  not  therefore  see  why  an 
exception  is  made  in  the  case  of  the  ethical  ideal. 

(2)  A  further  difficulty  arises  concerning  the  content 
of  the  Absolute  Moral  Ideal.  We  are  acquainted  with 
some  of  the  values  which  belong  to  finite  moral  endeavor, 
both  individual  and  social,  but  we  are  far  from  being  able 
to  define  them  with  any  degree  of  adequacy.  Even  the 
great  principles  can  be  stated  only  in  the  most  general, 
and  hence  very  indefinite,  terms.  We  can  speak  of  "an 
absolute  standard  of  right  and  wrong,"  but  the  words 
refuse  to  convey  an  intelligible  meaning.  The  only  stand- 
ard that  we  know  is  relative  and  therefore  progressive — 
a  flying  goal.  If,  then,  we  are  ignorant  of  what  is  included 
in  a  perfect  ethical  ideal,  how  can  we  affirm  the  existence 
of  such  an  ideal  in  any  mind,  however  great.? 

(3)  We  have  already  seen  that  the  conditions  under 
which  such  a  consciousness  is  postulated  forbid  the  exist- 
ence of  the  very  thing  in  question.  To  conceive  of  the 
divine  Mind  as  static  and  self-identical,  or  even  with 
Aristotle,  as  eternally  active  with  an  eternally  unchanged 
content,  is  to  contradict  both  the  meaning  of  conscious- 
ness and  the  fulfillment  of  purpose.  If  we  are  to  discover 
the  nature  of  God  in  the  nature  of  the  world — and  we 
have  no  encouragement  to  look  in  any  other  direction — 
we  shall  never  come  upon  the  track  of  an  Absolute  Being. 
Even  if  we  regard  the  Absolute  as  all-inclusive,  we  have 


242  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

no  monotonous,  self-repeating  activity,  but  the  revelation 
of  a  Power  renewing  its  energy  in  an  endless  variety  of 
changing  forms,  symbol  of  an  exhaustless  capacity  of 
creative  differentiation. 

Ill 

The  impression  one  receives  from  pragmatic  pluralism 
is  that  between  it  and  any  doctrine  of  the  Absolute  a 
great  gulf  is  fixed;  if  the  pluralistic  theory  is  true,  then 
idealistic  monism  under  whatever  form  is  excluded.  We 
are  therefore  at  once  interested  when  the  most  unrelent- 
ing advocate  of  radical  empiricism  says,  "The  Absolute 
is  not  the  impossible  thing  I  once  thought  it.  Mental  facts 
do  function  both  singly  and  together,  at  once,  and  we 
finite  minds  may  simultaneously  be  co-conscious  with  one 
another  in  a  superhuman  intelligence.  It  is  only  the  ex- 
travagant claims  of  coercive  necessity  on  the  Absolute's 
part  that  has  to  be  denied  by  a  priori  logic.  As  an 
hypothesis  trying  to  make  itself  probable  on  analogical 
grounds,  the  Absolute  is  entitled  to  a  patient  hearing."  -^ 
As  we  read  such  words,  we  begin  to  ask  ourselves  whether, 
after  all,  even  if  a  complete  understanding  between  the 
contending  camps  is  not  feasible,  a  truce  may  not  be 
arranged  so  that  peaceful  communications  may  pass  from 
one  to  the  other  and  perhaps  a  revaluation  of  each  by  the 
other  lead  to  further  friendly  approaches.  This  anticipa- 
tion is  weakened  when  we  read  further  in  reference  to 
religious  experience :  "The  believer  finds  that  the  tenderer 
parts  of  his  personal  life  are  continuous  with  ^  more  of 
the  same  quality  which  is  operative  in  the  universe  outside 
of  himself  and  which  he  can  keep  in  touch  with ;    .    .    .    a 


*  William  James,  A  Pluralistic  Universe,  pp.  292-293. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD    243 

wider  self  from  which  saving  experiences  come."  -^  And 
he  adds,  "The  drift  of  all  the  evidence  we  have  seems  to 
me  to  sweep  us  very  strongly  toward  the  belief  in  some 
form  of  superhuman  life  with  which  we  may,  unknown  to 
ourselves,  be  co-conscious."  He  is  referring  to  the  analo- 
gies with  psychology,  with  the  facts  of  pathology,  psychi- 
cal research,  and  religious  experience.  These  when  taken 
together  establish  a  decidedly  formidable  probability  in 
favor  of  a  general  view  of  the  world  nearly  identical  with 
that  of  Fechner.^  Thus  proceeding  from  lower  to  higher, 
we  have  a  unified  psychical  life  which  embraces  all  partial 
beings,  rising  to  include  the  heavenly  bodies,  and  these 
in  turn  becoming  members  of  a  cosmic,  universal  life.  The 
outlines  of  this  superhuman  consciousness  thus  probable 
remain  very  vague  and  the  functionally  distinct  selves 
involved  in  it  are  left  problematical.^  Professor  James 
shows  further  that  the  improved  idealism  of  the  present, 
instead  of  dissolving  the  many  in  the  One,  preserves  the 
many  as  the  eternal  objects  of  the  One.  It  begins,  there- 
fore, to  look  as  if  pluralism  in  its  scheme  of  the  universe 
might  provide  a  place  for  the  Absolute.  But  the  promise 
is  deceptive.  As,  on  the  one  hand,  the  absolutist  repre- 
sents the  Absolute  with  a  pluralistic  object,  so,  on  the 
other  hand,  Fechner,  in  spite  of  his  finely  wrought  web 
of  panpsychicism,  advocates  an  idea  of  God  who  in  con- 
flict with  evil  is  not  essentially  different  from  the  God  of 
ordinary  theism.*  After  having  apparently  yielded  so 
much.  Professor  James  ^  withdraws  all  that  he  seemed  to 

*  Op.  cit.,  p.  307. 
'  Cf.  Zend  A  vesta,  passim. 
'  Cf.  A  Pluralistic  Universe,  pp.  309-310. 

*Cf  Zend  Avesta,  2d  ed.,  Vol.  I,  pp.  166  ff.,  181,  244  ff.,  cited  by 
James,  op.  cit.,  pp.  294,  844. 
"Op.   cit.,  pp.  310-811. 


244  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

concede:  "The  only  way  to  escape  from  the  paradoxes 
and  perplexities  that  a  consistently  thought-out  monistic 
universe  suffers  from  .  .  .  is  to  be  frankly  pluralistic  and 
assume  that  the  superhuman  consciousness,  however  vast 
it  may  be,  has  itself  an  external  environment,  and  conse- 
quently is  finite."  Thus  disappears  the  last  hope  that 
pluralism  can  come  to  terms  with  any  sort  of  an  Absolute. 


IV 


The  question  whether  the  Absolute  is  without  further 
ado  to  be  identified  with  God  has  received  opposite 
answers.  With  some  thinkers  as  Bradley,  God  and  the 
Absolute  are  two  different  entities.  All  that  we  know 
presents  itself  in  experience  under  two  aspects — ^Appear- 
ance and  Reality.  Every  aspect  of  the  world  is  charac- 
terized as  appearance  which,  when  we  try  to  think  it 
through  by  itself,  gives  rise  to  contradiction.  This  is 
true  of  space  and  time,  of  motion  and  change,  of  activity 
and  passivity,  of  self  and  the  not-self.  We  are  compelled 
to  conceive  of  each  of  these,  on  the  one  hand,  as  indi- 
vidual, independent  substance,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  as 
in  relation  to  other  things ;  neither  of  these  interpreted  by 
itself  is,  however,  the  entire  truth,  but  must  be  supple- 
mented by  the  other — the  relative  by  the  self-subsistent. 
According  to  the  law  of  contradiction,  we  are  held  within 
the  world  of  appearance,  unable  to  reach  Reality.  For 
in  Reality  itself  all  contradictions  are  annulled,  all  opposi- 
tions reconciled,  all  imperfections  done  away.  There  is 
but  one  Real ;  plurality  of  Reals  is  impossible ;  in  this  Real 
all  differences  are  embraced,  all  discords  dissolved,  all  phe- 
nomena unified  and  perfect.     The  Real  is  therefore  inde- 


THE  ABSOLUTE  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD    245 

pendent,  unrelated,  self-consistent,  a  complete  individual 
experience,  that  is,  it  is  the  Absolute.  In  relation  to  the 
Absolute  the  world,  the  self,  and  even  God  as  personal  are 
resolved  into  appearance.  Accordingly,  there  is  a  dis- 
crepancy between  the  God  of  religion  who  is  a  "person," 
an  object  to  man,  and  therefore  a  finite  being,  and  God 
identified  with  the  Absolute.  Hence  one  must  choose; 
one  may  retain  the  God  of  religion,  but  if  so,  one  will  have 
a  being  who  is  incomplete,  inwardly  contradictory,  ever 
striving  to  pass  beyond  himself  and  to  be  absorbed  in  the 
Absolute.  If,  on  the  contrary,  one  identifies  God  with 
the  Absolute,  one  satisfies  his  metaphysical  demand,  but 
parts  with  his  religion.  "We  may  say  that  God  is  not 
God,  till  he  has  become  all  in  all,  and  that  a  God  which 
is  all  in  all  is  not  the  God  of  religion.  God  is  but  an 
aspect,  and  that  must  mean  but  an  appearance  of  the 
Absolute."  1 

With  this  position  of  Bradley,  although  with  varying 
shades  of  difference,  many  thinkers  are  in  accord.  It  will 
serve  our  purpose  to  cite  two.  Professor  A.  E.  Taylor 
defines  the  Absolute,  or  as  an  alternative  name,  the  Uni- 
verse, as  "a  conscious  life  which  embraces  the  whole  of 
existence,  all  at  once,  and  in  a  perfect  systematic  unity." 
This  is  not  necessarily,  however,  the  same  as  "God."  We 
can  prove  neither  that  the  Absolute  is  the  God  of  religion, 
nor  that  God  is  a  finite  individual  within  the  Absolute.^ 
Dr.  Inge,^  who  follows  Eckhart  in  distinguishing  between 
the  Godhead  and  God,  says  that  "the  God  of  religion  is 
not  the  Absolute,  but  the  highest  form  under  which  the 
Absolute  can  manifest  himself  to  finite  creatures."     Ac- 


^  Appearance  and  Reality,  pp.  446,  447,  448. 
'Cf.  Elements  of  Metaphysics,  pp.  60,  404. 
*  Personal  Idealism  and  Mysticism,  pp.  13-14. 


246  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

cording  to  Dr.  Rashdall/  "The  Absolute  cannot  be  identi- 
fied with  God,"  but  "must  include  God  and  all  other  con- 
sciousness ...  as  forming. with  him  a  system  of  unity. 
.  .  .  The  Ultimate  Being  is  a  single  Power,  .  .  . 
manifested  in  a  plurality  of  consciousness,  one  conscious- 
ness which  is  omniscent  and  eternal,  and  many  conscious- 
nesses which  are  of  limited  knowledge,  which  have  a  begin- 
ning, and  some  of  which,  it  is  possible  or  probable,  have  an 
end."  This  doctrine  of  God  belongs  to  the  group  which 
we  have  already  considered — the  conception  of  God  as 
finite.  Here,  however,  the  background  is  the  Absolute, 
which  embraces  the  totality  of  being  or  existence,  from 
which  indeed  evil  is  not  wholly  excluded. 

This  differentiation  of  God  from  the  Absolute  has  not 
commanded  the  assent  of  all  competent  thinkers.  Indeed, 
until  a  comparatively  recent  time  the  God  of  traditional 
theology  has  been  identified  with  the  Absolute,  but  with- 
out subjecting  the  position  to  critical  inquiry.  For 
Anselm,  God  was  the  Absolute  Reality.  Calvin,  in  his 
postulate  of  the  divine  sovereignty  and  the  several  doc- 
trines derived  from  this,  leaves  no  room  for  and  indeed  is  in 
no  need  of  any  Absolute  beyond  God.  For  Spinoza  in 
his  definition  of  substance,  for  Leibnitz  with  his  central 
Monad  originating  pre-established  harmony,  for  Hegel 
with  his  philosophy  of  Idea  or  Spirit,  and  for  his  follow- 
ers of  the  right  wing  with  their  identity  of  thought  and 
being,  God  is  the  Absolute,  and  no  property  of  the  Abso- 
lute lies  beyond  his  being.  In  Spinoza  and  Hegel  the 
formal  definition  of  God  is  far  removed  from  the  common 
doctrine  of  the  church.  The  idea  would  have  been  more 
fully  represented  with  Spinoza  by  the  All-Real,  or  Nature, 


^  Theory  of  Good  and  Evil,  Vol.  II,  pp.  239-241.    Cf.  also  Personal 
Idealism,  "Personality  Human  and  Divine,"  pp.  392-393. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD    247 

or  the  Absolute,  and  with  Hegel  by  the  Absolute  Spirit 
or  Idea.  Yet  they  continued  to  employ  the  term  "God" 
partly,  perhaps,  out  of  deference  to  its  traditional  value 
and  partly  on  account  of  their  own  religious  interest. 
More  recently  the  question  has  become  acute,  and  the 
identifying  of  God  with  the  Absolute  is  accompanied  by 
considerations  and  arguments  not  less  carefully  drawn 
than  are  presented  by  those  who  distinguish  between  God 
and  the  Absolute.  Pringle-Pattison  ^  maintains  that  the 
Absolute,  instead  of  an  all-embracing,  self-centered  life,  is 
an  eternally  purposive  Being  who  communicates  his  life 
to  individual  spirits  capable  of  spiritual  response ;  in  such 
beings  the  Absolute  becomes  known  in  the  qualities  which 
we  attribute  to  God.  According  to  Mr.  Webb,^  when  one 
has  attained  to  that  degree  of  intellectual  development  at 
which  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  God  to  the  Absolute 
emerges,  "no  conception  of  God  which  takes  him  for  less 
than  Ultimate  Reality  will  satisfy  the  demands  of  the 
religious  consciousness."  He  corroborates  this  position 
by  the  assertion  that  the  religious  consciousness  will  never 
be  satisfied  with  anything  less  than  identifying  God  with 
the  Supreme  Reality  or  the  Absolute.  On  the  one  hand, 
on  the  ground  of  the  distinction  between  philosophy  and 
religion,  there  need  be  no  question  that  the  Absolute  is  a 
valid  object  of  speculative  philosophy,  as  is  witnessed  to 
by  a  long  line  of  great  thinkers ;  on  the  other  hand,  it  is 
only  for  the  religious  consciousness  that  the  Absolute  can 
be  known  as  God.  Here  is  laid  bare  both  the  connection 
and  the  distinction  between  these  two  permanent  fields  of 
human  interest.  Moreover,  there  is  no  more  serious 
obstacle  in  regarding  the  Absolute  as  an  object  of  relig- 

*  The  Idea  of  God,  Lectures  XIV,  XV. 
*Ood  and  Personalfty,  pp.  137-188. 


24>8  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

ious  devotion  than  as  an  object  of  metaphysical  specula- 
tion. God  has  been  distinguished  from  the  Absolute  in 
part  to  relieve  him  from  responsibility  for  moral  evil; 
either  the  Absolute  is  not  incompatible  with  moral  evil, 
since  in  it  is  found  the  reconciliation  of  all  discords  and 
the  perfection  of  all  mistaken  and  imperfect  endeavors, 
or  else  God  is  of  boundless  goodness,  but  of  limited  power. 

Particular  questions  involved  in  this  position  will  come 
up  for  discussion  later  when  the  personality  of  God  is 
considered.  In  the  meantime,  it  is  to  be  said  that  the 
Absolute,  if  it  is  to  be  all-embracing,  so  that  the  totality 
of  all  forms  of  existence  is  to  be  included  within  it,  com- 
ports with  evil  as  well  as  with  good.  "The  Absolute 
seems  to  be  tolerant  of  any  kind  of  world-contents  and 
experience-contents  whatever."  ^  No  evil  of  any  sort  can 
be  separate  from  the  Absolute  except  by  denying  its  exist- 
ence or  declaring  it  "unreal."  If,  however,  we  are  to 
appeal  to  experience  for  our  test  of  reality,  evil  appears 
to  be  not  less  "real"  than  good. 

The  idea  of  God  as  the  Absolute  has  arisen  in  response 
to  two  deep  and  permanent  longings :  first,  for  stability 
in  a  world  of  change;  secondly,  for  completeness  in  a 
world  of  fragmentary  experiences.  "Being"  is  thus  con- 
trasted with  "Becoming,"  and  perfection  with  what  is 
partial  and  incomplete.  Reality  is  thought  of  as  the 
unchangeable  and  eternal,  as  the  Absolute  beyond  the 
limitations  of  the  finite.  The  pious  heart  has  voiced,  this 
feeling  in  the  prayer: 

"Change  and  decay  in  all  around  I  see ; 
O  Thou  who  changest  not,  abide  with  me !" 


^W.  E.  Hocking,  The  Meaning  of  God  in  Human  Experience,  p. 
184. 


THE  ABSOLUTE  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD    249 

If  men  are  to  live,  they  must  find  a  refuge  which  abides 
through  all  the  fluctuations  of  experience,  the  same  yes- 
terday, to-day,  and  forever.  Plato  discovered  this  in  the 
metaphysical  idea  of  the  Good,  transcendent  and  change- 
less. The  Hebrews  found  it  in  the  all-powerful  will  of  a 
redeeming  God,  the  same  through  all  generations.  For 
them  the  idea  was  dynamic  and  functional;  later,  owing 
to  the  feeling  that  it  needed  a  basis  and  justification  from 
metaphysics,  the  static  was  welded  to  the  Hebrew  and 
early  Christian  dynamic  conception.  Now,  after  so 
long  a  time,  the  static  conception  has  become  a  part  of 
the  very  structure  of  our  thinking  about  God.  The  pres- 
ent need  is  therefore  twofold.  (1)  To  set  the  idea  of 
God  free  from  the  static  conception  which  has  for  cen- 
turies dominated  the  definition  of  the  Absolute.  The 
point  at  which  the  static  and  the  dynamic  have  been  fused 
must  be  discovered  and  a  solvent  applied  which  will  once 
more  separate  them  and  leave  the  moral  values  free  to 
function.  (2)  To  transfer  the  values  associated  with  the 
static  into  the  dynamic  conception  of  the  Absolute  or 
God.  This  will  take  place  when  we  look  for  the  Absolute 
not  beyond  the  world,  but  in  it:  in  its  flux  and  change 
and  becoming;  in  the  order  and  intelligence  within  it;  in 
its  permanence,  changelessness,  and  "duration."  Here,  if 
anywhere,  we  find  God.  And  here,  too,  is  all  that  we 
require  of  the  stability,  and  so  far  as  possible,  the  com- 
pleting of  the  progressive  individual  and  social  ideals. 

The  question  of  the  relation  of  the  metaphysical  Abso- 
lute to  God  is  partly  a  matter  of  definition.  If,  for  exam- 
ple, we  regard  such  an  Absolute  as  self-relating,  that  is, 
as  creating  his  own  relations,  then  naturally  his  relations 
will  be  those  only  which  are  willed  by  himself  or  which 
spring  from  his  necessitated  action.    If  in  any  respect  the 


260  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

world  conditions  the  exercise  of  his  wisdom  or  power,  this 
must  be  traced  to  his  will,  since  the  existence  of  the  world 
and  the  action  of  every  single  thing  in  it  have  their  source 
in  him.  If,  moreover,  free,  responsible  persons  further  his 
will  or  even  hinder  it,  both  their  being  and  their  activity 
must  be  referred  ultimately  to  him.  When,  therefore,  God 
is  defined  as  the  Absolute  Creator  and  the  Absolute  Sov- 
ereign, he  is  the  source  of  all  power,  the  ultimate  source 
of  evil  and  sin.  This  is  essentially  the  Augustinian-Cal- 
vinistic  doctrine  of  God.  Thus  the  relations  which  subsist 
between  the  Absolute  Will  and  all  forms  of  the  finite 
originate  in  that  will  and  may  at  any  instant  be  termi- 
nated by  it.  This  view  is,  however,  invalidated  by  several 
untenable  assumptions.  (1)  That  before  the  creation  of 
the  world  God  as  the  Absolute  was  a  solitary,  self-suffi- 
cient Being,  wholly  absorbed  in  the  intercommunion  of 
the  divine  nature,  embracing,  according  to  the  Trinitarian 
formula.  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit.  (2)  That  the 
Absolute  Power  passed  from  an  uncreating  to  a  creating 
activity.  (3)  That  the  world  therefore  had  an  absolute 
origination.  (4)  That  it  exists  outside  of  the  Absolute 
Being.  (5)  That,  accordingly,  the  creating  action  gave 
rise  to  no  reciprocally  necessary  relations  between  the 
Absolute  Will  and  the  world;  for  whereas  on  the  side  of 
the  world  these  relations  are  necessary,  on  the  side  of  the 
Absolute  Will  they  are  arbitrary :  that  Will  is  as  perfectly 
free  to  annihilate  as  to  create  the  world  of  time  and  space 
and  human  spirits.  We  have  seen  that  these  definitions  of 
God  as  the  Absolute  are  unwarranted  whether  by  scien- 
tific, philosophical,  or  religious  considerations. 

Those  who  like  Professor  Royce^  do  not  shrink  from 
attributing  to  the  Absolute  a  causal  relation  to  sin  and 
evil  awaken  a  revolt  in  the  moral  sense  at  the  implications 


THE  ABSOLUTE  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD    251 

of  such  a  view.  This  theory  is  no  more  acceptable  when 
urged  from  a  metaphysical  than  from  a  purely  theo- 
logical point  of  view.  The  moral  consciousness  will  not 
tolerate  the  notion  that  sin  originates  in  the  will  of  God. 
Forever  repugnant  is  the  suggestion  that  the  declarative 
will  of  God  requires  sin  as  a  necessary  condition  of  reveal- 
ing the  divine  justice;  equally  repugnant  is  the  supposi- 
tion that  sin  both  originates  in  and  is  overcome  by  the 
Absolute  Will. 

A  religious  relation  to  a  metaphysical  Absolute,  if  in- 
deed this  is  possible,  must  be  extremely  attenuated. 
Neither  prayer  nor  gratitude,  neither  the  sense  of  sin  nor 
a  healthy  longing  for  viijtte  could  arise  in  connection  with 
it.  No  churches  are  built  to  perpetuate  and  extend  its 
power  over  men.  No  altars  have  been  reared  for  sacri- 
ficial offerings  to  it.  No  social  service  has  been  under- 
taken in  its  name.  No  missionary  has  ever  gone  forth  to 
win  converts  to  its  saving  influence.  And  it  is  inconceiv- 
able that  any  one  should  lay  down  his  life  for  it.  If  reli- 
gion is  to  survive  on  the  earth,  the  quickening  spirit  in 
human  hearts  must  be  not  the  Absolute  but  God. 


XL    TRANSCENDENCE  AND 
IMMANENCE 


The  doctrines  of  the  divine  transcendence  and  the 
divine  immanence  have  had  a  long  and  checkered  history. 
They  have  been  associated  with  many  philosophies,  many 
experiences,  many  theories  of  the  world.  Sometimes  they 
have  been  consistently  worked  out,  each  on  its  own  line  to 
the  exclusion  of  the  other,  and  again,  under  the  conviction 
that  transcendence  and  immanence  are  complementary 
aspects  of  reality,  efforts  have  been  made  to  reconcile 
them.  Just  now  this  is  the  popular  point  of  view;  but 
the  endeavor  to  harmonize  them  is  often  beset  by  con- 
fusion of  thought  and  the  result,  being  unsatisfactory, 
invites  to  renewed  attempts  in  the  same  direction. 

Until  the  Hebrews  came  under  the  influence  of  Aryan 
thought,  whether  from  Persia  or  from  Greece  their  idea 
of  God  was  free  from  those  elements  which  later  became 
integral  and  essential  parts  of  it.  Their  God  was  in  a 
semi-detached  relation  to  the  world,  neither  rising  out  of 
it  nor  bound  absolutely  to  it;  whenever  he  would  he 
manifested  himself  in  natural  phenomena  on  the  land,  in 
the  sea  and  sky,  in  storm  and  flood,  in  famine  and  plenty, 
in  pestilence  and  war,  now  letting  his  people  go  their  way 
and  now  aiding  or  punishing  them,  giving  victory  or 
defeat  to  their  enemies.     He  was  free  to  work  his  will 


TRANSCENDENCE  AND  IMMANENCE         263 

both  in  the  hosts  of  heaven  and  among  the  inhabitants  of 
earth.  He  was  a  God  who  was  near  and  yet  afar  off. 
Their  pragmatic  idea  of  God  left  no  room  for,  as  it  had 
no  need  of,  those  subtle,  speculative  conceptions  which 
arose  among  a  people  to  whom  the  reason  meant  more 
than  the  will  and  speculative  thought  was  more  prized 
than  moral  action.  In  this  matter  Jesus  differed  in  no 
respect  from  the  prophets.  God  was  for  him  One  who  had 
all  power,  who  as  Father  answered  to  every  need  of  his 
children,  who  fed  the  birds  of  the  air,  clothed  the  grass  of 
the  field,  and  established  his  kingdom  in  the  earth.  Such  a 
question  as  "What  and  where  is  God?"  would  have  seemed 
strange  to  Jesus,  and  if  answered  by  him  at  all  must  have 
derived  its  content  from  his  experience  and  the  ideal  hopes 
of  his  people.  But  transcendence  and  immanence,  as  these 
were  conceived  by  Greek  thinkers,  by  Jewish  theologians, 
and  by  Christian  apologists,  never  emerged  above  the 
threshold  of  his  consciousness. 

n 

In  Greek  thought  transcendence  in  an  extreme  form  is 
the  doctrine  of  Aristotle,  immanence  the  doctrine  of  the 
Stoics;  traces  of  both  appear  in  the  Old,  and  especially 
in  the  New  Testament.  Plato  in  different  moods  may  be 
cited  as  representative  of  both  immanence  and  transcend- 
ence, and  the  Platonic-Stoic  philosophy  has  affinities  with 
each.  In  the  early  Christian  centuries  the  thought  of  God 
was  powerfully  influenced  by  the  Alexandrian  school  as 
may  be  seen  by  a  study  of  Plotinus  and  his  followers,  of 
Clement,  Origen,  and,  not  least,  of  Augustine.  To  the 
same  source  may  be  attributed  the  point  of  view  of  Justin  ^ 

^Apology,  I,  61  ff. 


254  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

with  which  one  may  compare  Philo^  and  the  Hermetic 
writings.^  The  development  of  the  idea  of  the  divine 
transcendence  may  be  traced  along  three  main  lines — 
theological,  mystical,  and  philosophical.  These  are  not 
always  clearly  separated  from  one  another  but  often  flow 
together;  yet  even  so  the  central  interest  will  lie  in  one 
rather  than  the  others  of  these  three  directions. 

From  the  theological  point  of  view  there  is  a  meta- 
physical aspect  of  God  which  is  remote,  unrevealed,  incon- 
ceivable, the  Absolute,  to  which  only  negative  terms  may 
be  applied.  For  the  majority  of  those  who  represent  this 
position,  transcendence  is  not  the  whole  of  God.  Many 
of  these  theologians,  as  Augustine,  conceive  of  God  as 
personal,  revealing  himself  in  the  most  intimate  and  lov- 
ing way  in  redemption.  All  of  God  that  can  become 
active  for  the  salvation  of  man  comes  into  play;  and,  so 
far  as  man  is  concerned,  if  this  were  all  of  God,  there 
would  be  no  feeling  of  the  inadequacy  of  the  divine.  For 
in  relation  to  the  world  God  is  all-wise  and  all-powerful; 
all  causes  are  the  expression  of  his  will ;  in  relation  to  men 
all  events  are  the  fulfillment  of  his  purpose.  But  theology 
is  not  merely  practical ;  it  is  in  part  the  product  of  specu- 
lative thought.  And  this  is  satisfied  only  with  alleging  a 
transcendent  element  in  God.  The  interests  supposed  to 
be  served  by  this  conception  are  various.  There  is  first 
the  feeling  that  God  must  be  far  more  than  any  expres- 
sion of  him.  For  Augustine  "God  is  more  truly  thought 
than  he  is  uttered,  and  exists  more  truly  than  he  is 
thought."  It  is  regarded  as  the  height  of  irreverent  pre- 
sumption to  suppose  that  the  plumb-line  of  our  reason  or 
imagination  can  fathom  the  utmost  depths  of  the  divine. 


^Leg.  Alleg.,  47a. 
*Poemander,  4, 


TRANSCENDENCE  AND  IMMANENCE         255 

To  the  words  of  the  prophet  a  metaphysical  meaning  is 
assigned :  "As  the  heavens  are  higher  than  the  earth,  so  are 
my  ways  higher  than  your  ways,  and  my  thoughts  than 
your  thoughts."  ^  Those  who  would  scale  the  heavens  in 
order  to  comprehend  God  are  sobered  by  the  warning: 
"Canst  thou  by  searching  find  out  God?  canst  thou  find 
out  the  Almighty  unto  perfection?"  There  is  an  element 
of  mystery  in  the  nature  as  in  the  ways  of  God  that  man 
cannot  comprehend ;  since  he  cannot  know  what  this  is,  he 
can  give  it  no  name.  It  is  more  and  other  than  what  he 
has  experienced;  yet  if  it  could  be  apprehended  it  would 
in  no  respect  contradict  but  only  complete  what  the  soul 
has  already  found  to  be  true.  The  value  of  this  assertion 
of  the  transcendence  of  God  lies  less  in  its  contribution  to 
theology  than  in  its  influence  upon  the  theologian  himself, 
in  creating  a  modest  reserve,  an  attitude  of  reverence, 
even  of  awe  toward  this  Reality  of  realities. 

One  conception  of  the  divine  transcendence  arises  from 
a  distinction  between  the  secret  and  the  revealed  will  of 
God.  The  biblical  warrant  for  this  is  sought  in  part  in  a 
word  in  the  Old  Testament:  "The  secret  things  belong 
unto  the  Lord  our  God;  but  the  things  that  are  revealed 
belong  unto  us  and  our  children  forever."  ^  There  are 
also  many  other  references  to  which  appeal  is  made  in 
support  of  the  position,  that  within  the  divine  nature  is  a 
wealth  of  wisdom  and  purpose  which  is  known  only  to 
God,  which  is  of  such  a  nature  or  degree  that  it  either  has 
not  been  or  cannot  be  communicated  to  men.^  To  this 
hidden  source  is  to  be  referred  the  decree  not  only  of  elec- 
tion to  holiness  but  of  reprobation  to  damnation.     Only 


*  Isa.  iv,  9. 
^Deut.  xxix,  29. 
•Cf.  Rom.  xi,  m 


^56  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

the  impious  and  incorrigible  could  reject  the  latter  decree, 
since  it  originated  in  the  secret  and  adorable  counsel  of 
God.  This  transcendent  aspect  of  God  is  opaque  to 
human  intelligence  and  will  remain  forever  impervious  to 
human  inquiry.  Although  it  is  irreconcilable  with  what 
we  otherwse  know  of  God,  yet  it  is  maintained  that  since 
it  is  given  by  revelation  there  is  no  recourse  but  to  accept 
it  and  bow  before  its  awful  mystery.  Such  a  tension  in 
the  divine  nature  cannot,  however,  be  tolerated  by  us, 
some  way  must  be  found  to  solve  the  contradiction  and 
render  God  either  all  transcendent,  or  else  so  known  that 
the  contradiction  disappears.  "God  is  light,  and  in  him 
is  no  darkness  at  all."  -^ 

Another  way  of  conceiving  of  the  divine  transcendence 
appears  in  the  common  doctrine  of  the  Trinity.  This 
takes  two  forms.  In  the  first,  God  is  presented  under  two 
aspects:  (1)  for  the  sake  of  redemption,  God  appears  to 
men  as  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit, — all  revealed  and 
active  in  delivering  men  from  sin,  each  with  a  definite 
function  which  may  be  intelligibly  defined.  (2)  He  is  rep- 
resented as  existing  in  an  eternal  super-mundane  form, 
with  an  inner-Trinitarian  life,  essentially  and  unchange- 
ably Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit.  Of  that  life  the 
revealed  Trinity  is  a  faint  and  far  reflection.  This  life 
was  real  and  complete  before  the  creation  of  the  world; 
nothing  was  added  to  its  fullness  or  felicity  by  the  crea- 
tion of  life ;  and  if  the  universe  were  to  sink  into  nothing- 
ness, this  would  in  no  way  affect  the  consciousness  of 
God  as  Triune.  We  have  no  language  to  describe  this  life 
of  God.    We  cannot  penetrate  to  its  inmost  secret. 

"God  only  knows  the  love  of  God." 


*  I  John  i,  6. 


TRANSCENDENCE  AND  IMMANENCE        257 

Naturally  such  a  conception  has  but  slight  bearing  on 
our  idea  of  God.  Its  only  claim  to  recognition  lies  in  the 
theory  that  the  Trinity  of  redemption  is  grounded  in  the 
eternal  transcendent  Triunity. 

In  the  second  form  of  conceiving  of  God  as  transcend- 
ent in  relation  to  the  Trinity,  the  Trinity  is  defined  as 
follows :  the  Father  is  the  source  and  ground,  and  is  mani- 
fested in  his  Son  Jesus  Christ  and  in  the  Spirit  which  is 
the  quickening  principle  of  the  consciousness  both  of  the 
individual  and  of  the  community.  So  far  as  we  interpret 
Fatherhood  through  Jesus  Christ,  we  know  what  qualities 
to  ascribe  to  it.  This  could,  however,  be  only  a  partial 
description  of  God,  for  the  term  God  signifies  immeasur- 
ably more  than  is  embodied  in  Jesus,  and  that  "more"  is 
either  the  ideal-forming  Energy  by  which  the  world  is 
carried  forward  in  the  development  of  meaning,  or  it  is 
the  unrevealed,  unexplored  element  in  the  divine  nature 
which  lies  beyond  our  present  and  even  possible  intelli- 
gence. In  either  case  we  are  brought  to  acknowledge  a 
transcendent  aspect  of  God. 


ni 


If  we  seek  a  religious  valuation  of  the  transcendence  of 
God  we  have  recourse  to  the  mystics.  There  are  two  types 
of  mysticism,  one  of  which  brings  to  full  expression  the 
doctrine  of  the  divine  immanence.  This  makes  much  of 
the  "inner  light."  It  has  affinity  with  a  pantheistic  view 
of  the  world.  It  elevates  the  feelings  to  a  commanding 
place  in  religious  experience.  An  indescribable  sense  of 
oneness  with  God  is  the  seal  of  its  consummation.  There 
are  moments  here  below  when  the  feeling  of  this  union  is 


268  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

intense  and  seems  on  the  way  to  complete  and  permanent 
realization;  ideally  this  is  not  an  exceptional  experience 
but  an  enduring  state  of  the  personal  life.  None  of  the 
powers  of  the  self  are  quiescent,  but  while  all  are  brought 
into  full  play,  the  sense  of  effort  is  wanting.  God  who 
is  to  be  real  for  the  inner  life  is  not  far  off. 

"Closer  is  he  than  breathing,  and  nearer  than  hands 
and  feet."  And  yet,  as  another  has  said,  "near  is  too 
far."  Instead  of  losing,  one  finds,  himself  in  God.  This 
type  of  mysticism  flourishes  under  the  shelter  of  the  divine 
immanence. 

The  other  type  draws  its  very  life-blood  from  a  theory 
of  the  transcendence  of  God.  For  the  great  mystics,  as 
Dionysius  the  Areopagite,  John  Scotus  Erigena,  St.  Ber- 
nard of  Clairvaux,  and  Eckhart,  the  essence  of  God  was 
beyond  human  apprehension,  indefinable,  ineffable,  incon- 
ceivable. Its  content  cannot  be  bodied  forth  by  the  imag- 
ination, fathomed  by  the  reason,  or  disclosed  by  revela- 
tion. In  the  earthly  life  there  are  moments  when  the  soul 
as  in  a  swoon  sinks  into  union  or  identification  with  God, 
but  the  moment  quickly  passes,  the  waking  memory  recalls 
nothing  of  its  secret ;  only  in  heaven  can  it  reach  its  con- 
summation, from  which  no  lapse  is  thereafter  possible. 

This  conception  of  the  divine  transcendence,  which  is 
connected  with  a  postponing  of  the  Beatific  Vision  to  the 
celestial  world  or  an  absorption  into  God  does  not,  as 
might  be  supposed,  vacate  the  earthly  life  of  positive  con- 
tent. For  in  the  interim  there  are  many  things  to  do  and 
much  to  enjoy.  Life  here  is  intensely  active.  By  prayer, 
by  discipline,  by  contemplation,  the  spirit  moves  toward 
its  divine  destination.  The  stages  of  the  journey  are  both 
religious  and  ethical.  As  religious  the  spirit  directs  its 
aspiration  and  longing,  its  prayer  and  praise,  its  peni- 


TRANSCENDENCE  AND  IMMANENCE        259 

tence  and  thanksgiving  to  God;  as  ethical  it  seeks  to 
purge  itself  of  sloth  and  self-indulgence,  to  cultivate 
every  excellence  and  all  virtue.  As  religious  there  is 
Christian  fellowship,  communion  of  saints,  desire  for  "the 
better  country."  Hymns  like  those  of  St.  Bernard  of 
Clugny,  "The  Celestial  Country"  and  Faber's  "0  Para- 
dise!" voice  this  longing  for  release  from  the  body  and 
presence  with  the  Lord.  Professor  James  in  his  Varieties 
of  Religious  Experience  has  introduced  us  to  a  score  of 
mystics  with  their  vivid  and  intense  scorn  of  earth  and 
their  unfulfilled,  impatient  longing  for  the  consummation 
of  bliss.  Yet  in  spite  of  the  insatiate  other-worldliness 
of  their  aspiration,  their  activity  in  respect  to  the  pres- 
ent world  was  of  astonishing  volume.  In  corroboration 
of  this  one  has  only  to  mention  St.  Francis  of  Assissi,  St. 
Catherine  of  Siena,  St.  Theresa,  and  Madame  Guyon. 
St.  Bernard  of  Clairvaux  would  have  been  content  only  if 
he  might  found  one  new  monastery  every  day.  Their 
mortification  of  the  flesh,  their  fidelity  to  every  task,  their 
rigorous  discipline  of  thought  and  desire,  their  practise 
of  "recollection,"  their  vigils  of  fasting  and  prayer,  were 
the  steps  by  which  "they  climbed  the  steep  ascent  of 
heaven."  Inextricably  associated  with  this  is  the  Platonic 
ideal  that  life's  goal  is  reached  only  by  the  "practise  of 
death."  The  aim  is  to  divest  one's  self  of  all  that  con- 
stitutes one  human  in  order  to  rise  into  union  with  the 
transcendent  God. 

IV 

The  chief  representatives  of  the  philosophical  view  of 
the  transcendent  God  are  Kant,  Hamilton,  and  Spencer. 
As  this  has  been  already  described,  we  do  not  need  to 


260  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

expatiate  upon  it  at  length.^  For  these  men  the  transcen- 
dence of  God  is  only  another  way  of  saying  that  he  is 
unknowable  by  the  human  reason,  first,  on  the  ground  of 
a  theory  of  knowledge  by  which  we  are  limited  to  a  knowl- 
edge of  phenomena,  and,  secondly,  on  the  ground  of  the 
unresolved  antinomies  which  beset  the  terms  Absolute  or 
Unconditioned,  Infinite,  and  First  Cause.  According  to 
Kant,  we  regulate  our  conduct  and  our  view  of  the  world 
"as  if"  God  existed;  according  to  Mansel,  the  spokesman 
of  Hamilton's  logic,  the  veil  which  hides  the  knowledge  of 
God  from  us  may  be  lifted  by  revelation;  according  to 
Spencer  the  Infinite  and  Eternal  Reality  is  of  the  same 
nature  as  that  which  wells  up  in  consciousness. 

Several  other  definitions  of  transcendence,  partly  meta- 
physical, partly  personal,  have  been  proposed:  (1)  the 
many  depend  on  the  One;  the  One  is  neither  the  sum  of 
the  many,  nor  the  material  of  which  they  are  composed ;  ^ 
(2)  God's  essence  is  infinite,  whereas  the  essence  of  nature 
is  finite  both  in  quantity  and  in  quality;  ^  (3)  the  divine 
life  is  not  exhaustively  revealed  by  any  temporal  or  spatial 
or  personal  expression  of  the  divine  Mind  or  Will ;  (4)  the 
perfect  spirituality  and  personality  of  God  constitute  his 
transcendence;  (5)  the  absolute  freedom  of  the  divine 
action  proves  transcendence. 


Immanence  rightly  understood  is  metaphysical  or  cos- 
mic ;  it  is  therefore  to  be  distinguished  from  personalism, 


»Cf.  pp.  57-59. 

'  Bowne,  Theism,  p.  245. 

'  Paulsen,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  p.  257. 


TRANSCENDENCE  AND  IMMANENCE        261 

and  also  from  a  naive  doctrine  of  omnipotence.  It  has 
been  interpreted  in  terms  of  substance,  thought,  causality 
or  force,  consciousness,  the  contingency  of  free  will,  and 
the  Logos  doctrine. 

1.  The  principal  modem  advocates  of  cosmic  imma- 
nence, based  on  the  idea  of  substance,  are  Bruno,  Jacob 
Boehme,  and  Spinoza.  According  to  Bruno  every  indi- 
vidual thing  is  an  existence-form  of  God.  Since  God  is 
the  universal  animating  principle,  each  thing  follows  in 
part  the  law  of  its  particular  nature  and  in  part  the  law 
which  holds  good  of  the  world  as  a  whole.  Boehme 
thought  of  the  world  as  an  organism,  with  God  as  its  life, 
a  conception  reflected  in  Fechner's  Ueber  die  Seelenfrage, 
For  Spinoza  God  is  the  only  life.  All  the  forces  of  exist- 
ence are  either  extension-  or  thought-modes  of  the  one 
Substance.  All  of  nature  is  God,  although  all  of  God  is 
not  included  in  nature.  Thus  a  basis  is  laid  for  a  theory 
of  transcendence  as  well  as  of  immanence. 

2.  According  to  Hegel,  to  whom  the  essential  nature 
of  reality  is  thought,  all  phenomena  are  referred  to  an 
inner,  necessary  logic  of  development.  In  this  metaphysi- 
cal pantheism  the  many  are  only  forms  of  the  One  and 
the  One  is  identical  with  the  many.  No  influences  can 
come  from  without,  since  there  is  nothing  from  which  such 
influences  would  originate.  Aside  from  the  universe  there 
is  no  self-existent  Being  who  before  the  creation  dwelt  in 
solitary  grandeur  or  who  from  an  unseen  region  sends 
forth  "light  and  truth."  The  nature  of  the  universe  is 
rational,  and  this  is  also  the  nature  of  God. 

3.  When  God  is  regarded  as  Force  or  Causality  we 
have  a  diff*erent  approach  to  the  idea  of  immanence. 
Schleiermacher,  for  example,  bases  his  conception  of  Im- 
manence on  certain  definitions:  (1)  religion  is  the  feeling 


262  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

of  absolute  dependence  which  is  man's  response  to  God 
as  the  absolute  Causality;  (^)  the  omnipresence  of  God, 
itself  unspatial,  conditions  what  is  spatial  and  even  space 
itself;  (S)  the  individual  and  limited  things  in  the  uni- 
verse are  the  immediate  expression  of  the  causality  of 
God.  For  Professor  Royce  ^  the  immanence  of  God  is 
secured  by  a  reconciliation  of  individuation  with  the 
reality  of  the  Absolute.  Each  finite  self-consciousness  is 
a  portion  of  the  divine  self-consciousness.  "The  one  will 
of  the  Absolute  is  essentially  and  organically  composed  of 
many."  The  harmony  of  all  is  due  to  the  freedom  of  each 
acting  in  unison  with  others.  Bowne  holds  that  a 
system  of  interacting  members  requires  a  unitary 
Being  by  which  they  are  posited  and  maintained  in  har- 
monious relation;  that  is,  the  One,  conceived  of  as  cau- 
sality instead  of  as  substance,  is  the  power  by  which  the 
many  exist. 

4.  In  the  theory  of  evolution  as  advocated  by  Herbert 
Spencer,  John  Fiske,  and  Joseph  Le  Conte  the  idea  of  im- 
manence is  essential  and  is  defined  by  reference  to  con- 
sciousness. Spencer  ^  has  been  cited  as  an  advocate  of 
transcendence ;  he  is  also  and  equally  on  the  side  of  imma- 
nence. In  his  ultimate  theory  of  the  world  he  declares 
that  "all  things  proceed  from  an  Infinite  and  Eternal 
Energy  which  is  of  the  same  nature  as  that  which  in  our- 
selves wells  up  in  consciousness."  According  to  Fiske 
the  world  is  not  a  machine  but  an  organism  with  an 
indwelling  principle  of  life.  Each  organic  life  is  a  spe- 
cialized form  of  the  Universal  Life.  The  evolutionary 
movement  toward  psychical  life,  the  dramatic  tendency  in 

*  Cf.  The  Conception  of  God,  p.  293.  The  World  and  Individual, 
Vol.  I,  Chapter  X,  Vol.  II,  Chap.  VII. 

«Cf.  Sociology,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  172:  "Religious  Retrospect  and  Pro«- 
pect" 


TRANSCENDENCE  AND  IMMANENCE         263 

history,  and  the  development  of  the  moral  ideal  are  the 
manifestations  of  the  indwelling,  living  God.  For  Pro- 
fessor Le  Conte  God  is  resident  in  nature.  All  phenomena 
are  modes  of  his  consciousness ;  all  natural  forces  are 
forms  of  his  consciousness ;  all  laws  of  nature  are  regular 
methods  of  the  operation  of  his  will.  God  is  the  only 
independent  reality  and  his  action  throughout  the  uni- 
verse is  direct  and  constant.  An  analogy  of  the  imma- 
nence of  God  in  the  world  is  seen  in  the  inner  psychical 
aspect  of  the  activity  of  the  brain.  Thus  the  veil  of 
nature  hides  a  person,  infinite  and  self-conscious,  whose 
perfection  is  revealed  in  the  universe.* 

5.  A  more  or  less  confused  doctrine  of  immanence  is 
based  upon  the  divine  will  yet  is  regarded  as  essentially 
real.  The  totality  of  God  pervades  and  fills  the  universe : 
God  is  present  not  potentially  but  essentially  and  as  a 
whole  in  every  part  of  the  world.  His  immanence  is,  how- 
ever, conditioned  by  his  purpose;  it  depends  on  his  free 
creating  and  conserving  will.  Such  a  relation  is  neces- 
sary to  the  world  but  not  to  God.^ 

6.  According  to  the  Logos-doctrine  as  interpreted  by 
Hegelian  dialectic,  in  the  Son  God  is  objectively  imma- 
nent, revealing  himself  in  nature  and  history,  and  espe- 
cially in  the  incarnation;  in  the  Spirit  God  is  subjectively 
present  and  immanent  in  his  redeeming  action  in  the 
human  soul  and  in  the  community  of  believers.  There  is, 
however,  nothing  arbitrary  about  this.  It  is  not  a  matter 
of  choice  whether  God  will  sustain  this  relation  to  the 
human  consciousness ;  it  is  essential  to  his  very  being ;  on 
man's  part  therefore  it  is  radical  and  indefeasible  and  can 


^Evolution  in  its  Relation  to  Religious  Thought,  pp.  888  ff.     Cf. 
also  Lyman  Abbott,  The  Theology  of  an  Evolutionist,  p.  18. 
'  A.  H.  Strong,  Systematic  Theology,  Vol.  I,  pp.  79  flF, 


2^"^  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

never  be  wholly  perverted  or  destroyed.  Humanity  is 
rooted  in  God.  God's  highest  self-expression,  indeed  his 
very  self-realization,  is  through  the  universe  and  espe- 
cially through  man  redeemed.-^ 

7.  A  conception  of  immanence  appears  in  literary 
form  in  many  modern  writers,  as  Wordsworth,  Coleridge, 
Carlyle,  Emerson,  Tennyson,  and  Walt  Whitman.  No 
one  has  defined  this  attitude  more  fitly  than  in  Words- 
worth's oft-quoted  words  ^  which  became  classic  the  mo- 
ment they  were  penned.  Those  who  see  in  Nature  a  phy- 
sical fact  only  are  blind  to  its  greater  meaning;  he  is 
aware  of 

"a  sense  sublime 
Of  something  far  more  deeply  interfused. 
Whose  dwelling  is  the  light  of  setting  suns 
And  the  round  ocean  and  the  living  air 
And  the  blue  sky,  and  in  the  mind  of  man ; 
A  motion  and  a  spirit  that  impels 
All  thinking  things,  all  objects  of  all  thought 
And  rolls  through  all  things." 

This  feeling  has  been  associated  with  the  Romantic  move- 
ment in  poetry,  with  the  evolutionary  view  in  science, 
with  the  metaphysics  of  one  type  of  idealistic  philosophy, 
and  with  certain  interpretations  of  religion  from  the  point 
of  view  of  experience  and  the  consciousness  of  values. 
Its  permanent  appeal  to  the  human  spirit  is  witnessed  to 
by  its  long  history  and  its  prevalence  among  many  races 
of  men;  and  that  too  not  alone  in  the  earlier  animistic 
stages  but  in  the  highest  circles  of  human  development — 


^Cf.  A.  E.  Garvie,  A  Handbook  of  Apologetics,  pp.  157-158.     Cf. 
A.  H.  Strong,  Christ  in  Creation  and  Ethical  Monism. 
^ Lines  Above  Tintern  Abbey. 


TRANSCENDENCE  AND  IMMANENCE        266 

Hindu,  Greek,  Mohammedan,  and  English.  In  some  quar- 
ters it  seems  to  have  reached  the  saturation  point,  as  in 
Emerson,  Whitman,  John  Burroughs,  and  in  many  Rus- 
sian and  French  novelists.  That  the  ethical  ideals  asso- 
ciated with  this  general  attitude  are  at  times  naturalistic 
or  at  least  not  marked  by  the  vigor  and  rigor  of  Kant's 
categorical  imperative  is  easily  understood.  These 
writers  think  of  the  universe  as  animated  throughout  by  a 
single  Principle  or  Power,  so  that  morality  is  everywhere 
and  always,  even  when  tinged  with  Stoic  fortitude,  rela- 
tive to  time  and  place  and  degree  of  evolution. 


VI 

The  entire  question  of  transcendence  and  immanence 
requires  restatement  and  revaluation.  The  classic  form 
in  which  each  of  these  ideas  appeared  arose  from  differ- 
ent sources  and  as  ideas  are  incapable  of  reconciliation. 
They  cannot  be  harmonized  in  any  being  so  as  to  become 
constituent  parts  of  a  personality.  Attempts  have  been 
made  in  this  direction,  but  the  result  is  a  clumsy  piecing 
together  of  incongruous  elements.  Devotional  hymns 
render  this  incongruity  less  conspicuous,  partly  because 
they  express  what  the  pious  heart  feels  and  partly  be- 
cause they  envisage  reality  in  concrete  representative 
forms.  This  has  never  been  more  finely  put  than  by  Dr. 
Holmes,  who  has  given  to  transcendence  and  immanence 
and  all  that  lies  between  them  their  full  value. 

"Lord  of  all  being,  throned  afar. 
Whose  glory  flames  from  sun  and  star; 
Center  and  soul  of  every  sphere, 
Yet  to  each  loving  heart  how  near." 


266  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

The  theories  of  transcendence  and  immanence  origi- 
nated on  Greek  soil.  The  conceptions  of  them  which  have 
been  most  in  vogue  among  later  theologians  seem  to  have 
forgotten  their  source  and  have  wandered  off  into  con- 
fused and  incoherent  formulas.  To  be  in  earnest  with 
either  one  of  these  has  always  resulted  in  a  reduction  of 
the  other  to  a  meaningless  framework,  or  if  the  intention 
was  to  retain  both,  they  were  subjected  to  an  interpreta- 
tion far  removed  from  their  historic  and  intelligible  set- 
ting. Transcendence  has  been  evaporated  into  a  spir- 
itual freedom  of  activity,  immanence  into  a  willed  omni- 
present energy.  At  a  time  when  second  causes  were  set 
over  against  the  First  Cause,  immanence  was  defined  as 
the  divine  providential  activity  which  "energizes  in  the 
second  causes."  ^  A  recent  writer  says  that  through  the 
divine  immanence  the  "whole  organism  of  humanity  is  en- 
vironed and  saturated  with  the  Spirit  of  God."  ^  In  such 
presentations  a  distinction  between  transcendence  and 
immanence  melts  away  and  the  same  definition  serves  for 
both.  In  case,  however,  one  seeks  to  maintain  the  com- 
mon distinction  between  transcendence  and  immanence, 
the  divine  nature  is  separated  into  two  unrelated  and 
incongruous  parts. 

If  we  are  to  assign  any  meaning  to  transcendence  we 
must  avoid  the  assumption  that  God  is  independent  of 
the  universe,  that  his  life  would  be  complete  without  it, 
and  that  he  is  any  degree  separated  from  it.  Apart  from 
the  universe  God  is  inconceivable :  no  content  can  be 
attributed  to  his  being.  All  that  we  know  or  can  know 
of  him  is  conditioned  on  our  knowledge  of  the  world. 
Moreover,  we  believe  that  there  is  no  "beyond,"  no  Epi- 

*  L.  F.  Stearns  Present-Day  Theology,  p.  268. 
'J.  H.  Snowden,  The  Personality  of  Ood,  p.  109. 


TRANSCENDENCE  AND  IMMANENCE         267 

curean  heaven  removed  from  the  world,  as  a  dwelling- 
place  for  the  divine.  Prayer  is  often  conceived  of  as  in 
the  formula  of  the  dedication  of  Solomon's  temple, 
addressed  to  a  Being  far  above  the  earth:  "hear  thou  in 
heaven  thy  dwelling-place."  A  New  Testament  writer 
refers  to  God  as  "dwelling  in  light  unapproachable.'* 
For  such  a  Being  intermediaries  would  be  necessary,  even 
as  for  the  Olympian  Zeus,  flying  from  heaven  to  earth, 
from  earth  to  heaven.  It  is  not,  however,  so  much  the 
precise  conceptions  of  an  earlier  time  as  the  attitude  of 
feeling  enshrined  in  these  conceptions  which  lives  on  in 
the  popular  mind.  The  intermediaries  have  disappeared, 
unless  indeed  Jesus  and  the  Holy  Spirit  are  regarded  as 
such,  but  prayers  still  go  "up"  to  God,  between  whom 
and  the  worshiper  is  some  mysterious  means  of  communi- 
cation. To  those  who  are  thus  disposed,  wireless  teleg- 
raphy has  been  seized  upon  as  an  analogy,  suggesting 
that  distance  is  annihilated  between  the  aspiring  soul  and 
God.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  vague  sense  of  relief 
at  the  thought  that  God  is  far  off  rather  than  near: 
otherwise  the  soul's  most  private  sanctuary  is  invaded  and 
thoughts  and  feelings,  which  one  likes  to  believe  are  known 
only  to  one's  self,  are  open  to  the  gaze  of  another  of 
whose  presence  one  is  unaware.  Every  one  has  secrets 
which  he  not  only  does  not  but  even  cannot  lay  bare  to 
his  most  intimate  and  sympathetic  friend ;  how  much  more 
would  he  shrink  from  freely  exposing  them  to  the  sight 
of  the  Most  Holy  and  the  Most  Loving.  Many  comfort- 
ing assurances  have  grown  out  of  that  word  in  the  Reve- 
lation :  *  "Behold,  I  stand  at  the  door  and  knock ;  if  any 
man  hear  my  voice  and  open  the  door,  I  will  come  in  to 

Mii,  20. 


268  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

him,  and  will  sup  with  him,  and  he  with  me."  Although 
this  may  be  the  feeling  and  language  of  religion  or  of  the 
naive  consciousness,  it  is  not  true  to  reality.  It  is  the 
survival  of  a  conception  of  God  which  lingers  in  the  popu- 
lar mind  after  the  view  of  the  world  in  which  it  arose  and 
was  once  at  home  has  ceased  to  function  in  the  scientific 
and  philosophical  consciousness. 

On  the  other  hand,  quite  as  far  removed  from  the  truth 
is  that  theory  of  the  divine  immanence  which  conceives  of 
God  either  as  identical  with  the  universe,  himself  Nature 
in  all  its  contents  and  operations,  or  as  so  imprisoned 
within  the  physical  order  as  to  be  determined  forever  by 
physical  necessity.  We  have  already  seen  that  while  there 
is  an  element  of  invariable  mechanism,  there  is  also  a  pur- 
posive element  in  the  universe,  everywhere  present  and 
everywhere  active,  to  which  all  the  meaning  of  the  universe 
is  to  be  referred.  Accordingly,  mechanical  necessity  does 
not  swallow  up  the  freedom  of  this  all-pervasive  Power, 
for  the  sphere  of  freedom  is  the  realm  of  ends. 

If  the  terms  immanence  and  transcendence  are  still  to 
be  valid,  they  must  grow  out  of  our  view  of  the  world 
and  be  interpreted  so  as  not  to  be  mutually  contradictory 
or  to  nullify  each  other  when  referred  to  the  same  Reality. 
It  would  perhaps  be  preferable  to  dispense  with  both  of 
these  terms  in  favor  of  some  word  which  has  no  embar- 
rassing implications.  Since,  however,  the  terms  in  their 
present-day  use  have  no  fixed  and  uniform  connotation, 
we  need  not  hesitate  to  seek  a  meaning  which  shall  justify 
our  use  of  them.  Accordingly,  we  shall  find  immanence 
in  a  universal  purposive  principle  or  activity,  and  trans- 
cendence in  the  ideal  meaning  which  has  been  and  is  to  be 
developed  in  distinction  from  the  immediately  actual. 
The  two  are  therefore  not  essentially  different  from  each 


TRANSCENDENCE  AND  IMMANENCE         269 

other:  they  are  different  aspects  of  the  same  Reality.  If 
we  may  seek  an  analogy  to  the  divine  in  the  human  experi- 
ence, we  shall  say,  on  the  one  hand,  that  at  every  instant 
consciousness  continues  its  purposive  activity  and  is  char- 
acterized by  a  definite  content;  on  the  other  hand,  that 
there  are  ideals  and  potencies  within  it  not  yet  realized, 
which  await  future  actualization.  There  would  be  no 
present  content  if  there  were  no  ideal  aspect,  and  there 
would  be  no  ideal  aspect  without  the  actual  content,  of 
experience.  While  these  two  points  of  view  may  be  dis- 
tinguished from  each  other,  they  cannot  be  separated. 
It  is  as  if  the  ideal  hovered  over  the  actual  and  beckoned 
it  forward  to  new  stages  of  achievement,  or  as  if  there 
were  in  the  actual  an  indefeasible  urge  toward  further  and 
higher  forms  of  the  actual  (cf.  Heb.  xi,  16).  God  is  im- 
manent so  far  as  he  is  the  pervasive  principle  or  energy 
by  which  the  creative  process  is  carried  forward;  he  is 
transcendent  so  far  as  there  are  infinite  possibilities  in 
the  creative  process  which  may  be  realized  under  tem- 
poral, spatial,  and  conscious  forms.  The  immanent 
God  is 

"The  God  of  things  as  they  are"; 

the  transcendent  God  is  the  God  of  things  as  they  are  to 
become.  Since,  however,  being  is  ever  passing  into  becom- 
ing, God  as  immanent  is  not  static  but  dynamic ;  and 
because  becoming  rises  out  of  and  fulfills  being,  God  as 
transcendent  is  not  detached  from  the  actual.  If  he  is 
the  changing,  he  is  also  the  permanently,  real  One. 

In  different  systems  of  worlds  in  the  universe  the  trans- 
cendence of  God  has  different  meanings;  whether  in  a 
given  world  there  is  life  and  personal  consciousness ;  in 
some  worlds  this  may  have  existed  and  have  disappeared ; 


270  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

in  one  system  and  another  this  or  a  different  expression 
of  the  creative  energy  may  be  in  process  of  realization. 
Here  is  life  and  consciousness,  in  perhaps  a  single  planet 
of  our  solar  system ;  in  Orion  or  Capella  a  divine  impulse 
may  be  working  out  an  even  more  wonderful  result.  The 
resources  of  God  are  various  and  inexhaustible;  we  know 
those  only  with  which  experience  has  made  us  aware. 
Some  of  these  are  disclosed  in  flashing  insights  of  scien- 
tific research;  others  are  conjectured  on  the  ground  of 
analogy.  The  question  as  to  how  far  there  is  a  divine 
memory  and  a  divine  anticipation,  distinct  and  separate 
from  the  world-process,  is  one  of  deep  interest  but  one 
which  we  may  not  be  in  position  to  solve.  Whether  the 
divine  memory  is  registered  in  the  present  dynamic  ten- 
dencies of  the  universe,  as  these  have  arisen  out  of  the 
past,  enriched  by  continuous  accretions  from  creative 
evolution,  and  the  divine  anticipation  is  to  be  identified 
with  all  that  is  involved  in  the  existing  movements  of  the 
present  hour,  must  be  left  an  open  question.  In  any 
case,  no  other  memory  or  foreknowledge  than  this  is  sus- 
ceptible of  proof.  To  speak  of  an  infinite  fullness  of 
knowledge  in  the  Absolute,  out  of  all  necessary  relation 
to  or  dependence  on  the  universe  is  to  use  terms  which  are 
purely  a  matter  of  definition.  No  defensible  doctrine  of 
revelation  could  guarantee  the  validity  of  belief  of  an 
absolute  foreknowledge  of  all  events  which  lie  in  the  bosom 
of  the  future.  Nor  can  it  be  shown  that  any  tenable 
theory  of  salvation  requires  such  prescience  on  the  part 
of  God.  It  is  enough  if  the  individual  self  and  the  social 
organism  are  both  quickened  to  higher  ethical  and  spir- 
itual activity  by  the  divine  purposive  will  and  find  an  ade- 
quate response  in  it  to  their  ever-renewed  endeavor.  This 
resource  from  which  life  draws  its  meaning  is  none  other 


TRANSCENDENCE  AND  IMMANENCE         271 

than  the  immanent  yet  exhaustless  and  therefore  trans- 
cendent Creative  Good  Will. 

One  of  the  most  significant  aspects  of  transcendence  is 
seen  in  the  evolution  of  life  on  our  globe.  It  would  have 
been  a  reasonable  supposition  that  when  vegetable  and 
animal  existence  appeared  the  Purposive  Will  operating 
in  nature  had  reached  its  goal.  But  as  one  traces  the 
long  process  in  which  higher  forms  have  emerged,  he 
becomes  aware  that  reserves  of  power  and  adaptation 
have  been  drawn  upon  until  man  comes  forth  to  begin  his 
struggle  for  existence,  the  development  of  his  moral  ideas, 
and  the  creation  of  a  social  organism  which  is  to  embody 
his  instinctive  and  conscious  aims.  If  this  evolution  had 
been  arrested  at  any  of  its  lower  stages,  who  could  have 
imagined  the  potencies  for  good  which  have  later  come  to 
manifestation — ^justice,  sacrifice,  social  service.'*  We  are 
told  not  alone  by  social  dreamers  but  by  sober  students  of 
history  that  humanity  is  only  just  now  entering  upon  an 
era  of  well-being,  vaster  and  more  splendid  than  all  that 
has  gone  before.  What  forms  this  higher  good  will 
assume  it  is  vain  to  conjecture.  Even  more  impotent  is 
one's  imagination  to  picture  the  high  moral  and  spiritual 
achievements  of  the  race  many  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
years  hence.  Nor  may  we  form  any  notion  of  the  nature 
and  attainment  of  those  beings  who  are  yet  to  dwell  in 
other  worlds  of  space.  All  this  belongs  to  the  region  of 
the  divine  transcendence,  the  so  far  unrevealed  and  meas- 
ureless potencies  of  the  Source  of  all  good.  On  the  other 
hand,  as  we  observe  the  movements  of  the  world-order  and 
the  progress  of  historical  events,  we  see  something  of  the 
divine  transcendence  passing  into  immanence,  and  the 
immanent  aspect  continually  changing,  as  the  world,  espe- 
cially man,  becomes  susceptible  to  finer  adjustments  and 


272  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

the  realizing  of  more  spiritual  ends.  The  supreme  in- 
stance of  this  is  Christianity  in  its  relation  both  to  other 
religions  and  to  its  own  background.  The  potencies  of 
the  divine  operating  in  it  carry  to  a  further  stage  the 
essential  ideals  of  other  religions,  including  the  Hebrew 
religion,  while  it  is  at  every  moment  scarcely  more  than 
the  promise  of  what  it  is  to  become.  It  is  what  it  is 
because  the  immanent  God  has  wrought  in  and  with  the 
human  spirit;  it  will  press  on  toward  its  consummation 
because  of  the  infinite  riches  of  grace  which  await  fulfill- 
ment from  a  transcendent  aspect  of  God. 


XIL     THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD 

I 

Eari.y  Christian  writers  made  no  more  attempt  than 
did  non-Christian  writers  to  analyze  and  define  person- 
ality. They  regarded  man  as  personal.  Since  man  was 
made  in  the  image  of  God,  God  was  also  personal,  that  is, 
of  the  same  nature  as  man.  Not  that  they  did  not  believe 
that  there  were  qualities  in  God  which  man  did  not  pos- 
sess, but  they  were  chiefly  interested  to  attribute  to  God 
what  they  conceived  to  be  the  highest  in  man.  The  high- 
est names  they  gave  to  him  represented  the  supreme  char- 
acter and  functions  of  man — King,  Lord,  Ruler,  and  best 
of  all.  Father.  Their  discussion  centered  not  in  the  per- 
sonality of  God  but  personality  in  God.^  As  their  doc- 
trine of  sin  was  that  of  "Original  sin,"  so  their  doctrine  of 
God  was  that  of  the  Trinity — three  persons  in  one  God. 
They  were  sensitive  as  to  the  use  of  the  term  "person,"  but 
their  sensitivity  was  limited  to  the  definition  and  defense  of 
the  "persons"  of  the  Godhead.  It  is  only  recently  that 
the  focus  of  discussion  has  shifted  from  personality  in 
God  to  that  of  the  personality  of  God. 

n 

From  its  first  appearance  the  word  person  has  been  a 
disturbing  presence  in   theological  usage.      It  is  purely 

» Cf .  C.  C.  J.  Webb,  God  and  Perscmality. 

278 


274  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

technical,  "convenient,"  so  it  was  labeled  by  St.  Thomas 
Aquinas.^  It  has,  and  indeed  it  has  always  had,  a  dif- 
ferent meaning  when  applied  to  the  persons  of  the  Trinity 
from  that  applied  to  men,  and  hence  often  leads  to  con- 
fusion of  thought.  Fairbaim  says  that  it  belongs  to  "the 
category  of  the  schools,"  which  is  true.  Much  trouble 
would  have  been  avoided  if  it  could  have  kept  its  academic 
seclusion.  It  comes  forth,  however,  into  the  light  of  day, 
forgetful  of  the  limitations  imposed  upon  it.  In  a  work 
intended  for  thoughtful  readers,  one  comes  upon  these 
words :  "there  is  a  true  sense  in  which  God  in  his  unity  is  a 
person.  .  .  .  Accordingly,  we  must  understand  tri-per- 
sonality  as  existing  consistently  with  the  unipersonality  of 
God."  Referring  to  personal  distinctions  implied  in  the 
terms  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit,  the  author  continues : 
"We  cannot  suppose  that  these  personalities,  these  Egos 
or  selves,  are  bounded  off  and  separated  from  each  other, 
as  is  the  case  with  men.  Rather  are  we  led  to  suppose 
that  in  the  one  self-consciousness  of  the  infinite  God  there 
are  three  distinct  centers  of  self-consciousness,  three  dis- 
tinct Egos  which  spring  from  and  are  merged  in  the  one 
divine  Ego.  .  .  .  The  closeness  of  the  relation  between 
the  three  persons  is  indicated  in  the  teaching  of  Orthodox 
theologians,  that  in  each  act  of  every  one  of  the  persons 
the  other  two  participate.^  This  is  only  one  instance 
among  many  which  might  be  cited  from  contemporary 
works  on  the  same  subject.^  However  circumspectly, 
even  meticulously,  a  writer  guards  the  preliminary  defini- 
tion of  the  term  "person,"  and  hedges  about  his  statement 
as  to  the  use  he  will  make  of  it,  he  invariably  neglects  to 


^8wmma  I,  Quaest.  29,  sec.  3. 

*L.  F.  Stearns,  Present-Day  Theology,  pp.  196-197. 

•Cf.  J.  H.  Snowden,  The  Personality  of  God,  pp.  36-S7. 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD  276 

observe  his  own  restrictions.  In  general  this  type  of 
thought  is  found  only  in  works  on  dogmatic  theology;  it 
rarely  ever  appears  in  treatises  on  theism. 

Although  to  the  word  person  or  personality  wholly 
different  meanings  are  assigned  when  referred  to  God  from 
those  applied  to  man,  yet  as  in  the  above  quotation  we  can 
see  precisely  where  the  confusion  arises.  Personality  is 
subjected  to  two  different  meanings,  yet  there  is  no  indi- 
cation that  the  same  word  is  not  valid  for  both  uses. 
Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit  are  called  persons,  and  God 
as  a  unitary  Being  is  also  called  a  person.  This  two-fold 
usage  has  arisen  in  response  to  two  situations,  one  an- 
cient, the  other  modern.  We  shall  first  indicate  the  origin 
and  meaning  of  the  term  "person"  in  early  Christian 
thinking,  and  then  show  how  more  recently  the  same  term 
has  acquired  a  different  significance. 

In  order  to  defend  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  the  early 
church  had  to  discover  in  the  nature  of  God  a  dual  aspect, 
one  of  which  represented  the  essential  reality,  the  other  a 
multiplicity  of  forms  or  entities  which  laid  a  basis  for  a 
two-fold  distinction  in  the  one  undivided  Being.  This 
was  expressed  in  the  Greek  creeds  by  the  use  of  three 
terms,  one  of  which  represented  being  or  reality  in  its 
widest  reference  (o^aia),  the  others,  concrete  differ- 
ences in  the  divine  nature  which  yet  involved  the  pos- 
session of  a  common  essence  (i)x6aTa(Ti?  and  Tupoawroov). 
When  the  discussion  of  the  Trinity  was  carried  over  to 
the  Latin  church,  by  a  singular  fortune  the  term  "Sub- 
stance" which  would  naturally  have  been  equivalent  to  the 
second  of  the  Greek  terms  referred  to  (yiuoaTaiJi? ) 
came  to  stand  for  being  or  essence,  and  another  word 
was  introduced  to  signify  the  three  distinctions  in  the 
Godhead,   namely,   "Person."      Thus,   Father,   Son,    and 


276  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

Holy  Spirit  are  persons,  although  possessing  a  common 
substance : 

"God  in  three  persons,  blessed  Trinity." 

Until  recently  the  definition  of  "person"  which  has  been 
generally  accepted,  owes  its  formulation  to  Boethius  in 
the  early  part  of  the  sixth  century:  ''Persona  est  natwrce 
rationalis  individua  substantia'^ — person  is  the  individual 
subsistence  of  a  rational  nature.^  Two  aspects  of  the 
definition  are  to  be  noted:  (1)  a  person  is  an  individual, 
yet  not  necessarily  of  a  fixed  and  changeless  character; 
(2)  a  rational  nature  is  a  universal  property  common  to 
many  individual  persons.  Accordingly,  while  all  persons 
are  individuals,  all  individuals  are  not  persons.  More- 
over, in  the  traditional  doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  while  the 
persons  of  the  Godhead  are  individual,  there  is  one 
rational  nature  common  to  all  alike.  This,  then,  is  the 
standard  or  official  doctrine  of  the  Greek  and  Roman,  the 
Lutheran  and  Reformed  churches. 

The  history  of  this  doctrine  in  the  Christian  church 
shows  that  it  is  beset  with  inner  difficulties  which  have 
never  been  and  perhaps  can  never  be  resolved — ^logical, 
metaphysical,  psychological,  ethical,  and  religious.  The 
confusion  and  the  contradiction  inherent  in  the  definition 
of  persons  in  its  traditional  setting  is  apparently  so 
serious  that  at  present  interest  in  it  is  hardly  more  than 
academic.  It  is  for  the  most  part  confined  to  theologians 
who  are  more  intent  on  conserving  the  past  than  finding 
truth  for  the  present,  to  theological  students  in  the  early 
stages  of  their  training,  and  to  controversial  preachers 
who  make  it  a  point  to  defend  all  the  dogmas  of  the 


*Cf.  Webb,  op  cit,  pp.  47-48. 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD  277 

church,  regardless  of  conditions  which  have  rendered  these 
dogmas  if  not  obsolete  yet  inactive.  The  average  lay- 
man, whether  he  is  college-bred  or  not,  is  ignorant  con- 
cerning the  doctrine  of  the  three  persons  in  one;  or,  if 
he  chances  to  know,  he  passes  it  by  as  something  which  his 
pastor  may  preach  about  but  which  has  for  him  no  prag- 
matic value. 

It  is  conceivable  that  if  the  doctrine  of  the  three  per- 
sons in  the  Godhead  were  to  survive  and  once  more  resume 
its  ancient  supremacy,  belief  in  the  personality  of  God 
might  be  seriously  endangered;  indeed  all  interest  in  the 
personality  of  God  might  cease,  having  been  concentrated 
on  personality  in  God  or  the  three  persons  of  the  Trinity. 
At  present,  however,  this  danger  is  far  from  imminent, 
the  tendency  is  all  the  other  way,  and  unity  rather  than 
triunity  is  the  trend  of  the  time. 

These  remarks  are  subject  to  slight  qualification  in 
view  of  a  particular  theory  of  the  Trinity.  Its  aim  is  to 
provide  a  basis  in  the  Godhead  for  the  social  relations  of 
men — the  family,  the  church,  the  state,  and  indeed  all 
the  forms  of  association  in  which  humanity  realizes  its 
destiny  in  a  social  organism.  According  to  this  con- 
ception God  is  not  a  unitary  Being,  solitary  in  an  insu- 
lated felicity ;  he  is  a  social  Being,  Father,  Son,  and  Holy 
Spirit — an  eternal  society.  Before  the  creation  of  the 
world  the  inner  fellowship  of  the  Trinity  was  complete 
and  perfect.  And  since  man  was  created  in  the  divine 
image,  his  ideal  is  to  become  through  social  union  and 
activity  what  God  is.  And  as  Father  and  Son  are  not 
complete  each  in  himself  without  the  other  or  apart  from 
the  Spirit,  so  every  man  is  incomplete  except  as  he  shares 
a  common  good  in  a  social  family  patterned  after  the 
divine  Family,  between  which  and  humanity  is  the  recipro- 


278  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

city  of  love.  Even  if  one  hesitates  to  yield  assent  to  this 
conception,  one  cannot  fail  to  be  attracted  to  the  aim 
for  which  it  is  put  forth.  For  the  social  is  among  the 
very  first  of  all  present-day  interests.  He  who  surren- 
ders himself  to  social  as  distinguished  from  purely  indi- 
vidualistic aims, — and  the  hope  of  the  world  lies  in  the 
social  gospel, — must  find  in  the  nature  of  man,  in  the 
structure  of  the  universe,  and  most  of  all  in  the  consti- 
tution of  God  the  ground  of  his  confidence.  Whether 
such  a  theory  of  the  nature  of  God  as  this  conception  of 
the  Trinity  oifers  provides  the  basis  desired  is  question- 
able. Whether  the  theory  itself  is  a  true  interpretation 
of  the  inner  life  of  God  is  more  than  questionable.  That 
the  theory  is  imaginatively  conceivable  does  not  guaran- 
tee its  truth.  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  good,  the  con- 
serving power  in  the  realization  of  human  well-being,  be 
already  in  existence  in  perfect  actuality;  it  is  only  nec- 
essary that  it  be  in  process  of  development,  endowed  with 
the  promise  and  potency  of  renewal  and  advance.  The 
evidence  for  the  social  life  of  God  as  described  above  is 
unconvincing  because  in  the  nature  of  the  case  it  is  inac- 
cessible to  the  human  mind.  On  the  other  hand,  all  those 
to  whom  God  is  real  believe  that  he  is  the  source  and 
inspirer  of  all  the  social  ideals  in  which  lie  the  future  of 
humanity.  For  the  divine  purposive  will  is  exhaustlessly 
rich  in  impulsions  toward  all  those  ends  in  which  the  high- 
est good  is  realized. 


m 


The  solution  of  the  problem  under  consideration  is  not 
advanced  by  setting  up  a  distinction  between  person  and 
personality ;  as  if  there  were  a  difference  between  the  per- 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD  279 

sons  of  the  Godhead  and  the  personality  of  God.  Nor 
does  it  meet  the  case  to  say  that  the  Father,  Son,  and 
Holy  Spirit  are  persons,  but  that  God  is  a  super-person- 
ality which  somehow  embraces  the  three  in  a  mysterious 
unity.^  The  confusion  into  which  this  whole  matter  has 
been  plunged  is  seen  in  treatises  on  the  Person  of  Jesus 
Christ,  and  the  Personality  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  where  the 
aim  is  to  formulate  a  doctrine  of  the  nature  of  Christ  and 
the  nature  and  function  of  the  Spirit  as  individual  and 
also  as  members  of  the  Trinitarian  life  of  God.  In  treat- 
ing of  Christ  the  method  is  first  to  describe  Jesus  as  a 
historical  person,  and  then  to  investigate  the  meaning  of 
his  person  in  a  metaphysical  realm.  This  results  in  three 
very  different  descriptions:  (1)  his  human  nature;  (2)  his 
divine  nature  in  union  with  his  human  nature  in  the  incar- 
nate state;  (3)  his  eternal  nature  in  the  being  of  God, 
in  no  way  dependent  upon  the  incarnation.  The  Holy 
Spirit  is  presented  as  an  eternal  subsistence  in  the  life  of 
God,  as  a  cosmic  spirit  immanent  in  the  life  of  the  world, 
and  as  an  agent  in  the  work  of  redemption.^  Our  atten- 
tion is,  however,  detained  by  several  suggestive  facts: 
first,  complete  treatises  are  devoted  to  one  or  another 
member  of  the  Trinity,  Father,  Son  or  Jesus,  and  Holy 
Spirit,  as  If  each  of  these  was  practically  Independent  of 
the  others ;  secondly,  there  Is  the  person  but  not  the  per- 
sonality of  Jesus  Christ ;  thirdly.  Instead  of  the  person  It 
Is  the  personality  of  the  Holy  Spirit ;  fourthly.  Father- 
hood is  substituted  for  personality  in  God.  Between  1860 
and  1900  this  was  the  well-nigh  universal  practise  of 
writers  on  these  subjects.  It  still  continues  In  many  quar- 
ters.    Recently,  however,  another  path  has  been  struck 

*  Cf.  Snowden,  op.  ciL,  p.  86-87. 

'Cf.  F,  B.  Denio,  The  Sv/preme  Leader. 


280  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

out.  This  variation  in  the  use  of  terms  as  applied  to  the 
different  aspects  of  Christian  experience  is,  to  say  the 
least,  confusing.  One  result  is  that  the  reader  of  average 
intelligence,  perplexed  at  a  use  of  words  and  a  method  of 
argument  which  he  meets  with  nowhere  else,  withdraws 
attention  and  becomes  indifferent  to  the  whole  matter. 
He  is  not  unwilling  that  his  pastor  preach  an  occasional 
sermon  on  the  subject,  but  he  feels  that  while  it  may  be  a 
part  of  the  church's  faith,  it  lies  entirely  beyond  the 
circle  of  his  understanding.  An  opposite  result  is  that 
many  readers  whose  uncritical  opinions  have  been  received 
upon  authority,  supposing  themselves  to  be  in  possession 
of  the  truth,  become  vehement  advocates  of  the  teaching 
they  have  imbibed.  Unless  we  are  prepared  to  regard 
"person"  as  a  function  of  the  Deity, — in  which  case  an- 
other word  should  be  substituted  for  it, — it  would  be 
better  to  dispense  with  it  altogether.  Until  this  is  done, 
we  must  expect  confusion  to  continue,  and  the  confusion 
will  become  more  serious  by  as  much  as  the  present  ten- 
dency develops  to  fix  attention  exclusively  on  the  person- 
ality of  God. 


IV 


In  more  recent  times  this  question  has  been  approached 
from  a  different,  one  might  almost  say,  a  revolutionary 
angle.  This  path  has  indeed  been  already  trodden  by 
philosophers,  although  not  without  the  companionship  of 
theologians.  The  philosophers  have  compelled  a  revision 
of  the  whole  inquiry  concerning  the  personality  of  man 
and  God.  Except  in  the  case  of  Hegel  and  his  followers 
of  the  right  wing,  little  or  no  attempt  has  been  made  to 
find  in  the  personality  of  God  a  place  for  the  "persons"  of 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOE|  281 

the  Trinity.  The  question  has  been  generally  although 
not  wholly  detached  from  its  relation  to  the  Trinity ;  and 
God  is  thought  of  as  one.  It  is  not  so  much  what  God 
might  be  in  himself, — this  had  occupied  the  attention  of 
the  theologians  of  the  early  church, — as  what  might  be  his 
relation  to  the  world  and  to  the  religious  consciousness 
of  men.  The  scientific  spirit  is  abroad,  the  world  is  con- 
ceived of  as  a  unity;  an  adequate  cause  must  be  sought 
for  its  production.  The  Creator  of  this  vast  mechanical 
order  must  be  one.  Since  the  universe  bears  traces  of 
power  and  wisdom  and  goodness,  the  Source  of  it  must 
not  only  not  be  less  but  more  than  it;  he  must  himself 
possess  in  the  highest  degree  the  properties  found  in  the 
universe.  But  power,  wisdom,  and  goodness  are  the  marks 
of  personality.  Passing  from  the  natural  world  to  the 
moral  order  Schleiermacher  -^  found  in  religious  experi- 
ence a  warrant  for  ascribing  personality  to  God.  He 
makes  no  attempt  to  analyze  the  content  of  personality, 
save  only  as  it  is  related  to  the  religious  consciousness. 
Later  his  outline  of  personality  became  more  vague  and 
shadowy  and  the  reality  as  objective  yielded  its  place  to 
the  postulate  of  religious  experience. 

The  common,  one  might  call  it  the  naive,  way  of  reach- 
ing a  definition  of  the  divine  personality  is  by  attributing 
to  it  the  properties  which  are  characteristic  of  the  human 
consciousness.  When,  for  example,  by  Snowden  ^  these 
properties  are  described  as  intellect,  sensibility,  and  will, 
the  method  of  procedure  is  to  set  these  free  from  their 
finite  limitations  and  thus  raise  them  to  the  highest  degree 
of  excellence  and  activity.  The  personality  of  God  is 
defined  in  terms  of  consciousness.     This  consciousness  is 


*Cf.  On  Religion,  pp.  98  flF.,  transl.  by  Oman. 
»0p.  ciL,  pp.  40  if. 


282  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

fundamentally  intelligence,  feeling,  and  will,  but  it  has  no 
need  of  the  processes  which  are  necessary  to  the  human 
mind.  God  knows  by  an  infinite  and  immediate  aware- 
ness. His  relation  to  time  and  space  is  beyond  our  com- 
prehension. His  emotional  life,  although  real,  is  both 
higher  and  deeper  than  that  of  man,  and  perhaps  different 
in  kind.  His  will  acts  without  the  use  of  means. 
Thought,  feeling,  and  will  are  in  perfect  unison.  His  in- 
telligence is  omniscience,  his  will  omnipotent;  no  similar 
term  is,  however,  found  for  the  divine  feeling.  Such  is  the 
common  doctrine  of  the  divine  personality. 


When  this  subject  is  approached  from  the  idealistic 
point  of  view,  as  for  example,  that  of  Professor  Royce, 
we  have  a  conception  of  God  as  the  Absolute  in  terms  of 
thought,  will,  experience,  and  life.  It  is  fully  in  accord 
with  this  idea  of  the  Absolute  to  regard  God  as  personal. 
It  is  true  that  conditions  which  appear  to  us  to  be  essen- 
tial to  constitute  personality  are  wanting.  Thought,  will, 
experience,  and  life  are  affirmed,  yet  each  is  so  defined 
as  to  leave  it  radically  different  from  anything  which  we 
are  familiar  with  as  personal.  Moreover,  an  effort  is 
made  to  reconcile  the  various  meanings  assigned  to  these 
terms,  but  the  idealistic  point  of  view  from  which  the 
argument  proceeds  maintains  the  primacy  of  thought, — 
thought  which  is  absolute  and  perfectly  fulfilled  in  the 
life  of  the  world.  Will,  although  not  absent,  is  subordi- 
nated to  thought:  the  will,  instead  of  achieving,  is  eter- 
nally accomplished.  Co-ordinated  with  thought  and  will 
are  experience  which  is  completely  organized,  self-con- 
sciousness and  life  in  perfect  accord  with  idea,  "with  no 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD  283 

unanswered  questions  and  no  unfulfilled  desires."  This  is 
essentially  the  doctrine  held  by  the  Calvinistic  Dr.  Hodge 
and  Edwardean-Augustinian  Dr.  Shedd,  although  it  has 
its  source  in  a  very  different  metaphysics  and  is  ex- 
pounded from  the  theological  rather  than  from  a  philo- 
sophical interest.  The  ultimate  question  is  perhaps  not 
so  much  whether  a  Being  so  defined  is  personal  as  whether 
such  a  Being  exists.  If  the  fact  of  its  existence  could  be 
established,  then  no  doubt  the  term  "personal"  in  some 
transcendent  sense  might  be  employed  to  designate  the 
character  of  this  Being.  A  further  question  may  be 
raised,  whether,  if  this  is  the  meaning  of  personality,  some 
other  word  than  personal  should  not  be  applied  to  man. 

It  would  be  more  difficult  to  associate  personality  with 
the  idea  of  God  as  the  Absolute  as  advocated  by  Pro- 
fessors Caird  and  Watson.  The  characteristic  terms. 
Principle,  Unity,  a  coherent  system,  and  others  like  them, 
lend  themselves  less  readily  to  the  notion  of  personality 
than  is  the  case  with  Royce's  will,  experience,  and  life. 
And  although  according  to  Professor  Watson  this  reality 
is  self-conscious,  yet  both  self  and  consciousness  find 
little  or  no  analogy  in  human  experience;  the  meaning 
assigned  to  these  hardly  raises  them  above  a  non-personal 
pantheism.  If,  however,  the  Absolute  is  all-embracing,  it 
must  be  characterized  by  consciousness,  so  far  at  least 
as  there  is  consciousness  in  man.  It  is  also  claimed  that 
the  human  consciousness  would  have  no  intelligible  con- 
tent but  for  the  fact  that  it  rises  out  of  and  expresses  in 
part  the  Absolute  Consciousness;  for  all  finite  thought 
presupposes  Infinite  Thought  which  alone  gives  it  ration- 
ality. When  we  have  allowed  to  these  terms  all  the  values 
they  will  bear,  we  are  still  far  from  personality.  The 
terms    themselves    are    abstract.       Thought    implies    a 


284  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

thinker,  but  the  thought  is  neither  discursive  nor  intuitive, 
and  it  does  not,  any  more  than  the  Idea  of  Plato,  involve 
a  personal  background.  There  is  a  Principle  which  per- 
vades the  universe,  to  which  its  unity  and  development 
are  to  be  referred,  but  nothing  is  added  to  it  by  calling  it 
personal.  The  doctrine  here  in  question  is  more  a  phil- 
osophy, even  a  theosophy,  than  a  basis  for  religion.  And 
there  are  many  points  of  contact  between  it  and  Christian 
Science.  It  is  a  late  instance  of  Greek  idealism  with  in- 
telligence as  the  key-note,  salvation  by  knowledge,  and  the 
elimination  of  all  that  appears  in  consciousness  save 
thought  alone. 

VI 

Personality  is  much  more  truly  attributed  to  God  by 
those  theories  of  reality  which  assign  primacy  to  the  will 
rather  than  to  the  idea.  In  this  group  the  Hebrew  reli- 
gion is  the  forerunner.  On  the  whole  the  New  Testament 
conception,  omitting  a  few  references,  flows  in  the  same 
channel.  St.  Augustine,  on  the  side  of  his  theology  rep- 
resented by  the  Confessions,  gives  to  the  personality  of 
God  its  full  value,  although  he  does  not  discuss  the  ques- 
tion of  personality  as  such.  This  is,  however,  out  of 
harmony  with  his  presentation  of  the  Trinity  in  his  great 
treatise  on  that  subject;  in  that  work  he  reserves  the 
term  Person  for  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit,  yet  in  a 
qualified  sense ;  he  used  the  term  not  because  it  was  equiva- 
lent to  the  reality,  but  in  order  not  to  keep  silence  when 
something,  however  beyond  human  speech,  must  be 
affirmed. 

Among  later  thinkers  new  initiatives  have  given  a  pow- 
erful impulse  to  the  conception  of  the  divine  personality. 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD  286 

One  is  to  be  traced  to  Leibnitz,  the  other  to  Kant.  Leib- 
nitz has  his  doctrine  of  finite  monads — creative  reproduc- 
tions of  the  Supreme  Monad,  each  with  its  possibility  of 
consciousness,  depending  upon  an  inner  principle  of  devel- 
opment into  full  personality,  according  to  the  type  of  the 
Great  Monad,  God.  From  this  conception  has  grown  the 
pluralistic  theory  of  the  universe,  with  many  centers  of 
independent  initiative  yet  with  interchanges  of  activity. 
Although  the  human  is  patterned  after  the  divine,  yet  the 
human  monads  are  developing  personalities ;  the  divine  is 
an  eternally  complete  and  perfect  personality.  To  the 
other  impulse,  derived  from  Kant,  are  to  be  referred  all 
those  notions  of  the  divine  which  represent  it  as  a  pur- 
posive activity,  whether  the  activity  be  finite  or  infinite. 
Both  pragmatism  and  pluralism  are  at  home  here.  A 
contrast  is  drawn  between  "an  Immutable  Absolute  or  a 
God  who  strives."  Under  this  head  we  must  group  the 
recent  doctrines  of  God  as  finite,  developing,  struggling, 
suffering,  sharing  with  man  his  defeats  and  victories,  iden- 
tified with  the  ideal  tendencies  of  the  world,  having  a 
history,  and  aims  not  less  real  than  those  of  man.  The 
two  most  fascinating  advocates  of  this  conception  are 
Professor  James  and  H.  G.  Wells ;  but  they  are  only  the 
leaders  of  an  increasing  number  to  whom  the  static  God 
of  traditional  theology  offers  an  unsatisfying  notion. 

In  order  more  adequately  to  account  for  the  opposing 
tendencies  of  good  and  evil  in  the  world  one  writer  has 
suggested  "a  Cosmic  Soul,  a  struggling  God  .  .  .  who 
has  striven  up  out  of  the  blind  but  not  merely  mechanical 
action  of  physico-chemical  atoms,  into  the  instinctive, 
spontaneous,  half-conscious  life  of  the  planet.  From 
there  he  has  struggled  up  to  the  consciousness  of  the  ani- 
mal; find  frpm  there  with  ever  growing  power,  purpose, 


286  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

and  will,  with  the  faint  stirring  of  a  definitely  moral  life 
within  him,  into  the  consciousness  of  the  cave-dweller  and 
the  primitive  savage.  From  there,  with  ever  widening 
vision,  with  an  acquisition  of  mental  power  and  moral  will, 
with  an  increasing  determination  to  conquer  those  physi- 
cal propensities  which  have  clung  to  him  since  the  time  of 
his  brute  existence,  but  are  now  hindering  his  progress 
up  the  heights  of  righteousness  and  purity,  he  has 
struggled  up  and  up  until  he  has  expressed  himself  in  a 
Buddha,  a  Socrates,  a  Jesus,  a  Tolstoi,  ...  in  every 
human  being."  ^  Here  is  presented  a  conception  of  God 
which  includes  all  the  elements  of  personality.  To  sub- 
stantiate the  position  appeal  is  made  to  Christian  experi- 
ence, which  involves  communion  with  a  sympathetic 
because  a  struggling  God,  fellowship  with  him  in  his  great 
task,  a  sense  both  of  sin  against  him  and  of  his  forgive- 
ness, a  confidence  that,  despite  evil  and  defeat,  all  the 
essential  values  will  not  only  survive  but  ultimately 
triumph. 

While  the  above  view  conserves  the  elements  of  person- 
ality and  lends  itself  to  an  explanation  of  many  baffling 
facts  of  evil  as  well  as  of  good  in  the  life  of  the  world,  it 
is  a  high  price  to  pay  for  what  is  gained.  It  finds  in  God, 
however,  what  the  human  mind  has  never  been  and,  it  is 
safe  to  add,  will  never  be  satisfied  to  find  there,  namely, 
evil.  In  Zoroastrian  thought  Ahriman  was  invented  to 
relieve  Ahura  Mazda  of  evil.  In  Hebrew  thought  evil 
spirits  and  in  Christian  thought  Satan  clear  the  skirts  of 
God  of  all  complicity  with  sin.  Because  God  is  holy,  a 
gulf  yawns  between  him  and  all  evil.  It  is  his  shepherding 
love  which  goes  in  search  of  and  brings  back  the  wander- 

*  J.  W.  Macdonald,  The  Christicm  Register,  Vol.  100,  No.  80,  pp. 
206  fF.:  "The  Problem,  Is  God  Omnipotent?" 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD  287 

ing  one.  If  it  is  essential  to  the  personality  of  God  that 
evil  as  well  as  good  be  included  in  the  finite,  struggling 
God,  we  shall  have  to  choose  between  personality  and  good- 
ness, and  it  would  not  be  hard  to  say  which  shall  be 
retained.  Is  there  not  some  way  by  which  evil  and  the 
downward  tendency  here  alleged  may  be  eliminated  from 
the  idea  of  God,  and  all  that  is  essential  to  personality 
remain  ? 

With  reference  to  this  need  two  paths  have  been 
opened;  in  one,  personality  is  not  denied  to  God  but 
rather  affirmed  in  a  higher  degree.  Replying  to  a  charge 
that  his  idealistic  pantheism  deprived  God  of  proper- 
ties necessary  to  support  religious  faith,  Paulsen  *  vindi- 
cated his  position  by  saying:  "It  will  not  permit  us  to 
define  God  by  the  concept  of  personality,  simply  because 
the  concept  is  too  narrow  for  the  infinite  fullness  and 
depth  of  his  being.  Still,  in  order  to  remove  the  appre- 
hension, we  might  call  God  a  supra-personal  being,  not 
intending  thereby  to  define  his  essence,  but  to  indicate 
that  God's  nature  is  above  the  human  mind,  not  below  it. 
And  pantheism  might  add  that  it  finds  no  fault  with  any 
one  for  calling  God  a  personal  being  in  this  sense.  In  so 
much  as  the  human  mind  is  the  highest  and  most  impoi^ 
tant  thing  we  know,  we  can  form  an  idea  of  God  only  by 
intensifying  human  attributes."  Herbert  Spencer  says 
that  the  Infinite  and  Eternal  Energy  from  which  all 
things  proceed  is  probably  psychical  and  hyperpersonal. 
Bradley,^  replying  to  his  own  question,  whether  the  Abso- 
lute has  personality,  says :  "We  can  answer  it  at  once  in 
the  affirmative  or  negative  according  to  its  meaning. 
Since  the  Absolute  has  everything,  it  of  course  must  pos- 

^An  Introdniction  to  Philosophy,  p.  264. 
^Appearance  and  Reality,  pp.  681,  688. 


288  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

sess  personality.  And  if  by  personality  we  are  to  under- 
stand the  highest  form  of  finite  spiritual  development, 
then  certainly  in  an  eminent  degree  the  Absolute  is  per- 
sonal." On  the  other  hand,  he  adds :  "If  the  term  'per- 
sonal' is  to  bear  anything  like  its  ordinary  sense,  assur- 
edly the  Absolute  is  not  merely  personal.  It  is  not  per- 
sonal, because  it  is  personal  and  more.  It  is,  in  a  word, 
superpersonal.  .  .  .  It  is  better  to  afRrm  personality 
than  to  call  the  Absolute  impersonal.  But  neither  mistake 
should  be  necessary.  .  .  .  But  it  is  better  in  this  con- 
nection to  call  it  superpersonal." 

The  motive  of  these  writers  is  perfectly  sound.  Tested 
by  the  highest  degree  of  personality  attained  by  man,  we 
have  not  reached  the  measure  of  God.  We  are  told  that 
God  is  like  Jesus  Christ,  and  he  is  reported  as  saying,  "He 
that  hath  seen  me  hath  seen  the  Father."  And  this  is 
true.  But  God,  while  he  is  like,  is  yet  both  other  and 
more  than  Jesus.  Personality,  so  far  as  it  is  affirmed  of 
God,  is  far  richer  and  more  inclusive  than  the  personality 
of  Jesus.  If,  as  St.  Paul  declares,  Christ  is  the  head  of 
man  and  if  he  represents  the  highest  achievement  of 
human  personality,  then  we  must  call  God  super-personal, 
a  being  who  embraces  all  the  essential  properties  of  Jesus 
and  of  all  men,  and  possesses  others  which  are  beyond 
their  capacity. 

The  disparity  between  man  and  God  has  given  rise  to 
an  ingenious  and  widely  accepted  theory  of  the  relation 
between  the  two.  Lotze  took  the  position  that  human 
personality  is  far  from  perfectly  developed.  He  sup- 
ported this  by  showing  that  our  feelings  and  passions 
which  rise  out  of  an  obscure  background  never  attain  com- 
plete self-consciousness,  and  that  the  finite  consciousness 
does  not  contain  within  itself  the  conditions  of  its  exist- 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD  289 

ence;  it  has  to  depend  upon  the  stimulus  of  the  cosmic 
whole  or  the  non-ego  for  the  initiation  and  growth  of  its 
activity.  These  are,  so  Professor  Bowne  who  is  Lotze's 
enthusiastic  pupil  and  expounder  affirms,  limitations 
rather  than  sources  of  our  self-consciousness.  In  our  in- 
ner life  are  similar  limitations  before  which  we  are  partly 
passive  and  which  in  any  case  we  cannot  wholly  control. 
Personality  in  us  will  always  be  incomplete,  an  ideal  which 
is  ours  only  conditionally  and  imperfectly.  Since  the 
ground  of  our  existence  is  not  in  ourselves,  we  have  never 
absolute  control  of  our  states.  This  is  not,  however,  true 
of  the  Infinite  Being ;  for  since  this  Being  has  the  ground 
of  its  existence  in  itself,  it  is  independent  of  all  outward 
conditions ;  it  is  therefore  eternally  self-sufficient.  Accord- 
ingly, Lotze  ^  turns  the  tables  on  previous  conceptions  of 
the  relation  of  the  human  to  the  divine  personality  by 
saying:  "Perfect  personality  is  in  God  only;  to  all  finite 
minds  there  is  allotted  but  a  pale  copy  thereof ;  the  finite- 
ness  of  the  finite  is  not  the  producing  condition  of  this 
Personality  but  a  limit  and  hindrance  to  its  development." 


VII 


May  we  hold  that  God  is  personal  but  is  also  less  or 
more  than  personal.?  A  position  not  wholly  unlike  this  is 
taken  by  those  who  as  Bradley  have  a  doctrine  of  the 
Absolute  of  which  God  is  part  but  not  the  whole.  There 
are  in  the  universe  vast  stretches  of  both  space  and  time 
which  but  for  the  presence  of  man  contain  no  intimation 
that  a  personal  Being  is  at  the  heart  of  things.     In  sys- 

^  Microcostmis,  Vol.  II,  p.  688.    Cf.  B.  P.  Bowne,  Theism,  pp.  167- 
168. 


290  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

terns  of  worlds  in  process  of  formation  or  dissolution,  in 
which  perhaps  no  rational  being  has  ever  existed,  none 
that  could  form  social  relations,  or  lift  a  face  reflecting 
the  glory  of  God,  there  would  be  no  occasion  for  such  a 
question  to  arise  as  that  of  the  personality  of  God.  If  it 
were  conceivable  that  a  human  consciousness  had  stand- 
ing-place at  a  point  of  time  far  back  in  the  evolution  of 
the  solar  system  where  were  only  atoms  with  their  exact 
and  unvarying  mathematical  and  mechanical  relations,  the 
formation  of  gases,  of  water,  of  mineral  compounds,  and 
the  beginning  of  life  in  the  sea,  on  the  land,  and  in  the 
air,  looking  forward,  there  would  be  nothing  in  the  view 
to  suggest  the  idea  of  personality  in  the  Power  to  which 
these  phenomena  owed  their  appearance.  Not  that  there 
was  no  material  in  these  which  later  might  contribute  ele- 
ments to  this  idea  and  be  essential  to  its  completeness. 
When,  however,  at  another  and  later  moment  in  the 
process  of  evolution,  in  that  part  of  the  universe  with 
which  we  are  most  familiar  and  at  the  present  hour,  one 
looks  back  upon  the  unfolding  of  plan,  the  idea  of  per- 
sonality rises  and  shines  with  clear  and  steady  light.  We 
see  now  that  the  latest  crown  the  earlier  stages,  and  con- 
tain a  promise  the  fuU  scope  of  which  staggers  the  imag- 
ination. As  we  have  already  become  aware,  when  life 
was  less  developed  the  full  disclosure  of  God  in  its  farthest 
ranges  of  spirit  was  not  possible;  yet  this  was  immanent 
and  only  awaited  the  "fullness  of  time."  When  we  con- 
sider, what  is  certainly  possible,  that  always  in  some 
worlds  in  the  universe  there  are  beings  to  whom  ethical 
and  spiritual  values  are  real,  we  do  not  have  to  think  of 
God  as  himself  developing  step  by  step  with  the  planetary 
life  with  which  we  are  familiar  and  so  becoming  moral, 
whereas  he  was  before  ruled  by  necessity  or  driven  on 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD  291 

by  a  struggle  for  existence.  On  the  contrary,  moral 
values  were  from  eternity  essential  elements  of  his  nature 
and  were  revealed  to  such  beings  as  were  susceptible  of 
response.  Even  if  we  find  no  warrant  for  the  doctrine  of 
angels,  which  has  played  a  large  role  in  Jewish  and  Chris- 
tian theology,  as  giving  to  God  a  conscious  environment 
where  his  glory  might  be  felt,  yet  the  aim  which  inspired 
this  conception  was  worthy.  The  modem  view  of  the 
world  fully  justifies  the  conjecture  that  if  there  are  not 
angels,  there  have  always  been  and  will  always  be  spiritual 
agencies  wherever  in  any  world  conditions  for  such  beings 
are  ripe.  If  in  those  other  worlds  there  have  been  sin  and 
sorrow  and  death ;  if  such  souls  are  seeking  to  realize  the 
aim  of  individual  and  social  well-being,  then  we  may  be- 
lieve that  in  the  will  of  God  they  find  forgiveness  and  com- 
fort, the  impulse  and  strength  for  living  which  mortals 
experience  here.  This  may  be  stamped  as  an  attenuated 
speculative  notion,  and  it  does  not  claim  to  be  much  more. 
It  cannot  be  proved  to  be  true,  but  it  also  cannot  be  dis- 
proved. If  it  is  true,  it  greatly  encourages  the  conviction 
that  the  good  will  of  God  has  not  sprung  up  first  with  the 
advent  of  man  on  the  earth  but  is  eternal  and  the  source 
of  good  wherever  goodness  is  found. 

The  question  whether  God  is  super-personal  needs  per- 
haps a  more  adequate  putting.  If  it  means  that  God  is 
wholly  above  the  personal  plane,  the  answer  must  be  a 
negative  one ;  for  we  have  just  seen  that  there  are  elements 
in  the  divine  nature  which  are  also  highest  in  man.  Man 
may  be  regarded  as  the  standard  of  personality.  The 
personality  of  man  has  been  defined  as  "selfhood,  self- 
consciousness,  self-control,  and  the  power  to  know."  *  This 
definition  shares  the  defects  which  shadow  all  definitions 


*Bowne,  Perfonalism,  p.  226. 


292  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

which  are  concerned  with  the  highest  values.  The  con- 
crete personal  life  would  hardly  recognize  itself  under  this 
scheme.  The  human  selfhood  is  in  the  making  and  never 
comes  to  more  than  the  bud  or  at  most  to  the  blossom 
stage.  Self-consciousness,  widened  out  to  embrace  the 
un-  and  the  sub-consciousness,  is  in  its  farthest  develop- 
ment fragmentary  and  incomplete;  if  not  discontinuous, 
is  intermittent ;  now  and  then  like  lightning  flashes  illum- 
ining its  world  yet  disclosing  the  darkness  out  of  which  it 
rises.  Self-control  is  never  more  than  an  imperfect  mas- 
tery of  the  unfolding  personal  powers — an  ever  renewed 
struggle  to  unify  the  aims  and  especially  the  spirit  of 
life.  As  for  the  power  to  know :  with  all  his  achievements 
man  stands,  an  eager  child,  on  the  threshold  of  inquiry, 
with  key  in  hand  which  experience  alone  can  shape — the 
greatest  secrets  of  the  universe  as  truly  hidden  from  him 
as  from  his  most  distant  ancestors  gazing  with  dumb  awe 
at  the  show  of  things.  In  the  nature  of  the  case,  human 
personality  as  we  know  it,  however  splendid  its  attain- 
ments, can  never  be  anything  else  in  the  individual  than 
transient  and  incomplete,  in  the  race  pressing  on  toward 
a  receding  goal. 

If  this  is  to  be  the  standard  of  personality,  then  God  is 
both  sub-  and  super-,  perhaps  extra-personal.  The  sub- 
personal  aspect  of  God  appears  in  purposive  activity  in 
all  such  phenomena  as  the  play  of  atoms,  the  formation  of 
carbonic-acid  gas,  and  the  metereological  cycle ;  the  super- 
personal  aspect  is  related  to  those  purposive  aims  which 
lie  beyond  the  comprehension  of  human  intelligence. 
However  far  science  pushes  the  boundaries  of  knowledge, 
the  mystery,  the  wonder,  the  appeal  to  faith  is  not  less 
than  in  the  time  of  Job — the  unconquerable  faith  that  will 
not  let  go.    God  is  not  less  than  man,  since  man  is  one  of 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD  293 

the  forms  in  which  God  reveals  his  creative  will;  but  he 
who  is  the  all-creating,  the  all-embracing  One  is  to  man 
as  the  infinite  compared  to  a  mathematical  number  low 
down  in  the  scale.  Something  of  God  is  beheld  in  the 
movement  of  atoms,  something  in  the  majestic  sweep  of 
worlds  in  space,  and  something  in  the  spirit  of  man,  but 
in  none  of  these  nor  in  all  together  at  any  single  instant 
of  time  may  one  discover  the  entire  meaning  of  God. 


VIII 


To  assert  that  God  is  perfect  personality  of  which  man 
is  but  a  faint  copy  is  open  to  many  objections.  The  path 
by  which  this  definition  is  arrived  at  has  been  frequently 
traversed.  The  characteristic  properties  of  the  human 
personality  are  first  ascertained;  these  are  found  to  be 
imperfectly  developed;  their  very  existence  as  imperfect 
implies  a  perfect  archetype.  We  are  reminded  of  Aris- 
totle's contingent  motion  which  implies  an  Absolute  Prime 
Mover,  and  of  Leibnitz's  finite  monads  and  the  Infinite 
Monad  of  which  they  are  copies.  But  apart  from  the 
matter  of  terms  the  imperfect  does  not  imply  an  actual 
perfect.  The  conception  to  which  Lotze  lent  the  influ- 
ence of  his  great  name  has  won  assent  more  by  its  bold 
and  startling  paradox,  which  strikes  one  with  the  force 
of  a  discovery  in  a  field  where  miich  confusion  prevails, 
than  by  its  correspondence  with  reality.  It  could  be  true 
only  by  the  denial  of  features  which  are  as  essential  to 
personality  as  those  which  are  affirmed.  It  has  to  be 
assumed  that  to  be  a  person  one  must  have  a  self-centered 
existence,  independent  of  an  environment,  having  all  of 
its  resources  within,  every  element  of  its  being  transpar- 


294  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

ent  to  itself,  all  subsisting  in  changeless  harmony  and  per- 
fection. But  we  know  nothing  of  such  persons ;  persons 
that  we  know  or  indeed  would  wish  to  know  belong  to  a 
very  different  order  of  experience.  Sensations  and  per- 
ceptions ;  imaginations  and  memories ;  discursive  reason- 
ing and  flashes  of  interpretative  insight ;  dependence  upon 
a  physical  organism  which  conditions  birth,  growth,  ani- 
mal spirits,  and  decay;  love  and  hate;  struggle,  defeat, 
and  success ;  friends  and  social  ties ;  hopes  and  dreams  of 
a  life  after  death, — these  and  many  other  inner  and  outer 
conditions  are  inseparable  from  persons.  We  can  form 
no  conception  of  what  a  person  would  be  from  whom  these 
were  absent.  And  now  one  of  two  things ;  either  we  must 
redefine  the  idea  of  personality  so  as  to  eliminate  all  that 
gives  zest  to  life,  leaving  only  a  bundle  of  attributes,  such 
as  selfhood  and  the  power  to  know,  or  else,  if  we  retain 
that  which  makes  life  personal  and  vivid,  we  must  carry 
this  over  to  God  and  find  in  him  one  who  shares  our  strug- 
gle and  suffering,  our  momentary  defeats  and  glorious 
victories,  himself  the  great  Protagonist  on  the  battlefield 
of  the  good. 

The  latter  alternative  is  chosen  by  all  those  who  advo- 
cate a  finite  God.  They  have  brought  God  down  from  the 
heights  where  he  has  dwelt  in  secure  isolation,  inaccessible 
to  all  but  speculative  thinkers,  and  domiciled  him  among 
men;  they  have  welcomed  him  who  works  and  suffers  and 
overcomes  with  them  in  the  adventure  of  life.  Thus  en- 
dowed with  human  attributes  and  thereby  raised  to  a 
vastly  higher  degree  of  excellence,  he  is  the  Person  of 
whom  all  other  personal  beings  are  but  faint  copies;  and 
he  is  this,  not  because  he  exists  apart  from  men,  but  be- 
cause he  is  one  with,  and  yet  in  his  very  oneness  superior 
to,  all  other  persons.     On  the  other  hand,  those  who  have 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD  295 

stripped  God  of  the  amazing  variety  of  interests  which 
lend  to  human  life  its  charm,  and  find  in  Intelligence  or 
the  Trinity  the  secret  of  the  life  of  God,  and  then  assure 
us  that,  in  virtue  of  such  qualities,  God  is  the  Supreme 
Person,  and  that  at  best  we  are  but  imperfect  reflections 
of  his  personality,  have  removed  God  so  far  from  us  that 
it  matters  little  whether  or  not  he  exists  as  a  Person. 

The  human  heart  in  its  hunger  for  God  is  not  so  easily 
satisfied.  It  will  never  long  accept  stones  for  bread.  Baf- 
fled in  one  direction,  it  strikes  out  new  paths.  At  present 
two  of  these  are  hard  trodden  by  eager  spirits.  One  is 
the  attention  given  to  Jesus  Christ.  Despairing  of  a 
direct  and  rewarding  approach  to  God,  men  have  turned 
to  Jesus.  The  word  God  is  still  often  on  men's  lips,  but 
their  intimate  and  most  happy  thought  is  about  Jesus ; 
whatever  else  God  is  he  will  at  least  be  as  good  as  Jesus 
was;  indeed,  Jesus  is  gradually  taking  the  place  of  God 
in  the  reverent  affection  of  Christians.  One  has  but  to 
read  our  hymns  and  books  of  devotion,  to  listen  to  popu- 
lar sermons,  scan  Sunday-school  lesson  helps,  examine 
courses  of  lectures  offered  to  theological  students,  and 
converse  with  educated  laymen  to  discover  that  interest 
in  God  is  secondary  to  interest  in  Jesus  Christ. 

The  other  path  is  that  of  social  service.  An  increasing 
number  of  serious  people  do  not  question  that  God  is  real, 
a  fit  subject  for  metaphysics  and  for  theological  study, 
but  they  believe  that  life  is  short  and  human  need  urgent ; 
by  higher  ideals  of  justice,  by  education,  by  sympathy 
and  co-operation  society  may  be  reorganized  so  that  all 
that  was  contemplated  by  the  coming  of  the  kingdom  of 
God  may  be  realized  apart  from  a  definite  reference  to 
God.  It  is  not  so  much  what  God  may  be  in  himself, 
that  is,  whether  he  is  the  Absolute  Person  of  which  human- 


296  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

ity  is  a  faint  copy,  as  whether  the  value,  which  found 
expression  in  the  life  of  Jesus,  which  have  been  all  along 
associated  with  the  idea  of  personality,  and  are  in  process 
of  development  in  the  social  organism,  are  to  be  the  crea- 
tive forces  in  the  new  moral  order  of  the  world.  Not  infre- 
quently the  two  paths  are  merged  into  one,  and  Jesus,  as 
representative  of  personal  values,  is  made  the  leader  in 
the  recreation  of  society.  But  however  highly  we  esti- 
mate the  power  of  Jesus  and  the  social  ideal,  we  cannot 
fail  to  recognize  that  in  this  program  the  dynamic  of 
belief  in  a  personal  God  as  an  impetus  to  individual  and 
social  regeneration  is  hindered  and  repressed. 

There  are  still  others  who  would  wholly  dispense  with 
the  idea  of  God,  whether  personal  or  not.  They  believe, 
on  the  one  hand,  that  increasing  knowledge  will  do  away 
with  the  need  of  any  reference  to  him  as  accounting  for 
the  world,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  as  the  sense  of 
social  solidarity  grows,  the  idea  of  God  as  personal  helper 
will  become  unnecessary :  men  will  find  in  their  fellow-men 
what  they  formerly  supposed  they  found  in  a  superhuman 
Power.  Unless,  therefore,  by  a  fresh  definition  of  person- 
ality God  is  felt  to  stand  in  some  most  intimate  and  insep- 
arable relation  to  men,  he  will  take  a  diminishing  place 
in  the  experience  of  men. 


IX 


We  wish  now  to  approach  the  idea  of  the  personality 
of  God  from  a  different  angle,  not  by  way  of  analysis 
of  the  content  of  personality,  but  by  relating  it  to  pur- 
posive ends.  If  one  confines  himself  to  an  analysis  of  the 
idea  of  personality,  he  reports  his  findings  as  selfhood, 
self-consciousness,  self-control,  and  the  power  to  know. 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD  297 

Without  these  the  idea  would  be  lacking  in  completeness. 
Unless,  however,  we  can  establish  the  personality  of  God 
on  other  grounds  than  the  logical  completeness  of  the 
idea,  we  are  met  with  the  same  difficulty  which  confronted 
us  in  Anselm's  famous  argument.  In  order  to  avoid  this, 
we  shall  interpret  personality  with  reference  to  ends.  Our 
proposition  is  that  the  notion  and  degree  of  personality 
are  determined  by  the  number  and  quality  of  ends  which 
are  connected  with  it.  Ends  exist  in  infinite  and  ever- 
changing  profusion,  and  they  are  of  all  grades  from  lowest 
to  highest,  dissolving  only  to  be  renewed.  Some  are  con- 
cerned with  physical  relations  only,  others  are  bound  up 
with  the  process  of  life.  A  larger  number  and  a  higher 
grade  of  ends  are  involved  in  animal  than  in  vegetable 
existences,  and  among  animals  there  are  also  varieties  and 
degrees.  Yet  among  animals  there  are  none  which  have 
purposive  ends  either  high  enough  or  numerous  enough  to 
make  life  personal ;  there  are  in  them,  as  comparative  psy- 
chology discloses,  the  beginnings  of  personality.  It  is  only 
when  we  rise  to  man  that  we  discover  ends  of  such  a  char- 
acter that  we  designate  the  one  in  whom  these  appear  as 
personal.  Even  here  they  exist  in  manifold  variety,  at 
their  beginnings  hardly  personal;  in  some  individuals 
developing  only  in  feeble  degree,  leaving  them  at  the  end 
of  life  only  slightly  personal ;  in  others  unfolding  in  splen- 
did profusion,  constituting  them  richly  endowed  persons. 
Purposive  ends  are,  however,  only  partially  present  in  any 
man,  or  indeed  in  all  men  together,  but  to  the  extent  to 
which  they  are  present,  men  are  persons. 

In  the  argument  for  the  existence  of  God  from  ends  in 
the  universe,  we  saw  that  the  universe  gave  abundant  evi- 
dence of  purposive  activity,  and  that  this  purposive  activ- 
ity defined  the  nature  of  God.    The  character  of  the  ends 


298  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

reveals  the  personal  character  of  the  Power  operating  in 
the  world.  If  we  could  transport  ourselves  backward  in 
the  history  of  our  planet  to  a  time  when  we  beheld  only 
waters  and  barren  rocks  and  encircling  clouds,  we  should 
have  no  reason  for  raising  a  question  concerning  the  per- 
sonality of  God,  for  no  values  had  yet  appeared  to  sug- 
gest or  support  such  a  thought.  And  even  after  vegeta- 
tion sprang  up  both  in  the  sea  and  on  the  land,  and  life 
emerged  with  its  brood  of  swarming  fish  and  huge  beasts 
and  fowls  of  the  air,  there  was  little  or  nothing  to  indi- 
cate the  personal  nature  of  the  Power  by  which  all  these 
were  brought  into  existence.  It  is  only  with  the  advent 
of  man  that  moral  values  begin  to  play  a  part.  There 
are  indeed  ends  in  the  material  realm  connected  with  atoms 
and  physical  forces.  The  omnipresent  Power  cares  for 
rhythmic  motion  and  for  beauty,  but  if  this  were  all,  it 
is  doubtful  if  the  personal  character  of  this  Power  would 
ever  have  been  suggested.  Beyond  the  non-moral  and  the 
esthetic  there  has  been  created  in  our  world  in  the  develop- 
ment of  human  life  a  scale  of  moral  and  religious  values. 
And  we  have  a  right  to  believe  that  what  is  true  on  our 
planet  is  not  unique,  but  is  duplicated  in  countless  other 
worlds.  While  these  values  have  come  to  birth  in  the 
human  consciousness,  they  are  not  limited  to  the  human 
consciousness  alone.  They  have  arisen  in  a  universe  which 
is  not  hostile  to  them,  but  is  on  their  side.  The  Power 
inseparable  from  the  world  energizes  mightily  in  their 
behalf.  To  man  belongs  much  credit  for  great  achieve- 
ments in  virtue,  for  his  gains  in  purity  of  heart,  for  his 
love  of  truth,  for  his  sense  of  social  justice,  and  not  least 
for  the  refinement  and  elevation  of  his  religious  senti- 
ments. But  these  are  not  achievements  of  man  alone. 
They  have  been  partly  created  and  partly  forced  upon 


THE   PERSONALITY  OF  GOD  299 

him  by  an  ideal-forming  activity  resident  in  the  world. 
And  because  they  are  never  complete,  but  are  susceptible 
of  indefinite  expansion,  they  witness  to  an  inexhaustible 
push  in  the  Will  that  called  them  into  being.  So  irresist- 
ible was  this  impetus  felt  to  be  that  the  Greeks  called  it 
Fate,  so  infallibly  retributory  that  the  Buddhist  called  it 
Karma,  so  superior  to  all  earthly  custom  and  authority 
that  the  Hebrew  called  it  King  of  Kings  and  Lord  of 
lords,  so  like  the  spirit  and  aims  of  the  Saviour  that 
Christians  have  called  it  the  Father  of  our  Lord  Jesus 
Christ.  In  each  instance  the  name  was  taken  from  the 
ends  which  are  supremely  active  in  the  lives  of  men.  This 
Power  is  not  detached  from  these  ends ;  it  does  not  exist 
independently  of  them.  It  is  personal  to  the  extent  that 
they  are  personal.  It  is  not  necessarily  exhausted  in  the 
ethical  and  spiritual  ends  which  appear  in  our  experi- 
ence. It  would  be  idle  to  look  primarily  elsewhere  for  the 
personality  of  God  than  in  the  ends  which  are  being  real- 
ized in  our  world.  But  having  found  personality  here  we 
cannot  limit  it  to  our  globe.  Wherever  moral  beings  are, 
there  these  ends  are  and  there  personality  is.  If  our  per- 
sonality is  constituted  by  the  number,  variety,  and  char- 
acter of  the  values  which  emerge  in  our  experence,  this 
must  be  likewise  true  of  the  Reality  in  whom  we  live  and 
move  and  have  our  being,  only  in  a  higher,  even  in  an 
immeasurable  degree. 

Wherever  there  is  truth  there  is  God;  wherever  there 
is  justice,  loyalty,  sacrifice,  parental  affection,  co-opera- 
tion, wise  charity,  religious  devotion,  there  too  is  God; 
and  he  is  both  the  source  and  the  guarantor  of  these.  In 
the  deeper  moments  of  our  experience,  when  we  are  caught 
in  the  drift  and  whirl  of  dangerous  seas,  mast  and  rudder 
swept  away,  and  we  are  threatened  with  swift  and  remedi- 


SOO  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

less  overthrow,  an  inner  voice  is  heard  speaking  in  words 
as  unmistakable  as  those  of  human  speech,  "Lo!  I  am 
with  thee;  be  not  dismayed;  I  will  hold  thee;  in  me  thou 
art  safe."  The  words  are  indeed  of  human  origin  and 
have  come  down  from  those  who  before  us  have  passed 
through  the  deep  waters,  but  they  are  the  continued 
human  response  to  an  authentic  inner  yet  objective  Pres- 
ence. The  sense  of  guilt,  the  feeling  of  release  from  sin, 
the  urge  to  conserve  and  increase  moral  values — these  are 
the  echoes  in  the  human  soul  of  a  creative  purpose  in  the 
soul  of  the  universe.  The  social  movement,  with  its  con- 
flicting tides  of  emotion  and  interest  and  aim,  expresses 
not  merely  the  diverse  ends  of  many  individuals,  but  the 
one  end  of  a  mighty  Power  whose  impetus  tends  to  origi- 
nate, correct,  enlarge,  and  complete  all  human  endeavor. 
Such  ends  as  these,  saturated  with  ideal  meaning,  are  the 
very  essence  of  personality. 

Looking  backward  upon  the  process  of  evolution,  we 
can  now  see  that  the  personal  values  which  have  arisen 
in  man's  life  are  only  higher  forms  of  that  purposive 
Energy  which  appeared  earlier  in  animal  existences,  for 
there,  too,  ages  before  man  came  into  being,  were  the 
struggle  for  a  fuller  life,  sympathy,  sacrificial  self-giving, 
the  group  consciousness,  and  co-operation.-^  In  their  mute 
acceptance  of  man's  superiority  and  dominion  they  uncon- 
sciously confess  that  what  they  have  realized  in  part  is 
yet  more  richly  fulfilled  in  man.  Their  development,  occu- 
pying millions  of  years,  is  a  silent  prophecy  of  the  con- 
tinuation if  not  completion  of  their  upward  push  in  the 
fuller  life  of  man.  One  vital  impulse  runs  through  it 
all — to  express  and  fulfill  itself  in  ends  which  are  consti- 
tutive of  personality. 

*  Cf.  Henry  Drummond,  The  Ascent  of  Man,  pp.  216  S. 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD  301 

Not  less  significant  is  the  further  fact  that  the  physi- 
cal world  is  so  organized  and  controlled  as  to  be  not  only 
a  congenial  home  for  the  ideal  ends  of  animal  and  human 
life,  but  also  to  create  that  life  of  which  the  ends  referred 
to  are  its  characteristic  notes.  And  since  our  planet  is  not 
independent  and  self-sufficient,  but  is  an  integral  part 
both  of  the  solar  system  and  of  the  infinite  systems  in 
space,  we  must  extend  our  conception  to  embrace  these 
also,  and  see  in  the  ends  we  discover  here  an  instance  of 
ends  which  are  universal.  And  since  these  ends  are  pur- 
posive and  culminate  in  ethical  and  spiritual  values,  we 
must  pronounce  them  personal  and  the  Reality  of  which 
they  are  the  expression  as  personal. 

In  this  presentation  we  have  left  at  one  side  the  com- 
mon conception  of  personality,  as  selfhood,  self-conscious- 
ness, self-control,  and  the  power  to  know.  Whether  these 
are  true  of  the  Reality  which  is  the  indwelling  and  direc- 
tive power  in  the  universe,  we  may  not  be  in  position  to 
say.  It  is  not  true  in  any*  sense  which  these  words  bear 
in  our  human  experience  and  speech.  This  view  of  the 
personality  of  God  may  leave  much  to  be  desired  by  those 
who  would  psychologize  the  consciousness  of  God.  But 
as  this  appears  to  be  a  task  beyond  us,  we  feel  that  we 
do  not  lose  anything  in  renouncing  the  attempt.  Since 
our  conception  of  the  personality  of  God  rests  not  on  a 
theory  of  the  divine  consciousness,  but  on  the  character  of 
the  ends  which  are  disclosed  in  the  universe,  we  are  content 
to  seek  for  no  other  definition  or  ground  of  belief  in  con- 
ceiving of  it. 


XIII.     THE  LIVING  GOD 

I 

We  are  now  near  the  end  of  our  task.  It  remains  to 
gather  up  the  meaning  of  our  discussion  into  a  definition, 
with  a  further  interpretation  of  the  implications  involved 
in  it.  The  aim  has  been  to  expound  ethical  monotheism. 
By  ethical  monotheism  is  meant  a  doctrine  of  God  defined 
in  terms  of  purpose.  In  the  discovery  of  purpose  we  have 
discovered  God.  For  us  the  question  is  not  what  God 
may  be  as  a  metaphysical  Absolute,  but  what  he  is  as 
active  in  relation  to  the  world  and  to  our  highest  good. 
The  ultimate  ground  of  our  belief  in  God  is  therefore  not 
metaphysical  but  moral — the  necessity  of  God  for  the 
completion  of  the  meaning  of  our  life:  first,  to  provide  a 
principle  of  unity  for  our  intelligence  in  relation  to  the 
world;  secondly,  to  guarantee  the  validity  and  fulfillment 
of  our  ethical  and  spiritual  ideals ;  finally,  to  ratify  our 
religious  yearnings  for  redemption  and  union  with  God. 

The  principle  of  unity  is  a  universal  purposive  Will 
which  is  active  in  all  worlds,  its  fundamental  constituents 
like  the  atomic  constitution  of  the  universe  the  same  every- 
where, entering  into  an  infinite  variety  of  combinations, 
but  under  all  circumstances  a  Creative  Good  Will.  We 
do  not  first  formulate  this  conception  of  God  and  then 
project  it  into  the  changing  world,  but  we  find  it  there 
in  the  facts  of  the  world  and  interpret  these  into  a  rational 

302 


THE  LIVING  GOD  303 

ideal.  So  far  as  we  believe  that  our  ideals  of  individual 
and  social  development  are  in  harmony  with  the  "Power, 
not  ourselves,  that  makes  for  righteousness,"  we  are  confi- 
dent that  they  will  not  go  down  in  defeat,  but,  corrected 
and  enlarged,  will  find  their  fulfillment  in  the  continued 
life  of  men.  Our  deepest  need  is  to  be  set  free  from  the 
narrow  and  debasing  aims  of  self,  from  the  passion  that 
burns  but  does  not  purify,  from  the  cleft  will,  from  the 
unsocial  spirit,  the  irreverent.  Godless  temper.  We  need 
to  know  that  at  the  heart  of  things  is  a  steadfast,  right- 
eous, almighty  Will  which  tolerates  no  deviation  from  its 
rigid  way,  but  sometimes  violently  arrests  the  trans- 
gressor, and  tenderly  draws  him  back  into  paths  of  peace. 
We  need  also  to  be  assured  that,  while  social  regeneration 
may  be  delayed,  it  cannot  be  killed;  it  will  surely  make 
its  way,  and  that  too  by  a  thousand  agencies,  some  con- 
flicting, some  co-operating — the  church,  the  state,  the 
school,  the  family,  industrial  reforms,  commercial  treaties, 
political  agitation,  the  printing-press ;  through  all  "work- 
eth  the  same  Spirit,"  urging  toward  the  goal  of  a  redeemed 
humanity.  To  believe  in  a  glorious  future  for  the  race,  we 
must  believe  in  a  God  whose  purpose  of  good  can  never 
know  defeat.  To  believe  in  such  a  God  carries  the  fulfill- 
ment of  our  dearest  hope. 

n 

Our  idea  of  God  is  partly  a  postulate  of  faith.  This 
is  the  Reality  which  must  be,  if  our  hopes  are  to  attain 
their  fruition.  Here  we  follow  in  the  path  of  the  Old 
and  the  New  Testament.  The  supreme  characteristic  of 
the  prophets,  Jesus,  and  the  apostles  was  the  clearness, 
certainty,  and  enthusiasm  of  their  faith  in  God.    Yet  this 


304  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

was  not  the  product  of  theoretical  reason,  but  an  attitude, 
an  affirmation,  an  expectancy,  in  which  they  gathered  up 
the  meaning  of  their  own  future  and  that  of  the  world  in 
terms  of  a  Purpose,  at  first  in  part  other  than  their  own, 
but  with  which  they  identified  their  will.  They  knew  that 
their  faith  must  be  true,  not  because  they  had  experienced 
its  full  truth,  but  because  without  it  life  would  be  robbed 
of  content, 

"And  dust  and  ashes  all  that  is." 

They  were  unconsciously  practicing  Anselm's  dictum, 
"Credo  ut  intelligam" — I  believe  in  order  that  I  may 
know.  Had  they  waited  for  their  idea  of  God  until  they 
had  fully  explicated  it  by  experience,  they  would  have 
been  forever  destitute  of  it.  It  was  the  necessary  pre- 
supposition of  this  experience;  without  it,  the  experience 
would  have  been  entirely  different.  It  was  indeed  a  postu- 
late, but  it  was  something  more,  and  in  that  "more"  lay 
its  secret.  One  may  believe  something  to  be  true,  but  at 
the  same  time  be  cold  or  neutral  toward  it.  To  these 
men,  on  the  contrary,  their  belief  was  like  a  fire  in  the 
bones ;  it  renewed  its  energy  in  every  new  experience,  how- 
ever resistent  and  contradictory ;  for  the  most  part  devel- 
oping itself  in  the  common  social  tasks,  yet  in  the  hour 
of  extremity  and  anguish  disclosing  its  richest  content. 
This  is  and  must  remain  a  permanent  feature  in  our  idea 
of  God.  Not^  that  we  shall  follow  Kant  in  a  will  that 
there  be  a  God,  without  the  hope  that  we  shall  ever  be  in 
contact  with  the  Reality  which  we  thus  assume  to  exist. 
Naturally,  if  God  is  defined  by  ends,  and  these  ends  are 
progressively  realized,  one  who  stands  at  the  beginning  of 
the  ways  can  know  only  what  has  been  actualized.  When  a 
man  and  a  woman  plight  their  troth  at  the  altar,  they 


THE  LIVING  GOD  306 

understand  little  of  what  it  means — "for  better  for  worse, 
for  richer  for  poorer,  in  sickness  and  in  health,  till  death 
do  us  part," — ^but  the  energy  of  their  love  contains  within 
itself  the  fulfillment  of  their  pledge.  To-day,  however 
long  the  idea  of  God  has  been  cherished  in  human  hearts, 
we  are  still  only  on  the  threshold  of  our  knowledge  of  this 
infinite  and  eternal  Good  Will.  Yet  even  so,  our  devotion 
to  it  is  measured  not  by  our  knowledge,  but  by  our  inward 
surrender  to  what  is  implicit  in  our  faith. 

Ethical  monotheism,  instead  of  remaining  merely  a  pos- 
tulate, presents  itself  to  experience  for  verification.  It  is 
an  assumption  on  which  the  great  adventure  of  life  waits. 
It  holds  in  its  hand  the  good  of  all  the  days  to  come.  If 
it  begins  in  faith,  it  is  transmuted  by  experience  into 
knowledge.  *  It  has  to  be  held  fast  in  the  face  of  seeming 
contradictions.  For  in  the  first  place,  circumstances 
which  are  not  of  our  choosing,  over  which,  too,  we  have 
no  control,  appear  at  times  utterly  to  confute  its  truth; 
and  in  the  second  place,  fidelity  to  this  Will  forces  us 
into  conditions  in  the  midst  of  which  the  very  survival  of 
faith  in  it  seems  impossible.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  one 
condition  of  its  being  permanently  true  for  us  is  that  we 
are  true  to  it.  Naturally,  if  the  postulate  of  the  Good 
Will  were  ultimately  to  be  discredited,  it  would  have  to 
go  the  way  of  other  exploded  assumptions;  such  a  con- 
tingency, in  view  of  the  meaning  which  this  idea  has 
already  acquired,  is  so  remote  as  to  be  entirely  negligible. 
Since  it  involves  the  entire  scope  and  all  the  values  of 
human  experience,  not  only  now  but  also  hereafter,  its 
verification  is  necessarily  progressive  and  always  incom- 
plete. It  is  therefore  continually  susceptible  of  enlarge- 
ment and  also  of  correction.     Accordingly,  we  need  never 

»Cf.  Ps.  xxxiv,  8;  John  viii,  81-82. 


306  '  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

be  disturbed  that  the  concrete  definition  of  God  changes 
with  each  new  generation,  becoming  richer  in  proportion 
to  its  experienced  content;  we  should  be  profoundly 
thankful  that  it  can  never  be  embedded  in  a  fixed  and 
final  dogma.  When  through  experience  that  which 
was  a  postulate  of  faith  becomes  an  object  of  knowl- 
edge, the  knowledge  becomes  a  basis  for  further  ven- 
tures of  faith  and  wider  expectancies  and  fulfillment: 
*'Intelligo  ut  credam" — ^I  know  in  order  that  I  may 
believe. 

Of  these  two  poles  of  the  idea  of  God  neither  can  be 
dispensed  with;  one  is  not  less  essential  than  the  other. 
The  idea  of  God  as  a  Purposive  Will  may  be  true,  and  if 
so,  is  worthy  to  command  the  supreme  devotion  of  the 
human  will.  It  can  be  known  to  be  true  only  if  in  response 
to  that  devotion  it  proves  itself  valid  by  filling  life  with 
a  divine  content  and  eternal  meaning. 

This  must  not  be  understood  as  if  at  any  conceivable 
stage  of  advance  in  our  knowledge  of  the  divine  Good 
Will  we  shall  be  able  to  include  all  reality  within  its  scope. 
There  will  always  be  something  to  say  for  naturalism,  for 
dualism,  for  an  immanent  and  conscious  tendency  in 
things.  Strive  as  we  may  to  bring  all  refractory  ele- 
ments into  harmony,  some  still  prove  recalcitrant.  In 
every  religion  is  such  a  remainder  which  has  been  handed 
over  to  an  alien  and  hostile  power — demonic  spirits,  Satan, 
Ahriman,  Fate,  intractable  matter,  a  place  of  everlasting 
torment  for  the  obdurately  bad.  It  would  be  of  no  use 
for  us  to  blink  this  age-long,  unresolved  conflict ;  it  is  with 
us  still,  in  forms  no  less  benumbing  to  faith  than  at  any 
earlier  day.  Yet  in  spite  of  all  untoward  and  unrecon- 
ciled facts,  we  ally  ourselves  with  those  of  all  ages — 
prophets,  poets,  philosophers,  founders  of  commonwealths, 


THE  LIVING  GOD  307 

saints — ^who  believe  that  goodness  is  the  heart  of  things, 
and  that  it  has  creative  power  to  penetrate  and  trans- 
form the  life  of  man ;  and  this  not  without  recognition  of 
the  evil  which  confronts  and  withstands  it,  and  not  ignor- 
ing the  struggle  in  which  evil  gives  place  to  good.  A 
light-headed  girl,  upon  whose  steps  the  shadows  have  not 
yet  fallen,  may  come  tripping  down  the  primrose  path 
with  lilting  song: 

"God's  in  his  heaven, 
All's  right  with  the  world !"  ^ 

But  those  to  whom 

"Years  have  brought  the  philosophic  mind" 

know  that  unless  God  comes  down  out  of  his  heaven,  and 
awakens  and  confirms  in  men  the  will  to  good,  the  world 
will  not  be  right.  Jesus  beheld  Satan  falling  as  lightning 
from  heaven,  and  in  the  instantaneous  vision  was  concen- 
trated the  victories  of  a  million  years ;  yet  to  his  followers 
was  committed  the  task  of  fragmentary  and  age-long  real- 
ization of  his  dream. 

No  doubt  it  is  this  motive  which  has  originated  the 
more  recent  conceptions  of  God.  Instead  of  a  Being  who 
dwells  in  undisturbed  felicity  in  a  transcendental  world, 
God  is  here,  among  men,  in  the  very  midst  of  their  experi- 
ence of  good  and  evil ;  one  who  strives,  who  struggles,  and 
fights  with  men  on  the  side  of  the  good ;  who  sufi^ers  pain 
and  sometimes  defeat  in  the  conflict,  yet  undaunted  by 
momentary  failure  ever  renews  the  attack  and  progres- 
sively wins.  However  inadequate  such  a  picture  may  be, 
it  has  probably  done  more  than  any  and  all  other  concep- 

*  Browning,  Pvpa  Pcuset, 


SOS  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

tions  of  God  to  bring  him  back  and  down  into  the  strug- 
gles of  our  human  world.  Centuries  ago  Jesus,  whose 
name  was  to  be  Immanuel  (God  with  us),  ate  and  drank 
with  men,  and  they  felt  that  God  was  in  very  truth  with 
them.  But  after  his  death,  they  believed  that  he  was 
taken  up  into  heaven,  "a  cloud  received  him  out  of  their 
sight,"  and  he  was  gone.  Although  he  bequeathed  his 
spirit  to  his  followers,  yet  it  has  always  been  far  more 
difficult  for  them  to  realize  his  spiritual  than  his  bodily 
presence.  The  Father  was  remote  and  unseen ;  the  Son 
had  withdrawn  into  the  heaven  whence  he  came ;  the  Spirit, 
if  among  men,  was  an  impalpable  presence  which  came 
and  went.  It  was  natural  for  the  heart  of  man  to  turn 
to  the  Virgin  Mary,  the  apotheosized  woman  with  the 
mother-heart  to  be  to  troubled  souls  what  Jesus  had  been. 
But  now  the  tide  has  turned;  the  barriers  have  been 
thrown  down;  once  more  all  that  Mary,  the  "Mother  of 
God,"  the  Spirit  as  the  comforting  Presence,  and  Jesus 
as  the  incarnate  Savior,  stood  for  as  ministers  to  human 
need,  is  provided  in  this  newer  conception  of  God.  He 
has  come  down  from  his  inaccessible  heights  and  has  joined 
himself  to  men,  making  common  cause  with  them  in  their 
endeavors  after  the  greater  good.  He  is  the  Great  Adven- 
turer; he  is  the  unconquerable  Fighter;  he  is  the  Intimate 
Companion;  in  sickness  he  is  the  tender  Nurse;  in  death 
with  soothing  touch  he  draws  the  soul  forth  into  an  ampler 
realm.  Some  of  these  suggestions  may  seem  crude  and 
irreverent,  and  perhaps  they  are  so ;  they  may  err  on  the 
side  of  familiarity  as  much  as  the  older  doctrine  erred 
on  the  side  of  exaltedness;  and  they  may  diminish  the 
spirit  of  worship  which  was  begotten  by  the  thought  of 
God  as  "high  and  lifted  up."  But  at  any  rate,  there  is 
now  no  partition-wall  between  God  and  man:  God  is  the 


THE  LIVING  GOD  309 

immanent  Spirit  in  the  spirit  of  man,  Life  of  his  life, 
Love  of  his  love. 

At  the  same  time,  there  is  no  ground  for  disquietude 
lest  the  other  aspect  of  God  be  lost  sight  of.  We  shall 
never  be  so  arrogant  as  to  claim  to  know  aU.  There  will 
always  be  an  unexplored  remainder — the  Unknown  beyond 
experience,  inviting  but  impenetrable ;  and  in  the  presence 
of  the  Great  Mystery  the  spirit  will  give  expression  to  its 
hushed  feeling  in  reverence  and  awe.  In  the  New  Jerusa- 
lem the  seer  beheld  no  temple ;  but  so  long  as  human  hearts 
are  on  this  side  of  the  veil,  there  will  be  churches  and 
altars  and  worship.  In  all  our  world  there  is  no  sight  so 
impressive  as  that  of  a  multitude,  or  even  of  two  or  three, 
bending  low  in  adoration  before  the  unseen,  unfathomable 
God.  There  will  always  be  the  great  hymns  of  the  church, 
breathing  out  aspiration,  confession,  thanksgiving,  in 
which  man  brings  his  frail  and  yearning  self  to  the 
Eternal.  And  the  greatest  thinkers,  as  Plato  and  St. 
Paul,  will  not  cease  to  attribute  to  God  more  than  our 
human  measuring-rod  can  compass.  After  completing  the 
most  elaborate  theodicy  which  issued  in  the  cry,  "O  the 
depth  of  the  riches,  both  of  the  knowledge  and  the  wisdom 
of  God !"  a  deeper  hush  falls  upon  the  spirit  of  the  brood- 
ing apostle,  and  the  cry  completes  itself:  "How  unsearch- 
able are  his  judgments,  and  his  ways  past  finding  out!" 
The  drama  of  the  world-history,  written  in  rocks  and  stars 
and  the  vanishing  tablets  of  human  experience — who  can 
decipher  it.''  Who  is  worthy  to  break  the  seals  and  to 
open  the  book  which  holds  the  secrets  of  the  future,  even 
of  man's  life  on  the  globe  ? 

Those  who,  as  Horace  Bushnell,  Samuel  Butler,  and 
H.  G.  Wells,  advocate  a  finite  God,  are  not  satisfied  to 
leave  the  matter  there.     They,  and  indeed  all  who  think 


310  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

of  God  as  finite,  feel  the  need  of  an  infinite  background  of 
reality  out  of  which  rises  the  divine  personage  whom  we 
call  God.  Here  we  have  again  a  witness  to  the  inexpug- 
nable conviction  voiced  by  Job:  "Lo,  these  are  but  the 
outskirts  of  his  ways ;  and  how  small  a  whisper  do  we  hear 
of  him!  But  the  thunder  of  his  power,  who  can  under- 
stand?" (Job  xxvi,  14).  Such  words  carry  an  unanswer- 
able rebuke  to  the  smug  complacency  of  those  to  whom, 
as  to  Job's  friends,  the  entire  will  of  God  lies  bare — and 
as  barren — as  the  sands  of  the  desert.  More  reverent  is 
Mr.  Wells,  with  all  his  seeming  irreverence,  than  are  those 
who  profess  to  have  sounded  the  abysmal  depths  of  the 
divine  Will.  Ethical  monotheism  is  partly  a  postulate  of 
faith,  presenting  itself  for  verification,  and  partly  an  atti- 
tude in  which  "deep  answers  to  deep,"  with  no  articulate 
words  to  voice  its  meaning — 

"...  with  no  language  but  a  cry." 


m 


The  conception  of  God  as  an  ideal-forming  Principle, 
a  Creative  Good  Will,  retires  into  the  background,  if  it 
does  not  wholly  dispose  of  several  points  of  view  from 
which  theories  of  God  have  been  framed.  1.  God  is  defined 
as  Substance,  a  notion  advocated  by  nearly  all  theolo- 
gians, with  the  exception  of  Duns  Scotus,  Leibnitz,  and 
Schleiermacher.  It  was  felt  that  there  must  be  some 
permanent  basis  in  which  the  various  properties  cohered 
and  which  therefore  gave  them  their  indissoluble  unity. 
It  did  not  matter  that  there  was  no  conceivable  relation 
between  the  rational  nature  and  the  individual  substance. 
The  doctrine  gave  rise  to  many  positions  which  have  been 


THE  LIVING  GOD  311 

provocative  of  controversy,  which  but  for  this  doctrine  of 
substance  would  never  have  arisen.  The  doctrine  of  the 
Trinity  in  its  traditional  form  is  a  case  in  point.  A  recent 
statement  ^  of  it  runs  as  follows :  "The  three  Persons  in 
the  Trinity  are  truly  persons  in  the  sense  that  each  one 
has  a  degree  of  independent  thought  and  feeling  and  will, 
and  yet  these  three  cohere  in  the  higher  synthesis  of  one 
unitary  spirit  and  life."  If  we  substitute  the  word  "Sub- 
stance" for  "spirit  and  life,"  we  shall  find  the  meaning 
clear,  and  we  shall  see  perfectly  the  background  from 
which  the  conception  rises.  A  very  different  meaning 
would,  however,  be  assigned  to  the  Trinitarian  doctrine, 
providing  it  was  retained,  if  we  think  of  God  not  as  Sub- 
stance, but  as  Creative  Will.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
unity  of  God  is  in  question,  it  is  not  the  unity  of  sub- 
stance, but  of  purposive  action  which  embraces  all  ranks 
of  being  and  endures  forever. 

2.  The  conception  of  God  as  Purposive  Will  relieves 
us  of  the  attempt  to  reconcile  and  unite  the  metaphysical 
and  the  religious  interests  of  the  traditional  idea  of  God. 
Both  of  these  notions — the  metaphysical  and  the  religious 
— have  been  held  by  great  thinkers  at  the  same  time,  and 
because  they  were  supposed  to  be  homogeneous  have  on 
equal  terms  been  incorporated  into  the  dogmas  of  the 
church  and  in  theological  teaching.  But  these  notions 
have  really  nothing  in  common.  They  belong  to  different 
universes  of  discourse.  They  have  lived  together  in  peace 
only  when  and  because  their  incompatibility  was  not  per- 
ceived: one  is  rational,  the  other  ethical;  one  static,  the 
other  dynamic ;  one  is  abstract,  the  other  living  and  per- 
sonal. To  the  static  aspect  of  the  idea  of  God  have  been 
referred  the  divine  properties  conceived  of  as  at  rest  back 

*  J.  H.  Snowden,  op.  ctt„  p.  86. 


312  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

of  the  active  properties ;  to  the  ethical  or  religious  aspect 
has  been  referred  the  activity  by  which  the  kingdom  of 
God  is  established  among  men.  For  us,  however,  this  dis- 
tinction does  not  exist.  In  God  is  no  potentiahty  beyond 
the  actual  energy  of  willing.  There  is  perfect  rest,  but 
this  is  as  Schopenhauer  pointed  out  the  tireless  action  of 
will.  There  are  indeed  potentialities  in  God,  not,  however, 
as  latent  power,  but  precisely  those  ideal-forming  activi- 
ties which  have  been  eternally  operative  and  will  yet  bring 
forth  other  forms  of  beauty  and  goodness  in  the  world  of 
his  delight. 

"...  God  fulfills  himself  in  many  ways. 
Lest  one  good  custom  should  corrupt  the  world." 

S,  In  addition  to  the  idea  of  Substance  as  characteriz- 
ing the  nature  of  God,  various  other  conceptions  have 
been  suggested,  as,  for  example,  the  Godhead  distinguished 
from  God ;  an  ineffable  Reality  back  of  all  manifestation ; 
a  perfect  self-consciousness  complete  apart  from  the  uni- 
verse. These  conceptions  come  to  us  with  a  variety  of 
backing — ^by  a  theory  of  revelation,  of  being,  of  experi- 
ence, of  knowledge,  and  of  language.  (1)  We  are  told 
by  Mansel  in  his  Lirmts  of  Religious  Thought  that  the 
entire  content  of  dogma,  relating  to  God  as  the  Trinity 
and  the  Person  of  Christ,  lies  beyond  the  reach  of  our 
rational  power  and  can  be  known,  if  at  all,  only  by  revela- 
tion. We  are  in  a  field  of  mystery  where  unless  God 
draws  aside  the  veil  we  are  shrouded  in  darkness.  The 
use  of  the  reason  is  purely  regulative,  that  is,  it  is  limited 
to  reducing  to  logical  order  what  has  been  received  by 
revelation.  This  appears  to  be  the  common  position  occu- 
pied by  theologians  in  expounding  the  doctrine  of  the 


THE  LIVING  GOD  818 

Trinity.  (2)  There  is  also  a  theory  of  being  which  is 
essentially  that  of  the  mystics.  From  Plotinus  on  to 
the  latest  advocate  of  mysticism,  man  in  his  most  awak- 
ened moments  hears,  not  authentic  sound,  but  only  its 
echo,  beholds  not  light,  but  only  the  shadow  of  light, 
stretches  forward  to  a  goal  which  withdraws  itself  as  he 
approaches ;  his  deepest  longing  is  to  sink  himself  in  the 
ineffable  One  where  all  differences  are  annulled  and  all 
movement  forever  stilled.  (3)  From  a  very  different  point 
of  view  we  are  told  that  we  are  so  limited  by  the  nature 
of  experience  that  here  below  we  can  have  no  knowledge 
of  aught  but  the  phenomenal  world,  yet  are  so  constituted 
that  we  must  postulate  a  transcendental  world  in  which 
God  is  eternally  real,  although  we  are  incapable  of  enter- 
ing into  personal  relations  with  him.  This  position  is 
supported  by  a  theory  of  knowledge  which  offers  a 
rational  justification  of  it.  (4)  We  have  finally  a  theory 
of  language  according  to  which  all  ideas  are  compelled  to 
clothe  themselves  in  words,  and  words  have  only  a  repre- 
sentative value.  Even  the  Trinity  is  no  more  than  an 
instrumental  manifestation  of  the  divine  for  the  sake  of 
redemption ;  what  God  is  in  reality  back  of  this  dramatic 
representation  lies  beyond  the  power  of  man  to  know. 

From  our  point  of  view,  the  dualism  involved  in  these 
and  other  theories  of  God  does  not  exist.  Not  that  we 
know  or  can  comprehend  the  entire  meaning  of  God.  Our 
actual  knowledge  is,  however,  summed  up  in  Purposive 
Will  realizing  itself  in  ends.  So  far  as  these  ends  are 
known,  God  is  known.  And  there  are  not  two  sources  of 
knowledge  of  God,  one  referred  to  natural  revelation 
which  is  shared  by  all  men,  another  referred  to  supernat- 
ural revelation  as  communicating  truth  about  God  which 
the  human  mind  cannot  otherwise  become  aware  of.     The 


314  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

being  of  God  is  not  other  than  his  will,  and  his  will  does 
not  exist  outside  of  a  world  of  space  and  time  and  con- 
scious beings.  Nowhere  is  God  more  real  and  never  will 
he  be  more  active  than  in  the  immediate  circle  of  our 
conscious  life.  If  our  experience  is  not  in  contact  with 
his  energizing  activity  here  and  now,  we  shall  not  else- 
where and  at  another  time  be  in  touch  with  it.  And  if  our 
language  concerning  God  cannot  extricate  itself  from 
its  earlier  function  as  representing  physical  objects,  and 
it  is  still  compelled  to  body  forth  its  meaning  in  imagery 
which  betrays  its  sensuous  origin,  this  does  not  signify 
that  the  Reality,  if  we  could  know  it,  would  be  something 
essentially  different  from  what  our  words  enshrine.  The 
attempt  to  separate  the  Godhead  from  God  is  futile — the 
Godhead  incomprehensible  and  ineffable,  God  revealed  in 
creation  and  redemption.  There  is  no  God  back  of  God. 
To  hold  with  Augustine,  on  the  one  hand,  that  God  is  the 
unmoved  and  inconceivable  Absolute,  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  that  he  is  the  sole  predestinating  cause  of  salvation, 
or  with  Calvin  that  the  will  of  God  is  utterly  inscrutable 
and  yet  is  the  source  of  both  election  and  reprobation,  or 
with  Herbert  Spencer  that  the  Ultimate  Reality  is  Un- 
known and  Unknowable,  and  yet  is  an  Infinite  and  Eternal 
Energy,  the  First  Cause,  and  of  the  same  nature  as  that 
which  wells  up  in  the  human  consciousness — this  is  to 
divide  a  unity  which  admits  of  no  cleft.  All  of  these  con- 
ceptions originate  in  a  common  fallacy,  that  the  world  of 
our  experience  is  different  from  a  theoretical  world  which 
transcends  our  experience.  With  a  world  which  trans- 
cends experience  and  a  conception  of  God  which  alleges 
something  in  him  which  is  other  than  what  is  manifest  in 
our  world  we  can  have  no  concern.  Speculation  regarding 
such  supposititious  matters  is  unproductive.   Exceedingly 


THE  LIVING  GOD  815 

happy  are  the  words  of  one  who  was  of  all  men  perhaps 
the  greatest  sinner  in  this  regard:  "Cold  and  frivolous 
are  the  speculations  of  those  who  employ  themselves  in 
disquisitions  on  the  essence  of  God,  when  it  would  be  more 
interesting  to  us  to  become  acquainted  with  his  character, 
and  to  know  what  is  agreeable  to  his  nature.  For  what 
end  is  answered  by  professing  with  Epicurus  that  there  is 
a  God  who,  discarding  all  concern  about  the  world,  in- 
dulges himself  in  perpetual  inactivity?  What  benefit 
arises  from  the  knowledge  of  a  God  with  whom  we  have 
no  concern?"  ^ 

There  is  no  intention  here  of  warding  off  a  speculative 
in  favor  of  a  positive  doctrine  of  God.  Speculation  is  of 
high  antiquity  and  numbers  among  its  adherents  the 
most  famous  thinkers;  it  is  an  inalienable  prerogative  of 
the  human  reason.  But  whatever  lustre  attaches  to  it  by 
reason  of  age  or  splendid  achievements,  it  must  not  usurp 
the  seat  of  authority  when  truth  near  at  hand  and  ade- 
quate to  support  life  is  available.  However  prolonged 
our  existence  and  in  whatever  world  passed,  we  could 
never  know  that  God  is  Absolute  Thought  or  that  there  is 
an  abysmal  Godhead  back  of  God,  but  every  day  in  any 
sphere  we  can  be  aware  that  God  comprises  the  sum  of 
our  ideal  interests,  and  that  he  is  not  only  «,  but  the^ 
Creative  Good  Will.  When  we  try  to  thwart  that  Will, 
our  deed  reacts  upon  us  with  abortive  and  fatal  futility. 
When  we  work  with  it,  individual  aims  and  social  endeav- 
ors are  furthered  and  confirmed.  To  have  discovered  this 
is  the  immemorial  glory  of  the  Hebrew  prophets.  Jesus 
gave  expression  to  it  through  all  his  ministry,  but  most 
in  the  shadows  of  Gethsemane  and  the  cross.  And  history 
is  one  long  confirmation  of  it. 

*  Calvin,  Institutes  of  the  Christian  Religion,  Vol.  I,  p.  50. 


316  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

IV 

Our  idea  of  God  disposes  of  another  misconception, 
namely,  that  there  is  in  the  divine  nature  a  tension  be- 
tween justice  and  mercy.  This  misconception  has  been 
thus  stated:  "God  may  be  merciful;  he  must  be  just." 
This  assertion  raises  the  whole  question  of  justice  and 
love  and  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  and  the  relation  of  these 
to  the  divine  will.  The  question  is  made  more  difficult  by 
reason  of  two  considerations:  one,  the  statements  of  the 
Scriptures,  the  other,  the  experience  of  life.  The  sacred 
writers  are  at  one  with  the  greatest  of  the  Greek  trage- 
dians, that  retribution  for  both  good  and  evil  is  a  uni- 
versal law,  and  they  are  agreed  in  referring  it  to  such  a 
source  as  guarantees  its  inviolable  execution.  A  prophet 
of  the  Old  Testament  avers  that  "the  soul  that  sinneth, 
it  shall  die,"  and  an  apostle  of  the  New  Testament  an- 
nounces that  "Whatsoever  a  man  soweth,  that  shall  he 
also  reap."  The  entire  Bible  may  be  regarded  as  an  illus- 
tration of  the  truth  of  the  words  here  transcribed — stem, 
pitiless,  and  without  exception,  involving  the  innocent  no 
less  than  the  guilty  in  the  sweep  of  its  resistless  law.  It 
presents  the  will  of  God  as  indeed  "a  consuming  fire."  ^ 
His  jealousy  for  obedience  to  his  law — the  progressive 
social  ideal  of  the  time,  his  bringing  to  naught  the  deeds 
of  evil-doers,  sometimes  with  fierce  and  terrible  destruc- 
tion, always  infallibly  just,  often  rough  in  execution,  re- 
veals a  will  whose  very  structure  is  justice.  The  impres- 
sion created  by  the  Scriptures  is  carried  to  a  complete 
confirmation  in  the  wider  continued  experience  of  men. 
It  may  happen  that  men  do  not  know  what  justice  is,  they 
may  even  be  striving  to  realize  it,  but,  choosing  the  wrong 

» Heb.  xii,  29. 


THE  LIVING  GOD  817 

path,  go  more  or  less  blindly  to  their  aim ;  yet  this  neither 
delays  nor  bends  the  justice  of  the  divine  will.  This  is 
invariable,  inexorable,  inescapable.  And  we  are  ever  held 
within  the  circle  of  such  a  God:  "His  justice  which  knows 
no  flaw  and  brooks  no  evasion  and  cannot  be  swerved; 
.  .  .  his  hatred  of  sin,  terrible  and  flaming,  a  hatred  which 
will  send  men  through  a  thousand  hells,  if  they  will  have 
them."  ^  Such  is  the  justice  of  God,  sometimes  secret,  at 
other  times  open,  always  sure  as  the  conservation  of 
energy  and  the  swing  of  atoms. 

Experience  reveals  another  law  not  less  pervasive  than 
that  of  justice,  namely,  that  of  love.  Side  by  side  with 
the  stem  demands  of  justice  and  its  penalty  for  transgres- 
sion, the  Bible  comes  to  us  freighted  with  its  love,  its 
sympathy,  its  compassion,  its  persuasive  gentleness — a 
revelation  of  the  heart  of  God.  And  from  the  day  when 
our  first  parents  began  to  sufl^er  the  long  doom  of  sin  and 
"God  made  them  coats  of  skin  and  clothed  them,"  to  the 
last  vision  of  the  redeemed  when  he  shall  clothe  them  with 
"fine  linen,  bright  and  pure,"  there  is  never  a  moment  in 
between  when  the  divine  loving  will  is  not  pouring  out  its 
wealth  of  good.  In  spite  of  devastating  physical  forces 
and  ferocity  of  animal  life,  we  may  still  say  that  the  struc- 
ture of  our  world  is  beneficent  and  in  the  animals  below 
man  are  the  beginnings  of  beautiful  love.  Appalling  is 
the  contrast  between  the  unweaponed  gentleness  of  the 
dove  and  the  tearing  beak  of  the  eagle,  the  trusting  sim- 
plicity of  the  lamb  and  the  cruel  strength  of  the  tiger; 
and  one  does  not  wonder  at  the  poet's  startled  question 
as  he  contemplates  the  two — 

"Did  he  who  made  the  lamb  make  thee.?" 


*  Albert  Parker  Fitch,  Preaching  and  Pagarmm,  p.  161, 


318  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

It  is  not  less  hard  to  feel  that  to  the  same  source  are 
to  be  traced  justice  and  mercy.  Almost  by  instinct  we 
believe  in  a  rigorous  and  unbending  righteousness;  but 
only  by  an  effort  do  we  convince  ourselves  that  love  is 
equally  fundamental  in  our  world ;  particularly  is  this  the 
case  when  we  think  of  the  forgiveness  of  sins.  For  here 
we  meet  a  double  difficulty:  first,  we  seem  to  require  an 
exception  to  the  inexorable  law  of  justice,  and  secondly, 
we  do  not  see  how  love  can  supplant  justice.  There  is, 
however,  incontrovertible  evidence  of  the  arrest  of  wicked 
purposes  in  the  hearts  of  men,  the  beginning  of  new  im- 
pulses, desires,  and  aims.  There  is  release  from  the  bond- 
age of  the  past.  There  is  emancipation  to  a  better  spirit. 
There  is  a  sense  of  oneness  with  God.  Most  persons  con- 
nect this  experience  with  a  particular  theory  of  God's 
relation  to  it,  alleging  an  atoning  deed  on  the  part  of 
God  as  a  condition  of  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  in  which 
justice  is  satisfied,  in  which  too  a  different  attitude  is 
created  in  God  toward  the  sinner,  even  that  of  clemency. 
Yet  the  fatal  tension  between  justice  and  love  continues — 
they  never  meet. 

The  antinomy  thus  set  up  in  the  divine  Good  Will  be- 
tween these  needs  somehow  to  be  resolved.  This  cannot, 
however,  be  brought  about  by  any  expedient  in  which  the 
divine  justice  is  relaxed,  deflected,  arrested,  transmuted, 
or  in  any  way  becoming  other  than  it  is,  but  only  by  hold- 
ing fast  its  principle  in  undeviating  operation.  We  no 
longer  define  miracle  as  suspension,  interruption,  or  viola- 
tion of  a  law  of  nature.  "Justice  is  man's  dearest  pos- 
session." Once  let  an  exception  be  acknowledged  in  the 
working  of  the  divine  will  and  we  may  as  well  throw  over- 
board reliance  on  any  principle  or  law  of  the  divine 
order. 


THE  LIVING  GOD  Sid 

Love  has  been  defined  as  the  opposite  of  justice.  Jus- 
tice holds  the  even  scales  of  desert  and  reward ;  love  would 
ignore  desert  and  turn  reward  into  a  gift.  Justice  would 
punish;  love  would  arrest  penalty  and  confer  blessing. 
Justice  would  kill ;  love  would  make  alive.  Justice  would 
reduce  all  to  law;  love  would  annul  law  and  draw  men 
into  the  realm  of  grace.  But  love  is  not  to  be  so  con- 
trasted with  justice.  If  love  is  anything,  it  is  a  higher 
justice.  The  father  of  the  prodigal,  having  made  the 
utmost  expression  of  his  love  to  his  younger  son,  replied 
to  the  elder  son's  charge  of  injustice:  "It  was  meet  to 
make  merry  and  be  glad;  for  this  thy  brother  was  dead 
and  is  alive  again,  and  was  lost  and  is  found." 

Thus  love  does  not  violate  justice;  it  is  an  interpreta- 
tion and  expression  of  justice  which  reveals  more  fully 
its  essential  nature;  it  is  not  love  until  it  is  justice  in 
the  highest  degree.  Perfect  justice  would  leave  nothing 
to  be  desired  in  the  relation  of  man  to  man  and  of  man  to 
God;  and  perfect  love  could  offer  neither  more  nor  less 
than  this.  To  join  the  word  "holy"  to  love  adds  nothing 
to  its  meaning  when  applied  to  God. 

In  order  to  realize  the  force  of  the  contention  that  jus- 
tice and  love  are  two  names  for  the  same  divine  quality, 
we  may  consider  the  relation  of  the  justice  of  God  to 
sin  and  the  forgiveness  of  sin.  Sin  is  not  what  the  antin- 
omy of  justice  and  love  assumes,  nor  is  it  what  that  theory 
of  the  atonement  based  upon  this  opposition  requires. 
Sin  is  not  the  completely  individual  thing,  involving  the 
degree  of  knowledge,  capacity,  and  responsibility  which 
this  doctrine  demands.  No  one  has  ever  been  willing  to 
find  the  entire  source  of  sin  in  the  individual,  not  even  in 
the  first  man.  It  has  been  explained  as  originating  in  our 
first  parents,  in  Satan,  in  ignorance,  in  untrained  will,  in 


S20  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

weak  and  diseased  physical  bodies,  in  untoward  environ- 
ment. It  has  been  described  as  an  anachronism,  wherein 
men  continue  actions  of  animals  under  conditions  which 
are  unsuited  to  their  performance,  and  the  legitimate 
habits  of  an  earlier  social  condition  live  on  when  they  have 
been  outgrown  or  outlawed.  Whatever  explanation  we 
have  to  offer  for  the  fact  of  sin,  we  cannot  load  exclusive 
responsibility  on  any  man  or  on  all  men.  Man  with  his 
frailty,  his  failure,  and  his  sin  is  the  product  of  the  uni- 
verse, that  is,  of  the  indwelling  Power  which  has  shaped 
our  world  and  all  that  is  in  it.  In  the  long  process  of  the 
evolution  of  life  and  well-being,  in  one  corner  of  the  globe 

"out  of  darkness  came  the  hands 
That  reach  through  nature,  moulding  man." 

Man  did  not  ask  to  be  born;  he  has  chosen  but  little  of 
the  conditions  in  which  success  and  defeat  arise;  he  aims 
at  a  good  and  mistakes  the  path  to  its  accomplishment. 
He  is  rarely  as  guilty  as  his  envious  or  pharisaic  fellow- 
man  adjudges  him  to  be.  In  his  sorrow  for  his  sin  and 
despair  of  release  from  the  bands  of  habit  and  debasing 
social  ties,  he  looks  upward  and  still  more  deeply  within, 
and  there  he  comes  upon  the  Power  to  which  he  owes  his 
being,  his  circumstances,  and  even  his  temptations,  the 
Power  which  has  beset  him  behind  and  before,  in  which 
lies  all  his  hope,  and  he  cries: 

"Thou  wilt  not  leave  us  in  the  dust; 
Thou  madest  man,  he  knows  not  why ; 
He  thinks  he  was  not  made  to  die; 
And  thou  hast  made  him :  thou  art  just."  ^ 


^  In  Memoriam. 


THE  LIVING  GOD  S21 

Between  these  two  poles  of  human  frailty  and  the  justice 
of  God  our  lives  are  passed.  For  the  truth  of  this  we  do 
not  have  to  resort  to  a  weak  sentimentality ;  the  sober  in- 
sight of  prophets,  poets,  social  workers  among  the  sub- 
merged tenth,  those  who  seek  to  reform  men  and  women 
with  criminal  record,  the  leaders  in  religious  education  of 
the  young, — all  find  in  this  a  key  to  their  outlook  upon 
human  life.  To  our  own  poet  Whittier  ^  we  owe  a  beau- 
ful  wording  of  this  truth: 

"He  who  knows  our  frame  is  just, 
Merciful  and  compassionate, 
And  full  of  sweet  assurances 
And  hope  for  all  the  language  is 
That  he  remembers  we  are  dust." 

In  the  forgiveness  of  sins  we  are  in  the  presence  of  the 
same  sense  of  justice.  For  forgiveness  is  not  less  an  act 
of  justice  than  of  love;  indeed,  it  is  justice  under  another 
name.  Forgiveness  does  not  annul  the  past;  it  does  not 
abolish  the  consequences  of  sin;  it  does  not  transmute 
acquired  dispositions ;  it  only  initiates  but  does  not  com- 
plete the  substituting  and  transforming  of  the  stored-up 
content  of  the  sub-conscious  self  into  a  heaven  of  holy 
tendencies.  He  who  feels  that  his  sins  are  forgiven  be- 
gins to  fulfill  those  ends  both  individual  and  social  which 
are  to  constitute  him  a  person;  these  ends  are  the  only 
justification  for  bringing  him  into  existence,  for  forgiv- 
ing his  sin,  and  for  making  him  part  of  that  moral  and 
spiritual  order  in  which  the  greater  glory  of  God  is 
revealed  and  realized.  He  has  now  begun  to  conserve  and 
advance  the  values  which  give  to  the  world  and  human 


^  Snow  Boimd, 


322  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

life  their  highest  meaning.  Jonathan  Edwards  has  a  flam- 
ing discourse  on  "The  Justice  of  God  in  the  Damnation  of 
Sinners."  We  would  substitute  for  this  "The  justice  of 
God  in  the  Salvation  of  Sinners,"  initiated  as  this  is  by 
the  forgiveness  of  sins.  Two  writers  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment have  stated  this  in  words  which  have  formed  the 
theme  of  a  hundred  thousand  sermons  and  have  led  mil- 
lions of  souls  to  the  new  life.  One  said  that  God  had 
taken  in  hand  the  doing  away  with  the  sins  of  men,  "that 
he  might  be  just,  and  the  justifier  of  him  that  hath  faith 
in  Jesus ;"  -^  the  other,  who  was  not  blind  to  the  deadly 
nature  of  sin,  wrote,  "If  we  confess  our  sins,  he  is  faith- 
ful and  just  to  forgive  us  our  sins,  and  to  cleanse  us  from 
all  unrighteousness."  ^ 


We  turn  now  to  the  more  personal  relations  involved  in 
our  conception  of  God — prayer,  co-operation  with  God 
in  the  tasks  of  life,  divine  sympathy  and  comfort  in  sor- 
row. 

Our  idea  of  God  will  bring  about  a  profound  change 
in  the  conception  of  prayer.  It  would  be  difficult  to  for- 
mulate the  various  notions  and  especially  feelings  which 
are  commonly  associated  with  this  experience ;  these  differ 
with  the  individual  groups  as  influenced  by  tradition,  ex- 
perience, education,  and  the  world-view.  We  shall  not 
attempt  a  description  of  them  or  an  explanation  of  the 
reason  for  their  divergences.  Ours  is  a  more  modest  task, 
— to  show  the  attitude  of  prayer  which  is  involved  in  our 

*  Rom.  iii,  26. 
»IJohni,  9. 


THE  LIVING  GOD  828 

idea  of  God.  This  will  be  limited  to  three  particulars: 
adoration,  confession,  petition. 

1.  When  we  think  of  adoration  there  rises  before  us 
a  prostrate  form  symbolizing  a  spirit  overladen  with  a 
sense  of  the  majesty  of  God.  The  feeling  is  inarticulate, 
or  if  it  utters  itself  in  words,  it  is  aware  how  inadequate 
these  are  to  convey  its  meaning.  We  give  expression  to 
this  attitude  in  song,  as  in  the  great  processional  which 
echoes  the  adoring  praise  of  a  scene  in  the  Revelation : 

"Holy,  holy,  holy!  all  the  saints  adore 'T:heeT 

Casting  down  their  golden  crowns  around  the  glassy 
sea; 
Cherubim  and  seraphim  falling  down  before  thee. 
Which  wast,  and  art,  and  evermore  shalt  be" 

In  a  previous  paragraph  we  have  seen  how  such  a  feeling 
will  never  be  outgrown.  Now  we  wish  to  point  out  other 
avenues  along  which  this  spirit  will  move  in  our  time.  As 
the  earlier  adoration  was  begotten  in  the  great  crises  of 
experience  where  the  Deliverer  immeasurably  surpassed  the 
world  and  all  its  forces  of  evil,  so  now  our  attitude  toward 
God  will  take  its  rise  in  experience  not  less  rich  in  mean- 
ing to-day.     There  are  three  of  these. 

The  first  is  the  new  appreciation  of  the  natural  world 
which  is  a  late  product  of  the  human  spirit.  Not  that  the 
Psalmists,  Homer,  and  Vergil  have  no  eyes  for  the  beauty 
and  the  terror  of  the  universe.  But  the  conscious  seeking 
for  the  strange  and  wonderful,  the  going  in  search  for 
beauty  as  one  searches  for  hid  treasure,  exploring  for- 
eign lands  to  come  in  sight  of  new  visions  of  loveliness 
and  grandeur  is  something  which  had  its  birth  with  the 
Romantic  spirit,     A  new  worship  has  arisen.     It  is  not 


524  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

now  God  in  his  transcendent  isolation  and  in  the  puri- 
tanical sternness  of  his  ethical  demands,  robbing  life  of 
half  its  charm,  but  beauty  that  draws  men  on  into  the 
shrine  of  worship. 

"  *Beauty  is  truth,  truth  beauty,' — that  is  all 
Ye  know  on  earth,  and  all  ye  need  to  know."  ^ 

A  new  temple  is  therefore  reared,  a  new  altar  consecrated, 
and  the  worshipers  bend  low  before  the  strangeness,  the 
mystery,  and  the  splendor  of  the  spirit  that  makes  "every- 
thing beautiful  in  its  time." 

Another  attitude  is  created  by  the  discoveries  of  phy- 
sical science.  The  infinitely  great  and  the  infinitely  little ; 
the  play  of  hidden  forces  which  have  begun  to  yield  up 
their  meaning  to  the  painstaking  inquirer;  the  perfect 
obedience  which  Nature  demands  of  him  whom  she  will 
serve;  the  complete  emptying  of  conceit  and  presupposi- 
tion ;  the  humility  and  teachableness  which  she  will  reward 
with  knowledge;  the  assurance  that  we  are  only  on  the 
borderland  of  a  yet  more  wonderful  world  than  imagina- 
tion has  dreamed ;  and  withal,  that  however  far  we  pene- 
trate into  the  heart  of  things,  we  are  still  and  shall  always 
be  in  the  presence  of  an  Infinite  and  Eternal  Mystery. 
Here  again  is  another  temple  and  another  altar,  and  hither 
come  worshipers,  some  in  academic  robes,  others  in  the 
rough  garb  of  those  who  are  busied  with  metals  and  gases, 
with  earth  and  rocks,  with  bodies  both  living  and  dead. 
Here  are  no  blatant  voices,  but  spirits  alert  with  expect- 
ancy, silent  with  surprise,  hushed  with  reverence  and  awe. 

Another  group  rises  before  us,  who  confess  to  the  ele- 
vation of  the  ethical  ideal  and  the  sanctity  of  the  moral 

*  Keats,  Ode  on  a  Grecian  Urn. 


THE  LIVING  GOD  S26 

order, — a  moral  order  not  finished  and  complete,  like  the 
New  Jerusalem,  hidden  in  heaven,  some  day  to  be  let  down 
bodily  to  earth,  but  an  order  progressively  realized  among 
men,  whose  realization  may  be  delayed  but  not  destroyed 
— "which  eye  hath  not  seen,  nor  ear  heard,  nor  hath  it 
entered  into  the  heart  of  man  to  conceive."  Here  again 
is  a  temple,  with  altar  and  worshipers  bending  low  in 
recognition  of  an  Almighty  Power,  who  out  of  the  struggle 
and  confusion  in  our  social  world,  is  creating  a  new 
Humanity  in  which  his  Spirit  shall  completely  dwell. 

These  are  the  newer  forms  of  the  adoring  mind  as  real 
to  men  and  as  dear  to  God  as  was  the  worship  of  Ezekiel 
or  of  the  Revelation.  To  this  ideal-creating  Power, 
Beauty  and  Truth  are  not  less  precious  than  are  Moral 
Values ;  those  who  adore  in  one  or  other  of  these  temples 
are  equally  dear  to  the  God  of  all. 

2.  According  to  our  idea  of  God  confession  of  sin  will 
complete  itself  in  two  aspects — ^word  and  deed.  There  is 
oral  confession  to  one  who  has  been  wronged.  If  one 
repents  of  an  evil  action  or  course  of  life,  this  may  be 
all  that  is  required  to  set  his  feet  in  the  path  of  virtue. 
But  a  word  of  confession  carries  the  resolve  a  step  fur- 
ther; it  is  a  fuller  expression  of  the  purpose  of  good;  it 
commits  one  to  the  fulfilling  of  his  intent ;  it  brings  the 
social  influences  into  play ;  it  carries  with  it  the  force  of 
a  spoken  contract  and  the  creation  of  a  new  social  expec- 
tancy. Much  of  what  is  said  here  is  valid  for  the  "con- 
fessional" where  the  confession  of  sins  is  voluntary  and 
sincere  and  the  priestly  confessor  represents  the  moral 
and  spiritual  values  which  are  involved  in  the  transaction. 
Still  more  significant  is  the  deed  of  him  who  repents  of 
his  sin.  He  is  now  active  on  the  side  of  the  moral  order; 
he  assumes  relations  with  good  men,  which  will  reinforce 


326  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

his  own  good  intentions  and  make  it  harder  for  him  to  fall 
back  into  his  evil  past;  he  begins  to  be  at  one  with  the 
Good  Will  in  its  creation  of  good  in  the  world.  In  some 
quarters  there  is  a  tendency  to  disparage  good  works,  but 
there  is  no  danger  that  there  will  be  too  many  of  these. 
It  is  only  by  good  works  that  good  will  can  be  expressed 
and  established  among  men.  As  there  is  no  sin  against 
God  which  is  not  at  the  same  time  a  sin  against  one's 
fellow-men,  so  there  is  no  good  which  embraces  one's 
fellow-men  but  at  the  same  time  involves  God  in  its  sweep. 
3.  Our  hardest  problem  confronts  us  in  the  matter  of 
prayer  as  petition.  Volumes  have  been  written  on  such 
questions  as,  How  to  pray,  What  to  pray  for.  Remark- 
able answers  to  prayer.  Prayer  and  the  laws  of  nature, 
and  the  Reflex  influence  of  prayer.  These  and  other  ques- 
tions like  them  we  leave  at  one  side.  We  shall  ask  only 
what  is  the  meaning  of  prayer  and  what  its  relation  to 
the  Purposive  Good  Will. 

We  pass  by  the  prayers  of  the  church,  venerable, 
stately,  fitted  for  every  occasion,  distilling  the  experi- 
ence, the  wisdom,  the  aspiration  of  the  greatest  souls. 
We  shall  best  reach  the  heart  of  the  subject  by  analysis 
of  two  prayers,  one,  the  Lord's  prayer,  the  other,  the 
prayer  of  Jesus  in  Gethsemane.  The  Lord's  prayer  is 
divided  into  two  sections,  in  the  first  of  which  is  a  recog- 
nition and  surrender  to  the  divine  will.  In  order  that  the 
nature  of  that  will  may  be  more  clearly  perceived  it  is 
addressed  to  a  paternal  Being;  it  is  social  in  its  scope; 
ideally  fulfilled  in  heaven;  to  be  reverently  accepted  and 
obeyed.  Such  is  the  attitude  toward  the  divine  Good  Will 
with  which  one  begins  his  day,  takes  up  his  tasks,  and 
relates  himself  to  the  world  of  men  and  things  around  him. 
Then  comes  the  second  section  which  concerns  personal 


THE  LIVING  GOD  327 

needs:  first,  physical,  those  which  belong  to  the  provi- 
dential order  of  the  world ;  secondly,  spiritual,  those  which 
are  related  to  the  fulfillment  of  the  moral  and  spiritual 
ideal.  Central  to  this  prayer  is  the  divine  will  which  pre- 
scribes our  ideal,  provides  for  our  need,  and  judges  our 
spirit.  Its  use  by  every  variety  of  believers  in  God  and  its 
connection  with  all  the  Liturgies  of  the  church,  show  that 
men  have  found  it  to  be,  what  in  reality  it  is,  a  universal 
prayer.  Although  Jesus  said,  "Thus  pray  ye,"  yet  in 
the  Garden  of  Gethsemane  we  have  a  very  different  type 
of  prayer.  The  order  of  petition  is  reversed;  instead  of 
the  will  of  God  as  first,  we  have  at  the  outset  the  most 
urgent  thrusting  forward  of  an  individual  wish,  so  press- 
ing and  violent  that  it  expresses  itself  "in  strong  crying 
and  tears."  This,  however,  at  length  gives  place  to  an- 
other mood,  the  will  of  God  swings  back  into  the  fore- 
front of  the  field  of  desire  and  aim,  and  the  cry  is  heard, 
"Not  my  will,  but  thine  be  done !"  And  now  the  strang- 
est of  all  paradoxes  appears:  Jesus'  will  finds  its  fulfill- 
ment in  the  divine  Good  Will ! 

Different  as  these  prayers  seem,  they  are  at  heart  one. 
They  equally  lay  bare  the  nature  of  all  petition, — to  seek 
and  to  find  the  meaning  of  the  Purposive  Good  Will  in 
every  particular  condition,  and  then  to  make  that  will 
our  own.  This  may  give  rise  to  a  struggle,  a  fierce  and 
bitter  conflict  between  the  lower  and  the  higher  self,  the 
individual  and  the  social  well-being;  the  human  and  the 
divine  may  at  the  outset  seem  in  sharp,  irreconcilable 
opposition ;  but  the  prayer  is  not  ended  until  the  lower  is 
merged  in  the  higher,  the  individual  finds  his  larger  life  in 
the  social  realm,  and  the  longing  completes  itself  in  the 
infinite  and  eternal  Good  Will.  A  self-willed  child  takes 
no  account  of  the  wise  purpose  of  a  good  father  but 


32$  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

insisting  upon  his  own  claim  defeats  the  fulfilhnent  of  any 
part  of  his  wish.  But  this  is  not  prayer.  The  first  condi- 
tion of  fruitful  prayer  is  to  accept  the  world  we  live  in,  in 
every  way  to  strive  to  ascertain  the  meaning  of  it  and  how 
to  realize  its  ends, — and  this  is  the  function  of  prayer, — 
and  then  with  heart  and  soul  give  oneself  to  the  furthering 
of  the  Divine  Will  in  which  alone  our  wish  comes  to  its 
consummation. 


VI 


Our  conception  of  God  as  Purposive  Will  throws  light 
on  our  part  in  the  realizing  of  ends  in  the  world.  1.  We 
shall  not  think  of  ourselves  as  pawns  on  a  chess-board, 
moved  to  and  fro  at  the  will  of  a  master  hand.  However 
we  minimize  the  initiative  of  the  human  will,  we  cannot 
reduce  it  to  zero,  save  at  the  price  of  exchanging  a  per- 
son for  a  thing.  In  the  analogy  suggested  by  Jesus,  "I 
am  the  vine,  ye  are  the  branches,"  while  the  branch  cannot 
wholly  originate  its  fruit,  yet  it  has  a  unique  and  indis- 
pensable part  in  the  production  of  it. 

2.  In  the  task  which  we  engage  in  we  do  not  work  in 
companionship  with  the  divine  will  only.  We  can  estab- 
lish no  exclusive  claim  nor  acquire  any  patent  right  to 
material  or  method  of  work  in  association  with  God  alone. 
We  are  indeed  fellow-workers  with  God,  but  he  does  not 
lend  himself  to  any  private  enterprise  with  which  he  and 
we  are  exclusively  concerned.  This  was  the  fallacy  of  the 
mystics.  St.  Simeon  Stylites  and  the  Blessed  Henry 
Suso,  one  on  his  pillar,  the  other  in  his  cell,  renounc- 
ing every  common  interest  with  their  comrades  in  the  task 
of  life,  dreamed  that  they  were  having  God  all  to  them- 
§elvesj   acquiring  sainthood  by   abnegation  of  all  social 


THE  LIVING  GOD  329 

relations  and  every  physical  good.  It  has  been  said  that 
the  secret  of  the  profound  religious  experience  of  Augus- 
tine lay  in  the  reciprocal  relations  "God  and  the  soul,  the 
soul  and  God."  If  one  judged  by  the  Confessions  alone, 
this  might  seem  to  be  true.  It  is,  however,  only  half  of  the 
truth,  as  one  may  discover  by  a  study  of  Augustine's 
exhaustless  labor  both  by  pen  and  by  the  oversight  of 
his  great  See.  Peter  would  have  three  tabernacles  reared 
on  the  Mount  of  Transfiguration,  that  so  the  glory  might 
be  continued  and  confined  to  the  happy  disciples;  but 
Jesus,  in  the  strength  born  of  the  new  experience,  would 
go  back  once  more  to  the  valley,  there  to  resume  his  social 
ministry.  There  can  be  no  permanent  solitary  enjoy- 
ment of  God.  Many  of  Faber's  poems  which  are  attuned 
to  this  note  are  not  only  fallacious  but  even  malign. 
Dante's  final  view  of  Beatrice,  as  she  turns  from  her  lover 
to  face  again  the  vision  of  God,  is  beautiful  as  a  picture, 
but  it  is  neither  human  nor  Christian.  The  human  will 
docs  not  lend  itself  to  such  self-centered,  insulated  enjoy- 
ment. The  "Legend  Beautiful"  floating  down  to  us  from 
Medieval  days  shows  how  such  an  expectation  frustrates 
itself.  The  convent  bell  has  rung  the  signal  for  distribut- 
ing alms,  and  the  monk,  about  to  obey  its  summons,  is 
startled  by  a  vision  of  his  glorified  Lord  standing  in  the 
middle  of  the  room  as  if  to  bless  him  with  a  word  and 
touch  from  the  heavenly  world.  Hesitating  for  an  instant 
between  his  desire  to  stay  and  his  duty  to  go,  reluctantly 
and  without  a  word  he  leaves  his  Lord  and  goes  on  his 
errand;  having  fed  the  hungry,  with  perturbed  spirit,  he 
returns  to  his  now  thrice-deserted  room,  and  to  his  im- 
measurable surprise  beholds  his  Master  still  standing 
there :  "Hadst  thou  stayed,  I  must  have  fled !" 

3.   So  far  as  personal  relations  are  concerned  we  serve 


330  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

God  in  proportion  as  we  serve  our  fellow-men.  We  speak 
of  our  hymns  and  prayers  and  the  sermon  at  church  as 
"divine  service";  we  announce  that  "divine  service"  will 
be  held  at  morning  and  evening  hours;  and  we  speak  of 
the  prayer  meeting  as  the  "service"  of  prayer.  This  is  a 
reminiscent  relic  of  the  time  when  men  supposed  that  wor- 
ship could  be  perpendicular,  ascending  straight  to  heaven. 
We,  however,  in  our  day,  know  that  all  our  "services"  are 
social.  We  know  also  that  the  Spirit  of  God  is  a  social 
spirit,  and  that  all  service  of  our  fellow-men  is  service  of 
the  social  will  of  God.  In  the  parable  of  "The  Great 
Assize"  those  who  had  been  kind  to  the  needy  were  all 
unaware  that  in  their  service  they  had  ministered  to 
Christ;  while  those  who  had  turned  a  cold  heart  to  the 
destitute  implied  that  they  would  not  have  withheld  mercy 
from  Christ  if  they  had  known  that  in  distress  he  had 
appealed  to  them  for  aid.  We  cannot  say  that  one  should 
serve  God  and  afterward  his  fellow-men ;  no  one  can  serve 
men  without  at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same  deed  serv- 
ing God.  "If  we  love  one  another,  God  abideth  in  us." 
4.  The  Creative  Good  Will  is  unable  to  bring  to  ex- 
pression the  infinite  multiplicity  and  richness  of  its  ends 
without  us.  Jesus  said,  "Apart  from  me  ye  can  do 
nothing;"  it  is  no  less  true  that  apart  from  us  he  can  do 
nothing.  A  thousand  volts  of  electricity  may  be  devel- 
oped, but  unless  there  are  tiny  filaments  in  every  room,  it 
cannot  light  the  house;  it  remains  a  potential  energy  or 
flows  off  in  other  channels.  The  significant  thing  at  Pen- 
tecost was  not  the  rushing  of  a  mighty  wind  and  the  fire 
— a  potential,  undistributed  good;  but  the  fresh  gift  of 
enthusiastic  interpretation  of  the  gospel,  symbolized  bv 
the  wind  and  by  the  flame  parting  itself  into  individual 
tongues  resting  upon  each  of  those  who  stood  on  the 


THE  LIVING  GOD  331 

threshold  of  their  mission.  The  principle  of  individua- 
tion finds  its  meaning  here.  There  is  no  such  reality  as 
an  undifferentiated  universal;  the  One  exists  only  in  and 
through  the  Many.  So  far  as  the  ends  are  concerned 
which  make  for  personality,  God  is  as  impotent  without 
man  as  man  is  impotent  without  God.  The  only  way  he 
can  "raise  up  children  unto  Abraham"  is  not  by  changing 
stones  into  persons  but  by  the  free  surrender  to  his  will 
of  those  who  incarnate  the  spirit  of  Abraham.  Tender 
and  gracious  and  willing  as  was  the  power  of  Jesus,  "he  did 
not  many  mighty  works  there  because  of  their  unbelief." 
5.  In  this  task  of  realizing  ends  which  are  in  line  with 
the  Creative  Good  Will,  we  can  create  nothing  new  but 
only  aid  in  carrying  further  those  ends  which  are  already 
partly  fulfilled ;  we  use  natural  means  and  social  agencies 
which  await  our  hand.  The  landscape  gardener  has  only 
to  look  around  him  if  he  would  discover  his  material :  the 
earth  and  grass,  flowering  plants,  shrubs  and  trees,  rocks 
and  sloping  land, — out  of  these  he  makes  beauty  where 
ugliness  reigned  before.  The  sailor  who  would  gain  a 
distant  port  has  but  to  assure  himself  that  his  ship  is  sea- 
worthy and  to  trim  his  sails,  letting  his  compass  rule  his 
rudder,  and  sea  and  wind  will  bear  him  on  to  his  desired 
haven.  The  divine  will  which  energizes  in  the  human 
will  controls  all  natural  forces  and  guides  other  human 
wills,  and  this  provides  both  the  opportunity  and  the  re- 
inforcing aids  for  completing  or  at  least  furthering  our 
highest  personal  aims.  On  the  cross  Jesus  cried,  "It  is 
finished!"  and  yet  the  work  which  he  had  scarcely  more 
than  begun  he  left  for  others  to  carry  on.  Our  lives  are 
so  intertwined  with  others  that  we  really  begin  no  tasks ; 
we  only  continue  what  others  have  undertaken,  perhaps 
able  only  to  conserve  the  talents  intrusted  to  us  and  at 


332  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

our  death  leaving  them  for  alien  hands.     "Other  men  have 
labored  and  we  have  entered  into  their  labors." 


vn 


Perhaps  the  problems  raised  by  our  conception  of  God 
as  Purposive  Good  Will  culminate  in  our  experience  of 
sorrow  and  loss.  It  is  not  so  much  that  a  speculative  solu- 
tion of  sorrow  seems  to  be  beyond  our  reach,  as  that  we 
find  it  hard  to  adjust  our  feelings  to  those  conceptions 
of  the  divine  will  which  appear  to  be  well-grounded.  We 
have,  however,  certain  fundamental  convictions  which  we 
know  to  be  unassailable.  1.  This  is  on  the  whole  a  good 
world.  This  conclusion  remains  after  making  allowance 
for  all  the  untoward  and  evil  things  in  it.  The  untoward 
and  evil  things  are  real;  they  are  not  less  real  than  is 
the  good.  They  may  give  place  to  more  favorable  condi- 
tions ;  they  may  be  modified  so  as  to  be  endurable.  But 
if  old  evils  disappear,  new  ones  rise  up:  a  new  disease 
takes  the  place  of  one  which  has  been  vanquished.  Still, 
in  spite  of  physical  evils  and  the  morally  bad,  this  world 
with  its  sickness  and  deformity,  its  cruelty  and  deceit,  its 
disappointment  and  sorrow,  its  death  which  brings  every 
life  however  brilliant  and  happy  to  an  inexorable  end, — 
in  spite  of  these  and  all  other  unfortunate  things,  all,  save 
those  who  were  bom  with  an  incurably  sour  taste  in  the 
mouth,  unite  in  saying.  This  is  a  good  world. 

2.  In  this  good  world  sorrow  and  loss  are  integral 
to  its  existence.  It  is  written  that  in  the  New  Jerusalem 
God  shall  wipe  away  all  tears  from  their  eyes,  and  sor- 
row and  sighing  shall  flee  away.  But  this  is  spoken  of  a 
dream-world  which  when  we  waken  to  reality  vanishes  like 


THE  LIVING  GOD  55S 

the  phantasms  of  our  sleep  when  the  day  dawns.  In  the 
only  world  that  we  know,  sorrow  is  inescapable — an  ex- 
perience created  by  the  same  life  that  creates  joy.  We 
cannot  conceive  of  a  human  existence  from  which  all  sor- 
row is  completely  barred.  There  are  indeed  those  athwart 
whose  path  its  shadow  is  not  yet  cast;  there  is  no  one 
to  whom  sorrow  and  loss  are  not  imminent,  who,  if  he 
lives  long  enough,  will  not  feel  its  aching  and  benumbing 
touch.  "God  has  one  Son  without  sin,  but  none  without 
stripes." 

3.  This,  then,  is  the  way  that  the  Creative  Good  Will 
constitutes  and  controls  the  world,  or  at  least  that  part 
of  it  where  we  pass  our  days ;  and  we  have  no  power  com- 
pletely to  change  it.  We  may  alleviate  pain,  we  may  pro- 
long life,  but  when  all  is  done  we  have  only  broidered 
the  garment  of  sorrow  and  lightened  by  a  little  the  spirit 
of  heaviness.  Sorrow  abides  still,  a  constituent  part  of 
our  life  that  we  did  not  make  and  cannot  change. 

4.  And  yet  sorrow  is  somehow  reconcilable  with  the  Pur- 
posive Good  Will.  Speculatively  we  may  not  see  how,  but 
in  experience  the  two  co-exist  in  a  harmony  created  by 
faith.  Sometimes  one  holds  fast  the  Good  Will  in  spite 
of  the  sorrow :  "Though  he  slay  me,  yet  will  I  trust  him !" 
At  other  times  the  sorrow  is  a  form  of  the  Good  Will,  as 
in  Gethsemane  and  on  the  cross.  Again,  the  sorrow  is 
transmuted  into  joy  by  the  lapse  of  time  and  the  alchemy 
of  a  loyal  spirit ;  the  letters  of  St.  Paul  abound  with  this 
promise  and  its  fulfillment.  This  elemental  faith  has  been 
thus  expressed :  ^ 

"I  doubt  not  that  the  passionately-wept  deaths  of  young 
men  are  provided  for — and  that  the  deaths  of  young 

*Walt  Whitman,  Leaves  of  Grass,  "Assurances." 


8S4  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

women,  and  the  deaths  of  little  children  are  pro- 
vided for; 

(Did  you  think  Life  was  so  well  provided  for — and 
Death  the  purport  of  all  Life,  is  not  provided  for?) 

I  do  not  doubt  that  wrecks  at  sea,  no  matter  what  the 
horrors  of  them — no  matter  whose  wife,  husband, 
child,  father,  lover,  has  gone  down,  are  provided  for, 
to  the  minutest  points ; 

I  do  not  doubt  that  whatever  can  possibly  happen,  any- 
where, at  any  time,  is  provided  for,  in  the  inher- 
ences of  things ; 

I  do  not  think  Life  provides  for  all  and  for  Time  and 
Space — ^but  I  believe  Heavenly  Death  provides  for 
aU." 

What  then  is  the  attitude  toward  life  which  goes  along 
with  this  conception  of  the  divine  Good  Will?  1.  It  is 
partly  expressed  in  the  title  of  the  latest  book  by  John 
Burroughs,  "Accepting  the  Universe."  Our  task  is  to 
know  the  universe  we  live  in;  what  it  offers  and  what  it 
demands;  what  it  gives  and  what  it  takes  away;  how  to 
adjust  ourselves  to  its  conditions  and  how  to  shape  these 
to  our  use.  Here  is  birth,  here  too  is  death.  Joy  is  here 
and  also  sorrow;  love,  memory,  hope,  disappointment, 
struggle,  defeat,  victory;  and,  crowning  all,  desire  for 
continued  life  after  death;  but  whether  we  shall  realize 
this  in  prolonged  individual  consciousness  or  only  "join 
the  choir  invisible,"  experience  here  below  offers  us  no 
lighted  torch.  We  may  read  fairy  tales,  we  may  listen  to 
marvelous  prophecies  of  the  future  unfolded  by  men  who 
talk  in  their  sleep ;  such  things  signify  nothing.  Our  task 
is  single  and  perfectly  simple — to  ascertain  what  kind  of 
a  world  the  Creative  Good  Will  is  actualizing  here  and 


THE  LIVING  GOD  SS5 

now  in  the  short  space  of  our  earthly  life,  to  calculate 
the  "risks"  which  are  probable  and  the  events  which  are 
sure,  and  then  adjust  ourselves,  not  with  the  hard  tem- 
per of  the  Stoic,  but  faithfully  and  bravely,  even  if  at 
times  sadly,  to  our  task. 

2.  When  the  shadow  falls  and  sorrow  and  loss  have 
darkened  all  our  world  and  we  sit  alone  and  disconsolate 
by  the  ashes  of  our  hope,  we  may  still  recall  the  light  and 
joy  of  other  days;  we  may  comfort  our  hearts  with  the 
assurance  that  the  world  as  it  is  is  created  by  a  Good 
Will,  wiser  than  our  wisdom,  more  just  than  our  meas- 
uring-rod of  right,  more  tender  than  our  gentlest  com- 
passion, and  more  worthy  of  our  trust  than  all  our  im- 
perfect conceptions  of  his  goodness.  A  Psalmist  ^  has 
coupled  two  words  which  at  first  seem  removed  from  each 
other  "as  far  as  the  east  is  from  the  west." 

"He  healeth  the  broken  in  heart, 
He  bindeth  up  their  wounds. 
He  counteth  the  number  of  the  stars, 
He  calleth  them  all  by  their  names." 

Here  is,  however,  no  chance  connection.  Only  that  Good 
Will  could  heal  the  broken  hearted  with  whom  lay  the 
control  of  the  infinite  worlds  of  space  and  time;  and  he 
alone  would  be  worthy  to  guide  the  universe  in  its  track- 
less path  through  eternity  without  the  loss  of  a  single 
shepherded  star  to  whom  a  broken  heart  is  among  the 
most  precious  of  all  values.  In  this  confidence  we  go  for- 
ward to  meet  what  life  has  to  offer,  even  its  sorrow  and 
loss,  safe  in  the  will  of  the  Living  God. 

*  Ps.  cxlvii,  8-4. 


$Se  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD 

"Oh  living  will  that  shalt  endure 

When  all  that  seems  shall  suffer  shock, 
Rise  in  the  spiritual  rock, 
Flow  through  our  deeds  and  make  them  pure. 

"That  we  may  lift  from  out  of  dust 

A  voice  as  unto  him  that  hears, 
A  cry  above  the  conquered  years 
To  one  that  with  us  works,  and  trust, 

"With  faith  that  comes  of  self-control. 

The  truths  that  never  can  be  proved 
Until  we  close  with  all  we  loved, 
And  all  we  flow  from,  soul  in  soul." 

— Tennyson,  In  Memoriam,  Canto  cxxx. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


Absolute,  The,  69,  76;  and  the 
Trinity  60;  and  the  finite,  69; 
and  God,  88;  244;  as  Power, 
105,  215,  219;  as  immutable, 
218  f.;  and  experience,  226,  229 
f.,  234;  and  time,  231  flf.;  as 
dynamic,  232,  242  ff. ;  as  static, 
232;  and  moral  evil,  234  ff., 
250;  and  perfection,  237;  and 
Pluralism,  242;  and  dynamic 
values,  249;  and  transcendence, 
254;  and  personality,  282  f. 

Adler,  Felix,  83. 

Ahriman,  165. 

Ahura  Mazda,  165. 

Ames,  Edward  Scribner,  61,  198 
f.,  202  f. 

Anselm,  110,  205,  246,  297,  304; 
on  the '  cosmological  argument, 
97;  on  the  ontological  argu- 
toent,  97  f. 

Aristotle,  on  God,  40  f.;  as  the 
Prime  Mover,  40,  96,  217;  as 
realized  ideal,  96;  on  final 
cause,  129 ;  on  perfect  self-con- 
sciousness, 210;  on  self-moving 
souls,  217;  on  knowledge  and 
virtue,  235;  transcendence,  253. 

Arnold,  Matthew,  69,  197. 

Aryan  idea  of  God,  18,  40,  209. 

Ascent  of  Man,   The,  300. 

Augustine,  Confessions,  48;  and 
Manichaeism,  48 ;  and  Neo-Pla- 
tonism,  48;  and  the  Absolute, 
49;  and  Dionysius,  49;  and  ex- 
perience, 50;  on  evil,  166;  on 
divine  sovereignty,  229 ;  on  pre- 
destination, 828. 

Augustinianism,  26. 

Authority,  10. 

Bacon,  129. 
Banks,  J.  S.,  104, 


Bergson,  160. 

Bernard  of  Clairvaux,  197,  268. 

Bernard  of  Clugny,  123,  259. 

Blatchford,  Robert,  86. 

Boehme,  Jacob,  261. 

Boethius,  276. 

Bosanquet,  B.,  on  mechanism 
and  teleology,   132. 

Bowne,  B.  P.,  262;  on  the  on- 
tological argument,  108 ;  on  per- 
sonality, 289,  291. 

Bradley,  F.  H.,  on  the  Absolute 
and  God,  215,  245;  on  the  Ab- 
solute and  personality,  287  f. 

Bronte,  Emily,  194. 

Bridges,  Horace  J.,  83. 

Bridgewater  Treatises,  The,  108, 
111,  128. 

Browning,  Robert,  171,  173,  307. 

Bruno,  55,  261. 

Bunyan,  123. 

Burroughs,  John,  86,  265,  334. 

Bushnell,  Horace  60,  214  f.,  809. 

Butler,  Samuel,  71,  218  f.,  809. 


Calvin,  26,  64,  141,  246,  260,  814 
f.;  on  predestination,  92,  99. 

Carlyle,  264. 

Cause,  Meaning  of,  100,  119,  132; 
efficient,  129;  final,  129,  132. 

Christ,  Deity  of,  31;  Person  of, 
Q6  f. 

Christian  Science,  87. 

Clarke,  W.  N.,  104. 

Clifford,  86. 

Coit,  Stanton,  88. 

Coleridge,  S.  T.,  264. 

Comte,  A.,  on  religion  of  human- 
ity, 76. 

Confessions  of  Augustine,  48, 328. 

Consciousness,  120,  142  f.,  169;  in 
God,  141. 


340 


INDEX 


Cosmological  argument,  36,  97  f., 

103  f.,  106  f.,  116. 
Creation,  7,  117  f.;  as  related  to 

consciousness,  120  f. ;  as  related 

to  personality,  120  f. 
Creative  Energy,  214. 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  103, 113, 

140. 
Criticism,  Historical,  6. 
Cyrus,  the  king,  161. 

Dante,  215,  329. 

Darwin,  137,  144. 

Davis,  Grace  T.,  119. 

Deity  of  Christ,  31. 

Democritus,  41,  118. 

Denio,  F.  B.,  279 

Descartes,  55,  110;  on  the  cos- 
mological argument,  98. 

Design,  130. 

Development,  Tendency  to,  155. 

Dewey,  John,  154. 

Dickinson,  G.  Lowe,  86. 

Dialogues  concerning  Natural 
Religion,  99  ff,  130  f.,  140,  211. 

Dionysius  the  Areopagite,  49, 258. 

Duns  Scotus,  63  ff.,  310. 

Dynamic  Conception  of  God,  247. 

Dysteleology,  140. 

Eckhart,  245,  258. 

Education,  Religious,  82. 

Edwards,  Jonathan,  322. 

E14ot,  C.  W.  80. 

Emerson,  Ralph  W.,  264  f. 

Enquiry  concerning  the  Human 
Understanding,  100. 

Epicureanism,  42,  210. 

Epicurus,  131. 

Erigena,  John  Scotus,  258. 

Eternity,  233,  237. 

Ethics,  Theory  of,  101. 

Ethical  Culture,  Society  of,  82. 

Evil  as  defect,  166;  in  Augustine, 
Kant,  Leibnitz,  166;  in  Mueller, 
167;  in  Hume,  168;  as  error, 
167;  as  incompleteness,  167  f.; 
evolutionary  view  of  169;  phys- 
ical, 183;  moral,  184,  234  ff. 


Evolution,  Physical,  8,  150,  156, 
159;  social,  160,  180,  263  f.,  271, 
300. 

Experience,  24,  64;  as  basis  of 
the  idea  of  God,  25. 

Faber,  F.  W.,  123,  329. 
Fairbairn,  A.  M.  274. 
Faunce,  W.  H.  P.,  62. 
Fechner,  243,  261. 
Fichte,  105,  110. 
Finite,  God  as,  209,  218  ff. 
Fisher,  G.  P.,  104. 
Fiske,  John,  262. 
Flint,  Professor,  104,  117. 
Foreknowledge  of  God,  270. 
Forgiveness  of  sin,  319  ff. 
Foster,  G.  B.,  82. 
Freedom,    101;    in   the   scientific 
sense,  141. 

Garvie,  A.  E.,  264. 

Gnosticism,  43,  436,  219. 

Gnostics,  The  God  of,  46. 

God,  Nicene  idea  of  1,  3;  as  dy- 
namic, 23,  249 ;  Semitic  idea  of, 
18,  39  f.;  as  static,  23,  41,  249; 
as  Substance,  42,  47  f.,  88,  312; 
as  Absolute,  49,  52,  86,  226  ff., 
244  ff.,  248;  As  Will,  53  f.;  the 
All-Real,  58;  Value,  61,  196; 
Creator,  70,  121  ff.;  Redeemer, 
70;  The  Known  and  Unknown, 
72;  Democratic  idea  of,  74,  83; 
growing,  75;  personal,  78;  im- 
manent, 78  ff.,  252  ff.;  Ideal, 
82;  Tendency,  86;  Principle, 
87;  Saviour,  123;  finite,  209  ff., 
218  ff.,  294,  310;  Prime  Mover, 
217;  Progressive  Purpose,  218; 
Infinite,  222  ff.;  Nature,  222; 
Creative  Good  Will,  224,  271, 
302,  310,  315,  330  ff.;  Abso- 
lute Experience,  229 ;  Casuality, 
261 ;  Superpersonal,  287  ff.,  291 
f.;  Personality  of,  289,  293; 
Purposive  Will,  296  ff.,  306, 
311,  329;  Living,  302  ff.;  Pos- 
tulate of  faith,  302  ff. 


INDEX 


S4,l 


God  and  Godhead,  279,  812,  314. 
Good,  The,  162. 
Gordon,  George  A.,  82. 

Hamilton,  Sir  William,  68,  206, 
222,  259  f. 

Hampden,  Bampton  Lecture^  18. 

Happiness,  212  f. 

Harnack,  A.,  18. 

Harris,  Samuel,  104. 

Hartmann,  von,  137. 

Hatch,  E.,  105. 

Hedge,  F.  H.,  105. 

Hegel,  247,  261. 

Henderson,  F.  L.,  133,  138. 

Herrmann,  W.,  219. 

"Hit  or  miss"  method,  146  ff. 

Hocking,  W.  E.,  109,  203,  248. 

Hodge,  C,  103,  288. 

Hodge,  A.  A.,  Hodge,  108. 

Hoeffding,  61,  198. 

Holmes,  O.  W.,  265. 

Holy  Spirit,  81. 

Homer,  323. 

Howe,  Julia  Ward,  186. 

Howison,  J.  H.,  216  f. 

Humanity,  Religion  of,  75,  88. 

Hume,  David,  14,  140,  211;  mir- 
acles, 57;  the  cosmological  ar- 
gument, 98;  the  idea  of  cause, 
100;  the  design  argument,  180; 
evil,  168;  God  as  finite,  211  f. 

Huxley,  85. 

Idea  of  God,  Historical  origin  of, 

16. 
Ideal,  the  moral,  241. 
Immanence  of  God,  76,  78,  262  fF., 

260  flF.,  268. 
Incarnation,  209  f. 
Infinite,  the,  206,  222  ff. 
Inge,  W.  R.,  246  f. 

James,  W.,  62,  69,  111,  198,  222, 

226,  242  f.,  286. 
Janet,  137. 
Jesus,  19,  267,  288,  296;  deity  of, 

20,  81. 
Job,  Book  of,  on  evil,  165. 


Judgments  of  value,  201. 
Justice,  316  ff. 

Kant,  19,  57,  100,  188,  213,  285, 
304;  on  evil,  166  f.;  on  the 
moral  argument,  100;  on  prim- 
acy of  will,  221;  on  God  as 
transcendent,  259. 

Keats,  324. 

King,  Irving,  61,  198. 

Kaftan,  J.,  202. 

Le  Conte,  Joseph,  80,  262. 

Le  Gallienne,  Richard,  87. 

Leibnitz,  14;  on  God  as  Force, 
55  f.,  and  as  Monad,  56,  114, 
246,  285,  298;  on  pre-estab- 
lished harmony,  114,  180,  142, 
246;  on  mechanical  causation, 
180;  on  parallelism,  133;  on 
evil,  166;  on  Pluralism,  221, 
285. 

Limits  of  Evolution,  etc.,  126. 

Limits  of  Religious  Thought,  812. 

Leuba,  J.  H.,  90,  198. 

Lincoln,  A.,  161. 

Logos,  49,  261,  263. 

Lotze,  on  mechanism  and  teleol- 
ogy, 108;  on  the  cosmological, 
teleological,  and  ontological 
arguments,  132,  288  ff. 

Love,  319. 

Lucretius,  131,  157. 

Luther,  54. 

Lyman,  E.  W.,  225. 

Macdonald,  J.  W.,  285  f. 

Macpherson,  J.,  104. 

Mechanism,  44,  47,  129,  182  f., 
135,  202. 

Mansel,  68,  109,  206,  222,  260, 
812. 

Menzes,  230. 

Mercy  816  ff.;  in  Christian  Sci- 
ence, 89. 

Meynell,  Alice,  211. 

Miley,  Professor,  104. 

Mill,  J.  S.,  God  as  finite,  211  f. 

Mind,  87  f.;  and  nature,  106. 


342 


INDEX 


Miracles,  13,  57. 
Mithraism,  43. 
Moody,  Dwight,  128. 
Moral  argument,  The,  101. 
Monotheisi^^302,  305. 
Mysticism,  53,  257  ff. 

Nature,  106,  136. 
Natural  Selection,  127  f. 
Natural  theology,   108,   161,   113, 

137. 
Naturalism,  806. 
Nemesis,  160. 
Neo-Platonism,  25,  48,  215,  219, 

222. 
New  Realism  75,   198;  and  evil, 

77;  and  the  ideal,  77   f.;  and 

value,  76. 
Nicene  idea  of  God,  8,  804. 
Nicaeno  -  Constantinopolitan 

Creed,  1. 

Ontological  argument.  The,  96  ff., 
99,  103  ff.,  107  f.,  191  f.,  205. 

Overstreet,  H.  A.,  on  God  as  the 
developing  spirit  of  society, 
74  f. 

Pacifist,  179  f. 

Paley,  103,  111. 

Panpsychism,  242  f. 

Parallelism,   185. 

Park,  E.  A.,  105. 

Paulsen,  Fr.,  260,  287. 

Perfection,  238  ff. 

Perfect  Being,  239  f. 

Person,  as  applied  to  God,  275  ff. 

Personality,  120;  in  God,  278;  of 

God,  273  ff.;  defined  by  ends, 

297  ff. 
Pfleiderer,  106. 
Philosophy,  Greek,  42. 
"Philosophy  of  the  Conditioned," 

109. 
Philosophy   of   the    Unconscious, 

137. 
Plan  in  the  universe,  147,  151  ff., 

160. 
Plato,  40,  95,  153,  168,  209,  229, 

253;  and  the  New  Realism,  76. 


Plotinus,  313  f. 
Pluralistic  universe,  A,  242  ff. 
Prayer,  91,  267,  322  ff. 
Predestination,  99,  141,  828. 
Pre-established     harmony,      114, 

180,  142,  246. 
Prime  Mover,  96,  217. 
Principle,  87. 
Pringle-Pattison,  212. 
Prophecy,  145  f. 
Psychology  of  religion,  21,  61. 

Rashdall,  H.,  215  f.,  289. 

Rauschenbusch,  Professor,  73. 

Realism,  The  New,  198  f. 

Reality  and  value-judgments, 
200  f. 

Religion,  Psychology  of,  21,  61. 

Renan  E.,  82. 

Revelation,  9,  16. 

Ritschl,  18,  59,  110;  and  value- 
judgments,  201. 

Rolland,  R.,  29. 

Romanticism,  823. 

Rossetti  Christina,  123. 

Royce,  concerning  God  as  the 
Absolute,  226  f.,  229  ff.,  234  f., 
250  f.,  262,  282;  on  evil,  167. 

Sabatier,  A.,  60,  110. 

Salvation,  128,  126. 

Schleiermacher :  God  -  conscious- 
ness of  Jesus,  19;  idea  of  God, 
24,  110,  229,  281,  310;  the  Trin- 
ity, 24,  37;  immanence,  261   f. 

Schopenhauer,  110,  137,  229,  812. 

Scientific  spirit,  5. 

Scriptures,  Changed  view  of,  8. 

Second  causes,  79,  266. 

Self-consciousness,  142  f. 

Semitic  type  of  thought,  88;  idea 
of  God,  18. 

Shedd,  W.  G.  T.,  108,  283. 

St.  Simeon  Stylites,  328. 

Simon,  D.  W.,  on  the  self-limita- 
tion of  God,  208. 

Sin,  319  ff. 

Smith,  H.  B.,  105. 

Snowden,  J.  H.,  266,  274,  279, 
281. 


INDEX 


S43 


Socinians,  The,  19. 

Son  of  God,  207,  257. 

Sophocles,  187. 

Sorley,  W.  R.,  on  Moral  Values 

and  the  Idea  of  God,  212,  240. 
Sorrow,  282  f. 
Spaulding,  E.  G.,  77. 
Spencer  H.,  68,  110,  207,  222,  257, 

262,  814. 
Spinoza,  14,  88,  114,  185,  140,  157, 

222,  229,  246,  261;  on  evil,  166. 
Spirit,  121. 
Spirit,  Holy,  80,  279. 
Static  conception  of  God,  249. 
Stearns,  L.  F.,  266,  274. 
Stoicism,  41  f.,  222,  268. 
Stoics,  158,  210. 
Strauss,  19. 

Strong,  A.  H.,  108,  264. 
Substance,  God  as,  42,  47  f.,  88, 

275,  812. 
Supernatural,  The,  18. 
Suso,  The  Blessed  Henry,  328. 

Taylor,  A.  E.,  246. 

Teleological  argument,  85  f.,  103 

f.,    106    fp.,    127    fF.,    182,    185; 

meaning  of,  189;  tendency  of, 

192. 
Teleology,    189,    202;    in    animal 

and  human  life,  134. 
Tennyson,  42,  162,  264,  820,  386. 
Tertullian,  47  f. 
Theism,  Professor  Flint,  117. 
Theistic  Arguments,  85  f.,  98  flf., 

108  f.,  106  ff.,  112  ff.;  cf.  Kant, 

"Theory  of  Ethics,"  108  f. 
Thomas  Aquinas,  St.,  274. 
Time,  281  f. 


Transcendence,  76,  262  ff.,  268. 

"Trial  and  error,"  148. 

Trinity,  36  f.,  61,  79  f.,  207,  256 

ff.,  275,  277  ff.  281,  284,  812. 
Triunity,  87,  207. 

Values,  22,  125,  168,  167;  and  the 

idea  of  God,  192. 
Value-judgments  110;  as  related 

to  reality,  199,  201  ff. 
"Veiled  Being,  The,"  76,  218. 
Vergil,  823. 
Virtue,  213,  221  ff. 

Watson,  J.,  on  the  Absolute,  226 

ff.,  283. 
Webb,  C.  C.  J.,  on  personality  in 

God  and  of  God,  247  ff. 
Wells,  H.  G.,  29,  70,  285;  on  God 

as  related  to  the  Veiled  Being, 

218,  809. 
Whitman,  Walt,  264  f.,  888  f. 
Whittier,  J.  G.,  821. 
Will,  Purposive,  214. 
Windelband,  210. 
Woods,  R.  A.  on  God  as  cosmic 

spirit,  78  f. 
Wordsworth,  "Ode  to  Duty,"  213, 

264. 
World-view,  7,  116  ff. 
Wright,    H.    W.,   immutable    or 

striving  God,  62. 
War,  The  Great,  34. 
Wormley,  F.  W.,  12. 

Younghusband,  Sir  Francis,  81. 

Zend  Ave^fta,  The,  243. 
Zoroaster,  166. 
Zwingli,  64. 


RF 


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